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Abstract 
During the period 1993-2006 the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) undertook a series of 
measures to deregulate its banking system. Key procedures included the removal of 
restrictions on interest rates, expansion of scope of banks' products and services, lifting 
of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions and the reduction of barriers to entry of 
foreign investors and foreign banks. The main aims of deregulation were to promote a 
diversified, efficient and competitive banking system in order to improve resource 
allocation, financial viability and operational flexibility. 
A data set from the CBJ comprising all the Jordanian banks, covering the time period 
1993-2006 was used to examine whether the efficiency of Jordanian banks has 
improved (or changed) over this time period. To this end, a parametric approach, 
stochastic frontier analysis, (SF A) and a nonparametric approach, data envelopment 
analysis, (DEA) was used to measure the efficiency scores of Jordanian banks over the 
period 1993-2006. 
The main conclusion for this thesis suggests that the level of efficiency scores for the 
Jordanian banks worsened over the period 1993-2006. The average cost efficiency fell 
from around 86% in 1993 to around 79% in 2006. Regarding profit efficiency, average 
efficiency scores fell from around 82% in 1993 to approximately a low of 59% in 2006. 
Linking the deregulation process put in place by the CBJ with the efficiency scores over 
1993-2006, the efficiency scores improved in the period characterised by deregulation 
of the interest rates (i.e. 1993-1996) by about 1% (for SFAcost efficiency) and about 
2% (for SFA profit efficiency). However, the deregulation put in place over 1997-2001 
had negative impacts on Jordanian banks' efficiency scores. The SFA cost efficiency 
scores are reduced on average by 8%, where the SF A profit efficiency scores are 
reduced by about 10%. This period is characterised by deregulation, which increased the 
scope and provision of bank products and services. This stage led to many Jordanian 
banks' becoming more risky, which in turn decreased the efficiency of Jordanian banks. 
However, after the year 2003, there was little improvement in the Jordanian banks' 
efficiency ( as a result of entry of many foreign banks into the Jordanian banking market 
and the CBJ worked from the year 200 I to strengthen its regulation on corporate 
i 
I 
governance and the issues relating to risk management. Additionally, the results 
indicated that: profit inefficiencies appear to be greater than cost inefficiencies; foreign 
banks are more cost efficient than domestic banks; Islamic banks are found to be the 
least cost efficient and; large banks seem to be relatively more cost efficient. 
The implication for government policy is the conventional wisdom that deregulation 
always improves efficiency may be incorrect. Industry conditions prior to deregulation 
and the existence of adequate prudential regulation and supervision procedures from the 
regulatory authority are also crucial for the success of such deregulation measures. 
Keywords: Cost efficiency, Profit efficiency, Stochastic frontier analysis, Data 
envelopment analysis, Jordanian banks, Deregulation. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Developing countries have historically been more controlling of the activities of their 
banks than industrialised countries (Grub en and McComb, 1997). However, the banking 
industries in many developing countries have been experiencing low levels of efficiency 
and subsequently poor performance, mainly due to heavy intervention by govermnent 
(Barth et aI., 2001, 2004; Pasiouras et aI., 2006, 2007). In order to address this 
inefficiency and poor performance, many of. these countries introduced a large 
liberalisation of the banking system in the early 1980s (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). 
An example of a banking system that has been heavily subjected to govermnent 
intervention and restrictions imposed by regulatory authorities is the banking system of 
Jordan. Before the 1990s, the Jordanian banking industry served as an agent of the 
govermnent, channelling investment funds to selected sectors under the country's 
economic development policy, while imposing many requirements and restrictions on 
banks activities. For example, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ): determined lending 
limits for banks; set a ceiling on interest rates for loans and deposits; restricted entry to 
the Jordanian banking market; and imposed a high reserve requirement ratio on banks 
and tight restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. 
In 1989, the Jordanian economy faced a major crisis when the Jordanian Dinar (lOD) 
suffered a major devaluation (i.e. the JOD lost 51 % of its value against the US Dollar), 
total govermnent debt reached 197% of gross domestic product (GDP), foreign currency 
reserves declined sharply, the inflation rate reached 25.6% and the budget deficit, 
excluding grants, reached 24% of GDP (Isik et al., 2004; Alissa, 2007). This crisis 
negatively affected the banking sector in Jordan and led to many problems such as an 
increase in the ratio of non-performing loans, which subsequently led to serious 
consequences for the banking industry. Petra Bank, one of the largest banks in Jordan, 
I 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
collapsed in August 1989 and the government had to move quickly to save its banking 
system. As a result, since 1989 Jordan has been implementing, with the aid of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), a strong stabilisation 
and structural reform programme. The liberalisation of the banking industry in Jordan 
was part of the programme and aimed to improve the structure and efficiency of 
Jordanian banks (Crane et aI., 2003). In the early 1990s and onward, the CBJ undertook 
a senes of measures to liberalise its financial system. Key procedures included a 
removal of restrictions on interest rates, a reduction of lending to government, an 
expansion of product deregulation, removal of restrictions on foreign exchange 
transactions and reduction of barriers to entry of foreign banks into the Jordanian 
market. As in other developing counties, the main aims of the CBJ in this liberalisation 
programme were to promote a diversified, efficient and competitive financial system, 
through measures such as improving resource allocation and financial viability and 
operational flexibility (Crane et aI., 2003; Isik et aI., 2004). The government and the 
CBJ hope that productivity, profitability, lower intermediation costs and enhanced 
customer service would be achieved by the banking sector as a direct result of this 
liberalisation (Toukan, 2002). The emphasis on the liberalisation of the banking system 
in Jordan is due to the fact that in Jordan, as in other developing countries, most of the 
intermediation between savers and borrowers is conducted by banks (lsik et aI., 2004). 
Therefore, it is important to examine whether the efficiency of Jordanian banks has 
actually improved after the implementation of the financial liberalisation programme. 
1.2 Objectives and Motives of Study 
The primary aims of this research. First, to measure cost and profit efficiency of the 
Jordanian banks during 1993-2006, using frontier approaches (i.e. parametric and 
nonparametric). Second, to assess the impact of the financial liberalisation which took 
place in Jordan in the early 1990s on the efficiency level of the Jordanian banking 
sector. Third, to reveal the main determinants of Jordanian banks' efficiency by 
examining bank-specific factors (i.e. level of risks, quality of loans, ownership 
structure, size of bank, specialisation, corporate control and age of banks) and market 
conditions (i.e. concentration, regulations) to see their impact on the level of banks' 
efficiency. 
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Despite the vast literature on efficiency in the United States and European banking 
industry and the rising empirical research in the context of developing countries (for 
example, see Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Goddard et aL, 2001), very few studies have 
been: conducted on the efficiency of the banking industry in Jordan. Two studies tested 
the efficiency level of Jordanian banks (i.e. Al-Jarrah, 2002; Isik et aI., 2004), but It 
should be noted that these two studies do not take into account foreign banks operating 
in Jordan. The exclusion of the foreign banks from the data may have an influence on 
the estimation of the efficient frontier for Jordanian banks. In addition, one study used a 
parametric approach and the other a nonparametric. Therefore this current research is 
important for several reasons. 
First, this study will be the first to (i) examine the impact of deregulation on the 
efficiency of Jordanian banks, (ii) to study the efficiency of foreign banks operating in 
Jordan and (iii) to use parametric and nonparametric approaches to measure cost and 
profit efficiency. Furthermore, this study uses a longer period (1993-2006) that covers 
the pre- and post-deregulation process. This period allows one to see the impact of 
deregulation on the efficiency level of Jordanian banks. 
Second, by investigating efficiency levels in the Jordanian banking industry, an area on 
which there is limited empirical evidence, this study will extend and complement the 
existing international banking efficiency literature, which is currently significantly 
skewed towards developed countries. 
Third, the liberalisation programme adopted by Jordan is aimed at achieving more 
competition and efficiency in the banking sector. Therefore this research may help 
policy makers to assess to what extent their policies have been successful in achieving 
their goals. 
Fourth, recently, the CBJ has been encouraging banks to become larger through mergers 
and acquisitions by means of various incentives (for example, decreasing the reserve 
requirements ratio). In this context, it is important to determine whether or not there is a 
link between bank size and cost and profit efficiency levels. 
Fifth, one of the main objectives of the CBJ is to ensure the safety and soundness of the 
banking system. This study may therefore help the CBJ in its efforts to improve the 
overall performance of the banking sector and identify the causes of inefficiencies. 
Six, it provides a comprehensive overview of the Jordanian banking sector over the 
period 1993-2006. Finally, the study might also highlight some positive determinants of 
3 
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efficiency that could benefit bank owners and managers in improving the level of 
efficiency in their organisations. 
This research therefore seeks to answer the following questions: 
I. Are Jordanian banks inefficient in terms of incurring more costs and generating fewer 
profits? 
2. Has the efficiency of banks in Jordan improved after the implementation of 
liberalisation? 
3. Does the level of equity and non-performing loans within banks have any impact on 
their costs and profits (i.e. increase or decrease costs (profits»? 
4. Is the efficiency offoreign banks lower (higher) than that of domestic banks? 
5. Are the specialised banks (Islamic, investment banks) more (less) efficient than 
commercial banks? 
6. Are big banks (i.e. in terms of asset size) more (less) efficient than small banks? 
7. Are old banks (i.e. in terms of date of foundation) more (less) efficient than new 
banks? 
8. Is the efficiency of banks that designate the same person to occupy the role of 
chairman of the board and chief executive officer lower (higher) than that of banks that 
separate the positions? 
9. Is efficiency enhanced in more a competitive market structure? 
1.3 Research Methods 
To answer the above questions, the present study uses frontier approaches to measure 
the efficiency of Jordanian banks. As outlined in Chapter 2, various parametric and 
nonparametric approaches have been used in the empirical literature to measure of the 
bank efficiency. Following the studies reviewed in Chapter 3, Chapter 5 uses a 
parametric stochastic frontier approach (SF A) and nonparametric data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) to calculate the efficiency of banks in Jordan. As this study aims to 
4 
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investigate the impact of liberalisation on the efficiency levels of Jordanian banks, as 
well as factors that may explain variations in the efficiency of banks over time, it 
employs the so-called one-stage analysis developed by Battese and Coelli (1995). In 
one-stage analysis, a set of control and environmental variables accounting for bank-
specific factors (e.g. bank size, ownership structure, level of risk) and market condition 
(e.g. concentration, regulations) are included directly in the model to estimate the 
efficiency level of Jordanian banks. The failure to include bank-specific variables and 
market condition in the first stage leads to a biased estimation of the parameters of the 
cost frontier and to biased predictors of cost efficiency (Coelli et aI., 1999). Moreover, 
this study uses contemporary literatures by estimating different models and statistical 
testing (i.e. log ratio test) to choose the best model that will be used to estimate 
efficiency scores for Jordanian banks. The issues of one-stage analysis and the 
estimation of different models will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. To check the 
robustness of the results derived from SF A and DEA, this study follows the 
recommendation of Bauer et al. (1998) to test the consistency between efficiency scores 
derived from SFA and DEA. 
1.4 Data 
As reviewed in Chapters 3 and 5, the frontier approaches require data on inputs and 
outputs of banks. The data used in this study are obtained from the CBJ database and 
cover the period 1993-2006. The data comprise all the banks (domestic and foreign) 
operating within Jordan and cover the period both before and after the liberalisation 
process: this allows us to test the impact of liberalisation on the Jordanian banks' 
efficiency. 
1.5 The Outline of the Study 
The current study is structured as: 
Chapter 2: Productive Efficiency: Theory and Measurement 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework related to the efficiency concept and 
draws attention to the difference between optimal and relative efficiency. This chapter 
reviews the traditional neo-classical theory of the firm that views the firm as a rational 
entity seeking to maximise profit. This theory ignores the internal structure of the firm 
5 
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and tries to explain how the market works rather than to understand the functioning of 
the firm itself. This theory also ignores the possibility of the internal inefficiency of the 
firm. Alternative theories and approaches such as X-efficiency, managerial discretion 
theory, principal agent theory and behavioural model are thell. briefly discussed. These 
theories focus on the internal structures of the firm and aim to explain why some firms 
may not operate efficiently. Moreover, this chapter introduces frontier efficiency as a 
tool used to measure efficiency within the context of economic theory, which is focused 
on the production activity as an optimisation process. This chapter reviews the main 
types of efficiency concepts in the economic theory (i.e. technical, allocative and 
economic efficiency). Parametric and nonparametric frontier approaches are also 
reviewed as these approaches enable one to measure the efficiency of a firm relative to 
other firms in the same industry. 
Chapter 3: Efficiency in the Banking Industry: Empirical Evidence 
This chapter draws attention to the importance of the banking system in the process of 
economic development and growth, and that a more efficient banking system is more 
qualified to lead the economic growth and development. This chapter outlines different 
arguments about whether the 'regulated' or 'market-based' banking system performs 
better and then promotes development and economic growth. The advantages of using 
frontier analysis within the banking industry as a measure of performance based in 
economic theory rather than using simple ratio analysis is discussed in this chapter. 
Since frontier analysis requires identifying banks' inputs and outputs, different 
approaches to specifying them are reviewed. Finally, the empirical literature on the 
efficiency of banks on different areas such as the impact of deregulation on banks' 
efficiency in different countries and different time periods is reviewed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4: Jordanian Banking Industry 1993-2006 
This chapter presents a brief historical overview of the banking system in Jordan. It 
highlights the main measures put in place to deregulate it. The structure of the Jordanian 
banks' balance sheet and income statement is reviewed for the period 1993-2006 to 
show how the deregulation measures affected it. Moreover, this chapter shows the 
performance of the Jordanian banks based on financial ratio analysis and outlines the 
development of competition in the Jordanian banking market. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology and Data 
The chapter outlines the stochastic frontier approach (SF A) and data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) as frontier approaches used to measure efficiency levels of Jordanian 
banks. The variables to be used in this study are then described. This chapter also 
presents the model specification that involves estimating many models with different 
combinations of variables and the structural test employed to obtain the preferred model 
to measure efficiency levels for Jordanian banks. According to the preferred model, 
three distinct economic efficiency concepts (cost, standard profit and alternative profit 
efficiencies) are estimated to a single data set. 
Chapter 6: Analysis and Discussion. 
This chapter presents the preferred cost/profit model(s) obtained and the hypotheses (e.g. 
foreign ownership vs. domestic ownership) tested, using the preferred model(s). The 
efficiency scores over the period 1993-2006, from the preferred model(s) are estimated 
and analysed to see if and how the efficiency scores have changed over time. This gives 
an indication of the extent to which the steps taken by the CBJ have affected positively 
or negatively the banks' efficiency level. This chapter shows the robustness test for 
efficiency scores obtained from DEA and SFA by applying Bauer et al. (1998) criteria. 
This chapter draws attention to the difference between more and less efficient banks in 
terms of some indicators such as ownership structure, specialisation, bank size, non-
performing loan level and capital adequacy ratio, return on equity, return on assets and 
cost income ratio. Finally, this chapter reports scale efficiency and technological change 
for Jordanian banks during 1993-2006. 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
This chapter summarises and concludes. The main findings of the present study are 
outlined. Some policy implications are discussed. The limitations of the study and 
future research are also highlighted. 
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Chapter 2 Productive Efficiency: Theory and Measurement 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical framework related to productive 
efficiency and frontier efficiency. The chapter also seeks to explain different approaches 
that can be used to measure a firm's efficiency. Section 2.2 presents a basic description 
of the concept of productive efficiency and draws attention to the difference between 
optimal and relative efficiency. Also, this section highlights the fact that neoclassical 
theory views the firm as a unified rational economic agent and profit maximisation is 
the only determinant of a firm's behaviour. This theory seeks to explain the way the 
market works, rather than to understand the internal efficiency of the firm and the 
function of the firm itself. In addition, the section shows how the market structure may 
affect the internal efficiency of the firm. It also reviews alternative theories which focus 
on the internal structures of the firm, and aims to explain why some firms may not 
operate efficiently by not seeking profit maximisation or cost minimisation behaviour. 
Section 2.3 introduces frontier efficiency as a tool used to measure efficiency within the 
context of economic theory which is focused on production activity as an optimisation 
process, using maximum production, minimum cost and maximum profit as tools. 
Moreover, this section reviews the main types of efficiency concepts in economic 
theory, namely technical, allocative, cost, profit, scale and scope efficiency. These 
concepts (except scope efficiency) will be referred to later in the empirical chapter of 
the thesis where efficiency levels in the banking sector of Jordan are analysed. Section 
2.4 describes the main approaches (i.e. parametric and nonparametric) used to measure 
the main types of efficiency. The focus have is mainly on cost and profit efficiency as 
this methodology will be used later to estimate efficiency levels in the Jordanian 
banking industry. Also, this section shows the main differences between the two 
approaches used to measure firm's efficiency. Finally, section 2.5 presents a discussion 
on different functional forms used in the estimating cost and profit functions. 
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2.2 Internal Productive Efficiency and the Theory of the Firm 
One of the key objectives of any economic system is ensuring efficiency in production 
(Lovell, 1993). The concept of efficiency refers to the use of limited resources in the 
best possible way to produce a maximum level of output. Baumol and BIinder (1982) 
defined efficiency in general as the absence of waste in the resources. Traditionally, 
economists have focused on the macro dimensions of efficiency (i.e. allocative 
efficiency). This is in terms of how market economies allocate scarce resources 
efficiently by using the price mechanism l . Goddard et al. (2001) defined allocative 
efficiency" as the production of goods and services most valued by society to meet 
consumers' needs in the best possible way. In contrast, practitioners and managers focus 
on the internal efficiency of a firm in terms of its production (i.e. the micro dimensions 
of efficiency). That is, they are more concerned with how firms transform resources into 
various outputs. Efficiency indicates that resources are not wasted and a firm is 
producing the maximum feasible level of output from these resources and using less 
costly combinations of such resources to produce a particular mix of products or 
services (Wheelock and Wilson, 1995). 
Efficiency is recognised in the relevant literature as being achieved in two ways. Pareto-
Koopmans3 efficiency (optimality) is achieved when full (100%) efficiency reached by 
a firm, in inputs or outputs, can not be improved without worsening some of its other 
inputs or outputs (Thanassoulis, 2001; Ray, 2004). This optimal efficiency is an 
absolute term, but in most management and social science applications/research how to 
achieve such levels of efficiency, is not known (Cooper et aI., 2007). Therefore, 
reference to such levels of efficiency in the literature on firm efficiency is replaced by 
1 The price mechanism is a system of determination of prices and resource allocation and it operates in a 
competitive market where forces of demand and supply guide prices. Both producers and consumers base 
their respective production and consumption plans on the prevailing market price. When consumers pay a 
price for a commodity, they motivate the producer of that commodity and hence more of the same is 
rroduced and vice versa (Baumol and Blinder, 1982). 
In the context of this research, allocative efficiency will refer to how frrms use the right mix of 
input/output combinations relative to their prices rather than the allocation of resources by market forces 
using the price mechanism 
3 Vilfredo Pareto was concerned with welfare economics for customers; he formulated the so-called 
Pareto condition of welfare maximisation by noting that such a function could not be at a maximum if it 
was possible to increase one of its components without worsening other components of such a vector-
valued function. TjaIling Koopmans adopted these concepts to production by referring that it was possible 
to increase any output without worsening some other output (Cooper et aI., 2007). Their approaches were 
conceptual. N() empirical application is reported before the appearance of Farrell's (1957) work, which 
showed how their approach could be applied to data to arrive at relative efficiency evaluation. 
9 
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that of relative efficiency, in accordance with the available data and information on the 
performance of firms (banks). Relative efficiency (100% efficiency on the basis of 
comparison with available evidence on the performance of other firms) is achieved 
when the performance of other firms does not show that some of its inputs or outputs 
can be improved without worsening some of its other inputs or outputs (Zhu, 2002). 
Hence this second level of efficiency is considered as relative, rather than absolute, as it 
measures the performance of a firm relative to the best performance of other firms in a 
similar industry (i.e. a benchmark for performance). 
Given that relative efficiency of a firm is a measure of its performance compared to that 
of the best in the industry, such a measurement of efficiency has implications for public 
policy and managerial performance, in terms of understanding how to achieve best 
practice. The principal objective of measuring the efficiency of a firm is to explore 
hypotheses concerning the sources of inefficiency or productivity differentials among 
other firms in the same industry (Lovell, 1993). Identifying sources of inefficiency in 
the performance of firms would help policy makers to design appropriate policies to 
improve performance (Lovel!, 1993). Moreover, the performance of an economy 
depends on the performance of micro economic units, such as firms, in the sense that 
the enhancement of the efficiency of firms will contribute positively to enhance and 
enduring economic growth (Lovell, 1993). 
Cummins and Weiss (1998), and Fried et al. (2007) argued that, in many cases, the 
measurement of firms' efficiency is a useful way to quantify performance differentials 
predicted qualitatively by economic theory. For instance, how a firm performs and 
conducts its business is influenced in the structure of the market in which it operates 
(Goddard et aI., 2001). There is a common belief that in a competitive market, 
efficiency in terms of productivity is a key to survival, while it is not in a non-
competitive market (Lovell, 1993). Thus, the measurement of relative efficiency would 
help policy makers in deciding what type of market structure, in terms of cost and 
availability of services, might best serve the public (Molyneux et aI., 1996). For 
example, if the market is characterised by a high degree of concentration (dominated by 
few firms/institutions) and a large number of inefficient firms, this might indicate to 
policy makers the need to reduce entry barriers to that market, in order to foster 
competition that would alleviate such concentration. 
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At the managerial level, identifying best and worst practices (i.e. best and ~orst 
performing firms) is a useful tool to improve management practice and performance. 
Management practices found to be relatively efficient may be identified as best 
practices, to be adopted. In addition, managers can adjust their policies and procedures 
to avoid worst practices that are relatively inefficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
Furthermore, owners and managers may pay particular attention to the negative and 
positive determinants of efficiency by enhancing the positive determinants and avoiding 
or eliminating the negative determinants. 
2.2.1 Economic Theory and Efficiency 
The concept of productivity efficiency flows directly from the microeconomic theory of 
the firm and the production function is the most basic of such a concept (Cummins and 
Weiss, 1998). The production function lies at the heart of the theory of the firm. 
Broadly speaking, production is a series of activities by which inputs (resources) are 
transformed through various processes into output (goods or services). In other words, 
the production function is defined by efficient transformation possibilities depending on 
the available technology (Ganley and Cubbin, 1992; Cummins and Weiss, 1998). The 
production function represents the boundaries at which the firm reaches its technical 
production capabilities (Cohen and Cyert, 1975). If a firm is not operating at its 
production function capabilities, then it can not produce maximum output. The 
relationship between input-output, which underlines the production function, is viewed 
as a purely technical relationship. That is, the production function represents the 
maximum rate of output that can be produce with given inputs and technology. This 
relationship can be expressed as follows: 
(2.1) 
where y represents output, Xm (m = 1, 2, ... ,M) is a vector of inputs and f(.) is a 
functional form. Despite the economic theory's usually having little or nothing to say 
about the functional relationship in 2.1, it assumes the functional form of the relation 
between output and inputs should satisfy many properties (Sauer et aI., 2006). These are 
sununarised by CoeIli et al. (2005, p. 12) as follows: 
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1. Non-negativity: this means the value of f(x) is a finite, real and non-negative 
number. 
2. Weak essentiality: this means the production of positive output is impossible 
without the use of at least one input. The function curve begins at origin because 
x is an essential element in the production process, so if x ~ 0 then y = O. 
3. Non-decreasing in x: this means additional units of an input will not decrease 
output. Thus, if X2 2: XI then f(X2) 2: f(xl)' This property implies that all marginal 
products of input are non-negative. 
4. Concave in x, (the law of diminishing marginal productivity): this implies that 
the relationship between x and y is not linear. The law of diminishing marginal 
productivity4 represents that as the amount of variable input (x) is increased by 
equal increments, a point will be reached where the increase in the output 
quantity will get smaller and smaller. In other words, as more variable input is 
added, the shape of the production function will begin to concave towards the x-
axis. 
Duality theory5 establishes the relationships among production function, cost function 
and profit function (CoeIli et al., 2005). It is underlined by achieving minimum 
. production cost (minimum input cost) and maximum profit function. When data on 
prices for inputs and outputs are available and a firm is operating in a competitive 
market and its aims are to achieve cost minimisation or/and profit maximisation, then it 
is possible for a firm to decide on the best mix of inputs or/and outputs meeting such 
aims. The cost function is the one that can be interpreted as being derived from 
minimising cost subject to the constraint of a reasonable production technology. The 
cost function can be expressed as follows: 
(2.2) 
4 Marginal product of inputs can be defmed as ratio of variation in maximum possible output to variation 
in quantity of one input, by holding all other inputs' quantities constant. Mathematically, this procedure 
represents the partial derivative of the production function (y) with respect to one variable of inputs (Xl)' 
ay/ 
In symbols, /a Xl . 
'Generally speaking, duality theory is a mathematical technique concerned with translating concepts, 
theorems or mathematical structures into other concepts, theorems or structures, in one-to-one fashion 
(Sydsaeter and Hammond, 1995). 
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where TC variable total costs, Wn (n=I,2, ... ,N) represents a vector of input prices and 
Yk (k=1,2, ... ,K) represents the given level of outputs. Like the production function, the 
cost function should satisfy many properties, summarised by Coelli et al. (2005, p. 23) 
as follows: 
l. Non-negativity: this implies that the costs can never be negative. 
2. Non-decreasing in w: this implies an increase in input prices will not decrease 
costs. 
3. Non-decreasing in y: this implies it costs more to produce more output. 
4. Homogeneity: this implies the proportionate increase in inputs prices has 
resulted in the same proportionate increase in the variable costs. 
Similarly, the profit function can be interpreted as the result of maximising profit 
subject to the constraint of reasonable production technology. The profit function can be 
expressed as follows: 
NP = f (wn, Pr) (2.3) 
where NP is the net profit, (which is revenue minus cost), Pr (r=1,2, ... ,R) is a vector of 
output prices and wn is a vector of input prices. As with the cost function, the profit 
function should satisfy many properties which are a generalisation of cost properties. 
Some of the properties of the cost and profit functions will be referred to in the analysis 
and discussion chapter where we analyse the estimated cost and profit functions. 
2.2.2 Competitive Model and Efficiency 
As shown earlier, the production/cost/profit functions represent relationships between 
the factors of production (i.e. inputs) and corresponding outputs. These relationships 
aimed at optimisation behaviour are based on producing the maximum output that can 
be obtained from any given input (or alternatively, the minimum cost required to 
produce any given output) (Stevenson, 1980). The neoclassical theory 6 which is 
characterised by a perfect model, assumes that profit maximisation is the only 
determinant of a firm's behaviour (Cyert and Hedrick, 1972). The theoretical framework 
of perfect competition is based on reaching a long-run equilibrium position (Baumol 
• Campus (1987) defined neoclassical economics as a general approach in economics focusing on the 
determinants of prices, output, and income distribution in markets through supply and demand. 
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and Blinder, 1982). Under perfect competition, no one firm can influence prices and all 
players in the market (buyers and sellers) have perfect knowledge about all products and 
their prices (Goddard et aI., 2000). 
The main characteristics of a market under perfect competition are: 
1. A large number of firms in the market so that no single firm is able to 
exercise any significant influence on prices and all firms produce 
homogeneous products. 
2. All firms and buyers have a perfect knowledge of prices set by all firms and 
all firms face horizontal demand curve. 
3. The production technology is available to all firms in the market and the 
availability of resources in market is not restricted. 
4. There are no entry or exit barriers in the market. 
Goddard et al. (2001) pointed out that if all the above conditions are satisfied, then there 
exists a competitive equilibrium in which all firms earn normal profit, the minimum 
profit necessary to attract and retain firms in business. Under the perfect competition 
model, the behavioural assumption ofa firm is to maximise profit (Goddard et aI., 2001; 
Zamagni, 1987). The firm can maximise its profit in the long run by determining the 
optimal mix of inputs by equating the marginal product (MP) and marginal cost (MC) 
and output is determined when marginal revenue (MR)7 equals marginal cost (MC) (Le. 
where the revenue raised from selling an extra unit is equal to the cost of producing that 
extra unit). At the point where MR=MC, the firm is considered to have allocative and 
productive efficiency (Griffiths and Stuart, 2001). The allocative efficiency occurs 
because the price is equal to marginal cost, at which point the good is available to the 
consumer at the lowest possible price. Productive efficiency is achieved because the 
producer is minimising the cost of production by producing at the minimum point on its 
average cost curve (Griffith and Stuart, 2001). Since the information in the market is 
available to all producers and there are no transaction costs associated with the re-
allocation of inputs, firms can achieve the optimal allocation of their resources to 
produce the maximum level of output. For the neoclassical theory, a firm must operate 
7 Under perfect competitive model, the marginal revenue of a firm is equal to the price and the firm can 
sell as much as it wants at the going market price, which implies that the firm is facing a horizontal 
demand curve. The reason behind that is that the size of the firm is very small relative to the market and 
does not have any effect on the price (price takers). 
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efficiently as the capital markets will penalise inefficient firms by depressing thier share 
prices and SUbjecting them to takeover, or to drive out of the market by efficient firm. 
Also, Machlup (1967) argued that there is no scope for slack (e.g. waste resources) if a 
firm operates in a perfectly competitive market since a firm that does not minimise cost 
will eventually be driven out of the market. Additionally, some authors such as Vives 
(2001) argued that competition enhances productive efficiency by reduction of slack 
management; the pressure of the competitive market gives managers the incentives to 
perform and provides information to design appropriate incentive schemes that could 
prevent the firm from liquidation or being driven out of the market. Thus, efficiency in 
the competitive model is solely a function of the market (Cyert and George, 1969). 
However, the literature on firm efficiency suggests that firms can not always operate 
efficiently, as assumed by the neoclassical theory, due to many factors (discussed later 
in this chapter). Rather, the literature also shows that firms can still continue to work in 
the market, despite being inefficient. The view of the firm in the neoclassical theory as a . 
rational economy entity and must be operated efficiently is not always the case 
(Machlup, 1967). In addition, Williamson (1975) argues that the notion of optimality in 
the neoclassical theory is arbitrary, since it is based on the absence oftransaction costs 
(e.g. the cost of acquiring information) and the rationality of the producer. However, in 
reality, transaction costs are an integral part of the production process, while decision 
making can be irrational and imperfect, underlined by the failure to consider all 
available options and compare them to each other. Machlup (1967) points out that 
neoclassical theory seeks to explain the way the market works, rather than to understand 
the function of firms themselves. 
2.2.3 Market Imperfections 
As discussed earlier, the competitive model assumes that there are a large number of 
firms in the market so that no single firm is able to exercise any significant influence on 
prices and all firms produce homogeneous products. Rather, in reality, some industries 
are dominated by a few large firms that may have control over prices charged and 
therefore can eam abnormal profits. Thus the neoclassical theory has been made to take 
into account different market structures that may result in some firms operating 
inefficiently. When the market is not perfectly competitive, then the market structure is 
imperfectly competitive and the degree of imperfect competition is dependent on the 
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number of the firms operating in market. The extreme case of imperfect competition is 
monopoly, which was formulated by Sraffa (1926). Monopoly exists in a market for two 
basic reasons: (1) barriers to entry: exclusive knowledge of a given productive 
technique, owning the resource of production and patents and legal restrictions imposed 
by government to protect a specific sector from competition; (2) cost advantages of 
large-scale operations (Baumol and Blinder, 1982). Thus a competitive mechanism is 
blocked under a monopolist market. Like any other firms, the monopolist maximises its 
profit by setting marginal revenue (MR) equal to marginal cost (MC). However, 
because the monopoly firm faces a downward sloping demand curve, this means that 
the MR of the monopolist is less than the demand curve (average revenue or price), the 
monopolist can maximise profits when the price exceeds marginal costs and the firm 
can make super-normal profits. The ability of the monopolist to set higher prices is 
because the absence of barriers to entry can result in a restriction of output relative to 
the competitive level and thereby a misallocation of resources (Berger and Hannan, 
1998; Baumol and Blinder, 1982). 
Early economic theory had only two workable models of the behaviour of firms: the 
perfectly competitive and the monopoly models. These two models are very theoretical 
and could not represent all the types of market structure that existed between the 
perfectly competitive model and the monopoly model. The work of Chamberlin and 
Robinson (1930) filled this gap by introducing other types of market structures, namely 
monopolistic competition and oligopoly (Baumol and Blinder, 1982; Goddard et al., 
2001). Monopolistic competition has many characteristics similar to the competitive 
model (e.g. all firms and buyers have a perfect knowledge of prices set by all firms) 
except that the firms produce heterogeneous products, whereas the firms under perfect 
competition produce homogeneous products. Thus, since firms in monopolistic 
competition are able to differentiate their products, a certain freedom exists in fixing the 
selling price for products they offer and they face a downward sloping demand curve. 
The other kind of market structure introduced by Chamberlin and Robinson IS 
oligopoly. An oligopolistic market is characterised by a few firms which supply the 
market and realise that they are interdependent in their pricing and output decisions 
(Livesey, 1998). An oligopoly differs from perfect competition because each firm in an 
oligopoly has to take into account its interdependence. Analysing resource allocation 
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under oligopoly is not a simple task because of the interdependent nature of the 
oligopolistic decision (Baumol and Blinder, 1982). For example, if one firm announces 
a price change, competitors take quick notice and change their price. Consequently, 
competition is highly personalised, with each firm recognising that its own best course 
of action depends on the strategies of its competitors (Thompson, 1989). A change in 
output by one firm will alter the profits of competitor firms and cause them to adjust 
their output (Goddard et al., 2001). Competition under oligopoly ranges from vigorous 
price competition, which can lead to substantial losses, to implicit or explicit forms of 
collusion (Goddard et al., 2001). In the case of implicit and explicit collusion, firms in 
an oligopolistic industry may try to be like a monopoly by restricting industry output 
and raising prices in order to earn abnormal profit. Thus, firms in an oligopoly industry 
could exercise market power by setting their price above marginal cost and producing 
less output (Livesey, 1998). That is, the firms are not efficient in the allocation of 
resource. 
The above discussion shows that four basic (theoretical) market structures are described 
by neoclassical economic theory: perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic 
competition and oligopoly. These four structures define the number and the size 
distribution of the firms, the type of product produced, the extent of control over prices 
by firms, and the ease with which firms can enter or exit markets (Goddard et aI., 2001). 
Additionally, Berger and Hannan (1998) stated: 
"Market structure may influence efficiency for one of several reasons. First, if high levels 
of market concentration allow firms to charge prices in excess of competiave levels, then 
managers may take part of the benefits of the higher prices not as higher profits, but in the 
form of a "quiet /ife''', in which they don't work as hard to keep costs under control. The 
difference between the actual price and the competitive price may provide a "cushion" or 
comfort zone. In the absence of other disciplining mechanism, managers may allow unit 
cost to rise to consume part of this cushion and still allow owners to earn economic rents 
without the foil effort of cost minimisation. Second, market power may allow managers to 
pursue objectives other than firm profits or managerial leisure. Third, the price cushion 
provided by market power may simply allow inefficient managers or practices to persist 
'The Quiet Life Hypothesis was developed by Hicks (\935). This hypothesis assumes that a fIrm with 
greater market power will be more risk averse, and that it will be able to achieve some combination of 
both higher return and lower risk than fIrms possessing lesser power in the market. Berger and Hannan 
(1998) provided a test of the quiet life hypothesis in US banking and found that the concentrated market 
exhibited relatively low cost effiCiency 
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without any intention to pursue goals other than maximising firm value. The lack of market 
discipline in concentrated markets may simply blunt the economic signals that would 
normally force changes in management to keep costs low, leaving managers in a position 
for which they do not have comparative advantages. Thus. market power may allow 
managerial incompetence to persist without any wilful shirking of work effort, pursuit of 
other goals, or efforts to defend or obtain market power" (PA55). 
That is, if the market is characterised by high concentration which allows firms to 
charge prices in excess of the competitive price, managers of firms will benefit from 
such high prices by not operating efficiently and being interested in a quiet life, in 
which they do not work hard to keep costs under control9 (Berger and Hannan, 1998) . 
. 2.2.4 Why Some Firms may not Operating Efficiently? 
The neoclassical theory of the firm seeks to explain how the market works (i.e. the firm 
is a mere production function converting inputs to outputs), rather than to understand 
the functioning of firms themselves or their internal structure (Machlup, 1967). 
Although the neoclassical theory takes into account various market structures, it still 
assumes that the decision making process within the firm is rational and aiming to 
maximise profit. The neoclassical theory is challenged by alternative theories and 
hypotheses, such as X -efficiency hypothesis (Leibenstein, 1966), managerial discretion 
theory (Williamson, 1964), principal agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
behavioural theory (Simon, 1955; Cyert and March, 1964). These theories focus on the 
internal structures of the firm and aim to explain the factors that could make some firms 
operate inefficiently by not seeking profit maximisation or cost minimisation behaviour. 
9 Traditionally, public policy has been concerned with the concentration in a specific industry and has 
focused on the social loss associated with the exercise of market power at a high level of concentration 
(Berger and Hannan, 1998). The setting of the price in the concentrated market above the price level in 
the competitive market brings about a restriction on output level. The social loss associated with this 
misallocation is called deadweight loss. The deadweight loss represents the differences between the loss 
in consumer surplus and the gain in producer surplus associated with monopoly pricing (Berger and 
Hannan, 1998). Empirical studies have found the social loss associated with exercising market power is 
trivial. For example, Harberger (1954) reported that the elimination of monopoly resource misallocation 
in manufacturing during the period 1924·1928 would have increased social welfare by less than 0.1% of 
gross national product (GNP). Also, Rhoades (1982) reported that the deadweight welfare loss due to 
monopoly in the U.S banking market is very small. For more studies measuring deadweight welfare loss, 
see Leibenstein (1966). In the context of this research the concern will be on the impact of concentration 
on the internal efficiency of banks. 
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1. X-Efficiency 
The terminology of X-efficiency was developed by Leibenstein (1966) to describe why 
economic agents may not achieve maximal efficiency in their productive decisions and 
behaviour (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992). He named it 'X' to emphasise that the 
precise nature of inefficiency is not known (Frantz, 1992). Within his X-efficiency 
hypothesis, Leibenstein (1966) stated that the basic decision-makers in firms are 
individuals who, through their. efforts and choices determine cost of production. The 
utilisation of the resources depends basically on the level of effort of individuals within 
the firm. The variation of this level of effort depends on many factors, such as internal 
(e.g. pressure from managers on individuals) and external (e.g. pressure due to 
increasing competition). Leibenstein (1966, 1975, and 1979) argued that the 
neoclassical theory of the firm, which views firms as a production function, did not 
explain why firms do not operate efficiently. Leibenstein (1966) focused on the 
following sources of inefficiency. First, inadequate motivation stemming from a 
weakness of competitive pressure. That is, the lack of competitive pressure may lead a 
firm to neglect minimising unit cost of production, due to having a great amount of 
wasteful expenditure, such as maintenance of excess capacity and luxurious executive 
benefits. Second, the X-efficiency hypothesis assumes that employee contracts are 
incomplete in that pay in an employment contract is clearly determined, how much 
effort an employee exerts is not. Because of this incomplete contract, workers have 
freedom over how much effort they put into their work (Frantz, 1992). The X-efficiency 
hypothesis views the individual as the basic unit in the firm, rather than the firm that is a 
unified entity striving to maximise profit. Third, the agency problem, which refers to the 
conflict of interest between agents (managers) and principals (owners). Fourth, 
asymmetric information which assumes that at least one party to a transaction has 
relevant information that is not available to others. The X-efficiency theory hypothesis, 
states that: 
"Neither individuals nor firms work as hard, nor do they search for information as 
effectively as they could . .. (Leibenstein, J 966, p. 407). 
The degree of X-inefficiency, as described by Leibenstien (1975), is equal to the 
difference between maximal effectiveness of utilisation of inputs and actual utilisation 
of inputs. 
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2. Managerial Discretion Theory 
Williamson (1964) suggested that as a result of the separation of management and 
ownership and a lack of competition, managers would seek to pursue their own self-
interest. Although managers do aim to maximise profits, Williamson (1964) assumed 
that managers controlling the firms are in a position to divert profits from the owmers 
for their benefits indirectly. Managers cannot cut into profits after the fact, that is, after 
they have been declared (Leibenstein, 1966). But they can lower profits by increasing 
expenses. Thus, Williamson (1964) implicitly assumes there exist expenses which are 
for the benefit of managers (e.g. lavish furniture, excess staff expenditures) (Co hen and 
Cyert, 1975). If the top management is able to achieve an acceptable level of profit and 
show a reasonable rate of growth over time and sufficient dividends are paid to the 
stockholders to make them satisfied, then the managers can guarantee keeping their 
power and control over the firm. The expenses' preferences hypothesis, stemming from 
managerial discretion theory, can be defined as the satisfaction accruing to managers 
from their discretion in matters relating to expenditure (Zamagni, 1987). The expenses' 
preferences hypothesis1o (slack management) views the firm as maximising utility 
through the chasing of non-profit maximisation behaviour. Under this hypothesis, 
managers seek to increase staff expenditures and managerial compensations 
(Williamson, 1964). 
3. Principal Agent Theory 
Another problem stemming from the separation between management and ownership is 
the principal-agent problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship 
as a contract between the principal (owner) and the agent (manager). According to the 
contract, a principal appoints another person (agent) to perform some services on behalf 
of the owner, which involves delegating some of the owner's authority to a manager. If 
an agent is a utility maximiser, there is good reason to assume the agent will not always 
act to maximise profits as the principal might wish; rather, the manager will seek to 
maximise hislher utility. However, the principal can limit the aspiration of the manager 
by establishing an incentives system for the agent that could reduce the managers' 
10 Edward (1977) and Hannan and Mavings (1980) investigated the expenses preferences hypothesis in 
the banking industry. They found that wages and salary expenditures in banking increase with monopoly 
and oligopoly power. Also, their results showed that the banking market industry is dominated by market 
imperfection (monopoly and oligopoly). Both authors indicated that an expenses preferences hypothesis is 
the appropriate model to describe and predict bank behaviour rather than the profit maximising model. 
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aspirations. Also, the principal may incur monitoring costs (i.e. internal and external 
auditing systems reporting directly to the owner) to limit the activities of the manager 
which are not consistent with the principal's goals. The costs generated from the owner 
to limit the agent's aspirations are called agency costs, which include excessive 
operating costs and lost revenues. These costs could provide an explanation for the 
differences in the performance of firms operating under different ownership types 
(Cummins et aI., 2004). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the principal-agent problem 
would be a noticeable problem in the firm unless there is a system of compensation 
packages or external corporate control mechanisms that could align the objectives of the 
managers and shareholders. Under the principal-agent regime, the managers are likely 
to be increasing their perquisites or pursuing non-optimal growth strategies to maximise 
their utilities. The separation of the management decision from the control decision 
could help to alleviate the agency problem (Fama and Jensen 1983). Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) of the firms are usually endowed with the most power in the decision 
management process, in the sense they are highly engaged in the preparation of the 
investment projects and their follow-up implementation (Pi and Timme, 1993; Isik et 
aI., 2003). Whereas the Board of Directors, led by the chairman, is generally endowed 
with the most decision control, in the sense that the chainnan and board typically 
approve policies which define criteria and terms for investment decisions that will 
emanate from the CEO. However, when the CEO is also the chainnan of the board, 
principal-agent conflicts may be increased as a result of the concentration of decision 
making and control in one person (Isik et aI., 2003). The ownership/management 
relationship is an important element in the operation of finns. The motivation and goals 
of finns' management and stockholders may be a major detenninant of the finn's 
efficiency and perfonnance and such factors may differ widely from one firm to another 
(Spong et aI., 1995).1l 
4. Behavioural Model 
An understanding of the internal structure of the firm and the process of decision taking 
within it may help to explain why finns are not operating to maximise profits. The 
II The relationships between ownership structure and flnn efficiency have been analysed in the banking 
industry by several authors, for example see Pi and Timme (1993); Isik and Hassan (2003); Berger and 
Hannan (1998) ; Spong et al. (1995); Glaasman and Rhodes (1980). Most of these studies reported a 
negative relationship between the level of bank efficiency when the CEO and the chairman are the same 
person. 
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behavioural approach was developed and analysed by Simon (I955) and Cyert and 
March (1963). It aims to explain how decisions are taken within the firm. The 
behavioural approach examines the effects of variables internal to the firm on price and 
output decisions (e.g. goals of different parties). The traditional theory, however, 
ignores the internal structure of the firm and assumes that market factors dominate in 
relation to price and output decisions (Cohen and Cyert, 1975). Simon (1955) suggests a 
theory of human choice and decision making and concentrates on the decision-making 
process mechanism within each firm. Simon proposes that the process could be 
contradicted by rational aspects of choice that have been the principal concern of 
economists. Cyert and March (J963) view the firm as a coalition of various groups 
(managers, workers and stockholders, clients, suppliers, banks and government) which 
are linked to the firm's activities in different ways. Each group in this coalition has its 
own objectives. For example, workers want high wages, good working conditions and 
good pension rights; managers want high salaries and more power and prestige 
(Zamagni, 1987). 
As discussed earlier, the neoclassical theory of the firm views firms as having only one 
objective, which is profit maximisation, whereas behavioural theory views them as a 
coalition of many parties with conflicting objectives. Therefore, the behavioural theory 
emphasises the formation of the goals of the firm through a bargaining process among 
the various parties of the coalition. Thus, in contrast to the neoclassical approach, the 
firm under the behavioural theory has more than one objective. Cohen and Cyert (1975) 
stated that setting many conflicting objectives for the firm could bias its decision 
regarding cost and revenues estimation. 
Finally, it is worth referring to the work of Alchian and Demsetz (I972) who suggest 
that the essence of the firm is that it permits people to work as a team. They propose 
that in a firm a failure to reward without regard to the productive effort of individuals 
will distort the incentives to engage in any productive effort. Thus, according to Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972), the firm is required to measure input productivity and rewards. If a 
firm measures poorly, then productivity will be smaller. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
argued that under the neoclassical theory of the firm the inputs are allocated without 
cost, because they are allocated according to their marginal productivity. For Alchian 
and Demsetz, the firm therefore is an entity which brings together a team which is more 
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productive working together than at arm's length through the market because of 
informational problems associated with monitoring of effort. In effect, therefore, this is 
a 'principal-agent' theory since it is asymmetric information within the firm which 
Alchian and Demsetz emphasise must be overcome. 
To sum up, the neoclassical theory of the firm views the firm as a rational entity that is a 
mere production function converting inputs to outputs and failed to explain why firms 
are not operating efficiently. To overcome this, new theories focused on the internal 
structures of the firm and aimed to explain the factors that make some firms unable to 
operate efficiently, by not seeking profit maximisation or cost minimisation behaviour. 
The new theories are considering the firm as a nexus of contracts among various 
'opportunistic' individuals who may not be 'rational' utility maximisers. The ability of 
firms to transform inputs into outputs in these theories is a function of internal specific 
variables (e.g. risk attitude, ownership structure, corporate control) andlor external 
factors (e.g. market conditions, government regulations). 
In the context of this research, the market structure, managerial discretion, principal-
agent and behavioural theories can be analysed from many perspectives in relation to 
Jordanian banks' efficiency level. First, in Jordan, an oligopolistic market structure 
reflects reality better than perfect competition and prices for deposits and loans for both 
banks and individual customers are more likely to be endogenously rather than 
exogenously determined (Isik et aI., 2004). This means that banks in Jordan are 
operating in a concentrated market. The literature suggests that higher concentration is 
significantly associated with market power and that enables banks to set higher loan 
rates and pay lower deposit interest rates (Berger, 1995; Berger and Hannan, 1998; 
Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Also the literature and evidence suggest that banks 
working in a concentrated market are less efficient than those operating in a competitive 
market (Berger and Hanna, 1998). 
Second, the ownership structure of Jordanian banks mainly consists of local and 
foreign banks. The variation in the ownership structure could play a vital role in 
determining the efficiency level of Jordanian banks. Moreover, there are three different 
groups of banks operating in Jordan: commercial, investment and Islamic banks. These 
different groups of banks could play a crucial part in explaining cross-sectional 
variations in bank efficiency. 
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Third, the CEO and the chairman are the same person in most Jordanian banks. Thus, 
the designation of the same person in two positions may have a negative impact on the 
efficiency level of the banks. 
Finally, the banking culture In Jordan is one that is heavily reliant on ties and 
relationships (i.e. services are obtained quickly according to the degree of influence one 
has among staff (e.g. a friend! relative). For example, a decision on making of loans is 
influenced by the close relationship/ family ties between the lender and the manager. 
However, such relationships/ways of doing business have led to the problems of bad 
loans. Bad loans in the bank could be a result of wrong decisions taken by the bank's 
management and reflect bad managerial practice/ behaviour. Based on the above, the 
level of bad 10ans12 could play a vital role in explaining the differences in efficiency 
among Jordanian banks. 
2.3 Frontier Efficiency as Measure for Performance 
In section 2.2, it was shown that the economic theory focuses on production activity as 
an optimisation process. Theoretical production analysis has always focused on 
production activity as an optimisation process (Fare et aI., 1994). Maximum production, 
minimum cost and maximum profit are tools presented as a solution to the optimisation 
process (Lovell, 1993). Also, the previous section suggests that the traditional theory of 
the firm does not explain why firms are not operating efficiently. Also, we reviewed 
some theories that aimed to explain this. However, to determine whether the firm is 
efficient or inefficient, an empirical analysis is needed to compare between the actual 
operations of the firm and some best practice. In this section, we introduce frontier 
analysis as a tool to evaluate the efficiency of firms. The contemporary empirical 
literature on the measurement of efficiency builds on the work of Farrell (1957). The 
following sections will discuss Farrell's ideas that formulated a basis for efficiency 
measurement within economic theory that focuses on production activity as an 
optimisation process. 
The early empirical literature is based on the estimation of production, cost and profit 
functions using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions (Lovell, 1993). The function 
12 Berger and De Young (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1994) reported that level of problems loans and 
level of efficiency are negatively related. 
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estimated by OLS represents the line that intersects through data and estimates average 
performance. The resulting average function which represents the intersecting data with 
a function rather than surrounding data with a frontier is used as a measure of 
performance (Lovell, 1993). Ganley and Cubbin (1992) stated: 
"The resulting average function is a misleading indicator of efficient production 
possibilities in both theory and practice. In practice, an average performance standard will 
tend to institutionalise inefficiency. This can occur because in reducing, what appears to be 
attainable, an average standard acts as a disincentive to further improvement in 
performance. " They add that "An average production jitnction is inconsistent with the 
theoretical notion of a boundary function which reflects maximising behaviour" (page 9). 
Given that the estimation of the production/cost/profit functions using OLS as a 
performance measure is not consistent with the theoretical notion of the optimisation 
process, the focus has turned to envelop the data by using production frontier (e.g. 
Aignar and Chu,1968; Afriat,1972; Riclunond,1974). Thus the frontier methodology has 
become the function of analysis and interest in surrounding data has been replaced with 
the practice of intersecting data (Fried et aI., 2007; Fare et aI., 1994; Lovell, 1993). 
Frontier and efficiency measurements started with the work of Farrell (1957) who 
introduced the first empirical treatment of the production function as a production 
frontier. He provided a measure of a firm's efficiency that could account for multiple 
inputs within the context of technical and allocative efficiency. The frontier efficiency 
considers efficiency as a relative, rather than as an absolute, and is concerned with 
comparing observed and optimal values of inputs (cost) and outputs (profit)(Coelli et aI., 
2005). 
Aignar and Chu (1968) asserted that the production frontier is appropriate for 
ascertaining the maximum production capacity for a firm. That is, the main focus of the 
production frontier is to allow the maximurn output that is technologically feasible to be 
attained. Under the production frontier approach, a firm's performance is measured 
relative to the best in the industry (Coelli et aI., 2005). That is, the production frontier 
for all firms in the same industry is plotted and if a firm's actual production point lies on 
the production frontier, then the firm is considered efficient. However, if this production 
point lies below the frontier, then the firm is regarded as inefficient (Coelli et aI., 2005). 
Equivalent interpretations hold for cost and profit functions for given input and output 
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prices, which should be interpreted as a frontier function (Ganley and Cubbin, 1982). 
The measure of inefficiency is calculated by the distance from the point at which a firm 
lies below or above its production, profit and cost frontiers (Forsund et aI., 1980). 
2.3.1 Farrell's (1957) Efficiency (fechnical and Allocative Efficiency) 
FarrelI (1957) suggested that the productivity efficiency of any given firm can be 
measured through technical and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency(TE) refers to 
the ability of the firm to avoid waste by producing as much output as input usage allows 
or using minimum inputs as output production allows (Lovell, 1993). Thus, the analysis 
of TE can have an output or an input orientation. Evanoff (1998) refers to technical 
inefficiencies as the underutilisation or mismanagement of inputs, resulting directly 
from using excess inputs to produce a given level of outputs. He also stated that 
technical inefficiency can be attributed to weak competitive forces that allow inefficient 
firms to stay in the market. 
However, when input and output prices are known and the aim of a firm is to minimise 
cost or maximise profit, then it is possible to select the optimal combination from inputs 
or outputs, to achieve such an aim. This optimal mix is known as allocative efficiency 
(AE)13 (Farrell, 1957). Lovell (1993) defined AE as the ability of a firm to combine 
inputs and outputs in an optimal proportion, in the light of prevailing prices. As with TE, 
AE can be analysed from the perspective of input or output orientation (Lovell, 1993). 
Input-orientated alIocative efficiency refers to the ability of a firm to select the right mix 
of inputs (Le. achieve cost minimisation) in the light of prevailing prices to produce a 
given bundle of output. Output-orientated allocative efficiency refers to the ability of a 
firm to produce the right mix of output (i.e. achieve maximised revenue). 
Farrell (1957) introduced measures of technical and allocative efficiency as the ratio of 
potential and actual performance based on the production frontier. A score of unity (i.e. 
actual equals predicted potential) refers to technically efficient, because no 
equiproportionate input reduction is possible. A score less than unity refers to technical 
inefficiency (Lovell, 1993). 
" Farren used the term price efficiency instead of alIocative efficiency. 
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1. Input - Orientated: Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
Figure 2.1 illustrates Farrell's measurement of input- orientated technical and allocative 
efficiency, using an example of finns using two inputs (Xl and X2) to produce a single 
output (Y), assuming constant returns to scale and a given level of technology. 
Figure 2.1 Technical and Allocative Efficiency (input-orientated) 
X2 
S 
~----------~~~~Xl 
o 
A 
Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p. 52) 
The isoquant curve14 S S represents all the possible combinations of two inputs that 
can produce a given level of output. All the finns in the industry that produce to this 
given isoquant S S are technically efficient, where TE of the finn is the ratio of 
potential utilisation of inputs to the actual input consumption. Finns operating on the 
isoquant are considered technically efficient and those operating above it are regarded 
as technically inefficient. For example in Figure 2.1, if a firm is producing at point P the 
TE for this firm is equal to the ratio OQ/OP (potential factual), which equals less than 
unity. Thus, this firm is technically inefficient and the distance QP represents the 
amount of proportional inputs that could be reduced without a reduction in output. 
Mathematically, TE is equal to: 
TE=OQfOP (2.4) 
where OQ represents the potential inputs used to produce a given output and OP the 
actual consumption of inputs to produce the same quantity of output that could be 
produced using less input. 
14 Assuming the unit isoquant of fully efficient firms is known and this isoquant represents the optimal 
utilisation of inputs. It should be noted that the efficient unit of isoquant is not known in practice and thus 
must be estimated from observation ofa sample of firms in the industry concerned. 
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TE in equation 2.4 takes a value between 0 and I, where 1 represents the optimal 
utilisation of inputs. 
However, the concept of TE does not consider the prices of inputs and therefore does 
not consider whether firms in the industry are allocating their inputs according to their 
prices in the optimal proportion. Farrell therefore included an allocative efficiency (AB) 
ratio in his frontier framework. Using Figure 2.1, with the assumption that the prices of 
inputs are known and there is a competitive market for the purchase of these factor 
inputs (one of the assumptions of the model of perfect competition being that the 
production technology is available to all firms in the industry and the availability of 
resources is not restricted), the relative factor prices are incorporated into the isocost 
line A A which represents a combination of inputs which all cost the same. Therefore, 
as with TE, a score of unity refers to AE and a score less than unity measures the 
severity of allocative inefficiency. For example, at point Q in Figure 2.1, the AE of the 
firm is equal to the ratio of ORlOQ, which is less than unity. Although point Q is 
located on the isoquant, which means that this firm is technically efficient, it is not 
allocative1y efficient and the distance RQ represents the potential reduction in the 
production costs. Mathematically, AE is given by: 
AE=ORlOQ (2.5) 
where AE is allocative efficiency. 
The point of tangency between the isoquant and isocost curves represents the minimum 
cost of producing a given output. Thus point Q (Figure 2.1) represents the point where 
the firm is allocatively and technically efficient. Point Q is also the combination that 
Bauer et al. (1998) called economic efficiency. To be economically efficient, a firm has 
to choose its inputs and mixes according to their prices so as to optimise an economic 
goal, usually cost minimisation. In the case of input-orientation, given the measure of 
technical and allocative efficiency, the total overall cost efficiency (CE) can be 
presented as a product of technical and allocative efficiency measures (CoelIi et al., 
2005): 
CE =TE x AE = (OQ/OP) x (ORlOQ) (2.6) 
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where CE is cost efficiency, TE is technical efficiency and AE is allocative efficiency. 
2. Output-Orientation: Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
The above discussion presented technical and allocative efficiency from the cost 
minimisation perspective, by addressing the question "How much can input quantities 
be proportionally reduced without changing the quantities of output produced?". Or, 
"What is the optimal mix of inputs according to their prices that can be chosen to 
produce a given output with lower cost?" (Coelli et aI., 2005). One can also look at 
technical and allocative efficiency from the revenue maximisation perspective by 
addressing the question "How much can output quantities be expanded without 
changing the quantities of input?" (Coelli et al., 2005). 
To address the latter question, output-orientation measures for technical and allocative 
efficiency, as shown in Figure 2.2, can be used. Figure 2.2 illustrates Farrell's 
measurement of output-orientated technical and allocative efficiency, using an example 
of finns with one input (Xl) to produce two outputs (YI, Y2), assuming constant 
returns to scale and a given technology. 
Figure 2.2 Technical and Allocative Efficiency (output-orientated) 
Y2 
C 
o YI 
z 
Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p.55) 
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The production possibility curve 15 (Z Z ) represents all the ways of producing two 
outputs using a given level of input. Thus, moving along the production possibility 
curve (Z Z ) represents the technically efficient output combinations and any 
combination of the two outputs below the production possibility curve reflects a 
technical inefficient condition of production. The TE of the firm is the ratio of actual 
outputs produced to potential output. Thus point A in Figure 2.2 corresponds to an 
inefficient firm and the technical efficiency of the firm is equal to OA/OB (actual / 
potential) which is less than unity. The distance AB represents the amount by which the 
two outputs can be proportionally expanded without affecting the level of input. 
Mathematically, output TE is given by: 
TE=OA/OB (2.7) 
where OA represents actual production and OB represents potential production. 
TE in equation 2.7 can take a value between 0 and 1, where 1 represents the optimal 
outputs firm can attain for a given level of inputs. 
The concept TE does not consider the prices of outputs and therefore does not consider 
whether firms in the industry are allocating their outputs according to their prices in the 
optimal proportion. Farrell therefore included an AE ratio in his frontier framework. AE 
from an output perspective involves selecting the mix of outputs that maximise revenue 
with a given quantity of inputs. The isorevenue line (D D) in Figure 2.2 represents a 
line depicting all combinations of two products that will generate a given, or same, level 
of total revenue. At a point such as B in Figure 2.2, the AE of this firm is equal to the 
ratio of OB/OC, which equals less than unity. Although point B is located on the 
production possibility curve which means that this firm is technically efficient but is not 
allocatively efficient. The distance BC represents the increase in the revenue that a firm 
could earn if it moved from point B to B. Mathematically, AE from an output 
perspective is given by: 
IS A production possibility curve is a graph showing the different quantities of two goods that a firm 
could efficiently produce with minimum productive resources. 
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AE=OBIBC (2.8) 
where AE is allocative efficiency. 
The point of tangency between the production possibility curve and the isorevenue 
curve represents the maximum revenue the firm can earn. Thus point B represents the 
point where the firm is both allocatively and technically efficient. As in input-
orientation, economic efficiency is a combination of technical and allocative efficiency 
as at point B. To be economically efficient, a firm has to choose output levels and mixes 
so as to optimise an economic goal, usually revenue maximisation. In the case of output 
orientation, the total revenue efficiency (RE) can be presented as a product of technical 
and allocative efficiency measures (Coelli et ai., 2005): 
RE= TExAE = (OAlOB) x (OB/OC) (2.9) 
where RE is revenue efficiency. 
2.3.2 Scale Efficiency 
Section 2.3.1, discussed a firm's efficiency relating to the production technology 
frontier and at a given quantity of inputs and outputs and their prices. The firm may be 
described as efficient in terms of technical, allocative and economic efficiency, but the 
scale of its operation may still not be the optimal (Coelli et al., 2005). Economies of 
scale refers to the rate at which output changes, as all factor quantities are varied, and it 
measures whether firms with similar production and managerial technologies are 
operating at optimal economy of scale (Molyneux et al., 1996). An economy of scale is 
measured by the ratio of the proportionate change in output to a given proportionate 
change in all inputs/ average cost (Goddard et ai., 2001). Economies of scale can be 
defined in terms of either the production function or the corresponding cost function. 
There are three situations describing the relationship between the change in 
input/average cost unit and the change in output: 
1. If the proportional change in output is more than the proportional change in the 
input/average unit cost, a firm is said to be operating at increasing returns to 
scale. 
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2. If the proportional change in output is equal to the proportional change in the 
input/average unit cost, a finn is said to be operating at constant returns to scale. 
3. When the proportional change in output is less than the proportional change in 
input/average unit cost, a finn is said to be operating at decreasing returns to 
scale. 
Figure 2.3 shows the relationships between economy of scale and the shape of the long 
average cost curve. As the figure shows, a finn can minimise its production cost by 
producing at the constant returns to scale. Since raising the proportional change in 
output is equal to the proportional change in the input (average unit cost), a finn is said 
to be operating at constant returns to scale. 
Figure 2.3 Economies of Scale and Shape of Average Cost 
verage Cost 
Rising average cost (diseconomies of scale) 
U shaped cost curve 
Constant average cost 
Declining average cost (economies of scale) 
Output (y) 
Source: Sinkey (1992, p.306) 
Akhavein et al. (1997) highlighted that scale efficiencies can improve cost and profit 
efficiency in many situations. First, scale efficiency can increase profit as the unit 
average cost of production falls with increased size. In other words, it can improve cost 
efficiency by reducing costs per unit of output for a given set of output quantities and 
input prices. Second, it may increase profits through improvements in profit efficiency 
involving superior combinations of inputs and outputs resulting from large size. Also, 
De Young (1997) argued that moving closer to the best practice cost frontier is not the 
only way that finns can improve their cost inefficiencies. The reduction in per unit 
average cost can be achieved by glowing larger to capture economies of scale through 
cost savings from spreading costs over large amounts of output. 
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As mentioned before, the firm may be described as efficient in terms of technical and 
allocative (i.e. economically efficient) but the scale of its operation may not be optimal. 
The firm can improve its cost and profit efficiency by producing at constant returns to 
scale. Figure 2.4 represents this by assuming that firms are using one input (X) to 
produce one output (Y). In the figure firms, A, B, and C are technically efficient 
because they are all operating on the production frontier. However, these three firms are 
technically efficient but the productivity of each is different due to the effects of scale. 
Firm A is operating in the increasing returns to scale, so it could become more efficient 
by increasing its operation to point B, where the proportional increase in the output is 
more than the proportional increase in the input /average cost, which means that the 
firm can produce more output with lower average cost. The firm at point C is operating 
in the decreasing returns to scale portion of the production frontier; it could become 
more productive by decreasing its scale of operation to point B. When this firm 
decreases its operation to point B, the proportional decrease in output will be less than 
the proportional decrease in the input/average cost, which means that the reduction in 
input (average cost) will be more than the reduction in output. Finally, the firm at point 
B is technically and scale efficient and is said to be operating at the most productive 
scale size. Visually, this is the point on the production frontier at which a ray from the 
origin is tangential to the production frontier (i.e. the proportional change in output is 
equal to the proportional change in the input/average cost because the angle of ray from 
the origin equals 45°). 
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Figure 2.4 Effects of Scale on Productivity 
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Coelli et al. (2005) show that the scale economies for a single product firm can be 
measured as the ratio of technical efficiency of constant returns to scale to the technical 
efficiency of variable returns to scale. That is, 
SE = TEcRs / TEvRs (2.10) 
where SE is scale economy. TEcRs is technical efficiency under constant returns to scale, 
TEVRs is technical efficiency under variable returns to scale. 
Therefore when SE 2: 1, SE = 1, SE :s 1, we are experiencing increasing, constant or 
decreasing returns to scale, respectively. 
2.3.3 Scope Efficiency 
Another source of cost saving a firm can realise is economies of scope (ES). Economies 
of scope arise if two or more products can be jointly produced at a lower cost than that 
incurred in their independent production (Molyneux et aI., 1996). For instance, if we 
have two outputs YI and Y2 and their separate cost function are TC (YI) and TC (n). If 
the joint cost of producing the two outputs is expressed by TC (YI. Y2), then the 
economies of scope are presented if the cost of producing YI, and Y2 jointly is less than 
producing Yh and Y2, separately. Mathematically, an economy of scope is given by: 
34 
Chapter 2 Productive Efficiency: Theory and Measurement 
ES= [TC (Yl) + TC (yz) - TC (Yl, yZ») / TC (Yl, YZ) (2.11 ) 
If the value of equation 2.11 is greater than zero, economy of scope is present. 
Practically, the estimation of economy of scope in the banking industry is not an easy 
task. Unlike with manufacturing firms, banks' outputs cannot be measured by physical 
quantities. A bank is an entity engaged in the intermediation of services between lenders 
and depositors. Banks provide a wide array of services such as low-risk assets, credit 
and payment services and running of investment portfolios (Molyneux et al., 1996). 
Berger et al. (1993) mentioned that the major problem in estimating economy of scope 
in the banking industry is the lack of cost data for each output. In the context of this 
research, economy of scope will not be estimated for Jordanian banks because there is 
no information about cost for each bank's output. The total cost reported in banks' 
financial statements is related to all banks' output and it is difficult to separate cost for 
each output. 
2.4 Measurement Approaches 
As discussed earlier, frontier efficiency considers efficiency as relative rather than 
absolute and is concerned with comparing potential and actual performance (Lovell, 
1993). Also, the previous section introduced Farrell's (1957) notion regarding 
measuring efficiency using a frontier approach. Since the true frontier is unknown, an 
empirical approximation is needed and this is called "best practice" (Fried et aI., 2007). 
In estimating the efficiency frontier, accounting measures such as costs, inputs, outputs, 
revenue, profit, etc, are used to impute efficiency relative to the best practice based on 
the available data (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Two approaches have been used in the 
literature for frontier estimation: parametric and nonparametric. These two approaches 
attempt to benchmark the relative performance of production units by estimating the 
best-practice frontier, but they differ in terms of the underlying assumptions. For 
example, Berger and Humphrey (1997) identify the following differences between the 
two approaches: 
1. In terms of the functional form of the best-practice frontier, the parametric 
approach imposes a restrictive structure on the specification of the best 
practice frontier, whilst the nonparametric approach imposes relatively little 
structure. 
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2. In terms of the assumptions about random noise, the parametric approach 
assumes that a part of the deviation from the best practice frontier is due to 
(random error) and the remaining part of this deviation is due to managerial 
errors (inefficiency). However, the nonparametric approach assumes that 
deviation from the best practice frontier is wholly due to managerial errors 
(inefficiency). In other words, there is no random error in this approach. 
2.4.1 Nonparametric Frontier Approaches 
The nonparametric approach pioneered by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) is a 
linear programming technique which employs mathematical programming methods to 
construct production frontier to measure efficiency relative to that frontier. Thus, this 
approach depends on the envelopment of a data set by not allowing for random error 
(Lovell, 1993). Also, this approach assumes that all firms share a common technology 
and therefore face common production and cost frontiers: any variation in the firms' 
performance is therefore related to variations in their efficiencies and relative to these 
common frontiers. The nonparametric approach includes the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) and the free disposal hull (FDH). 
1. Data Envelopment Analysis Approach (DEA) 
DEA is a nonparametric approach that uses a linear programming method to construct a 
piece-wise surface (or frontier) over the data. This approach was first proposed by 
Farrell (1957), and received wider attention 20 years later, when Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) reformulated Farrell's idea into a mathematical programming method 
able to deal with many inputs and outputs (Casu and Moleneux, 2003). Their idea was 
built on the construction of a piece-wise combination yielding a convex production 
possibility set that enveloped all firms in the sample. Figure 2.5 illustrates the idea of 
the DEA frontier, with five firms using two inputs to produce one output: the ratio of 
input (Xl/OUtput y) for each finn is plotted on the horizontal axis and the ratio of input 
(X2/0Utput y) on the vertical axis. As shown in Figure 2.5, finns A, B and C define the 
efficient frontier because they are using the least input combinations to produce a fixed 
amount of outputs: the line connecting A, B and C represents the efficient frontier 
which is enveloping all the data. Firms D and E are considered inefficient. 
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Figure 2.5 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Illustration 
x,fy 
A 
Efficient 
Frontier 
B 
D • 
E* 
C 
The efficiency of each firm within the sample is then calculated relative to the surface 
(i.e. frontier) (Coelli et al., 2005) and the calculated scores are defined as either the 
percentage reduction in the use of all inputs that can be achieved without a reduction in 
output or the percentage expansion in the output that can be achieved without expansion 
in inputs. DEA is nonparametric, in the sense that it simply constructs the frontier of 
observed input-output ratios through linear programming (Lovell, 1993). Under DEA, 
no explicit relationships exist between inputs and outputs: production, cost and profit 
functions are not estimated through the data (i.e. no algebraic relationships between 
inputs and outputs) (Ray, 2004). This approach shows how a particular firm operates in 
relation to other firms within the sample and so provides a benchmark for best practice 
within the industry. Accordingly, the DEA efficiency scores are not defined by an 
absolute term but are relative to other firms within the specific data set under 
consideration (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). 
The original model of DEA, proposed by Charnes et aJ. (1978) is based on an 
assumption of constant returns to scale, although this assumption is not appropriate 
when firms exhibit economies or diseconomies of scale due to some factors such as 
market imperfection. Later developments to the DEA model considered alternative 
assumptions, such as variable returns to scale, introduced by Banker, Charnes and 
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Cooper (1984). Finally, it is worth noting that the basic DEA model has been further 
extended to involve new concepts such as cost and profit efficiency, new cost and 
efficiency, non-discretionary variables, the treatment of slack and congestion efficiency, 
weights restrictions, efficiency and super efficiency16. Recent research regarding some 
extensions of the basic DEA model (such as cost efficiency, profit efficiency, new cost 
efficiency and new profit efficiency) will be used in this study and will be discussed in 
more detail in the methodology chapter. 
2. Free Disposal Hull Approach 
The Free Disposal Hull approach (FDH), developed by Deprins et al. (1984), is a 
, 
special case of DEA. With FDH, the convexity of the production possibility set is 
abandoned and the set is composed only of DE A vertices and the FDH points interior to 
these vertices (Tulkens, 1993). Figure 2.6 illustrates the concept of FDH. Here, the 
efficient frontier is constructed from the actual observed measurements. Points such 
as R, for example, are not allowed because they are derived and not an actually 
observed performance. The point P in Figure 2.6 represents an inefficient firm and this 
firm should be compared with actual observations such as B or C where, under DEA, 
point P may be compared with the derived (hypothetical) point R . In other words, FDH 
is concerned with evaluation of a firm's efficiency with regard to the actual observed 
observations, while DEA allows measuring of the efficiency with regard to the frontier 
(i.e. projection point). 
16 For more details ofthe extension of the basic DEA model, see Cooper et al. (2007). 
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Figure 2.6 Free Disposal Hull (FDH) Illustration 
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The main drawback of this approach is that it can not be used to measure cost and profit 
efficiency and is used to measure just technical efficiency (Cooper et al., 2007). 
2.4.2 Parametric Frontier Approaches 
The parametric approach is an econometric technique that has been used in many 
studies to estimate a bank's (firm's) cost and profit efficiency. This approach requires 
the selection of economic concepts (i.e. profit function or cost function), a pre-specified 
functional form for the relationship between inputs and an output (e.g. translog 
functional form) and a distribution assumption for the error term of the estimated 
frontier (Bauer et aI., 1998). The parametric approach consists of deterministic and 
stochastic frontiers. 
1. Deterministic Frontier Models 
The earliest models within the parametric frontier are usually referred to as 
deterministic frontiers because these models specify a one-sided error term (i.e. only 
representing the inefficiency component and did not allow random error-term (Kuenzle, 
2005). The deterministic frontiers are based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation and include Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) and Modified 
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Ordinary Least Square (MOLS). Deterministic frontier models are estimated by OLS 
and the residual (i.e. error term) of the OLS is used to estimate the inefficiency. In the 
case of a cost frontier, the model can be written as: 
InTC; = f (Wn;,ykb P;) + In S; (2.12) 
where, InTC; is the logarithm of costs of the i-th firm, wn; is the vector of prices of 
variable inputs of the i-th firm, Yk; is the vector of output levels of the i-th firm, Pi 
represents the set of parameters to be estimated and S; is the error term representing the 
bank's cost/profit inefficiency, assumed to be non-negative and greater than zero. The 
value of the error term (s;) in equation 2.12 indicates the level of inefficiency: if S; is 
equal to zero, there is no inefficiency; if S; is more than zero, inefficiency is present. 
This model assumes that the error term is non-negative and being a one-sided error term 
represents the inefficiency component. As mentioned earlier, the estimation of 
production/cost/profit functions, using OLS as a performance measure, is not consistent 
with the theoretical notion of the optimisation process: the focus has instead turned to 
enveloping the data through the use of a cost frontier. Winsten (1957), in his discussion 
of Farrell's original paper, suggested that equation 2.12 could be estimated in such a 
way that it is consistent with the notion of the optimisation process (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). Winsten (1957) suggested that equation 2.12 should be estimated by OLS 
and shifting the intercept down (in the case of the cost frontier l7 ) by the highest 
residuals (i.e. error), in order to ensure that the estimated frontier bounds the data from 
the bottom (in the case of cost frontierl8). Shifting the intercept down by the highest 
residuals makes sure that the firm with the lowest cost is used as a benchmark to 
evaluate other firms. This model is called Corrected OLS (COLS). 
Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974) showed that COLS is vulnerable to outliers because 
the intercept is shifted by the highest residuals. They proposed a slightly different 
version of COLS, known as Modified Ordinary Least Square (MOLS). They suggested 
that equation 2.12 could be estimated by OLS, under the assumption that the residuals 
(Le. s;) follow an explicit one-sided distribution, such as half-normal (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). The assumed shape of the distribution motivated by the larger degree of 
inefficiency is less probable than smaller degrees of inefficiency and, as in the COLS 
17 In the case of the production and profit frontier, the intercept is shifted up. 
18 In the case of production and profit frontiers, the estimated frontier bounds the data from the top. 
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model, the OLS intercept is shifted downwards but by means of the assumed one-sided 
distribution (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). However, there is no guarantee that COLS 
shifts the intercept down by enough to ensure that all firms are bounded from the 
bottom (Lovell, 1993). However, the main drawback of frontiers estimated by COLS 
and MOLS is that they do not take into account the random error and still assume that 
all deviation from the frontier is caused by inefficiency (Coelli et al., 2005). 
2. Stochastic Frontier Models 
The second class of frontier models is called stochastic frontier models. These models 
allow for a composite error term, which consist of an inefficiency component and 
random noise (random shocks outside the control of the producer) (Berger and 
Humpbrey, 1997). There are three classes of stochastic frontiers models: stochastic 
frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier approach (TFA) and the distributional free 
approach (DFA). 
a- Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
To overcome the drawback of the deterministic frontier, Aigner, Lovel and Schmidt 
(1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) independently proposed the first 
stochastic frontier model. This model allows for the error term to consist of an 
inefficiency component and a random error (Berger and Humpbrey, 1997). The 
stochastic frontier for cost minimisation can be given as: 
InTCi = f (Wni,yki, ~i) + In Ei (2.13) 
The error term Ei in equation 2.13 now is equal to 
Vi+Ui for cost frontier (2.14) 
Vi - Ui for profit frontier (2.15) 
Vi is a random error component that permits random variation of the frontier across 
banks and captures the effects of measurement errors, other statistical noise and random 
shocks outside the bank's control. This error is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed normal random variables with zero mean and variance (i. Ui, is a 
non-negative and one-sided error component. That follows a half-normal distribution 
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capturing the effects of inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier. The SF A specifies 
a functional form for the cost and profit function and permits a composed error term (Si). 
The inefficiency (Ui) is measured by separating the inefficiency component from the 
overall error term (Si) (Cummins and Zi, 1998) and the estimated inefficiency for any. 
firm is taken as the conditional mean or mode of the distribution ofthe inefficiency term, 
given the residual, which is an estimate of the composed error (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997; Bauer et aI., 1998). The SFA can be employed within a single cross-section or 
panel datal9. 
b. Thick Frontier Approach (TFA). 
The SF A requires restrictive assumptions about the error term (i.e. the distribution of Ui 
and Vi) to estimate cost and profit efficiency. Berger and Humphrey (1991, 1992) 
developed the thick frontier approach (TFA) in order to avoid the restrictive 
assumptions about the error term and this can be employed within a single cross-section 
or panel data (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). As with SF A, TF A requires a functional 
form for the cost and profit function and involves dividing the firms in the sample into 
four quartiles, based on total cost per unit of assets20 (Mester, 1996). The firms are then 
placed in the top and bottom quartiles according to their average costs (i.e. total costs to 
total assets). Firms in the bottom quartile are presumed to be relatively cost efficient as 
a group and they define a thick frontier. Firms in the top quartile are presumed to be 
cost inefficient in relation to the thick frontier (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The cost 
functions for firms in the top and bottom quartiles are estimated and the deviation in 
predicted costs between the highest and lowest quartiles represents inefficiencies 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Bauer et al., 1998) and the variation of the residuals 
within each quartile is assumed to reflect the random error. Thus the error term (s) in 
the estimated functions is assumed to represent only the random error. The main 
shortcoming of the TF A is that it does not provide exact point estimates of efficiency 
for each firm. Rather, TF A provides an estimate of the general level of overall 
efficiency through measuring the difference between the best and worst quartiles. 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) argued that the IF A is likely to be useless to 
management and of limited value to policy-makers because it provides only one 
19 Cross- section data are observations on each producer for one period, whereas panel data usually 
contains more repeated observations for each producer over a period of time. 
20 This is done by dividing total costs for each bank by its total assets. 
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efficiency score for a group of banks (i.e. firms in the top quartile) and ignores the data 
of banks in the second and third quartiles. Due to this shortcoming, the TFA is rarely 
used in empirical studies. 
c. Distribution Free Approach (DFA) 
The DFA was introduced by Berger in 1993 and uses only panel data for estimation (i.e. 
repeated observation of each bank over a period oftime) (Kumbhaker and LoveIl, 2000). 
As with SFA and TFA, the DFA specifies a functional form for the cost and profit 
function. However, the DFA does not impose a specific shape on the distribution of 
inefficiency (SFA does). Berger (1993) assumes that there is a core efficiency or 
average efficiency (Ui) for each firm that is constant over time, while the random error 
(Vi) tends to average out over time (Bauer et aI., 1998). In other words, Berger (1993) 
assumes that inefficient firms remain inefficient over time and the effects of the random 
error tend to equal zero as the time increases. To estimate the cost or profit inefficiency 
(Ui) for firms, many years of observations should be avaiIable21 • The DF A is estimated 
by the following equation: 
InTCit = f (Wnit,ykib ~i) + In Cit (2.16) 
where InTCit is the logarithm of costs of i-th firm at time t, Wnit is the vector of prices of 
variable inputs of the i-th firm at time t, Ynit is the vector of output levels of the i-th firm 
at time t, ~i represents the set of parameters to be estimated and Bit is the error term of 
the i-th firm at time 1. DFA estimates a cost/profit function for each period for all firms 
and an average of residuals is calculated for each firm over all periods. This estimated 
average is transformed into a measure of inefficiency by comparing the average of 
residuals for each bank with the smallest residuals within the sample (AlIen and Rai, 
1996). The main disadvantage of DFA is the requirement that cost efficiency is time 
invariant22; this assumption becomes less tenable as time increases, as it is possible that 
some firms were inefficient and became efficient as time increased (Kumbhaker and 
Lovel!, 2000). 
2t Berger (1993) suggests that five years' observation is typically appropriate for using DF A. 
22 This model assumes that the structure of production technology is constant through time; that is, no 
allowance is made for technical change (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) 
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Because of drawbacks ofTFA and DFA, this research, the SFA will be used to estimate 
cost and profit efficiency for Jordanian banks and the SF A methodology will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
2.4.3 Is there a Best Frontier Approach? 
As discussed above, there are two approaches for measuring firms' (banks') efficiency: 
parametric and nonparametric. Despite the extensive use of both of these approaches, 
there is no agreement between researchers regarding which approach produces a better 
estimate of efficiency scores (Bauer et aI., 1998). This disagreement can be viewed from 
two sides: empirical and theoretical. On the empirical side, it is not possible to 
determine which of the two major approaches fares better than the other because the 
true level of the efficiency of firms is unknown (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). On the 
theoretical side, it is difficult to reach an agreement, as the two approaches have their 
relative advantages and disadvantages. 
The main advantages of the parametric approach over nonparametric approach are (i) 
the former takes into accounts the random error and (ii) can be used for conventional 
hypotheses testing (Coelli et aI., 2005). Some disadvantages of the parametric approach 
include the need to specify a functional form (i.e. the algebraic relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables, such as translog functional form) for 
the cost or profit function and the need to determine a distributional form for the error 
term. The restrictions imposed on the functional form of the estimated frontiers could 
lead to misspecification problems and, consequently, distort the measured efficiency 
scores (e.g. overestimated or underestimated). Thus, the nonparametric approach is 
preferable because this does not require an assumption of a functional form relating 
inputs to outputs (Ramanathan, 2003). Another disadvantage of the parametric 
approach, SF A, is the arbitrary assumption regarding the probability of distribution of 
the error term (e.g. half-normal distribution) (Berger and Mester, 1997). Regarding the 
measured efficiency score affected by the chosen distribution for the error term, Coelli 
et al. (2005) pointed out that different assumptions about the error term yield a different 
efficiency score23• 
23 Greene (1990) estimated a parametric approach (SFA) for 123 US electric utilities, using four 
distributions (Le. half-normal, gamma, exponential and truncated normal distribution). He reported 
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The main disadvantages of the nonparametric approaches are that these are 
deterministic, where measurement error and statistical noise are assumed to be non-
existent. This assumption about the non-existence of the measurement error may 
influence the shape and position of the frontier (CoelIi et aI., 2005), distorting the 
measured efficiency scores24 (for more details about the limitations of nonparametric 
approaches, especially DEA, see Coelli,et al.,2005 and Ramanathan, 2003). Berger and 
Mester (1997) also reported that studies involving U.S banks that used nonparametric 
apporaches reported lower efficiency means, on average, than those using parametric 
techniques. 
Given the advantages and disadvantages of parametric and nonparametric approaches, 
Bauer et al. (1998) argued that it is not necessary to have an agreement on which is the 
single best approach that can be used to measure efficiency levels. Instead, it is more 
important that the efficiency estimates derived from different approaches should be 
consistent in the following ways: 
I. The efficiency scores obtained from different approaches should have 
comparable means, standard deviations and other distributional properties. 
2. The different approaches should rank the firms according to their level of 
efficiency in the same order. 
3. The different approaches should identifY, in most cases, the same firm as 
best practice and as worst practice. 
4. The efficiency scores generated for firms should be consistent with the 
structure of the market in which they operate (e.g. it is expected that firms 
operating within a more competitive market will have higher efficiency 
scores). 
5. The measured efficiency scores should be reasonably consistent with non-
frontier performance indicators, such as ratio analysis. 
6. The efficiency scores should be reasonably stable over time. 
sample mean efficieneies ofO.87(half-normal), 0.90 (exponential), 0.89 (truncated normal) and 0.89 
~~a:e~:~t developments in bootstrapping techniques are used in DEA to correct efficiency estimates for 
bias and to assess the uncertainty which results from the non-existence of measurement error. The 
bootstrap is a way to analyse the sensitivity of the efficiency score relative to the sample variation of the 
estimated frontier (for more detail about bootstrapping in DEA analysis, see Simar and Wilson (2000». 
An example of a study using bootstrapping in DEA is by Casu and Molyneux (2003). 
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2.5 Functional Forms 
As indicated earlier, the use of the parametric approach requires specifying the functional 
form for cost and profit efficiency. The cost and profit function expresses a single 
dependent variable as a function of one or more explanatory (independent) variables 
(Coelli et al., 2005), with the cost function expressing cost as a function of input prices 
and outputs and the profit function as the function of input prices and output prices. 
The first step in estimating the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables is to specify the functional form. Lau (1986), Chambers (1988) and Coelli et al. 
(2005) have proposed some criteria for the selection of an approximate algebraic forms 
that are consistent with particular economic relationships (e.g. cost function, profit 
function). These are: 
1. Theoretically consistent: The algebraic functional form chosen should be capable 
ofreflecting the properties of the cost and the profit function mentioned earlier. 
2. Flexibility: A functional form should have enough parameters to provide second-
order approximation. A functional form is said to be second order-flexible if it has 
enough parameters to provide a second order differential (derivative) 
approximation. The second order approximation is very important for applied 
production analysis since it is a measure for scale economy and the change in 
technology over a time (Chamber, 1988; Coelli et al., 2005). 
In the literature for estimating cost and profit functions there are many functional forms 
employed: the most common are the Cobb-Douglas functional form, the translog 
functional form and the Fourier flexible form. 
2.5.1 Cobb-Douglas Functional Form 
Arguably, the best known empirical function was introduced by Cobb-Douglas in 1928, 
and takes the following form: 
K N 
TC= a rryOkrrw~' I 0 k n , (2.18) 
k.:o:l n=1 
or taking the logarithm, it is written as: 
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N K 
InTCi= Inuo + ~)nlnwni + ~)klnYki 
n=l k=l 
(2.19) 
where InTCi is the logarithm of costs of the i-th firm, Wni is the vector prices of variable 
inputs of the i-th firm, Yki is the vector of output levels of the i-th firm and 
U o, ~n and Ok are parameters to be estimated. 
The Cobb-Douglas cost function is only homogeneous of degree one in input prices (see 
N 
property 4 in section 2.2), ifL: ~ n = 1. This implies the proportionate increase input 
n=l 
prices has resulted in the same proportionate increase in the cost. The linear 
homogeneity restriction can by implemented by dividing costs and prices by one price. 
The main shortcoming of the Cobb-Douglas function is that it is, at best, a first-order 
approximation (Chambers, 1988) and thus exhibits a constant value for economies of 
scale (i.e. constant, decreasing or increasing) (Coelli et aI., 2005). The total cost (TC) 
elasticities under the Cobb-Douglas function do not vary with the variation of outputs25• 
Moreover, this function implicitly assumes that technological change is constant26 • 
Because of the shortcomings of the Cobb-Douglas function, it is rarely used in relation 
to the estimation of cost or profit frontiers in the literature (Coelli et al., 2005). 
2.5.2 Translog Cost Function 
A generalisation of the Cobb-Douglas functional form is the so-caIled translog form, 
introduced by Christensen et al. (1973). The translog functional form can be written as: 
(2.20) 
25 Elasticities of total cost (TC) with regard to outputs can be shown as the first derivative of TC with 
regard to output in equation 2.19 as: alnTC ~o, + fp,lnw,. Thus for any change in outputs the total cost 
OIny k 1:1=1 
will be change by a constant number (Le. lii)' 
26 See Coelli et al. (2005, p. 213) for an example. 
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Since the duality theorem requires that the cost function is linearly homogeneous in 
input prices and continuity requires that the second order parameters are symmetric, the 
following restrictions apply to the estimated parameters of the cost function: 
N N N 
~)n = I, Ll3nj = 0 and LTJnk = 0 
n=l n=l 
As with the Cobb-Douglas cost function, the linear homogeneity restrictions are 
implemented by either dividing the costs and the prices by one price or putting the 
restrictions directly on the function (Coelli et aI., 2005). The translog functional form is 
more flexible than the Cobb-Douglas, as it provides second order approximation and 
allows the economies of scale to vary with the output level (Coelli et aI., 2005). 
Moreover, the translog function allows technological change to increase or decrease 
with time (Coelli et aI., 2005). The translog cost functional form is widely used in bank' 
efficiency I~terature, yet it is subject to certain limitations. McAllister and McManus 
(1993) and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) demonstrated how it does not fit well with data 
far from the mean,27 in terms of output size. Also, the translog functional form is called 
the locally flexible form, which means that the cost function does not fit all the data to 
the greatest possible extent (Sauer et aI., 2006). Despite its limitations, the translog 
function is still the most used in the applied production analysis because of its flexibility 
and its forecasting ability to generate efficiency scores better than other functional 
forms (Altunbas and Chakaravarty, 2001). 
2.5.3 Fourier Flexible Form 
This is an extension of the translog functional form proposed by Gallant (1981, 1982) to 
overcome the problems associated with the locally flexible translog functional form. 
The Fourier form consists of two parts: the first is the usual translog function and the 
second is a Fourier expansion: this is a linear combination of sin and cosine of the 
variables used to estimate the translog function. Spong et al. (1995) argued that the 
Fourier flexible form is superior to the translog functional form, as it provides better 
approximates for the underlying cost function across a broad range of outputs. The main 
27Translog is approximated from Cobb-Douglas functional form by using Taylor series expansion method 
(Kuenzle, 2005). The Taylor series is mathematical technique used to expand any function in a point. In 
translog function, the expansion point is the mean of the variables to be expanded (i.e. y, w, TC). 
Translog functional form is called locally flexible form because it does not give exact estimation for all 
points in estimated function. . 
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problem with the Fourier flexible form is that there are many more parameters to 
estimate and this may give rise to multi-collinearity problems and requires large 
numbers of observations to estimate cost and profit efficiency28 (Coelli et aI., 2005). 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a theoretical overview of the relationship between economic 
theory and the internal efficiency of the firm. It shows how the different market 
structures in which the firm is operating can affect its internal efficiency. Under perfect 
competitive theory, the firm should be operated efficiently, otherwise the market will 
penalise the inefficient firm by driving it out of the market. However, if the market 
structure is imperfect (monopoly, monopolistic competition or oligopoly) the firms can 
exercise market power by setting their prices above the competition level. This will 
induce the firms not to operate efficiently by not working hard to keep costs under 
control. The different market structures which are stemming from the neoclassical 
theory seek to explain how the market works rather than to understand the internal 
function of the firm. The neoclassical theory is challenged by alternative theories (e.g. 
X-efficiency, managerial discretion, principal- agent and behaviour theories) which 
aimed to explain why some firms are not operating efficiently by not seeking profit 
maximisation or cost minimisation behaviours. 
Moreover, this chapter explained the definition of efficiency which is concerned with 
the relationship between inputs and outputs levels and some desirable objectives such as 
cost minimisation or profit maximisation. This chapter also showed the difference 
between absolute efficiency and relative efficiency. Also, this chapter showed different 
kinds of efficiency according to the economic theory and the conceptual framework 
underpinning the relative efficiency measurement. It showed that the relative productive 
efficiency has two orientations: input and output orientation, also that the overall 
productive efficiency can be decomposed into technical and allocative efficiency. The 
combinations of technical and allocative efficiency provide a measure for economic 
efficiency or overall efficiency. Economic efficiency is a broader concept than technical 
efficiency, since it is consistent with economic theory to reach desirable objectives such 
as cost minimisation or profit maximisation. 
28 For more details about functional forms, see Champer (1988). 
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Finally, this chapter showed that the relative efficiency of a firm can be measured by 
using parametric or nonparametric approaches to formulate a best practice frontier. The 
parametric approach uses econometrics and requires the selection of economic concepts 
(i.e. cost or profit function), a functional form for the relationship between inputs and 
outputs (e.g. translog function) and a distribution assumption for the error term of the 
estimated frontier. The nonparametric approach uses mathematical programming; no 
cost or profit function is estimated from the data and no error term is produced and any 
deviation from the frontier is considered as inefficiency. Despite the extensive use of 
both of these approaches within banking research to measure efficiency levels, there is 
no agreement between researchers regarding which approach can produce a better 
estimate of efficiency scores (Bauer et al., 1998). 
The next chapter will introduce the importance of frontier analysis within the banking 
industry, as tool to benchmark banks' performance against the best practice performer 
and as a tool to investigate the impact of policy makers' procedures on banks' 
performance. Also, the next chapter will show how frontier analysis can be used to test 
many conceptual issues (Le. deregulation, ownership structure) by reviewing different 
studies in the banking industry. . 
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3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced frontier efficiency as a tool to measure efficiency 
levels within the context of economic theory. Moreover, the previous chapter showed 
the different approaches that may be used to measure the main types of efficiency. This 
chapter continues to show the importance of frontier analysis within the banking 
industry as a tool to benchmark banks' performance against the best practice performer 
and as a tool to investigate the impact of policy makers' procedures on banks' 
performance. Moreover, this chapter highlights related theories regarding the regulation 
and deregulation of the banking sector and their consequences on efficiency levels. Also, 
this chapter reviews different empirical studies of the efficiency of banks that aimed to 
test many conceptual issues such as the impact of deregulation, ownership structure and 
bank characteristics on the level of bank efficiency. 
Section 3.2 introduces the role of banks in economic development and growth and 
highlights the importance of the existence of an efficient banking sector capable of 
mobilising its financial resources and directing them towards activities with higher 
expected rates of return. Section 3.3 introduces related theories to examine the rationale 
for regulation and deregulation of the banking system and the effect of that on the 
efficiency of banks. Section 3.4 emphases the importance offrontier analysis techniques 
within the banking industry, as these provide a superior method over traditional 
techniques (e.g. ratio analysis) in, measuring performance. Section 3.5 outlines the 
different approaches used to specify inputs and outputs that measure the efficiency of 
banks, using different frontier approaches and section 3.6 reviews empirical studies on 
the efficiency of banks. 
3.2 Role of Banks in Economic Development and Growth 
Over the past few decades, the relationship between financial institutions and economic 
growth has received attention in economic literature. It is argued that the operations of 
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financial institutions, especially banks, are crucial for economic activity and growth. 
For example, Hick (1969) argued that the financial system in Europe played a critical 
role in launching industrialisation by facilitating the mobilisation of capital for immense 
work. Moreover, seminal work by Schumpeter (1912, 1939) showed that financial 
institutions (e.g. banks) play an important role in promoting economic growth by 
redirecting funds towards innovative projects. The emergence of financial institutions 
( e.g. banks) can be attributed to the existence of market frictions in the form of 
information asymmetries and transaction costs 29 (Schumpeter, 1912; Hicks, 1969; 
Levine, 1997). The reducing of information and transaction costs leads banks to 
facilitate the allocation of resources in an uncertain environment (Merton and Bodie, 
1995). Thus the existence of a financial system is important in order to intermediate 
between saving and investing economic units. The main role of a financial system is 
pooling savings from customers and re-directing them to diversified investment projects 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Levine, (1997, 2004) summarises the main 
functions of banks as: 
facilitating the trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk; 
allocating resources; 
monitoring managers and exerting corporate control; 
mobilising savings; 
and facilitating the exchange of good and services. 
Levine (1997) argued that the functions of banks affect economic growth through 
capital accumulation: functions performed by banks affect steady-state growth by 
influencing the rate of capital accumulation, either by altering the saving rate or by 
reallocating savings among different capital-producing technologies. The funds in a 
banking system flow from those who have a surplus to those who have a shortage, and 
financing through financial intermediaries (i.e. banks) is an effective solution to adverse 
selection 30 and moral hazard 31 problems that exist between lenders and borrowers 
(Duisenberg, 2001). To facilitate trading, banks have developed expertise and risk 
29 These costs include the cost of acquiring information, enforcing contracts and exchanging goods and 
financial claims (Levine, 1997). 
30 It refers to a market process in which bad results occur due to information asymmetries between lenders 
and borrowers. For example, the lender may lend money t6 a bad customer because he/she does not have 
information about himlher. 
31 The risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in good faith has provided 
misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity (Boyd et al., 1998). 
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management teams to distinguish between good and bad borrowers and to select the 
most viable projects in which to invest. Bank finance plays a key role for many 
companies in need of funds and thus helps to ensure a well-balanced growth process 
(Duisenberg, 2001). Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) argue that banks promote growth 
through their superior monitoring and screening capabilities. Here, banks reduce 
information asyrnmetries and the attendant moral hazard and adverse selection problem 
and improve the allocation of credit. Herring and Santomero (2000) suggest how a well-
functioning banking system makes a critical contribution to economic performance by 
facilitating transactions, mobilising savings and allocating capital across time and space. 
Financial institutions provide payment services and a variety of financial products that 
enable the corporate sector and households to cope with economic uncertainties by 
hedging, pooling, sharing and pricing risks. Levine et al. (2000) point out that banks 
emerge to lower the costs of researching potential investments, exerting corporate 
control, managing risk, mobilising savings and conducting exchanges. In providing 
these services to the economy, banks influence savings and allocation decisions in ways 
that may alter long-term growth rates. Levine's (1997) empirical research in many 
countries reported that banking functions are positively related to economic growth. 
Overall, the banking system has major roles to play in the economy. In particular, banks 
help direct financial resources to their most efficient use, thus enhancing economic 
growth. 
3.3 Deregulation and Bank Efficiency 
Given the important contribution the banking sector makes to economic growth, an 
efficient banking system would mobilise its financial resources and direct them towards 
activities with higher expected rate of returns for a given level of risk (Das and Ghosh, 
2006). Analysts of economic growth have long discussed the proper role of the 
government in promoting economic growth (e.g. McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 
1975; Levine, 1997; Stiglitz, 1994) and there have been many arguments about whether 
the 'regulated' or 'market based' financial system performs better in promoting 
development. Most economists however, agree that each system has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. The market approach assumes that the market generally functions 
efficiently and so the government should not intervene to direct the financial system 
(see McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). In contrast, the regulated base assumes that 
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government intervention should act to prevent market failure (Stiglitz, 1994; Fry, 1995) . 
. This section outlines the grounds and rationale for regulation of the banking system in 
general. It describes the consequences of the deregulation of the banking system on 
banks' efficiency and performance. It then considers the removing of restrictions on 
foreign banks' entry in the local banks and any consequences on local bank efficiency. 
3.3.1 Rationale for Regulation 
Regulation may be defined as various rules set by a government or its agencies, which 
aim to control the operations of firms (Griffiths and Wall, 2001). The purpose of 
regulation is the prevention of market failure, where 'market failure' is a general term 
that describes situations in which the allocation of goods and services by a market is 
unacceptable. As Stewart (1997) points out, there are four broad categories of market 
failure: 
1. Asymmetric (or imperfect) information: The competitive model analysed 
earlier assumed that all firms and buyers have all the information they need for 
their decision. However, in reality, things are very different, with consumers in 
particular experiencing a lack of information. Government intervention could 
reduce the effects of a lack of information and improve customers' welfare32 
(Fry, 1995). 
2. Externalities: Externality may be defined as a situation where the effect of 
production or consumption of goods and services imposes costs or benefits on a 
third party not reflected in the price charged for the goods and services being 
provided (Khemani, 1990). 
3. Public goods: The term 'public good' is used to refer to goods that are non-
excludable and non-rival: this means it is not possible to exclude individuals 
from the good's consumption. Non-rivalry and non-excludability may cause 
problems for the production of such goods by the market, especially when it is 
not possible to charge a price for some public goods. Regulation may be 
required if such goods or services are to be provided to all at low cost or no cost 
(Baumol and Blinder, 1982). An example of a public good within the banking 
32 Asymmetric information has recently been noted to be on the decline due to the Internet, which allows 
unknowledgeable users to collect relevant information regarding their interests. 
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industry is the infonnation about the management and solvency of financial 
institutions (Fry, 1995). 
4. Monopoly: As discussed earlier, under monopoly, resources are misaUocated, 
due to the ability of the producer to . set prices above competitive price levels. 
Regulation may be used to prevent the abuse of monopoly power (Griffiths and 
Wall, 2001). 
Most governments in the world, especially in developing countries, subject their banks 
to certain requirements, restrictions and guidelines, in order to maintain the soundness33 
and integrity of their financial system. The banking industry in most economies is 
heavily regulated, because the failure of banks could have great effects on the whole 
economic system of a country (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). The failure of one 
individual bank could spread and become general through contagion risk34, along with 
uncertainty about the condition of other banks. 
The restrictions imposed by regulators on the scope and operations of banks, such as 
high reserve requirements, a ceiling on interest rates paid on deposits and for loans, 
entry barriers, heavy government-directed. lending, product restrictions, limits on 
foreign exchange transactions and specific capital requirements, are implemented to 
ensure that the financial system is sound and safe and to protect individual investors and 
depositors from the consequences of bank failure (Fry, 1995). The argument behind 
restricting banking activity is based on many factors: not least, the prevention of market 
failure and the protection of the consumer from the consequences of market failure 
(Stiglitz, 1994). Such regulation also prevents the conflicts of interest that may arise if 
banks are allowed to operate in a non-restricted way regarding securities' underwriting, 
insurance underwriting and real estate investment. Regulation is arguably therefore 
required to prevent the abuse of monopoly power and excessive pricing (Barth et al., 
2004; Boyd et aI., 1998; John et aI., 1994) and protect financial markets and institutions 
33 A sound fmancial system can be viewed as one that is operating safely, without serious problems that 
could threaten its stability. The soundness of a financial system can be enhanced by effective market 
discipline, effective bank supervision and effective risk management from banks (for details, see Basel, 
1998). 
34 Contagion risk regards the financial difficulties at one or more bank(s) spilling over to a large number 
of other banks or the financial system as a whole. 
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from shocks that might cause systematic risk35 (Herring and Santomero, 2000). 
Regulation also minimises the likelihood of an economic downturn resulting from a 
financial crisis (Stiglitz, 1994). 
3.3.2 Deregulation vs. Regulation: Benefits and Costs 
The co-ordination of economic activity across the various agents of the economy is the 
central role of an economic system (McKinnon, 1973). The banking system in many 
developing countries experiences poor performance and low levels of efficiency 
(Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003) and heavy governmental intervention in the banking 
system and the restrictions imposed on the scope and operation of banking activities are 
seen as main factors that cause banks' poor performance and low efficiency levels 
(Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). Also, the rapid changes in banking technology, such as 
Internet banking and telephone banking, have enabled large institutions to expand their 
activities away from narrow national boundaries: this can put banks in developing 
countries under greater pressure and they must work efficiently and effectively within 
their market to be able to survive these new challenges (Molyneux et al., 1996). In the 
early 1980s, many developing countries undertook a substantial liberalisation 
programme of the banking system through deregulation in order to make them more 
efficient (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003) and to help them to cope with these new 
challenges. The main objectives behind such deregulation are to improve competition in 
the market and to increase both efficiency and the soundness of the banking system. 
Financial deregulation in developing countries could and have included the following 
measures, as summarised by Fry (1995): 
1. Removing interest rate ceilings on deposit and loans; 
2. Removing restrictions on foreign exchange transactions; 
3. Removing/alleviating restrictions on banks' portfolios; 
4. Relaxation offoreign banks' entry to the local market; 
5. Removing or decreasing the reserve requirements; 
6. Promoting branch expansion; 
7. Removing government intervention in banks' lending decisions; 
8. Removing ceiling on amounts of credit; 
3S Systematic risk is defined as the risks of an anticipated event that cannot be diversified away because it 
is a risk of movement in the overall market or relevant market segment. The systematic risk could cause 
damage to the whole financial system. 
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9. Privatisation of state-owned banks. 
To a large extent, such a liberalisation of the financial system in developing countries 
was influenced by the views of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), sometimes referred 
to as the' McKinnon-Shaw Hypothesis'. 
McKinnon and Shaw challenged the policy of financial repression characterised by 
imposed ceilings on interest rates, high reserve requirements and government-directed 
lending. Their view focused on the negative impact of ceilings on deposits and loan 
rates on the stability and growth of the financial system and they argued that this 
"financial repression" could contribute to the decline of financial growth. If interest rate 
ceilings lead to low or negative real interest rates, this in turn will lead to reduced 
savings and a lower amount of loan funds intermediated through the financial system 
(Andersen and Tarp, 2003). McKinnon and Shaw analysed the impact of a reduction of 
financial repression on the domestic financial system within developing countries and 
they found that this exercised a positive effect on the growth of interest rates towards 
their competitive market equilibrium (mainly by allowing market forces to determine 
real interest rates). According to the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, the removal of 
ceilings on interest rates increases savings and encourages the financial system to be 
more efficient in the allocation of resources. Liberalised financial systems direct scarce 
economic resources to the most efficient use and this impact positively on the growth of 
the national economy. 
The McKinnon-Shaw view is based on the macro dimension of the impact of reducing 
financial repression on the financial system. Another macro dimension that could be 
achieved by less regulation is an increase in competition in the banking industry through 
the removal of entry barriers and the rerpoval of interest rate ceilings. Increased 
competition within the industry may increase the levels of efficiency amongst banks and 
thus the public will benefit in terms of cost and the availability of banking services 
(Molyneux et aI., 1996). Similarly, Winston (1998) argues that firms operating in a 
deregulated industry operate more efficiently than those in a heavily regulated industry. 
He states that regulations limit competition between firms and that this lack of 
competition causes an industry to accumulate substantial managerial slack. Winston 
presents empirical evidence from many deregulated industries in the USA, showing that 
such industries have become more efficient after deregulation and the level of 
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competition between firms increased. This intensified competition causes firms to 
operate more efficiently. For example, Winston (1998) reported that the operating costs 
of deregulated banks in the US have decreased by 8 per cent and returns in equity have 
improved. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are many views that concentrate on the micro 
dimension of the impact of deregulation on the financial system. Reger et al. (1992) 
argue that the field of strategic management assumes that managers match their firms' 
strategies to the characteristics of their environment and firms obtaining superior 
matches (e.g. choosing the best product mix) will enjoy superior competitive positions 
and high levels of performance. However, Mahoon and Murray (1981) argued that 
government regulation and deregulation are important factors that can affect the 
strategic choice of managers which, in turn, could affect financial performance and risk. 
Therefore, within a strict regulatory environment, a bank's choices will be limited and 
this will have a direct and indirect effect on the bank's performance through a restriction 
of strategic options. Therefore, deregulation (of the financial system) could reap 
benefits, such as producing a variety of products and services that may· enhance 
profitability and efficiency by the optimal use of resources in producing bank outputs 
(Merrick and Saunders, 1985) and the creation of a competitive banking system while 
the opportunity exists to produce the optimum quantity of money and resources 
(Friedman, 1969). However, deregulation may be accompanied with consequences that 
may threaten the safety and soundness of the financial system, such as banks' being 
more likely to invest in risky products (Merrick and Saunders 1985). Gruben and 
McComb (1997) reported how the portfolio of banks in Mexico became more risky after 
deregulation because they could not evaluate the risks associated with loans and higher 
real interest rates. 
Fry (1995, 1997) identified many pre-requisites that could lead to successful financial 
liberalisation: 
Adequate prudential regulation, needed to enhance the stability of a financial 
system and limit excessive risk -taking by banks; 
Successful monetary policy, resulting in a reasonable degree of price stability; 
Authorities where necessary, reducing taxes on the banking system. 
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3.3.3 Entry of Foreign Banks to Local Markets 
An important part of deregulation is to remove restrictions on the entry of foreign firms 
into the domestic banking market. This may take two forms: (1) regulations allowing 
the entry of foreign-controlled banks to the local market, and (2) regulations providing 
incentives for foreign ownership to invest in the common stock of local banks (Unite 
and Sullivan, 2003). Allowing foreign banks to enter a domestic market and allowing 
foreign investors to hold common stocks in domestic banks may increase the 
competitiveness of the local banking market, thus enhancing levels of efficiency (Unite 
and Sullivan, 2003). 
Levine (1996) and Goldberg (2003) identified many benefits and effects associated with 
allowing foreign banks' entry to the domestic market: 
I. Improved allocation efficiency: When foreign banks are allowed entry to 
industries with high entry barriers, they may help decrease monopoly and foster 
competition within the local market; 
2. Transferred and diffused advanced technology: Foreign banks coming from 
more industrialised countries will introduce new technologies to the local 
market, which may help local banks to improve efficiency in their operations. 
Allowing foreign banks entry to the local market could also help in promoting 
managerial skiJIs and transferring new knowledge to the domestic market. These 
skills and knowledge may take the form of marketing and managing skills, 
export contact and a more co-ordinated relationship between bank management 
and customers. 
There may however also be costs in opening the local market to foreign banks. Stiglitz 
(1994) argued that domestic banks may incur extra costs, as they have to compete with 
larger and stronger international banks with better management and better reputation. In 
addition, foreign banks have better access to cheaper funds not available to domestic 
banks. In some countries, depositors have little confidence in domestic banks, thus they 
direct their deposits to foreign banks that provide more security and confidence. As a 
result, the domestic banks would have to pay substantially higher interest rates to attract 
depositors. 
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The literature on foreign banks' 'entry to local banking markets frequently asserts that 
entry to the domestic banking market can make the national market more competitive 
and thereby encourage banks to operate efficiently (Claessens et aI., 2001), De Young 
and Nolle (1996), Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Evanoff and Ors (2003) argue that 
the elimination of entry barriers should lead to efficiency gains, as banks recognise that 
their domestic market will not be protected by the regulator. The removal of entry 
barriers will place competitive pressure on domestic banks in the local market to 
improve operations to remain as a feasible competitor. 
The impact of foreign bank entry on the efficiency levels of a local banking market has 
been the subject of many studies, In general, most studies in developing countries found 
that foreign banks contributed positively to increasing the level of competition and 
efficiency levels. Most of the stUdies also showed that foreign banks are more efficient 
than domestic banks (Isik and Hassan, 2002; Hao et aI., 200 I; Harvylchyk, 2006; Kraft 
et aI., 2006). Section 3.6 reviews studies that have examined the impact of deregulation 
and foreign bank entry on the level of banks' efficiency. 
3.4 Why Frontier Efficiency Analysis in the Banking Industry? 
Following the discussion of the possible impacts of deregulation and foreign bank entry 
on the efficiency of the banks, this section outlines the importance of using frontier 
analysis in banking. The frontier analysis could be a useful tool, providing guidance to 
regulators and policy makers regarding policies adopted and their effect on bank 
performance. 
Banks are increasingly using benchmarking techniques to identify operations needing 
improvement by comparing their performance with other banks in the industry and 
accounting-based ratios are a traditional tool to measure efficiency (De Young, 1997). 
With ratio analysis, a peer group of banks with similar characteristics should be 
constructed. The constructed ratios assume that all banks have the same characteristics. 
However comparing the financial ratios of different banks is not an appropriate tool in 
measuring the best performance unless the banks are almost identical in product mix, 
bank size, market conditions, ownership structure and any other characteristics that can 
affect banking performance (De Young, 1997). An important class of benchmarking 
methods used in the banking market is frontier efficiency analysis. De Young (1997) 
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argues that frontier efficiency analysis is superior to accounting-based efficiency 
analysis because with frontier efficiency analysis there is no need to construct peer 
groups of banks with similar characteristics. Rather, it uses linear programming and 
statistical techniques to remove the effects of differences in input prices and other 
exogenous market factors affecting standard performance ratios (e.g. return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE» so that a better estimate of the underlying performance 
of the managers may be obtained. Bauer et al. (1998) point out that frontier efficiency 
analysis is more useful for regulatory, financial institution managers and industry 
consultants to assess banks' performance. It may be used in a number of ways to help a 
bank evaluate whether it is performing better or worse than its peer groups in 
technology, scale, cost minimisation and profit maximisation. Thus management efforts 
can be directed to the areas most needing improvement. 
Similarly, Cummins and Weiss (1998) point out how frontier efficiency methods are 
useful in many situations. Firstly, frontier analysis provides guidance to regulators and 
policy makers regarding policies adopted and the effect of that on bank performance. 
Second, to inform management about the effects of policies, procedures, strategies and 
technologies adopted by the firm in relation to efficiency (performance). Third, they are 
important in testing some economic hypotheses in regard, to both agency and 
transaction costs. Through such measurement, economists can predict whether the 
ownership structure of firms influences their economic behaviour. In particular, the 
measurement of efficiency can attempt to evaluate whether cost and profit inefficiencies 
are related to ownership structures (Altunbas et al., ZOOI). For example, an analysis of 
the impacts of ownership structure on efficiency has implications for which kind of 
ownership (e.g. public or private domestic or foreign) can best achieve high levels of 
efficiency (Isik and Hassan, 2003). Finally, frontier analysis is useful to compare banks' 
performance (efficiency) across different countries. For example, in the case of bank 
efficiency, Berg et al. (1993) compared the relative efficiency of Nordic banks. 
3.5 Specification of Banks' Inputs and Outputs 
As indicated in Chapter Z, when measuring efficiency by using frontier approaches, one 
first needs to specify inputs (Xi) and outputs (Yi) of banks under consideration. This 
section outlines the choice of bank inputs and outputs typically used in the bank 
efficiency literature. Defining outputs of a banking firm has been a challenging task for 
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researchers. Unlike manufacturing firms, banks' outputs cannot be measured by 
physical quantities, as a bank is an entity engaged in the intermediation of services 
between lenders and depositors. Banks provide a wide array of services such as low risk 
assets, credit and payment services and rnnning investment portfolios (Molyneux et aI., 
1996). In addition, banks are multi-product institutions; many of their services are 
jointly or independently produced (e.g. different kinds of loan, investments). The 
precise definition of what banks produce and how their products should be measured 
have been the subject of much debate among researchers (Goddard et al., 2001). 
However, there are two main approaches use by researchers to identify banks' outputs 
and inputs; the production approach and the intermediation approach. 
With the production approach, banks are viewed as firms which employ capital and 
labour as inputs to produce different types of deposit and loan accounts. Outputs are 
then measured by the number of deposit and loan accounts or by the number of 
transactions performed on each type of product and total costs are the operating costs 
(excluding interest costs) used to produce the products (Molyneux et ai., 1996). The 
main shortcoming of this approach is that it does not take into account the interest 
expenses banks incur, which for most banks, forms more than 60 per cent of total costs 
(Molyneux et al., 1996; Goddard et al., 2001). In addition, it is difficult to obtain data 
for the number of deposits and loans accounts or the number of transactions performed 
for a given time. 
The alternative intermediation approach, proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977), 
assumes that banks collect deposits to transform them, using labour and capital, into 
loans, investments and other earning assets (e.g. balances with other banks). In short, it 
views banks as intermediators of financial services. Thus, loans, investments and other 
earning assets are considered as the bank's output measures and, labour, capital and 
deposits are considered inputs measures and total costs are the operating and interest 
expenses. With this approach, therefore, the selection of outputs and inputs is based on 
the bank's balance sheet data (i.e. assets and liabilities) (Matthews and Thompson, 
2005). The main advantages of the intermediation approach over the production 
approach are that the intermediation approach treats deposits as inputs, which is more 
convincing, since banks use deposits (as well as other funds) to make loans and 
investments (Elasiani and Mehdian, 1990). Additionally, Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
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argued that intermediation has the advantages of being more inclusive and capturing the 
essence of a financial intermediary, as banks buy rather than sell deposits. Therefore, 
the intermediation approach has been the most widely used in the empirical bank 
efficiency literature (e.g. Aly et aI., 1990; Berger and Mester, 1997; Altunbas et al. 2001; 
Bos et aI., 2009) 
3.6 Efficiency in Banking Industries: Empirical Evidence 
Early studies looking of the banking industry concentrated on scale and scope 
efficiencies (Berger et al., 1993). Berger et al. (1993) summarised the previous results 
of scale economies' studies in the banking industry and found that average cost has a 
relatively flat U-shape. Medium-sized banks with assets volume of $100 million- $10 
billion are more cost-scale efficient than small and big banks. These studies attempted 
to analyse the presence of scale economies (i.e. working at the minimum efficient scale) 
rather than cost/profit efficiency, and assumed that banks always operate on their 
minimum cost frontier, which means that frontier inefficiencies (e.g. cost inefficiency) 
do not exist (Sheldon, 1999; Drake 2003). Berger and Humphrey (1991) invalidated this 
assumption through their study on a sample ofU.S banks, which found that the frontier 
inefficiencies not only existed but were of more importance than the study of scale and 
scope economies (Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the early studies in the US and the 
European banking industries). Berger et al. (1993) indicated that cost inefficiencies in 
banking accounted for approximately 20 per cent or more of banking costs, whilst scale 
efficiencies (when they can be accurately estimated36) are usually found to account for 
less than 5 per cent of costs. Therefore, since the early 1990s, the analysis of efficiency 
within the banking industry has concentrated on cost and profit efficiency. Berger and 
Mester (1997) determined three concepts that offer a definitional framework for the 
testing of cost and profit efficiency in the banking industry: cost efficiency, standard 
profit efficiency and alternative profit efficiency (these three concepts are examined in 
the methodology chapter). The efficiency studies within the banking industry were 
mainly aimed at, as summarised by Berger and Humphrey (1997): 
1. Providing information to policy makers regarding policies such as 
deregulation, financial disruption, bank failure, risk, problem loans and 
36 For more details about the problem of estimation of scale efficiency, see Berger and Humphrey (1994). 
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market structure and concentration. Examples include Berg et al. (1993), 
Humphrey and Pulley (1997), Vivas (1997), Gilbert and Willson (1998), 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), Alam (2001), Berger and Mester (2003), 
Bertrand et al. (2007). 
2. Improving managerial performance through determining the characteristics 
of less efficient banks. Example include Vassilogou and Giokas (1990), 
Fried et al. (1993), Tulken (1993), Drake and Howcroft (1994), Berger and 
De Young (1997), Spong et al. (2005), Howland and Rowse (2006), Portela 
and Thanassoulis (2007). 
3. Testing certain conceptual issues such as corporate control, organisational 
form, principal-agent relationships, ownership structure, mergers and the 
level of risks taken by banks. Examples include Altunbas et al. (2001), Isik 
et al. (2003), Halkos and Salamouris (2004), Erdem and Erdem (2008). 
4. Comparing the performance of banks in different countries. Examples 
inclyde Allen and Rai (1996), Sheldon (1999), Altunbas et al. (2001), Casu 
and Molyneux (2003), Casu and Girardone (2006). 
5. Comparing efficiency scores using different frontier approaches and 
comparing cost and profit efficiency. Examples are Berger and Mester 
(1997), Vivas (1997), Rogers (1998), Bauer et al. (1998), Maudos et al. 
(2002), Maudos and Pastor (2003), Fiorentino et al. (2006), Delis et aI., 
(2009). 
Despite the extensive literature· that has examined efficiency within the US and 
European banking industries (Table 3.3 and 3.4 review the main efficiency studies), 
limited studies have been conducted on developing countries (Table 3.5 reviews the 
main studies), especially in Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan. This can in part be 
attributed to the fact that the banking system in these countries is less established and is 
still being developed and, more importantly, is still characterised by government 
control. However, during the last two decades, banking industry circumstances in 
developing countries have undergone wide-ranging change, including the globalisation 
of the financial markets accompanied by government deregulation, privatisation, 
economic reforms and financial innovation. The above factors and changes which have 
arisen within the developed countries' banking industries have provided an incentive to 
researchers to change in efficiency levels in developing countries, for many reasons. 
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Firstly, an empirical investigation of efficiency levels wiIJ help policy makers to assess 
the extent to which their policies were successful in improving the efficiency of the 
banking system. Secondly, these studies wiIJ also help the financial institutions 
themselves to improve levels of efficiency, in order to be able to compete nationalJy and 
intemationalJy and to remain in the market. Thirdly, different market structures in 
developing countries may have different implications for bank efficiency. In the context 
ofthis research, the main studies to test the impact of deregulation on banks' efficiency 
level and to test such conceptual issues (i.e. ownership structure, risk, specialisation and 
corporate control) and their impacts on the level of efficiency will now be highlighted, 
with particular emphasis on the studies in developing countries. 
3.6.1 Impact of Deregulation on Bank Efficiency 
1. Studies in developed countries. 
US deregulation occurred in the early 1980s and the main reforms that took place within 
the US banking industry include a ceiling on interest rates being eliminated, the 
aIJowing of interstate branch expansion, thrift institutions being aIJowed into consumer 
and business lending and affiliates of banks being permitted some degree of securities 
underwriting (Winston, 1998). The relationship between deregulation and efficiency 
within the US banking market has been tested by many empirical studies (e.g. 
Humphrey, 1991; Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Bauer et aI., 1993; Humphrey, 1993; 
Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999; Berger and Mester 2003). 
Humphrey (1991) analysed the relationship between deregulation and productivity for 
US banks in the years 1977-1987, using a non-parametric approach (DEA), and found 
that there was a very low to negative productivity growth as a result of deregulation. 
Humphrey (1993) replicated his previous study but adopted a parametric approach and 
found that the largest bank experienced negative productivity growth. 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) employed a parametric approach (i.e. TFA) and used data 
for the year 1980 to estimate cost efficiency. They measured technical change and 
productivity and found little change in these measures during the 1980s. 
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Bauer et al. (1993) measured efficiency level for the period 1977-1988, using 
parametric approaches (i.e. SFA and TFA). They found little improvement in the 
efficiency scores during the study period. 
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995), working with US data, selected from 1979 and 1986 as 
rough proxies for the pre- and post-deregulation periods. Using DEA, they calculated 
efficiency scores for samples of US banks from these two years. They found the 
efficiency scores for the year 1986 better than for 1979. Also, they found the technical 
efficiency declined by 3% for large banks. This means that the efficiency of banks 
improved as a result of deregulation. 
Wheelock and Wilson (1999) analysed the productivity of the US banks during 1984-
1993 using a non-parametric approach (DEA). Wheelock and Wilson (1999) found 
during 1984-1993 that banks experienced a decline in technical efficiency. 
Alam (2001) found that the productivity of US banks regressed between 1980-1983, 
following deregulation, but post-1985 there was increase in profit productivity. Alam's 
results are consistent with Humphrey and Pulley's (1997) findings, when they analysed 
the technological and efficiency effects of deregulation in terms of profit functions. This 
study concluded that adjustment to deregulation usually takes four years and that this is 
attributed to banks' adjusting to deregulation through three processes: 
1. Cost offset and reduction: At this stage, banks offset higher costs by reducing other 
costs, such as branch operating costs. 
2. Cost shifting: With this, higher funding costs and interest rates will be shifted to the 
borrower through floating rate loans. 
3. Profit augmentation: Banks expand their assets with more risky assets, in order to 
enhance profits 
Berger and De Young (2001) employed a parametric approach (DFA) using data for the 
period 1993-1998 to assess the effects of geographic expansion on banks' cost and 
profit efficiency. They found that the geographic expansion had positive effects on both. 
That is some efficient banks can export efficient practices to other banks. 
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Berger and Mester (2003) investigated the effects of technological change over the 
deregulation period and beyond (1984-1997). Their results showed that cost 
productivity worsened by 4.2% annually between 1984-1991 and by 12.5% annually 
between 1991-1997. However, profit productivity improved by 4.3% annually between 
1988-1991 and by 12.2% annually between 1991-1997. 
To summarise, the US deregulation experience showed that cost productivity worsened 
and profit productivity improved after deregulation. Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
pointed out that a possible explanation of their findings is that there was an increase in 
market power between 1991 and 1997, which enabled banks to set high output prices. 
Moreover, the US studies concluded that adjustment to deregulation usually takes four 
years. 
Berg et al. (1993) analysed the performance of the Nordic countries during the period 
1984-1990, using a nonparametric approach (i.e. DEA) to investigate the impact of 
deregulation on the efficiency of Norwegian banks, before and after deregulation. The 
main finding was that there was a decline in productivity pre-deregulation and an 
increase post-deregulation: this gain in productivity is related to banks' becoming more 
efficient after the deregulation. This deregulation includes remove entry barriers among 
European countries. 
The effects of deregulation on the cost efficiency of the Spanish banks was analysed by 
Grifell and Lovell (1996) and Vivas (1998) and both studies found that cost efficiency 
was not improved as a result of deregulation. Vivas (1997) used parametric techniques 
(TFA) to determine how deregulation affected the profit efficiency of Spanish savings 
banks between the years 1986-1991. He found that there was no significant decrease in 
inefficiencies, despite the introduction of deregulation. Similarly, Kumbhakar et al. 
(2001) used a parametric approach (SFA) to investigate the effects of deregulation on 
the performance of Spanish saving banks over the period 1986-1995 and their results 
reveal a high level of technical inefficiency, along with a very high rate of technical 
progress. Therefore in the case of Spanish bank it would be appear that the deregulation 
has no impact on the efficiency of banks. 
Canhoto and Dermine (2003) examined the impact of deregulation on the efficiency of 
the Portuguese banking industry, usmg DEA, over the period 1990-1995. The 
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deregulation process began in 1984 with authorised entry into the banking market, in 
addition to removing the credit ceiling and ceilings on interest rates and allowing 
freedom to open new branches. The study concluded that there was an improvement in 
the level of efficiency up from 59% to 84% after deregulation. 
The deregulation of financial services within the European Union, which aimed to 
remove entry barriers and to foster both competition and efficiency within European 
banks, was analysed by Casu and Girardone (2006). Using DEA and working with 
European data selected from 1997 and 2003 as rough proxies for the pre- and post-
deregulation periods, they calculated efficiency scores using samples of European banks 
from these two years. They also used the Panzar and Rose moderJ7 (H statistic) to assess 
the degree of competition within the European countries. To test the link between 
competition and efficiency, the H statistics (as a measure for competition levels) were 
regressed against measured efficiency levels with other explanatory variables 
(independent variables). The authors found little evidence that more efficient banking 
systems are also more competitive: the relationship between competition and efficiency 
is not as straightforward as this. Therefore increased competition has forced banks to 
become more efficient but increased efficiency has not resulted in more competition 
within EU banking systems. 
Bertrand et al. (2007) investigated how the deregulation of the French banking industry 
in "the 1980s affected the behaviour of banks. Their analysis suggested that a reduction 
of government intervention in the banking sector was associated with a more efficient 
allocation, of loans across banks. They also found that less government intervention is 
accompanied with major changes in "the structure of the product market, with an 
increase in banks' entry and exit rates, a reduction in the level of product market 
concentration and a progress in the allocation of assets and jobs across banks. 
37 Panzar and Rose (1987) developed a model of oligopolistic, competitive and monopolistically 
competitive markets and derived test statistics to distinguish among them. The H statistic test is the sum 
of elasticities of total revenue with respect to input prices. The inferences that can be drawn from the 
numerical value ofH are as follow: H equal to zero or negative indicates oligopoly or monopoly; equal to 
one indicates a perfectly competitive industry; 0 < H < 1 indicates the intermediate case of monopolistic 
competition. 
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2. Studies in developing countries' banking Industry 
Gilbert and Willson (1988) examined the impact of liberalisation on the productive 
efficiency of Korean banks between the years 1980-1994. Their results indicated that 
government control tends to limit incentives and the ability of managers to operate 
efficiently. Thus, the gradual deregulation of the Korean banking industry contributed 
positively in improving the productivity of Korean banks. Another study, conducted by 
Hao et al. (2001) investigated whether the further deregulation within the Korean 
banking industry in 1991 led to further improvements in productive efficiency. The 
research employed parametric techniques SFA and involved studying a sample of data 
covering the period 1985-1995. In contrast to Gilbert and Willson (1988), Hao et al. 
(2001) concluded that further deregulation did not improve productive efficiency. 
Leightner and Lovell (1998) investigated the impact of deregulation on efficiencies 
within the Thai banking system: they used nonparametric techniques to see annual 
productivity growth for Thai banks over the period 1989-1994. Their results indicated 
that productivity of the banks was improved and also the liberalisation significantly 
increased the competitiveness of the Thai banking industry by making Thai banks 
compete with each other and with international banks (i.e. foreign banks operating in 
Thai). In contrast to the above study, Williams and Intarachote (2002) and Okuda and 
Mieno (1999) found that banking efficiency in Thai banks decreased after deregulation. 
Katib and Mathews (2000) and Okuda et al. (2002) examined the impact of deregulation 
and technological change on the productivity and efficiency of Malaysian banks. The 
deregulation process included the Central Bank of Malaysia removing administrative 
control over interest rates and the study's results indicated that financial liberalisation 
was accompanied by an increase in banks' operational costs and a negative progress in 
technology. Also, the productivity of Malaysian banks declined during the liberalisation 
period: an increase in operational costs and a decrease in productivity indicated that 
output was growing at a lower rate than input. 
Hardy and de Patti (2001) used the parametric technique DFA to investigate the effect 
of financial reform on the efficiency of Pakistani banks. Their results indicated that, 
during the post-deregulation period (1993-1997), both cost and revenue increased. Thus, 
they concluded that the benefits of an increase in revenue efficiency were transferred to 
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customers (i.e. borrowers and depositors). Ataullah et al. (2004) argued that it is 
difficult to justifY Hardy and de Patti's conclusion regarding the improvement in 
revenue efficiency being transferred to the customers, as the interest rate margin within 
the banking industry in Pakistan increased significantly after deregulation: the banks 
charged higher interest rate on their loans, but did not increase interest rates on deposits. 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) examined the relationship between deregulation and 
productivity growth in India's banking industry during the period 1985-1996 and 
concluded that there was an extensive over-employment of labour relative to capital 
throughout the entire study period, finding little evidence to suggest that deregulation 
improved the productivity of banks. Ataullah et al. (2004) measured the technical 
efficiency of Indian and Pakistani banks before and after the adoption of the financial 
liberalisation programme. They used a nonparametric methodology (DEA) and their 
results showed that the overall technical efficiency of the banking industry in both 
countries has progressively improved over the years, especially after 1995. The 
improvement in India was due to improvements in both pure technical and scale 
efficiency. Their results also showed that public and foreign banks to be less efficient 
than private domestic banks. 
laim (1995), Kasman (2002) and Isik and Hassan (2003) found a positive relationship 
between the deregulation of banks and efficiency in the Turkish banking industry. Isik 
and Hassan (2003) examined the impact of liberalisation on productivity growth, 
efficiency change and technical progress in that industry during the decade 1980-1990. 
Throughout the 1980s, a series of financial restructurings took place, aiming to 
strengthen the efficiency and productivity of banks by limiting goverrunent intervention 
and enhancing the role of market forces. Interest rates and foreign exchange were freed, 
industrial and new financial businesses were allowed to operate and new product 
restrictions were removed, as were directed credit programmes and restricted rates. The 
results showed that the performances of all types of banks improved after deregulation. 
Productivity growth in Turkish banking also increased, due to an increase in banks' 
efficiency rather than technical progress and inefficient banks enhanced their 
productivity by improving their operations and becoming close to best practice banks. 
Isik and Hassan (2003) demonstrated how an improvement in the productivity and 
efficiency of the Turkish banks was low in the early years ofliberalisation (1980-1984), 
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yet banks need time to adapt to new regulations. This is in line with empirical evidence 
by Humphrey and Pulley (1997) who found that US banks needed four years to adjust to 
new regulations. 
Williams and Nguyen (2005) investigated the relationship between bank performance 
and bank governance and the impact of deregulation in South East Asia (Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) banks during the period 1990-2003, using 
the parametric approach (SFA). Their results indicated that bank privatisation was 
accompanied by superior profit efficiency performance in comparison with other types 
of bank governance. Also, they found that privatisation contributed positively to 
increasing banks' productivity. With regard to the efficiency and productivity of banks 
owned by foreign institutions,· their results suggested that profit efficiency of these 
banks was improved but their productivity was not. 
Cook et al. (200 I) examined the relationship between deregulation and bank efficiency 
in the Tunisian banking industry over the period 1992-1998, using a nonparametric 
approach (DEA). The banking system in Tunisia was characterised by heavy 
government intervention such as imposing credit allocations, placing ceilings on interest 
rates and limiting foreign presence in the financial sector. Banks did not have the 
authority to lend more than a specific amount determined by the Central Bank: any 
loans exceeding this amount needed the approval of Central Bank. Banks were also 
required to hold up to 20% of their assets in government bonds and to allocate a fixed 
percentage of their deposits for lending at preferred interest rates to specific sectors. The 
deregulation process took place in Tunisia in 1987; interest rates were liberalised, the 
amount of treasury bills banks were required to hold was reduced in 1991 and 
restrictions on the presence offoreign banks were also removed in 1991. Ultimately, the 
study results indicated that the deregulation process did not positively contribute to 
efficiency levels in Tunisian banks. 
To sum up, the empirical evidence on the impact of deregulation on banks' efficiency 
has been mixed (i.e. some studies reported a positive impact and others reported 
negative impact). Berger and Humphrey (1997) pointed out that the results of 
deregulation may essentially depend on whether the conditions of the industry have 
been regulated and on the type of deregulation measures implemented. Also, the 
institutional environment of the banking system plays a vital role in determining how 
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deregulation affects on banks' efficiency. For example, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1999) mentioned that countries with weak institutional environments, 
characterised by weak legal enforcement, inefficient bureaucracy and corruption are 
subject to instabilities within their financial system after deregulation. Thus 
deregulation could lead to a decrease in banks' efficiency in the period following 
liberalisation. 
3.6.2 Foreign Banks and Domestic Banks 
Another strand of studies related to banks' efficiency look of how the entry of foreign 
banks has affected local banks efficiency and on whether foreign banks are more 
efficient than local banks. In this section, many of the studies examining the effect of 
entry of foreign banks on efficiency will be reviewed. Moreover, it will review some 
studies comparing the efficiency of both foreign and local banks. 
1. The Impact of the Entry of Foreign Banks into Developing Countries on the 
Efficiency of Domestic Banks 
Using 7900 bank observations from 80 countries for the period 1988-1995, Claessens et 
al. (2001) examined the effects of the presence of foreign banks within domestic 
banking markets. Their findings indicated that foreign banks tended to have higher 
interest margins and higher profitability than domestic bank in developing countries, 
whilst the opposite was true in developed countries. The research concluded that, in the 
long term, foreign banks' entry to local markets puts pressure on local banks to improve 
their services and operations; thus, local banks eventually became more technically and 
allocatively efficient by trying to control their operational costs. 
Sturm and WilIiams (2004) used nonparametric (DEA) and parametric (SFA) 
approaches to examine the impact of foreign bank entry on banking efficiency in 
Australia during the post-deregulation period 1988-2001. As a result of Australian 
deregulation in 1981, sixteen foreign banks entered the Australian system in 1985. The 
Reserve Bank of Australia assumed that the foreign banks' entry would increase 
competitiveness and efficiency in Australian banks, but Sturm and WilJiams' (2004) 
results indicated that foreign banks were more input efficient than local banks. Also, 
their results showed that foreign banks proved an important source of efficient 
technological changes immediately after deregulation. They concluded that regulators 
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should encourage diversity amongst banks as a source of ongoing efficiency and 
innovation within the banking market. Thus the entry of foreign banks to the Australian 
banking market put pressure on local banks to adapt new technology and therefore 
enhancing their efficiency. 
Kraft et al. (2006) investigated the effects of privatisation and bank entry on efficiency 
levels within the Croatian banking market; they also analysed the relative efficiency of 
state-owned, private and foreign banks. They used a parametric approach (SFA) to 
estimate cost efficiency scores for the period 1994-2000, a period characterised by the 
privatisation of state-owned banks and the entry of foreign banks into the local market. 
The results showed that foreign banks were more efficient than domestic bank and also 
that the efficiency levels of local banks did not improve after liberalisation. The main 
policy implication from the study indicated that liberalisation in the form of opening the 
banking market to did not help to enhance efficiency levels for local banks. 
Unite and SuIIivan (2003) examined the response of domestic Philippine banks to 
allowing foreign banks entry and foreign ownership in the Filipino banking industry in 
the years 1990-1998: the relaxation of foreign banks' entry to the Philippine banking 
market was initiated during the period 1992-1998. The findings indicated that interest 
rate spreads became narrower and operating expenses decreased as a result of greater 
foreign bank entry; the results also show that competition within the banking industry 
increased as a result of the entry offoreign banks. Unite and SuIIivan (2003) concluded 
that foreign competition induced local banks to be more efficient through competitive 
pressures which forced banks to improve lending practices and allocate their resources 
efficiently. 
To sum up, the above studies showed the entry of foreign banks to local banks helped in 
the improvement of the competition and the efficiency within the local market. The 
introducing of foreign banks to local banking market helps in the introducing of new 
technologies to the local market, which in turn motivated local banks to adapt these 
technologies to improve their operations. 
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2. Efficiency of Foreign Banks vs. Domestic banks 
Another strand of the efficiency literature aimed to compare the efficiency levels of 
foreign banks against that of local banks. Developed countries studies of US data 
generally found that foreign-owned banks are significantly less cost efficient on average 
than domestic banks (Hasan and Hunter, 1996; Mahajan et al., 1996; Chang et aI., 1998) 
and less profit efficient on average than domestic banks (De Young and Nolle, 1996). 
Hasan and Hunter (1996) studied the cost efficiency of Japanese multinational banks 
operating in the US by using data for the period 1984-1989 and a parametric approach 
(SF A). They found that that the Japanese banks were significantly less cost efficient 
than the US ones. 
Mahajan et al. (1998) compared the efficiency of foreign banks in the US with that of 
US banks during the period 1987-1990 using a parametric approach (TFA). They 
estimated two frontiers, one for foreign banks and the other for US banks and found that 
the average cost efficiency for US banks was significantly more than the average cost 
efficiency for foreign banks. 
Chang et al. (1998) made a comparative analysis of the productive efficiency of foreign-
owned and US-owned multinational commercial banks operating in the US over the 
period 1984-1989. A parametric approach (SFA) was used to estimate cost efficiency 
scores for both sets of banks. Their results indicated that foreign-owned multinational 
banks operating in the US are significantly less cost efficient than domestically owned 
US banks. 
De Yong and Nolle (1996) estimated the profit efficiency of foreign banks working in 
the US and US banks over the period 1985-1990 with a parametric approach (SFA). 
Their main findings refer to foreign banks' being less profit efficient than US banks. 
Berger et al. (2000, 2005) in a multinational study estimated the cost efficiency for 
foreign banks operating in France, Germany, Spain, UK and USA over the period 1993-
1998. They used a parametric approach (DFA) and found that foreign banks were less 
cost efficient than local banks in the countries under study. 
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To sum, the literature in the efficiency of foreign banks operating in developed 
countries shows that the local banks are more efficient than foreign banks. Isik and 
Hassan (2003) attributed that to that foreign banks in developed countries usually 
finance their operations by depending on purchased funds, which is more expensive 
than core deposits (Isik and Hassan, 2003). 
With regard to studies in developing and emerging countries, most studies found that 
foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks (e.g. Bhattacharyya et aI., 1997; 
Hao et aI., 2001; Isik and Hassan, 2002; Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Bonin et aI., 
2005; Havrylchyk, 2006; Kraft et aI., 2006). 
For example, Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) measured technical efficiency for Indian banks 
during 1986-1991 using a nonparametric approach (DEA). Within their study, they 
compared the efficiency level for foreign banks against domestic banks. Their findings 
refer to foreign banks' being more efficient than domestic banks. 
Isik and Hassan (2002) estimated the cost and profit efficiency for Turkish banks using 
a parametric approach, and data for the years 1988, 1992 and 1996. They compared 
efficiency scores for local and foreign banks and found foreign banks to be more 
efficient than domestic banks. 
Bonin et al. (2005) using data from 1996 to 2000, investigated the effects of ownership 
on bank efficiency for eleven transition countries. Applying stochastic frontier 
estimation procedures, they measured profit and cost efficiency and found that foreign 
banks were more cost and profit efficient than domestic ones. 
After the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989, many foreign investors entered the 
Polish banking market by the acquisition of privatised local banks or the establishment 
of new subsidiaries in Poland. Havrylchyk (2006) investigated the efficiency of the 
Polish banking industry in the period 1997-2001 to determine the differences in 
efficiency between foreign and local banks. Havrylchyk (2006) used a nonparametric 
approach (DEA), to distinguish between cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and 
scale efficiencies and his results indicated that foreign banks were more efficient than 
domestic. Also, foreign banks showed higher productivity in the level of outputs and 
were superior to domestic banks in using the right mix of inputs in the light of given 
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prices. The study's results suggested that foreign bank managers were more capable of 
managing their costs and screening borrowers. On the other hand, foreign banks that 
acquired domestic banks did not appear as efficient as the foreign banks opening new 
subsidiaries in Poland. 
3.6.3 Correlates of Bank Efficiency (Factors affecting efficiency scores) 
Another strand of literature attempts to determine factors that may have an i~pact on 
efficiency scores (i.e. bank-specific factors and environmental variables). In the context 
of banks in developed and developing countries, many studies have tried to investigate 
the factors that may explain the variation in efficiency and to determine the 
characteristics of the most and least efficient banks (e.g. Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1996; 
Mester, 1996; Resti, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; Worthington, 1998; Berger and 
Haunan, 1998; Altunbas et al., 2001; Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Isik and Hassan 2003; 
Tortosa-Ausina, 2004; Hassan, 2005; Bos et aI., 2009). In general, these studies used the 
internal bank-specific variables (e.g. risk, loan quality) and environmental variables 
(e.g. concentration level) as factors that may explain the variations in the efficiency 
levels among banks. To investigate the effects of the above factors, the existing 
literature uses the following approaches to assess the impact of various factors on bank 
efficiency: 
1. Two-stage analysis: The first stage involves estimating a conventional frontier with 
traditional inputs and outputs, while the second involves the regression of these 
predicted cost and profit efficiencies scores onto the explanatory variables (i.e. bank-
specific and market condition variables). Examples include Berger and Mester (1997), 
Casu and Molyneux (2003) and Isik and Hassan (2003). However, the two-stage 
analysis has many shortcomings which will be mentioned in Chapter 5 (methodology 
chapter). 
2. One-stage analysis: This approach involves estimating the cost/profit frontier in one-
stage, through introducing explanatory variables (i.e. bank-specific and market 
condition variables) directly into the estimation of cost and profit efficiency. Examples 
include Mester (1996), Worthington (1998), Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2003) Fries and 
Taci (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2008), Bos et aI., (2009). The details of this approach will 
be discussed later in Chapter 5 since it will be adopted in this research. 
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Mester (1996) estimated the cost frontier for US banking over the period 1991-1996 
using the' parametric approach (SFA) and including directly into the estimation (i) the 
level of bank equity as a proxy for the difference between banks in terms of risk 
attitudes and (ii) non-performing loans as a proxy for the quality of bank loans. Mester 
(1996) reported that including variables to control for bank risk and the quality ofloans 
has a direct effect on the estimated cost efficiency scores. 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996) examined the relationship between estimated cost efficiency 
scores and the attitude of banks towards risk. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996) used a second 
stage analysis by regressing the cost efficiency scores from the first stage against some 
explanatory variables that proxy for risks (e.g. the ratio of equity to total assets, the ratio 
of loan provision to total loans). Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) reported that less efficient 
banks are have higher risk than efficient banks. 
Worthington (1998) estimated the cost efficiency of Australian banks over the period 
1992-1995 by using a parametric approach (SFA) and one-stage analysis. Worthington 
(1998) investigated the impact of capital adequacy and bank size on the level of cost 
efficiency. Worthington (1998) reported that the capital adequacy does not impact on 
cost efficiency, whereas asset size affected it positively. 
Berger and Mester (1997) estimated the cost and profit efficiency of US banks over the 
period 1990-1995 using parametric approaches (SFA and FDA). They investigated the 
impacts of many variables (e.g. age of banks, concentration, asset size) on the level of 
efficiency by adopting second-stage analysis. Berger and Mester (1997) found big (i.e. 
banks with assets size exceeds 1 billions US Dollars) banks and old banks more 
efficient than small and new ones. Also, they reported that banks operating in a more 
concentrated market are less efficient than those in a less concentrated one. 
Subsequently, Berger and Hannan (1998) examined the relationship between cost 
efficiency scores and the level of concentration and they reported that banks operating 
in a more concentrated market were less cost efficient than those in a less concentrated 
one. 
Altunbas et al. (2001), with parametric approaches (SFA and FDA), investigated the 
impact of different ownership structure (private, public and mutual banks) in German 
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banks cost efficiency using two stage analysis. They found that privately-owned are 
more efficient than mutual and public banks. 
Casu and Molyneux (2003) used a nonparametric approach (DEA) and data for the 
period 1993-1997 for five European countries to investigate factors that maybe have an 
impact on efficiency. They used second stage analysis by regressing the efficiency 
scores obtained from DEA against candidate variables. These variables were equity to 
total assets, average return on equity, dununy variable for kind of bank and dununy 
variable for the bank is listing on the stock exchange. They reported that the equity ratio 
and the kind of bank (e.g. commercial or investment) do not have an impact on 
efficiency, whereas the return on equity is positively related to efficiency scores. 
Tortosa-Ausina (2004), with a nonparametric approach (DEA), investigated the impact 
of specialisation, ownership type and size of bank on the efficiency of Spanish banking 
firms. He reported that specialised banks were less efficient than commercial banks and 
also that bank size is positively related to efficiency scores. Tortosa-Ausina (2004) also 
found specialised banks less efficient as they produce distinct services and different 
product mixes requiring a more intense input use and more specialised personnel. 
Hassan (2005) examined the cost and profit efficiency of Islamic banks worldwide 
using a parametric approach (SFA) for the period 1996-2003. He reported that Islamic 
banks were less cost efficient and more profit efficient than commercial banks and 
attributed that to the fact that the Islamic banks produce distinct services and different 
product mixes requiring a more intense input use and more specialised personnel. He 
attributed the superiority of Islamic banks in profit efficiency to the Islamic banks not 
dealing with risky assets such as derivatives and dealing with real assets, which in turn 
suggests that the Islamic banks are not facing the risks facing commercial and 
investment banks. 
Bos et al. (2009) used a parametric approach (SFA) to measure the cost efficiency for 
German banks over the period 1993-2005. They investigated the impact of 
heterogeneity among banks regarding estimated cost and profit efficiency by using one-
stage analysis. They used many variables to control for heterogeneity among banks such 
as the level of equity, bank type, regional location and bank size. They reported that the 
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cost and profit efficiency scores are underestimated if not controlling for heterogeneity 
among banks. 
To sum up, in investigating and controlling for the factors that may have impact on 
banks' efficiency, it is very important to explore the main characteristics of more and 
less efficient banks. This is particularly relevant to this study as this research 
endeavours to apply one-stage analysis and looks for the factors that maybe have an 
impact on the level of Jordanian banks' efficiency. 
3.6.4 Comparing Efficiency Scores from Parametric and Nonparametric 
Approaches 
Another strand in the literature compares the efficiency scores from the two approaches 
(i.e. parametric and nonparametric) used in the literature to estimate banks' efficiency. 
This strand of literature is aiming to establish a consistency between the scores obtained 
from the two different approaches (see Bauer et aI., 1998 consistency test in Chapter 2). 
A comparison between DEA and SFA in the banking industry has been offered by 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Resti (1997), Eisenbeis et al. (1999), Huang and Wang 
(2002), WeiII (2004), Fiorentino and Koetter (2006) and Delis et al. (2009). 
Resti (1997) and Eisenbeis et al. (1999) reported very high rank-order correlations 
between DEA and SFA, whereas Ferrier and Lovell (1990) found rank-order correlation 
between DEA and SFA very Iow. 
Huang and Wang (2002), using a panel of Taiwanese commercial banks, reported that 
parametric and nonparametric methods generally produced different rank order for the 
efficiency scores among banks. However, they noted that both approaches yield similar 
average efficiency estimates. 
WeiII (2004) investigated the consistency of efficiency scores from DEA and SFA in a 
European banks' sample. He measured the cost efficiency of banks of five European 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland), using DEA and SFA, and 
concluded that there was no consistency between the efficiency scores of the two 
approaches. 
Fiorentino and Koetter (2006) investigated the consistency of cost efficiency measures 
for German banks derived from SFA and DEA. Their results indicated that the two 
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approaches provided a reasonable ranking order between the efficiency scores derived 
from them. Moreover, they reported that DEA is particularly sensitive to measurement 
errors and outliers. 
Delis et al. (2009) measured cost and profit efficiency for Greek banks over the period 
1993-2005, using SFA and DEA. Their results suggest greater similarities between 
predictions of cost and profit efficiency scores from the two approaches. 
Overall, the empirical evidence from the above studies suggests that the efficiency 
scores from parametric and nonparametric approaches are quite similar in terms of 
ranking of banks as most or less efficient. However, the nonparametric approach yields 
slightly lower efficiency scores than the parametric approach because the former does 
not account for the random errors. 
3.6.5 Studies on the Jordanian Banking Industry 
With regard to the Jordanian banking industry, the literature regarding bank efficiency 
is limited: only two studies tested the efficiency levels of Jordanian banks (AI-Jarrah, 
2002; Isik et aI., 2004). 
AI-Jarrah (2002) used the SF A approach to examine efficiency levels in the Jordanian, 
Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Bahraini banking systems during the years 1992-2000. To 
derive efficiency levels, he estimated three distinct economic efficiency concepts: cost, 
standard profit and alternative profit efficiencies. The banks' output in this study 
included loans, other earning assets and off balance-sheet items, while inputs included 
interest on deposits, total personnel expenses and expenses on land and buildings. The 
results indicated that cost efficiency averaged around 95% in 1992-2000 (89% for 
Jordan) and standard and alternative profit efficiencies averaged 66% and 58%, 
respectively, over the same period (66% and 50% for Jordan). The results also indicated 
that there were considerable differences in average bank efficiency levels across the 
four countries during the sample period, with Jordanian banks being the least cost and 
profit inefficient and Bahrain banks being the most efficient. AI-Jarrah (2002) also 
reported that the Islamic banks were found to be the most cost-and-profit efficient, with 
the large banks relatively more efficient. 
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Isik et al. (2004) used DEA to investigate managerial, pure teclmical and scale 
efficiencies of the banks operating in Jordan over the period 1996-2001. In estimating 
efficiency, the researchers constructed a year-specific production frontier and, to 
account for group effects, they normalised all inputs and outputs by the number of 
branch offices and calculated a separate frontier for each banking group. Additionally, 
they used two alternative approaches to measure banks' inputs and outputs (production 
and intermediation approaches). With the production approach, deposits are treated as 
bank outputs, whereas they are treated as bank inputs under the intermediation approach. 
Results for the production (intermediation) approach were 71% (89%) managerial 
efficiency, 89% (96%) pure teclmical efficiency and 79% (92%) scale efficiency. 
Although the two approaches produced different results the component of managerial 
efficiency under both approaches suggested that a major source of inefficiency within 
the Jordanian banking industry was scale inefficiency. In common with AI-Jarrah 
(2002), this study reported that large banks are the most efficient. 
It should be noted that the two studies above did not take into account the foreign banks 
operating in Jordan, yet the 8 foreign banks operating within Jordan account for 41 per 
cent of the total number of banks in the country. Thus their exclusion from the data may 
have had an influence on the estimation of the efficient frontier for Jordanian banks. 
More importantly, none of these studies attempted to investigate the impact of 
deregulation .on the efficiency levels in the Jordanian banking industry and the 
efficiency of foreign banks vs. the efficiency of domestic banks. 
This section has focused on the academic literature that seeks to measure efficiency in 
banking industries. This literature was aimed to inform policy makers regarding their 
policies (e.g. the impact of deregulation on banks' efficiency), to investigate the main 
characteristics of the most and the least efficient banks in terms of ownership structure, 
size, age and specialisation, to test such conceptual issues (e.g. foreign banks vs. local 
banks) and to compare the consistency of estimated efficiency scores from parametric 
and nonparametric approaches. While a thorough literature search was made, a major 
limitation of the bulk ofthe academic literature is that it focuses mainly on the cost side 
of banks' operations, ignoring the profit side. Berger and Mester (1997) showed that 
profit efficiency may not be positively correlated with cost efficiency, suggesting that 
the measure of profit efficiency may include output features reflecting higher quality or 
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greater market power in pricing. Moreover, there have been surprisingly few attempts to 
compare cost and profit efficiency measures and even fewer to compare efficiency 
scores from parametric and nonparametric approaches. With regard to this research, cost 
and profit efficiency scores will be estimated for Jordanian banks using both approaches. 
This study covers the period both before and after the liberalisation process: this allows 
testing the impact of liberalisation on the Jordanian banks' efficiency. Moreover, one-
stage analysis will attempt to reveal the main characteristics of the most and least 
efficient banks by incorporating some bank-specific variables directly in the estimation 
of cost and profit efficiency (this will be explained in detail in Chapter 5 on 
methodology). Moreover, a consistency test between SFA and DEA efficiency scores 
will be performed. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted the importance of the existence of the financial system, 
especially banks, in the process of economic development and growth and then showed 
the related theories regarding the regulation and deregulation of the banking system, 
which aimed to establish an efficient banking system capable of promoting economic 
development and growth effectively. The chapter then showed the importance of using 
frontier analysis in banking industries as a tool to measure efficiency levels within the 
context of economic theory. This chapter also showed that there are two main 
approaches used to measure a bank's inputs and outputs as variables needed for frontier 
analysis. 
This chapter also showed that in banking research, there is a large body of literature 
studying the efficiency of financial institutions, with an increasing focus on cost and 
profit efficiency. These studies suggest that cost and profit inefficiency in banking is 
accounting for more than 20 per cent of banks' costs/profits and dominating scale 
efficiency. Despite the extensive literature that has examined efficiencies in the US and 
European banking markets, limited studies have been made in developing countries, 
especially in Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan. The relatively limited studies on 
bank efficiency in these countries can be attributed to the banking system being less 
established and still being developed and, more importantly, is still characterised by 
government control. The chapter also showed that most of the studies on developing 
countries concentrated on the impact of deregulation on the improvement of efficiency 
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levels. Moreover, it also showed that only a limited number of studies measured cost 
and profit efficiency and applied parametric and nonparametric approaches at the same 
time. 
In the following chapter, the main structure of the Jordanian banks and the deregulation 
process which took place in Jordan will be reviewed, to see how the deregulation 
measures affected the structure of Jordanian banks' balance sheet and income statement. 
Building in Chapter 2 (Efficiency Theory), Chapter 3 (Empirical Evidence) and the next 
Chapter (Jordanian Banking Sector) the main research hypotheses will be identified. 
These hypotheses will be tested, using two approaches (i.e. parametric and 
nonparametric approaches) in the methodology chapter. 
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Table 3.1 Seale Economies Studies in US Bankinl! 
Author Data 
Alhadeff 
(1954) 
Horvitz 
(1963) 
Schweiger 
and McGee 
(1961) 
Gramley 
(1962) 
Greenbaum 
(1964) 
Benston 
(1965) 
Mullineaux 
(1978) 
Data for 210 Californian branch 
and unit banks of different size 
using data 1938-50. 
Data from annual reports oflhe 
Federal Reserve period 1940-60. 
Data for 6233 banks for 1958. 
Data for 270 banks 1956-59. 
Data for 745 individual member 
banks in Kansas City Federal 
Reserve District and 413 in 
Richmond District area 1960-
1962. 
Data for 83 banks 1959-61. 
Data for 892 banks 1971 and for 
859 banks 1972. 
Approach 
Financial ratios with earning assets as 
output (loans and investments to total 
assets) and operating expenses as cost. 
Relates ratio of operating expenses to 
earning assets in order to derive cost 
curve. 
As above. 
Regression analysis. Dependent variable 
is ratio of current operating expenses to 
total assets and output measure is total 
deposits. 
Regression analysis. Dependent variable 
is ratio of current operating expenses to 
total assets and independent variable is 
total assets. 
Regression analysis. Divided output into 
two components: lending and a1l other. 
Cobb-Douglas cost function. 
Cobb-Douglas cost function. 
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Main findings and notes 
Increasing returns to scale for large and small banks and constant returns 
to scale for mid-sized banks. 
Major criticism oflhis study related to use of earning assets as measure of 
output and this measure did not include all assets. Exclusion of other 
assets tended to exaggerate average unit cost oflarge. banks. 
As above. 
Large banks seem to have cost advantage over sma1l and medium-sized 
banks. 
Average cost decreased as bank size increased. Therefore larger banks 
had cost advantage over small banks. Major drawback of this stndy is 
giving same weight for bank's output. 
Regressing current operating expenses on the output measure indicated U-
shaped average cost curves in Kansas City District with optimal-size 
banks of approximately $300 million in deposits. Also, finding indicates 
cost reduction with increasing size of bank. Despite assigned weight for 
two outputs: lending output and all other. Lending output consists of 
many types and each type has different cost. 
Economies of scale present, but small for all banking services. Ranged 
5%- 8%. Benston marked new direction for bank cost literature by 
employing Cobb-Douglas cost function. However, this is restri~tive: can 
only show one of three possible outcomes- decreasing, constant or 
increasing average cost for all banks. Cannot show, for example, U-
shaped average cost curve, 
Constant return to scale for branches, while increasing retnm to scale for 
unit banks. 
(contmued) 
Table 3.1 Scale Economies Studies in US Banking (continued) 
Author Data Approach Main findings and notes 
Benson Data for 1978 on commercial Translog cost function Evidence of existence ofU-shaped average cost curves. Unit banks with 
Berger, banks up to $1 Billon in more than $50 million in deposit recorded diseconomies of scale, while 
Hanweck deposits. branches experienced small economies of scale. Translog cost function 
and allows for U- shaped average cost curves. However, one major shortcoming 
Humphrey oftranslog cost function: gives poor approximation when applied to banks 
(1983) of all sizes, because it forces large and small banks to lie on symmetric U-
shaped cost curves. 
Kolari and Data 1979-1983. Translog cost function Economies of scale for banks with up to $50 million deposits and 
Zardkoohi decreasing return to scale beyond $50 million. 
(1987) 
Aly, Data 1986 from 322 banks. Nonparametric approach (DEA) Economies of scale not more than 3%. To solve shortcomings oftranslog 
Grabowski, cost function, new generation of studies began to use A frontier approach, 
Pasurka and such asDEA. 
Rangan 
(1990) 
Source: Greenbaum (1967), Goddard et al. (200 I) 
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k' Table 3.2 Scale Economies StudIes m European Ban mg 
Author Data Approach Findings 
Gough(1979) Data related to UK building societies Regression analysis No evidence of scale economies for UK building societies. 
1972-1979. 
Barnes and Dodds (1983) Data from UK building societies 1970-78. Regression analysis No evidence of scale economies for UK building societies. 
Cooper (1980) Data 1977 from UK building societies. Cobb-Douglas cost Evidence of scale economies with assets less than £1 00 million, 
function and diseconomies of scale for larger building societies. 
Fanjul and Marvell (J 985) Sample of 83 Spanish commercial banks Cobb-DougIas cost Economies of scale in respect of accounts per branch and constant 
and 54 saving banks 1979. function return to scale with respect to number of branches. 
Hardwick(l989) Sample of79 UK building societies 1985. TransIog cost function Evidence of scale economies for relatively smaller building 
societies. 
Landi (1990) Data from 295 Italian banks 1987. Translog cost function Evidence of scale economies for all bank sizes. 
Pallage (1991) Sample of 576 Belgian commercial Translog cost function Evidence of scale economies for small banks; decreasing returns 
banks, 24 savings and 3 public credit to scale when size grows. 
institutions. 
Drake (1992) Data from 1988 annual accounts for Translog cost function Study shows mild economies of scale evident only for societies in 
sample of76 UK building societies. £120 - £500 million asset size range. 
Rodriguez, Alvares and Sample of 645 Spanish saving banks Translog cost function Economies of scale for medium-sized saving banks and 
Gomez (1993) 1990. diseconomies of scale for larger. 
Molyneux et al. (1996) Data from 20 I French, 196 German, 244 Translog cost function Results indicate noticeable differences in cost characteristics 
Italian and 209 Spanish banks 1988. between countries and small and large banks suffering from 
economies of scale. 
Ashton (1998) Data from British retail-banking sector Translog cost function Slight diseconomies of scale when using intermediation approach 
1987-95. in determining output but substantial diseconomies of scale when 
using production approach to measure bank's output. 
Cavallo and Rossi (2001) Data from 442 European banks 1992- Trans10g cost function Results support the view that the regulatory changes and 
1997 progresses in technology have contributed to raising the optimal 
scale. 
Source: Goddard et al. (200 I) and author updated. 
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Table 3.3 Efficiency tu leS ID an mg S d' . US B k' 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Berger and Humphrey SFA Data for 1980s To analyse effects of Dependent variables: total costs. Little change in technical 
(1992) deregulation on Outputs: real estate loans; commercial loans; efficiency and productivity 
efficiency individual loans. as a result of deregulation. 
Input prices: price oflabour; price of physical capital 
and price of funds. 
Humphrey TFA Data for 1977 To analyse effect of Dependent variables: total cost (interest and Productivity declined after 
(1993) and 1988 deregulation on cost operating expenses). deregulation. 
efficiency. Outputs: value of demand deposits; small time and 
savings deposits; reatestate loans; instalment loans 
and commercial and industrial loans. 
Input prices: price oflabour; price ofphysical 
capital; price of funds; deposit interest rate; 
purchased funds interest rate 
Control variables: number of branches, bank merger 
dummy variable and a time trend dummy variable. 
Elyasiani and Mehdian DEA Data for 1979 To analyse effect of Outputs: investments, real estate loans, commercial Technical efficiency 
(1995) and 1986 deregulation on and industrial loans and other loans. declined by 3 % after 
banks' efficiency. Inputs: deposits, capital and labour. deregulation. 
Evanoff (1999) SFA Sample of 164 To evaluate whether Dependent variable: total cost. Main rmdings: regulation 
US banks industry regulations Outputs: commercial and industrial loans, instalment distorted input prices and 
1972-1978. distort firm behaviour loans, real estate loans and investment. resulted in allocative 
and, as a result, Input prices: price of labour, price of physical capital inefficiencies. 
generate productive and price of funds. 
inefficiencies in mix 
of inputs used by 
banks. 
(contlDued) 
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Table 3.3 Efficiency Studies in US Bankin!! (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Wheelock and Wilson DEA Data 1984- To measure change in Outputs: real estate loans, commercial and industrial 1984 -1993, all banks of 
(1999) 1993 productivity of US loans, consumer loans, all other loans and demand different sizes experienced 
banks after deposits. decline in technical 
deregulation. Inputs: labour, physical capital and funds. efficiency. Also, 
productivity declined over 
same period. 
Berger and Mester TFA Data from all To examine how Dependent variables: total costs (operating and During 1991-1997, cost 
(2003) US banks performance of interest expenses), net profit before tax. productivity in banking 
1984, 1991 banking industry has Outputs: consumer loans, business loans, real estate industry worsened while 
and 1997. been affected by loans and investment. profit productivity improved 
changes in Input prices: price oflabour, price of core deposits substantially. 
technology, and price of funds. 
deregulation, Output prices: price of consumer loans, price 
competition and business loans, price of real-estate loans and price of 
changes in business securities. 
conditions. Control and environmental variables: off - balance 
sheet items, physical capital, equity, non-performing 
loans, real estate growth and concentration. 
Alam (2001) DEA Sample of US To test relationship Outputs: investments, real estate loans, commercial Productivity of banks rose 
banks whose between changes in and industrial loans, instalment loans. as effect of deregulation. 
assets exceed productivity as result Inputs: equity, capital, labour, funds. 
$500 million of deregulation and 
1980-1989. competition. 
(contmued) 
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Table 3.3 Efficiency Studies in US Banking (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Berger and De Young DFA Sample of US To assess effects of Dependent variables: total cost, net profit before tax. . Geographic expansion has 
(2001) banks 1993- geographic expansion Outputs: consumer loans, business loans, real estate positive effects on cost and 
1998. as result of loans and securities. profit efficiency. 
deregulation on Input prices: price oflabour, price of core deposits 
banks' cost and price of funds. 
efficiency. Control variables: off balance-sheet items, physical 
capitaL, equity, ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans, 
Mester SFA Data for 1051 To measure cost Dependent variable: total costs. Stock banks less efficient 
(1993) banks 1991. efficiency for mutual Outputs: loans, investment. than mutual banks". Also, 
and stock banks and Prices of inputs: price oflabour, price of physical results indicate banks with 
to investigate factors capital and price of funds. high equity more cost 
affecting cost Explanatory variables: non-performing loans, equity, efficient than banks with 
efficiency. ROA, loweauitv. 
Mester SFA Sample of214 To see impact of Dependent variable: total costs Quality and riskiness of 
(1996) banks 1991- quality and riskiness Outputs: real estate loans, commercial loans, banks' output has direct 
1992. of bank output on individual loans. effect on estimated cost 
estimated efficiency. Input prices: price oflabour, price of physical capital efficiency. 
and price of funds. 
Control variables: non-performing loans and 
financial capital. 
De Young and Nolle SFA Sample of62 To compare Dependent variable: profit after tax US-owned banks more 
(1996) foreign-owned efficiencies of Outputs: loans and investments. profit efficient than foreign-
banks and 240 foreign-owned banks Input prices: price ofloans, price of investment, owned banks. 
US-owned and US-owned banks price of funds, price of core deposits and price of 
banks 1985- labour. 
1990. Control variables: equity, cash to asset, non-
I performing loans, ROA, ROE and assets. 
(contmued) 
"Stock banks owned by shareholders, mutual banks owned by depositors. 
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Table 3.3 Efficiency Studies in US Banking (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Kwan and Eisenbeis. SFA Semi-annual To examine Dependent variable: total costs. Average small banking firm 
(1996) data for 254 relationship between Outputs: commercial loans, real estate loans, found to be relatively less 
bank holding X-efficiency and risk consumer loans, offbaJance-sheet items. efficient than average large 
companies taken by banks. Input prices: price oflabour, price of physical bank. Less efficient banking 
1986-1991, capital, price of funds. firms take more risks. 
grouped into Control variables: standard deviation of daily stock 
size - quartiles return, ratio of market value of equities to book value 
to allow for of total assets, ratio of equity to total assets, ratio of 
different loan provision to total loans. 
production 
technologies 
for each size 
class. 
Berger and Mester SFA, FDA Sample of To examine several Dependent variables: total costs, net profit. Three efficiency measures 
(1997) 6000 US banks possible sources of Outputs: consumer loans, business loans, (cost efficiency, profit 
1990-1995. differences in investments. efficiency and alternative 
measured efficiency. Input prices: price offunds, price of core deposits, profit efficiency) positively 
Differences in price oflabour. correlated to measure of 
efficiency concepts Output prices: price of consumer loans, price of performance (Le. ratio 
(Le. cost or profit business loans, price of securities. analysis). 
efficiency), in Control and environmental variables: off balance- Some market conditions 
measurement sheet items, equity, physical capital, non-performing (Le. concentration) impact 
methods (Le. SF A or loans, weighted average of non-performing loans for on efficiency scores. 
DEA) and differences state. 
in potential correlates 
of efficiency that may 
explain some 
efficiency 
differences. 
(contmued) 
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Table 3.3 Efficiency Studies in US Banking (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Mester (1997) SFA Sample of To estimate bank Dependent variable: total costs Results suggest it is important 
6630 V.S efficiency for VS Outputs: real estate loans, commercial loans, when studying X-efficiencies to 
banks 1991- banks by taking into individual loans. account for differences across 
1992. consideration Input prices: price oflabour, price of physical markets in which banks are 
heterogeneity factors capital, price of funds. operating 
by formulatiug two Control variables: non-performing loans, fmancial 
cost functions: one capital. 
for all banks in VS 
and separate cost 
function for each 
District. 
Bauer, Berger, Ferrier SFA, TFA, 683 V.S banks To evaluate extent to Dependent variable: total costs. Parametric approach (i.e. SF A, 
and Humpbrey FDA and over 12 years which all four main Outputs: real estate loans, instalment loans, TF A and FDA) tends to rank 
(1998) DEA 1977-1988. approaches to commercial loans. banks in same order, and 
estimating frontier Input prices: price oflabour, price of physical identify mostly same banks as 
efficiency (SF A, capital, price offunds. best practice and worst practice. 
TFA, FDA, DEA) Inputs: labour, physical capital, time deposits, DEA yields much lower 
consistent with each purchased funds. average efficiencies, ranks 
other in many banks differently and identifies 
conditions and in best and worst banks differently 
other performance from parametric methods. 
measures most useful When performing regulatory 
for regulatory analysis using many techniques, 
analysis. likely to be more helpful. 
De Young and Hassan SFA Sample of US To compare profit Dependent variable: profit before tax. Results suggest new banks need 
(1998) banks 1980- efficiency of old and Outputs: loans, transaction deposits, off-balance nine years to reach old banks' 
1994. new established sheet items. profit efficiency levels. 
banks. Input prices: price oflabour, price of physical 
capital, price of funds. 
Control variables: equity, concentration (i.e. 
Herfindahl Index), non-performing loans. 
(contmued) 
91 
Table 3.3 Efficiency Studies in US Banking (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Evanoff and Ors (2002) SFA Sample of US To evaluate impact of Dependent variables: total costs, profit before tax. Results consistent with 
banks 1984- actual and potential Input prices: price of labour, price of small deposits economic tbeory. As result 
1999. competition resulting (core deposits), price of purchased funds. of merger, banks responded 
from market entry Outputs: securities, loans, leases. to increased competition by 
mergers and Output prices: price of securities, price of loans, decreasing costs and 
acquisitions and price ofleases loans. increasing levels of 
reductions in entry Control variables: physical capital, fmancial (equity) efficiency. 
barriers on banks' capital, dummy variable for entry, dummy variable 
cost and profit for merger, concentration, age of bank, total assets. 
efficiencv. 
Fare, Grosskopf and DEA Random To measure profit Inputs: labour, capital, deposits. Results show allocative 
Weber (2004) samples of 856 efficiency in banking, Outputs: real estate loans, commercial and industrial inefficiency is larger source 
US banks using newly loans, personal loans, transaction demand deposits. of profit loss tban technical 
1990-1994. developed technique Input prices: price of labour, price of capital, price of inefficiency and risk-based 
(directional distance deposits. capital adequacy has 
function) to Output prices: prices of real estate loans, prices of significant negative impact 
determine effects of commercial loans, prices of personal loans, prices of on banks' allocative 
risk-based capital transaction demand deposits. efficiency. 
requirements on Control variable: equity. 
profit measurement 
and profit 
performance of US 
banks. 
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Table 34 Effi . S d· . E lClency tu les ID uropean B k· an mg 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Vassiloglou and DEA Sample from 20 To measure relative Inputs: number of hours per person, II branches out of 20 have technical 
Giokas branches in efficiency of bank monetary value of stationery, square metres inefficiencies. Average annual efficiency 
(1990) Athens area branches. of branch floor space, number of computer 0.9lfor all branches. 
1987. terminals at each branch. 
Outputs: number of transactions processed 
at each branch. 
Berg, F orsund, DEA Sample from 779 To investigate relative Inputs: labour and physical capital. Comparing best practice frontier highest 
Hjalmarsson and banks in Nordic efficiency of banking Outputs: total loans, total deposits and efficiency in Sweden (0.89) lowest in 
Suominen (1993) countries 1990. industry in Finland, number of branches. Finland (0.58). 
Norway and Sweden. 
Drake and DEA Sample of 190 To measure technical Inputs: number of interview rooms, number Results suggested that branches inefficient; 
Howcroft branches of a efficiency ofUK clearing of automatic tellers, floor area in square 56% exhibited relative technical efficiency, 
(1994) majorUK branches, dichotomised to metres, management grade, clerical grade, 8% branches exhibited scale inefficiency, 
clearing bank scale and pure technical stationery costs. 16% exhibited pure technical efficiency. 
1991. efficiency. Outputs: till transactions, lending products, 
deposit products, automated transfers, 
clearing items, ancillary business, and 
insurance business. 
Alien and Rai SFA,DFA Sample of 194 To estimate cost function Dependent variables: total costs (total DFA overestimated inefficiencies. Large 
(1996) banks from 24 for international banks operating expense and interest expense). banks experienced high inefficiency. No 
European and to test input and Outputs: loans, investment. evidence scale and scope economies. 
countries 1988- output inefficiencies. Prices ofInputs: price oflabour, price of 
1992. fixed capital, price of fund. 
Langand SFA Sample of757 To investigate economy Dependent variables: total costs (total Evidence of moderate scale economies for 
Welzel. (1996) German co- of scale, scope and cost operating expenses and interest expenses). all size classes, sign of economies of scale. 
operative banks efficiency in Germany Outputs: loans, inter-bank loans, Overall cost efficiency deviated from 
1989-1992. banking. investment, fees and commissions, revenue optimum. 
from sales of commodities. 
Prices ofInputs: price oflabour, price of 
fixed capital and price of fund. 
(contmued) 
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Table 3.4 Efficiency Studies in EUropean Banking~(continuedJ 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Altunbas, SFA Sample of3779 To investigate impact of Dependent variables: total costs (total Rate of reduction in costs due to 
Goddardand banks from 15 technical change on costs operating expenses and interest expenses). technical change increased 1989-
Molyneux European of European banks. Outputs: loans, investments, and offbalanc. 1996, large banks benefited more 
(1999) countries 1989- sheet items. than small bank. 
~ 1996. Prices ofInputs: price oflabour, price of 
fixed capital and price of funds. 
V ivas (1997) TFA Sample of 52 To determine how Dependent variable: profit before tax. Profit inefficiency of Spanish saving 
Spanish saving deregulation has affected Ontputs: loans, inter-bank loans, deposits. banks averaged 28%, falling by 40% 
banks, 1986- profit efficiency of Prices of input: price oflabour, price of 1986-199l. 
1991. Spanish saving banks. physical capital, price of funds. 
Control variables: value of physical capital, 
number of branches. 
Sheldon (1999) DEA Sample ofl783 To assess relative Inputs: interest costs, personal costs, Average frontier efficiency of 
EU commercial efficiency of banks across commission fees and trading expenses, European banks relatively low, 45% 
and saving banks Europe, in order to other operating and administrative from cost perspective and 65% from 
1993-1997. address following expenses, probability of insolvency. profit prospective. 
questions, How large is Outputs: net loans, other earning assets, off 
cost differential among balance-sheet items and deposits. 
banks in Europe? What 
are sources of the cost 
differentials? What 
implications do resnlts 
have for future structural 
change and policy? 
Altunbas, Evans SFA, FDA Sample 0[7539 To test differences in Dependent variables: total cost, (operating Little evidence to suggest privately-
and Molyneux Germany banks efficiency between and interest expenses), net profit. owned bank more efficient than 
(2001) 1989-1996. different ownership Outputs: mortgage loans, public loans, other mutual and public banks. Private and 
structures (private, public, loans, investment, off balance -sheet items. mutual banks appear to benefit from 
mutual) by estimating Prices of inputs: price of labour, price of economies of scale. 
frontier for each type. funds, and price of capital. 
Control variables: equity. 
(contmued) 
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Table 3.4 Efficiency Studies in European Banking (continued) 
Anthors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Altunbas, SFA Sample of 4104 To establish literature on Dependent variables: total cost (operating Scale economies widespread from 
Gardener, banks from 15 modelling cost and interest expenses). smallest banks, those in ECU have 
Molyneux and European characteristics of banking Outputs: loans, investment, and off balance- assets size of 1-5 billion. Typically, 
Moore (2001) countries 1989- markets by applying sheet items. scale economies are found to range 
1997. flexible Fourier functional Prices of input: price oflabour, price of between 5% and 7%, while X-
form to estimate scale funds, and price of capital. inefficiency measures appear to be 
economies and X- Control variables: equity. much larger, between 20% and 
inefficiencies. 25%. 
Vennet (2002) SFA Sample of2375 To analyse cost and profit Dependent variables: total cost (operating Conglomerates more revenue 
European banks efficiency of European and interest expenses), net profit efficient than specialised competitors 
from 17 financial conglomerates Outputs: loans and investment. and degree of both cost and profit 
countries 1995- and universal banks. Prices of inputs: price oflabour, price of efficiency higher in universal banks 
1996. funds, price of capital. than in non-universal bank. 
Control variable: equity. 
Griogorina DEA Sample of 1074 To consider differences in Inputs: labour, fixed assets, interest Results indicated foreign banks more 
(2002) banks from 17 commercial bank expenses. efficient than others. 
transition efficiency across outputs: 
countries 1995- transition countries Set 1: revenues, net loans, liquid assets. 
1998. against wide array of Set 2: deposits, net loans, liquid assets. 
variables describing Control variables: number of employees, 
macro environment and value of fixed assets, loans, deposits, equity, 
bank specific variables. liquid assets, dummy for foreign banks, 
dummy for old banks, market share of each 
. bank, GDP per capita, inflation . 
Maudos, Pastor DEA Sample of To investigate impact of Outputs: loans, investments. Results suggested specialisation an 
and Francisco Spanish banks specialisation on cost Inputs: labour, fund, physical capital. important factor explaining 
(2002) 1985-1996. efficiency. Prices of inputs: price oflabour, price of differences between banks in term of 
funds, price of capital. efficiency. For example the saving 
banks are less efficient than 
commercial banks. 
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Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Casu and DEA Sample of 530 To investigate whether Inputs: total costs, total deposits. Results suggested since EV single 
Molyneux banks from France, productive efficiency of Outputs: loans and other earning assets market programme: small improvement 
(2003) Germany, Italy, European banking has Control variables: dummy for in bank efficiency. In addition, ROE 
Spain and U.K improved as result of the countries, equity to assets, ROE, positively related to bank efficiency. 
1993-1997 creation of single internal dummy for commercial banks, dummy 
market and factors that have if bank listed on stock exchange. 
impacted on efficiency. 
Weill (2004) DEA, SFA, Vnconsolidated To investigate consistency Outputs: loans, investment assets Main fmdings tended to support lack of 
FDA accounting data for of efficient frontier Inputs: personnel expenses, other non- robustness of frontier approach (Le. the 
688 banks in methods. interest expenses, interest paid. ranking order between DEA and SF A is 
France, Germany, Input prices: labour, physical capital very low). 
Italy, Spain, and borrowed funds. 
Switzerland. 
Tortosa-Ausina DEA Sample of Spanish To investigate whether Outputs: loans, investments, off Inefficiencies large and seemed to 
(2004) banks 1995-1998. specialisation, ownership balance-sheet items. persist, despite competitive forces being 
type, size bias bank Inputs: labour, funds, physical capital. unrestrained. Ownership type, firm size 
efficiency. Prices of inputs: labour, funds, and and specialisation did not have absolute 
capital. effect on efficiency. 
Bos and Kool SFA Sample of 40 I To estimate standard Dependent variables: total costs, profit Vse of exogenous input prices, rather 
(2006) small co-operative stochastic profit and cost before tax. than endogenous particularly important 
banks in frontiers using exogenous Outputs: retail loans, wholesale loans, for cost frontiers as spread in cost 
Netherlands 1998 market determinant input mortgage loans, loans' provisions. inefficiencies becomes larger and more 
and 1999. prices in efficiency Prices of inputs: labour, funds, capital, plausible. 
estimation. equity, public relations. 
Casu and DEA Data from Bank To test relationship between Inputs: total costs. Findings seemed to suggest most 
Girardone Scope for 11000 competition, concentration Outputs: loans, other earning assets. efficient banking systems also most 
(2006) observations from and efficiency in European competitive. Relationship between 
15 European banking market. competition and efficiency not 
countries 1997- straightforward: increased competition 
2003. has forced banks to become more 
I efficient but increased efficiency does 
not seem to be fostering more 
competition in EV banking system. 
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Table 3.4 Efficiency Studies in European BankingJ continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Fiorentino, SFA, DEA Data from To compare efficiency Dependent variable: total costs Results showed very low consistency 
Karmann and Deutsche scores obtained from DEA (operating and interest costs). between SF A and DEA measures, 
Koetter Bundesbank 1993- and SFA. Outputs: inter-bank loans, commercial especially when applied to entire panel 
(2006) 2004. loans securities. sample. Mean of cost efficiency 
Inputs: fixed assets, employees, funds. according to SFA substantially higher 
Input prices: fixed assets. labour, funds. when compared to DEA. 
Bos, Koetter, SFA Sample of Gennan To investigate impact of Dependent variables: total costs, net Cost and profit efficiency scores 
Kolari and Kool cooperative and heterogeneity among banks profit. underestimated when not allowing for 
(2009) savingbanks 1993- regarding estimated cost and Outputs: inter-bank loans, customers' heterogeneity among banks. 
2005. profit efficiency, by one- loans, and investment. 
stage analysis. Inputs prices: funds, labour, capital. 
Control variables: equity, banks type, 
regional location, size. 
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Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Zaim DEA Sample of42 Impact of Outputs: demand deposits, time deposits, Turkish banks experienced improved 
(1995) banks 1981 and liberalisation policies loans. efficiency in more liberalised banking 
56 banks 1990 on efficiency of Inputs: number of employee, interest environment. In addition, state banks more 
Turkish banks. expenses, depreciation, expenditure on efficient than private banks. 
furniture. 
Hardy and di Patti FDA Sample of33 To investigate effects Dependent variables: profit/total assets, Main effect of financial reform was 
(2001) Pakistani banks of financial reforms costltotal assets, revenueltotal assets. increase in both revenue and cost. Public 
1981-1997. on the Pakistani Outputs: earning assetsltotal assets. sector and privatised banks made progress 
banks' efficiency. Output price: interest receipt/ earning in improving cost efficiency and relative 
assets. profitability improved. 
Input prices: interest costs/earning 
liabilities, other costs/earning liabilities. 
Control and environmental variables: 
capital and reserves/total assets, inter bank 
borrowing! deposits, growth in GDP. 
Isik and Hassan DEA Data for all To explore impact of Outputs: loans, off balance-sheet items, Public banks and foreign banks were more 
(2003) Turkish banks ownership structure, other earning assets. efficient than private ones, in terms of cost 
1988 -1996. market structure, Inputs: labour, capital and funds. and technical efficiency. Also, bank size 
corporate control and did not seem to be strongly correlated with 
other bank traits on cost efficiency. Banks' performance 
bank efficiency. improved after implementation of 
financial deregulation. 
Sturm and Williams DEA, SFA Data for 39 To investigate impact Inputs (model I): employee numbers, Foreign banks more efficient than 
(2004) Australian banks of foreign bank entry deposits and borrowed funds, equity domestic banks. 
1988-2001. on banking efficiency capital. Entry of foreign banks contributed 
in Australia. Outputs (model 2): loan advances and oth~r positively to increasing efficiency levels 
receivables, off balance-sheet activity of Australian banks. 
measured as commitroents and contingent 
liabilities. 
Inputs (model 2): interest expenses, non-
interest expenses. 
Outputs (model 2): net interest income, 
non-interest income 
(contmued) 
98 
Table 3.5 Efficiency Studies in Other Countries and Developing Countries Bankin~ (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Hao, Hunter and SFA Sample of 19 To investigate impact Dependent variable: total costs. Average efficiency scores for Korean 
Won Keun Yang private Korean of deregulation on Outputs: loans and securities, demand banks 87 %. No impact of financial 
(2001) banks 1985- banks' efficiency and deposits, and fee incomes. deregnlation on cost efficiency. Banks 
1995. factors impacting on Inputs prices: price of fund, price oflabour with high rates of growth more 
efficiency scores. and price of capital. efficient, and bank efficiency 
Second stage analysis Control variables: equity, age of banks, total positively correlated with foreign 
used. assets, growth rate of total assets over the equity ownership. 
previous 12 months, ratio of salary to total 
assets; the ratio of total employees to total 
assets, ratio of demand deposit to total 
deposits, non-interest income over operating 
profits. 
Rao (2005) SFA Data from 37 To investigate cost Dependent variable: total cost (operating and Cost inefficiencies ranging 20%-25%. 
UAE 1998-200l. efficiency ofUAE expenses costs). Local banks more cost efficient than 
banks, and to show Outputs: investments, loans and off-balance foreign banks. 
whether local banks sheet items. 
are less or more Input prices: price of funds and price of 
efficient than foreign labour. 
banks. Also, to Control variables: type of banks (foreign, 
determine factors that domestic), year dummies, default risk (ratio of 
impact on cost loan loss provision/total loans), liquidity risk 
efficiency by (ratio of cash and dues from banks/total 
employing second assets), capital risk (ratio of equity to capital), 
stage analysis. ratio of retail deposits to total deposits, and 
ratio of net loans to total earning assets. 
Lin (2005) SFA Sample of46 To evaluate effects of Dependent variable: total cost (operating and Banks' cost efficiency improved if 
Taiwanese bank mergers on expenses costs). bank mergers happened between banks 
commercial bank efficiency. Output: loans. with different cultural backgrounds. 
. banks 1997- Input prices: price of funds, price oflabour However, if mergers occurred between 
1999. and price of capital. homogeneous banks, little 
Control variables: non-performing loans ratio, improvement in cost efficiency. 
loan to deposit ratio, total assets and dummy 
variable for merger. 
(contmued) 
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Table 3.5 Efficiency Studies in Other Countries and Developing Countries Banking (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Williams and Nguyen SFA Sample of231 To investigate impact of Dependent variable: net profit. Results indicated bank 
(2005) commercial deregulation on alternative Outputs: loans, other earning assets, and non- privatisation increased banks' 
banks from profit efficiency and to interest income. performance. Also, results 
South-East Asia investigate impact of Price of inputs: price of funds, price of labour indicated foreign banks more 
1990-2003. control and environmental and price of capital. efficient than domestic banks. 
variables on estimated Control and environmental variables: equity, 
profit efficiency, using one- credit risk (loan reserve/loans), market risk 
stage analysis. (interbank loans/interbank loans and securities), 
liquidity risk (gross loans/customer deposits), 
capital risk (equity/assets), GDP per capita, 
population density (popUlation per km), deposit 
density (deposits per km). 
Havrylchyk (2006) DEA Data for all To investigate efficiency of Outputs: Loans, treasury bonds and off balance Foreign banks more efficient 
Polish banks for Polish banks and role of sheet items. than domestic banks. 
1997- 2001. foreign banks in Poland. Inputs: deposits, fixed assets and labour. 
Prices of inputs: price of deposits, price of fixed 
assets, price oflabour. . 
Control variables: dummy variable for foreign 
bank, dummy variable for state banks, dummy 
variable for listing banks, dummy variable for 
home country of foreign banks, growth in total 
assets, non-performing loans, loan to total 
assets and variation on ROA. 
AtauIlah, Cockerill DEA Data for Test hypothesis regarding Inputs: operating and interest expenses. Improvement in technical 
and Le Hang (2004) Pakistani and possibility of relationship Outputs: loans and advances, investment. efficiency of banks, especially 
Indian banks for between economic reforms of foreign banks, after 
1988 - 1998. and bank efficiency. economic reform. 
Relationship between 
measured efficiency, bank 
specific factors, 
environmental factors. 
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Table 3.5 Efficiency Studies in Other Countries and Developing Countries Banking (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Kwan (2006) SFA Data from 59 To investigate cost Dependent variable: total cost (operating and expenses Average X-inefficiency 
Hong Kong efficiency of multi-branch costs). in Hong Kong bank 
banksI992-1999. operation in Hong Kong. Input prices: price of funds, price of labour, price of about 16-30%. Large 
capital. banks less efficient than 
Outputs: loans to finance imports,exports, re-exports, smaller bank. 
merchandising trade, loans for non-trade-related 
financing, other earning assets. 
Control variables: ·bank size, deposit-ta-asset ratio, 
ratio of trade-related loans to total assets, ratio of non-
trade-related loans to total assets, ratio of loan-loss 
provision to total loans, ratio of off balance-sheet 
activities to total assets, loan growth. 
Drake, Hall, and DEA Data from To study effects of impact Outputs: net interest income, net commissions, totals Macroeconomic 
Simper (2006) sample of Hong of macroeconomic factors other income, variables have 
Kong banks on levels of efficiency. Inputs: employee expenses, other non-interest significant impacts on 
1995-2002. expenses, and loan loss provisions. efficiency levels of 
Macroeconomic variables: private consumption Hong Kong banks. For 
expenditure, government expenditure, net export of example the South East 
goods, net export of services, discount window base Asian financial crisis, 
rate, unemployment levels, expenditure in housing and affect negatively ou 
current account balance. efficiency score. 
Regulatory variables: dummy variables for some years. 
Kraft, Hofler and SFA Data from To investigate effects of Dependent variable: total cost (operating and expenses foreign banks proved 
Payne Croatian banks privatisation and foreign costs). more efficient than 
(2006) 1994-2000. banks' entry on efficiency Input prices: price of funds, price of labour and price of local banks. 
levels oflocal banks. capital. Liberalisation did not 
Outputs: loans to enterprise, loans to household, improve efficiency 
deposits to enterprise. levels for local banks. 
Control variables: total assets, total capital, and dummy 
variable for private banks, dummy variable for new 
banks, and dummy variable for foreign banks. 
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Table 3.5 Efficiency Studies in Other Countries and Developing Countries Banking (continued) 
Authors Approach Sample Nature of Study Variables Main Findings 
Cumhur Erdem and DEA Data from To investigate impact of Inputs: labour, physical capital and funds. Average banks' efficiency 
Meziyat Sema Erdem Turkish banks banking crises in 2000 and Outputs: profit before tax. decreased from 0.71 in 
(2008) whose stocks are 2001, on level of banks' 1999 to 0.54 in 2001 and 
traded in Turkish efficiency. then started to increase, 
financial market indicating financial crises 
1998-2004. affected efficiency scores 
ofTurkish banks. 
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Chapter 4 The Jordanian Banking Sector 1993-2006 
4.1 Introduction 
A higher degree of competition and efficiency in the banking system can contribute to 
greater financial stability, product innovation and easier access to financial services, 
which in turn can improve the prospect of economic growth (Molyneux et al., 1996). 
The concern is that government intervention within a banking system is seen as a main 
factor for poor performance and low efficiency levels within banks (Kumbhakar and 
Sarkar, 2003). In this respect, it is important to identify the various reforms and 
measures that have taken place in Jordan to promote competition and efficiency in the 
banking system. The main purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide an overview 
of the banking system in Jordan and the main measures put in place to deregulate it. The 
main characteristics and evolution of the system will also be outlined. 
Section 4.2 gives a brief overview of the Jordanian economy. Section 4.3 presents an 
overview of the Jordanian banking system and the main measures taken to deregulate it. 
Section 4.4 reviews the structure of Jordanian banking in terms of ownership structure 
and different kinds of banks. This section also shows how the balance sheet and income 
statement structure of banks has changed during 1993-2006 as a result of the 
deregulation. Section 4.5 shows the performance of the Jordanian banks based on ratio 
analysis. Section 4.6 outlines the development of competition in the Jordanian banking 
market. 
4.2 Brief Overview of the Jordanian Economy 
Jordan is a low-middle-income country with a nominal per capita income estimated at 
about $2,515 in 2006 (World Bank, 2006) with a relatively small economy with 
abundant skilled human resources and limited natural resources (Alissa, 2007). To 
maintain its social and economic well-being, Jordan relies heavily on external resources 
such as foreign aid, remittance of Jordanians working abroad and external loans (Alissa, 
2007). 
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McDermott (1996) pointed out that historically Jordan's economic performance was 
robust from 1970 to the mid- I 980s as a result of flow of aid from rich Arab countries 
and of remittances of Jordanians working in these countries. The real gross domestic 
product (GDP) rose by 9.5 per cent a year in the years 1976-1980. However, with the 
economic slowdown in the Gulf as a result of the decrease of international oil prices 
after 1983, the availability of external resources to Jordan became more limited, demand 
for Jordanian products and workers in the Gulf declined and remittances from abroad 
became more volatile and dropped by 38 per cent from more than $1.2 billion in 1984 to 
around $900 million in 1988 (Alissa, 2007). Given these changes, Jordan faced 
mounting balance-of-payments problems, increased unemployment caused by the lack 
of job opportunities in the Gulf and increased external debt. Moreover, in 1989 the 
Jordanian economy faced a major crisis when the Jordanian Dinar (JOD) suffered a: 
major devaluation (i.e. the JOD lost 51 % of its value against the US Dollar), total 
government debt reached 197 per cent of GDP and the country's reserves of foreign 
currency declined sharply (Isik et aI., 2004). 
The Jordanian economy was in the process of collapse and, in 1989, real GDP shrank by 
10.7 per cent, the inflation rate increased to 25.7 per cent and the budget deficit, 
excluding grants, reached 24 per cent of GDP (Alissa, 2007). As a result, since 1989, 
Jordan has been implementing, with the aid of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (WB) strong stabilisation and structural reform programmes. The 
major goals ofthese programmes were to strengthen state revenues while reducing state 
expenditures by implementing long-term policies such as privatising state industries, 
introducing new taxes, freezing public sector salaries and liberalising the financial 
system (Isik et aI., 2004). Table 4.1 shows key macroeconomic indicators of Jordan 
from 1989 to 2006. As the table indicates, as a result of implementing the structural 
reform programmes, a number of important areas have been satisfying. Real GDP grew 
from a negative value in 1989 to a positive value after 1991. The GDP growth rate 
reached 14 per cent in 1992 and in 1993-2006 was 5.1 per cent. The percentage of 
external debt to GDP decreased from 197 per cent in 1989 to 62 per cent in 2006. 
Excluding grants, the budget and current account deficits were reduced from over 25.66 
per cent of GDP at the beginning of the programme (i.e. 1989) to 3.81 per cent in 1992. 
However, the deficits in current account began to rise after 1993 to reach 18.04 per cent 
in 2003. This increase could be attributed to the slowdown of growth in internal 
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revenues. Foreign currency reserves grew from 1055 MJOD in 1993 to 4779 MJOD in 
2006. This could be attributed to many reasons such as the increase in Jordan's exports 
and the removal of restrictions on the foreign exchange system, as will be explained 
later when discussing deregulation measures. The foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows to the country increased rapidly after 1997 as a result of removing the 
restriction on foreign ownership, as will be discussed later. Moreover, inflation was 
reduced from 25.6 per cent in 1989 to an average of2.9 per cent between 1993-2006. 
Table 4.1 Macroeconomic's Indicators of Jordan 1989-2006 
Foreign 
GOP Foreign direct 
constant GOP External External Reserve investment 
price in growth debt in debt as % Deficits as "in net flow 
Year MJOO' rate (%) MJOO' ofGDP %ofGDP"' MJOO' (MJOO)' 
1989 3428.70 -10.70 6745.30 197 24 NA ·0.71 
1990 3419.30 ·0.27 5765.30 169 11.00 NA 26.94 
1991 3474.30 1.61 4973.90 143 11.67 NA -8.51 
1992 3972.80 14.35 4577.60 115 3.81 NA 29.07 
1993 4151.10 4.50 3640.20 88 4.89 NA -24.11 
1994 4358.10 4.99 5253.30 121 6.69 1055.80 2.13 
1995 4627.70 6.19 5186.50 112 6.26 1224.60 9.22 
1996 4724.30 2.09 5056.70 107 7.57 1442.30 1l.34 
1997 4880.50 3.31 5348.80 110 11.75 2151.80 255.95 
1998 5027.60 3.01 5391.80 107 12.20 1681.70 219.79 
1999 5198.00 3.39 5350.40 103 10.43 2162.00 112.02 
2000 5418.70 4.25 4969.80 92 10.98 2406.60 577.84 
2001 5704.20 5.27 5043.50 88 11.53 2280.40 127.62 
2002 6034.10 5.78 5510.10 91 12.46 2953.00 86.50 
2003 6286.30 4.18 5333.70 85 18.04 4005.70 314.09 
2004 6822.80 8.53 4998.10 73 15.14 4059.00 578.54 
2005 7378.60 8.15 5164.30 70 13.24 4082.00 1257.77 
2006 7967.00 7.97 4911.80 62 9.39 4779.00 2282.27 
.. Real m mllhon ofJordaman dmar MJOD and the JOD equals lAl US dollars. 
2 Values in nominal terms. 
Inflation in 
percentage 
25.60 
16.20 
8.20 
4.00 
3.20 
3.60 
2.20 
6.60 
3.00 
3.10 
0.60 
0.70 
1.80 
1.80 
1.60 
3.40 
3.50 
6.25 
'Deficits equal revenues excluding external and internal debt minus expenditures in nominal terms. 
4 Values in nominal terms. 
5 Values in nominal terms. 
Source: Yearly Statistical Series, CBJ (2008). 
4.3 Overview of the Banking System in Jordan 1993-2006 
Bank 
Assets 
as%of 
GOP 
1l0.25 
119.62 
161.16 
158.86 
144.03 
153.25 
162.63 
165.61 
176.54 
187.47 
200.77 
211.75 
219.87 
219.17 
219.64 
235.83 
262.19 
282.70 
The introduction of the banking system into Jordan dates back to 1925 when the British 
Ottoman Bank opened in Amman and acted as fiscal agent to the government in the 
absence of a central bank. The first national bank established in Jordan was the Arab 
Bank. This bank was established in Jerusalem in 1930 and moved its headquarters to 
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Amman after the 1948 war between the Arabs and Israelis (Miani and Daradkah, 2008). 
Up to forty years ago, banking in Jordan was insignificant. Some foreign banks had 
branches in order to facilitate trade finance and to serve foreign workers in the region 
but local banks were scarce and their role in the economy was very limited. Since 1970 
and the discovery of oil in the Middle East, Jordan has undergone a process of 
significant economic change: during the 70's and 80's, the banking sector doubled its 
loans and deposits. Also, during this period, the number of banks doubled as the 
govenunent identified banking services as a key player in its economic development 
policy (Saleh and Zeitun, 2006). The number of banks before 1970 was 8, 4 of these 
were foreign. During the 1970's, 6 new banks were established in Jordan: 5 national and 
1 foreign. During the 1980's and 1990's, another 6 banks were established in Jordan, all 
of them national banks. During the 2000's, 3 foreign banks opened in Jordan. 
The banking and financial system products and services fonnulated of 17 per cent of 
Jordan's GDP and the value of Jordanian banks' assets exceeded GDP for all years 
1993-2006. This gives an indication of the crucial role that the banking system is 
playing in the economic development and growth of Jordan. 
There were 23 banks operating in Jordan at the end of 2006, 8 of which were foreign 
and 2 Islamic. Licensed banks operate 456 branches in Jordan and 125 outside the 
country, 61 of which are in Palestinian territories (Table 4.2 shows a profile of 
Jordanian banks). 
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Table 4 2 Profiles of Jordanian Banks 
Bank Name Year of Financial Capital Ownership Type of Branches Branches 
Foundation (MJOD) Structure Bank Local Abroad 
Bank of Jordan 1960 86 Jordanian 78% Commercial 44 7 
Foreigners 22% 
Jordan National Bank 1956 110 Jordanian 76 % Commercial 42 14 
Foreigners 23% 
HSBC 1949 14 Foreigners 100% Commercial 2 -
Rafdien 1957 10 Foreigners 100% Commercial 1 -
Arab Bank 1930 356 Jordanian 43% Commercial 82 96 
Foreigners 57% 
Arab EJ;!;votian Bank 1951 20 Foreigners 100% Commercial 8 -
Cairo Amman Bank: 1960 67.5 Jordanian 77% Commercial 36 16 
Foreigners 23% 
Standard Chartered 1969 13 Foreigners 100% Commercial 8 
-
City Bank 1974 23,5 Foreigners 100% Commercial 2 -
Jordan Kuwait Bank 1977 75 Jordanian 42.2% Commercial 34 3 
Foreigners 58% 
Jordan Commercial Bank 1978 57.5 Jordanian 74% Commercial 24 3 
(Gulf Bank) Foreigners 26% 
Arab Investment Bank 1978 44 Jordanian 76% Investment 8 I 
Foreigners 22% 
Jordan Islamic Bank 1979 64,1 Jordanian 38% Islamic 54 0 
Foreigners 62% 
Housing Bank 1974 250 Jordanian 22% Commercial 96 7 
Foreigners 76% 
Jordan Bank for Investment 1989 33 Jordanian 89 % Investment 7 o . 
and Finance Foreigners 11% 
ABC 1989 44,8 Jordanian 11 % Commercial 12 0 
Foreigners 89% 
Union Bank 1991 55 Jordanian 66 % Investment 12 I 
Foreigners 34% 
Societe General 1993 27 Jordanian 42% Commercial 16 -
Foreigners 54% 
Capital Bank 1996 116 Jordanian 80% Investment 5 -
Foreigners 20% 
International Arabic Islamic 1998 40 Jordanian 100010 Islamic 11 0 
Bank 
National Bank of Kuwait 2004 50 Foreigners 100% Commercial 1 
-
Audi Bank 2004 20 Foreigners 100% Commercial 7 -
Blom Bank 2004 20 Foreigners 100% Commercial 3 -
Source: Central Bank of Jordan (2007) 
The banking system is regulated by the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), the governmental 
monetary institution dominating the banking and monetary system of Jordan. The CBJ, 
established in 1964, is the only authority responsible for controlling monetary policy 
and the banking system in Jordan: it is managed by a Board of Directors consisting of 8 
people, 3 of whom are senior managers within the CBJ. The boards of the CBJ are 
appointed by the Ministry Council. According to Standard and Poor's (2007), the CBJ is 
regarded as one of the most conservative and proactive regulators in the Middle East. 
The CBJ periodically updates commercial bank regulations, in order to ensure that the 
interests of the public are protected. The CBJ regulations aim to: 
Enhance banks' risk-monitoring systems through enhancing the role of risk 
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management at each bank. 
Improve bank reporting and data warehousing through adopting the international 
accounting standards (e.g. IAS 39). 
Provide incentives for stronger compliance and governance practices. 
Improve bank risk management practice. 
Provide sound international supervision practice. 
During the past ten years, the CBJ has revised some of its regulations and has adopted 
the Basel guidelines for effective supervision of corporate governance, cross-border 
supervision, internal control, risk management and Basel n39• The development of 
monetary policy in Jordan may be divided into two stages: the first (1964-1990) and 
second (1991-present). In the first stage, the CBJ used direct and traditional monetary 
tools (e.g. fixing interest rates, reserve requirement ratio) to control the operation of the 
banking system (Miani and Daradkah, 2008). The Jordanian banking industry served as 
an agent of the government, channelling investment funds to selected sectors under the 
country's economic development policy (e.g. banks were required to invest 8% of their 
deposits in government bills and bonds and to invest at least 15% of their capital in the 
public and mixed sectors), whilst imposing many requirements and restrictions on 
banking activities (Maghyereh, 2002). The CBJ implemented a direct management 
control to determine the size, cost and direction of credit facilities and restructure the 
financial portfolio of the banks. For example, the CBJ determined lending limits for 
banks, set a ceiling on interest rates for loans and deposits, restricted entry into the 
Jordanian banking market, imposed high reserve requirement ratios and tight 
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions (Karasneh et al., 1997). As mentioned 
earlier, in 1989 Jordan faced a crisis and as a result the banking sector suffered from 
problems such as an increase in the ratio of non-performing loans. This subsequently 
led to serious consequences for the banking industry and the collapse of many Jordanian 
Banks (e.g. Petra Bank, Islamic National Bank, Amman Bank) (AI-Jarrah, 2002). 
The second stage (1991-present) was influenced by the crisis of 1989 and, as mentioned 
earlier, the Jordanian Government started to co-operate with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in order to develop a structural reform 
39 Basel II takes a three-piIlar approach to regulatory capital measurement and capital standards: PiIlar I 
(minimum capital requirements), Pillar 2 (supervisory process) and Pillar 3 (market discipline and 
disclosures) (for more detail, see Basel, 2004). 
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programme. The liberalisation of the banking system in Jordan was a part of this and 
was aimed to improve the structure and efficiency of Jordanian banks (Crane et aI., 
2003). In the early 1990's, the CB] initiated a series of financial sector reforms. Table 
4.3 shows the main deregulation process initiated by the CB] over the period 1990-2006. 
In February 1991, with the removal of interest rates ceilings on deposits and credit the 
CB] adopted a floating policy in respect of both debit and credit market interest rates. 
The CB] now lets market forces (supply and demand) determine the market interest 
rates by providing signals through open market operations 40 and the first open market 
instrument used by the CBJ, in 1991, was treasury bill auctions (CB], 2004). This aimed 
to bring about the wider role of market forces to influence treasury bill rates and 
facilitate the use of the indirect techniques (e.g. certificate of deposits) of monetary 
control. 
In 1993, the CB] introduced another indirect instrument by issuing its own certificates 
of deposit (CD) to mop up excess liquidity within banks (CBJ, 2004): the issuing of the 
CD allowed banks to invest their excess liquidity and get extra returns. In addition, the 
CB] exempted banks from paying reserve requirements on purchas~d CDs and offered 
to re-purchase them from banks. Since 1993, in an effort to motivate the banks to 
produce a variety of products and services (e.g. foreign-investment products) and to 
manage their risks, the CB] has allowed banks to manage foreign-investment portfolios 
on the basis of margin trading for non-resident customers41 (in 1996, the CB] allowed 
banks to offer this service to resident customers). The CB] has also allowed banks to 
use market derivatives, such as option and future contracts, to hedge their positions on 
foreign currency. Before 1995, banks were required to seek CBJ approval for any loans 
exceeding 100,000 JOD and this restriction aimed to determine the scope of credit 
facilities offered by banks which meant that they did not have the potential to expand 
their loans and thus enhance their revenue. In 1995, the CB] gave bank management 
greater autonomy to grant loans without prior approval of the CB] but with some 
restrictions (see Table 4.4), and in 1996 the CBJ took greater steps to dereguIate the 
banking system. Mandatory reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits fell from 
35 per cent to 14 per cent and banks were allowed to use 20 per cent of the reserve 
40 Buying and selling government securities by the CBJ, such as treasury bills and certificates of deposits 
to control the money supply and give signals about the level of interest rates. 
41 Non-resident customers represent those having accounts in foreign currency and whose sources of 
funds in these accounts are outside Jordan. 
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requirements in the inter-bank market. This allowed banks more funds to invest in loans 
and other investments, which in turn could lead to an improvement in the banks' 
revenue. In November 1996, the CBJ began to publish the weighted average interest 
rates of inter-bank loans and this disclosure helped banks to increase their effectiveness 
in managing assets and liabilities. The year 1997 saw the allowing of foreigners to 
invest over 50 per cent of their capital in Jordanian banks and, in March 1997, the 
maximum limit of 49 per cent regarding direct foreign investment and stock purchase 
was eliminated (Isik et aI., 2004). This led to the raising of foreign shares in Jordanian 
banks from 31 per cent in 1996 to 45 per cent in 1997, increasing to 55 per cent in 2006. 
Furthermore, the CBJ removed all restrictions on foreign exchange systems in 1997 
(CBJ, 2004). The main measures taken in 1997 included: 
Opening of non-resident accounts in Jordanian dinars and or / foreign currency; 
Allowing resident account holders to maintain an account in foreign currencies 
of any amount; 
Transferring the value of imports to foreign beneficiaries without CBJ approval; 
Removing all restrictions on money transferred out of Jordan; 
Reducing all reserve requirements on deposits in foreign currency and JOD 
reduced from 14 per cent to 12 per cent. This gradual reduction was designed to 
lower the cost of funds for banks, increase banking sector liquidity and induce 
banks to lower their lending rates and expand credit facilities. 
To promote the development ofthe money market, the CBJ introduced another indirect 
instrument in February 1998, by opening an overnight deposit facility. The use of this 
facility gave the banks an opportunity to employ their excess liquidity and earn extra 
income, which in turn could help the banks to enhance their profits. In addition, the 
facility would increase the effectiveness of the monetary policy in directing interest 
rates towards their market rate (CBJ, 2004). Additionally, to promote competition, a 
licence was given to two new local banks operating in Jordan, one of which was an 
Islamic bank. In 2000, the CBJ deregulation process was continued through the 
following measures: 
Greater autonomy was given to bank management in deciding the price of 
commission and other banking fees. In addition, the CBJ commission regarding 
money transferred out of Jordan was cancelled; 
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CBJ allowed banks to own insurance companies ( fuil ownership); 
CBJ adopted the International Accounting Standard (IAS) (IAS 39), a unified 
disclosure for all Jordanian banks, which would help in increasing competition 
between them. IAS 39 allows banks to recognise unrealised profits from 
financial instruments (e.g. trading and held-to-maturity investments). Allowing 
banks to recognise unrealised profits means that banks can increase their profits; 
CBJ allowed banks to take open positions in foreign currency (short or long-
position) for the purpose of trading; 
In an effort by the CBJ to promote competition in the banking market, banks 
were required to publish their prime lending rate. 
In 2000, the CBJ introduced the new banking law that has widened the scope of banking 
services in Jordan towards a 'universal banking' concept. This new law has impacted on 
many banking issues, such as protecting deposits (i.e. establishing the Deposit Insurance 
Company), protection against loan concentration, and it also outlines advice on new 
banking practices (e.g. e-commerce and e-banking) (CBJ, 2000). 
In 2003, in an effort to promote and enhance competition within the Jordanian banking 
industry, the CBJ allowed three branches of foreign banks to operate in Jordan. These 
belong to a large financial institution in the Middle-East area and have a strong financial 
position and good risk management practices and the CBJ hoped that their introduction 
would help in promoting competition in the Jordanian banking market and in motivating 
existing banks to operate more efficiently, in order to be able to compete with the new 
banks. The CBJ also reduced the general provision 42 on loans from 2 per cent to I per 
cent. 
42 General provisions or general loan-loss reserves are created against the possibility of future losses of 
loans. This provision is different from specific provision created against overdue loans. 
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T bl 43 D I' M . J d 1993 2006 a e . er~~u atlOn easures III or an -
Year Deregulation Measures 
1991 Interest rates fully liberalised. In February 1991, CBJ adopted floating policy with respect to 
both debit and credit market interest rates. Consequently, market forces (supply & demand) 
now determine market interest rates in Jordan. CBJ provides signals regarding interest rates to 
licensed banks through its indirect monetary policy, using different instruments. 
1991 Treasury bill auctions introduced, in order to bring about wider role for market forces to 
influence treasury bill rates and to facilitate use of indirect techniques of monetary control. 
1993 CBJ issued its own certificate of deposits (CD) to mop up excess liquidity as indirect technique 
of monetary control. In addition, CBJ exempted banks from paying reserve requirements on 
purchased CD's. At same time, CBJ offered to re-purchase COs from banks. 
1993 CBJ allowed banks to manage foreign investment portfolios on basis of margin trading. In 
addition, CBJ permitted banks to use market derivatives, such as option and future contracts, to 
hedge their positions on foreign currency. 
1995 Ceilings on credit extended by banks eliminated. 
1996 Foreign exchange system partially liberalised through: (I) mandatory reserve requirement for 
foreign currency deposits reduced from 35 per cent to 14 per cent, (2) banks permitted to use 
20 per cent of reserves in their inter-bank market. 
1996 The CBJ permitted swap operations in foreign exchange, in order to enhance the efficiency of 
the foreign exchange market. 
1996 Weighted average of interest rates of inter-bank loans announced by the CBJ. 
1997 Maximum limit of 49% regarding size ofFDI in Jordanian Banks eliminated. 
1997 CBJ fully removed all restrictions from foreign exchange system. Main measures taken: 
- Non-resident accounts could be opened in Jordanian dinars and or I foreign currency. 
-
Resident account holders could maintain account holding any amount of foreign 
currency. 
- Value of imports to foreign beneficiaries no longer subject to CBJ approval. 
- Removal of restrictions on transferring money out of Jordan. 
1997 On-site and off-site d"Partments of CBJ merged into one department - supervision department. 
1998 CBJ introduced overnight deposit facility. Banks could use this to manage excess liquidity 
better. 
2000 Greater autonomy given to bank management in deciding price of commission and other 
banking services. In addition, commission on transfer of the money out of Jordan cancelled by 
CBJ. 
2000 CBJ allowed banks to own insuring subsidiary companies (full ownership). 
2000 CBJ adopted International Accounting Standard (IAS 39) which unified disclosure for all 
Jordanian banks. In addition to this, IAS 39 allowed banks to recognise unrealised profit from 
financial instruments (e.g. trading and held-to-maturity investments) 
2000 CBJ allowed banks to take open positions in foreign currency. Moreover, allowed banks to take 
position on derivatives, for purposes of trading. 
2000 To enhance competition between banks, CBJ imposed on them publication of periodical prime 
lendingrate. 
2000 CBJ issued new banking law widening scope of banking services in Jordan towards 'universal 
banking' 43 concept. Law also emphasised many issues to help in strengthening banks' 
soundness, such as C9TPorate Governance. 
2000 Deposit Insurance Company established. 
2001 CBJ exempted COs issued in Jordanian Dinars bv banks from reserve requirements. 
2003 CBJ allowed additional three foreign banks to operate in Jordanian banking market. 
2003 CBJ reduced general provision on loans from 2 per cent to I per cent. 
Source. CBJ (2004) 
To sum up, the deregulation process undertaken by the CBJ can be divided into three 
stages: 
43 Banking that includes investment services, in addition to services related to savings and loans (Gardner 
and Molyneux, 1993). 
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The first stage (1993-1996) is characterised by the deregulation on the interest 
rates. During this period the ceiling on interest rates were eliminated and the 
CBJ provides signals regarding interest rates to banks through its indirect 
monetary policy, using different instruments such as treasury bills and CDs. 
The second stage (1997-2001) is characterised by the removal of restriction on 
the scope on banks operations; During this period the CBJ allowed for banks to 
produce more products and to offer different services such as foreign exchange 
transactions. 
The third stage (2002-2006) is characterised by opening the Jordanian banking 
market to the three new foreign banks. Moreover, during this period the CBJ 
worked to strengthen its regulations on corporate governance and the issues 
relating to risk management. 
The main aims of the CBJ in liberalising the banking system were to promote a 
diversified, efficient and competitive financial system in order to improve resource 
allocation and financial viability and operational flexibility (Crane et aI., 2003). The 
government and the CB] hoped that productivity, profitability, lower intermediation 
costs and enhanced customer service would be achieved by the banking sector as a 
direct result of such liberalisation. The government and the CBJ argued that the 
enhancement of bank efficiency through deregulation would have a positive impact on 
the whole economy, given the important contribution of the banking system to 
economic growth. The Governor of the CBJ, Dr. Umayya Toukan (2002), stated: 
"One of the fundamentals of Jordan's overall economic policy has been openness toward 
the international economy. In the light of this policy, Jordan undertook important 
liberalisation commitments in the process of its accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) with respect to financial services, including banking services. In addition to this, we 
aim to promote the soundness and the efficiency of banking system in Jordan" (Arab 
Banker, 2002). 
Despite this, the CBJ deregulated many aspects of bank operations but still imposed 
many restrictions. Table 4.4 summarises the main restrictions and regulatory 
requirements applied to Jordanian banks. 
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T bl 4 4 M . Rt' f a e am es ne IOns on S cove 0 rB k' 0 t' an S Jpera IOn 
Restrictions on Banks prohibited from holding more than 10% of company whose objectives do 
Investment not include acceptance of deposits and owning shares, without prior written 
approval of CBJ, in any other bank or company that accepts deposits. Such 
ownership shall not in any case exceed 10 per cent of either its own subscribed 
capital or of subscribed capital of bank or company in which the bank owns 
shares; owning capital shares in companies, total of which exceeds percentage 
decided by CBJ. In all cases, this total shall not exceed 50 per cent of subscribed 
capital of bank. Where bank has exceeded this percentage, it shall be allowed five 
years from effective date of this law to rectifY its state of affairs. Each bank 
acquiring at least 5% of the stocks and shares in capital of any company must 
notifY CBJ within 15 days of date of the acquisition. 
Restrictions on Real Estate Exposure: Banks prohibited from granting loans for construction or 
Loans purchase of real estate in excess of20% of total loans in JOD. 
Related-Party Exposure: Bank may not conclude deal with related party if deal 
can be undertaken in more favourable terms to bank with a third party who has no 
relationship with the bank; total related-party is limited to 50% of bank's 
subscribed capital and exposures to affiliates limited to 20% of their capital 
Loan Concentration Exposures: Overdraft facilities limited to 20% of bank's total 
loan portfolio; single name exposure limited to 25% of bank's subscribed capital 
excluding government-related entity exposures and cash-collateralised loans. Top 
ten exposures limited to 35 % of the bank's total loan portfolio for local banks 
and 70% for branches of foreign banks. In addition, concentration of economic 
'sector is limited to 25% of total loan portfolio. 
Overdraft accounts may not exceed 20% of total direct loans. 
Non-performing CBJ classified non-performing facilities as: 
Loans - Sub-standard (overdue 90-179 days). 
Requirements - Doubtful (overdueI80-359 days) .. 
- Loss (overdue more than 360 days). 
Banks required to take action on non-performing facilities, as follows: 
- 25% on sub-standard loans. 
- 50% on doubtful loans. 
- 100% on loss. 
Provisions on retail loans taken as: 15% for loans overdue for more than 30 days 
and less than 90 days, 25% overdue more than 90 days and less than 120 days, 
50% overdue by more than 120 days and less than 180 days, 75% overdue for 
more than 180 days and less than 270 days, and 100% overdue by more than 270 
days (these provisions are consistent with Basel n, standardised approach). 
Banks are required to take general provision equal to I % of total loans. 
Capital Paid-up capital for Jordanian banks increased in 2003 from 20 to 40 MJOD and 
Requirements from 5 to 20 MJOD for foreign banks. 
Leverage ratio (total shareholders' equity to total assets) should be more than 6%. 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio set at 12 % (defined as Tier I and Tier 244 
capital to risk weighted assets and market risks)". 
Liquidity Banks shall keep liquidity ratio of 100% for foreign currency denominated 
obligations and not less than 70% for JOD denominated obligations. 
Opening New No banks can open branches inside or outside of Jordan without previous 
Branches approvalofCBJ. 
, Sources: CBJ (2004) and Standard & Poor s (2007). 
44 Tier I capital equals fully paid-up capital plus disclosed reserves plus retained earnings plus minority 
interest minus goodwill and any shortage in provisions (Basel, 1998). Tier 2 equals undisclosed reserve, 
revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid debt capital and subordinated loans (Basel, 1998). 
"This ratio is according to Basel I guidance. From beginning of2008 CBJ adopted Basel n gnidance. 
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4.4 Structure of Jordanian Banks 
Having discussed the background of the banking system in Jordan and the deregulation 
process und~rtaken by the CBJ, this section will focus on the structure of the Jordanian 
banks according to their ownership and specialisation. As shown in Chapter 3, these 
could play a crucial part in explaining the variation between banks' efficiency. 
Moreover, in this research they will be tested with regard to which kinds of ownership 
structure and specialisation are more efficient. In addition, this section will outline the 
structure of the Jordanian banks' balance sheet and income statement and how it 
changed over 1993-2006 as a result of deregulation. 
4.4.1 Ownership structure of Jordanian banks 
There are two types of banks in Jordan according to the ownership structure: foreign 
and domestic banks. Foreign banks are branches of international banks and are fully 
owned by foreigners and domestic banks are public ownership banks owned by 
Jordanians and foreigners. The entry of foreign bank branches into Jordan is subject to 
prior approval from the CBJ46 and article 4 of the Banking Law of 2000 states: "No 
person shall engage in banking activities without first obtaining a final licence from the 
Central Bank, in accordance with the provisions of this law". The minimum capital for 
the foreign banks wanting to operate in Jordan is 20MJOD and this amount must be 
transferred into Jordan. 
In regard to foreign ownership in Jordanian banks, the regulations before 1997 did not 
allo\\, foreigners to own more than 49% of Jordanian banks but this was cancelled in 
1997. Table 4.5 summarises the number of local and foreign banks and their total assets. 
The number offoreign banks was 5 in 1993-2003: in 2003 the CBJ granted a licence for 
an extra 3 banks to operate in Jordan. The market share of foreign banks (i.e. assets of 
foreign banks in relation to total assets of the banking system) remained constant over 
the period 1993-1997, at about 8%. After 1997, and as a result of the removal of 
constraints on the foreign exchange system, the market share of foreign banks rose to 
46 In addition to CBJ regulations regarding entry of foreign banks, CBJ applies Basel guidance regarding 
supervision of cross-border banking, which implies that all international banks should be supervised by a 
home country authority that capably perfonns consolidated supervision. Creation of a cross-border 
banking establishment should receive prior consent of both host country and home country authorities, 
and the latter should possess the right to gather infonnation from their cross-border banking 
establishments (for more details, see Basel (1996)). 
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over 12 %. With regard to foreign ownership in local banks before 1997, ownership did 
not exceed 30% of the total assets of local banks. After 1997, as a direct result of the 
maximum limit of 49% regarding the size of FDI being eliminated, foreign ownership 
in the total assets oflocal banks reached 55% in 2006. 
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k Table 4.5 Ownership Structure of Jordaman Ban s 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total Assets (MJODI) 5979 6679 7526 7824 8616 9425 10436 11474 
Number of Banks 21 21 21 20 19 21 21 21 
Domestic Banks 16 16 16 IS 14 16 16 16 
Foreign Banks 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Domestic Banks' Assets (MJOD) 5465 6112 6888 . 7128 7848 8239 9099 10015 
Percentage of domestic banks' assets 
from total assets 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Foreign Banks' Assets (MJOD) 514 567 638 697 768 1185 1337 1459 
Percentage offoreign banks' assets 
from total assets 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Percentage offoreign ownership 
from domestic banks' total assets 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.48 
. . MJOD refers to mIllIons of JordanIan Dmars and the JOD equals 1.41US Dollars. Values III nommal terms . 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan Database 1993-2006. 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
12542 13225 13807 16090 19390 22523 
21 20 20 23 23 23 
16 IS IS IS IS IS 
5 5 5 8 8 8 
ll080 11485 12270 14144 17049 19604 
0.88 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87 
1462 1740 1537 1947 2342 2918 
0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 
0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.55 
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4.4.2 Classification of Banks According to Specialisation 
The Jordanian banking system is made up of commercial, Islamic and investment banks. 
The three different groups of banks operating in Jordan are subject to similar regulations 
(with the exception of foreign banks, which are also subject to their home country 
regulations) and the same market conditions. Commercial banks refer to banks dealing 
with traditional banking activities such as taking deposits and granting loans, while 
investment banks are more involved in capital market operations (e.g. issuing and 
selling securities), in addition to the brokerage service at the Amman Stock Exchange. 
Islamic banks must comply with Islamic Shariah law and avoid paying or receiving 
interest in any of its practices (Isik et al., 2004). Therefore, unlike commercial and 
investment banks, Islamic banks do not engage in giving fixed or predetermined rates of 
interest on financial transactions. According to the Islamic Shariah law, participants are 
allowed a share in the profit (loss) ofIslamic banking operations but are not allowed to 
receive or give any kind of fixed rate (Isik et al., 2004). To cope with the Islamic 
Shariah law, the Islamic banks developed a variety of interest-free products, such as 
equity-participation and profit and loss sharing. In addition, Islamic banks are playing a 
role in rendering social services 47 to generally ignored poverty-stricken households 
(Hassan, 2005). Given the different behaviours of Islamic banks in relation to the 
commercial and investment banks and to their involvement in social activities, the 
Islamic banks incur more operational costs than the commercial or investment banks. 
Regardless of specialisation, all Jordanian banks (except foreign) are public 
shareholders and their shares are listed on the Amman Financial Market. 
Table 4.6 shows the number of Jordanian banks and their total assets, according to 
specialisation. The table shows that commercial banks dominate the banking market in 
Jordan (the average total assets of commercial banks in 1993-2006 was about 83%, 
whilst for investment it was 9%, the same as for Islamic banks). These figures suggest 
that the Jordanian banking system is still traditional in its operations, i.e., in the taking 
of deposits and granting loans. Although investment banks have existed in Jordan since 
1978, the scope of their operations is limited and concentrated in financing the working 
capital for some firms and the brokerage services in the Amman Financial Market. 
Investment banks around the world are generally involved in areas like capital markets 
47 An example of social services the Islamic banks render in Jordan is granting loans without any returns 
to poor students who want to finish their degree. 
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and hedging products, specialised services and giving advice on areas such as mergers 
and acquisitions (Gardener and Molyneux, 1993). The investments banks in Jordan do 
not operate in the above areas for various reasons: firstly, all investment banks in Jordan 
are owned and managed by families and the purpose of these banks, in most cases, is to 
benefit such families (e.g. finance companies related to family members). Secondly, the 
capital market in Jordan is still very basic; its operations include trading in the shares 
and bonds of public listed companies (PLCs), as well as government bonds, but over-
the-counter trades, short sales, options, futures and other derivative trading are 
prohibited. Also, despite the CBI's deregulating of many aspects of banking operations, 
its regulations still prohibit banks from owning capital shares in companies exceeding 
50% of their subscribed capital. In addition, investment banks do not have specialised 
personnel capable of dealing with the advanced capital markets around the world. 
Table 4.6 shows how the number of investment banks has declined in 1993-2006 from 
five to three banks. The reasons for this are that two of them (the Amman and 
Philadelphia banks) went bankrupt, due to mismanagement (Siam, 2007). These 
bankruptcies affected the reputation of investment banks and discouraged clients from 
dealing with them in Jordan. 
119 
T able 4.6 Classification of Banks According to Specialisation 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total assets(MJOD)1 5979 6679 7526 7824 8616 9425 10436 11474 
l.Commercial Banks 
Number 15 15 15 15 14 15 15 15 
Total assets(MJOD) 4839 5442 61S1 6584 7278 7817 8612 9631 
Percentage of commercial banks' 
assets from total assets 0.81 O.SI 0.82 0.S4 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.84 
2.Tnvestment Banks 
Number 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
Total assets(MJODJ 612 667 723 622 687 743 850.8 961.3 
Percentage of Investment banks' 
assets from total assets 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
3.Tslamic Banks 
Number I 1 1 I I 2 2 2 
Total assets(MJOD) 528 570 621 618 651 864 973.2 881.7 
Percentage of Islamic banks' 
assets from total assets 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 
. . MJOD refers to mllltons of Jordaman Dmars andJOD equals IAIUS Dollars. Values In nommal terms . 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan Database 1993-2006. 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
12542 13225 13807 16090 19390 22523 
15 15 15 18 18 18 
10415 11077 11597 12903 16037 18478 
0.83 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.83 0.82 
4 3 3 3 3 3 
1164 1024 1067 1657 1627 2007 
0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.09 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
963.1 1124 1143 1531 1726 2038 
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 
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4.4.3 Assets and Liabilities Structnre 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the structure of assets and liabilities of Jordanian banks 
between 1993-2006. The total assets (liabilities) of the Jordanian banks amounted to 
22,523 million JOD (Jordanian dinars) in 2006 and it has been noted that foreign assets 
represented an average of 26% of total assets in the years 1993-2006. Asset 
development was consistent with the rates achieved by the Jordanian economy in other 
economic fields and total assets rose from 5979 JOD million in 1993 to 22523 million 
JOD in 2006 (Miani and Daradkah, 2008). Table 4.7 and Figure 4.1 show the annual 
percentage growth of assets during 1993-2006: the average growth in assets was 11 %. 
The total assets rose to 13% in 1994-1995 and after 1995 the growth rate slowed, 
ranging from 4 % to 11 % in 1996-2003. In this period, the banking industry in Jordan 
was subjected to a large number of changes: 
I. A decrease in customer deposits: Many Jordanians worked in the Gulf but 
returned to Jordan following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 after the First 
Gulf War in 1991 (Isik et aI., 2004) for political reasons. More than 300,000 
people returned from Gulf countries in 1991-2000 and the remittance of these 
Jordanians was a main source of deposits in Jordanian banks (Tian and Zeitun, 
2007). 
2. Before the First Gulf War, Jordan was the main trading partner for Iraq. This 
was complicated by sanctions imposed on Iraq by the United Nations (UN) 
during the 1990s. Key Jordanian economic sectors such as transportation, 
agriculture and industry, mainly serving Iraq, were severely affected by the 
sanctions (El-Sakka, 2004) and tourism was disrupted as the number of tourists 
declined by almost 25%. In addition, some Gulf countries prohibited imports 
from Jordan because of their political position during the war. Jordanian 
agriculture and industry products were thus shut out from the most important 
Gulf countries' markets and this affected many economic sectors, especially 
banking (El-Sakka, 2004). 
3. In the years 1999-2003, Jordanian banks faced many crises, such as the 
bankruptcy of the Philadelphia bank in 2002 due to fraud by bank management, 
and many banks (Jordan National Bank, Jordan Gulf Bank, Jordan Investment 
Bank and Export Bank) faced severe asset quality problems in 2001-2002 after 
they extended large amounts of loans (300 millions JOD) to a company whose 
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management had falsified contracts with Government departments (Standard 
and Poor's, 2007). 
As a consequence of the above-mentioned crises, confidence in the Jordanian banking 
system significantly decreased, which in turn adversely affected the growth of bank 
deposits. However, from 2003 the growth rate in banks' total assets began to increase, 
as the Jordanian government pledged to guarantee the deposits of banks faced with asset 
quality problems: the CBJ required such banks to increase their capital, in order to 
absorb any losses. In 2004, the growth rate of total assets reached 17 % and this can be 
attributed to the three new foreign banks which came to work in Jordan. The year 2005 
recorded a significant growth of21 % in total assets and by 2006 the figure was 16%. 
Regarding analysis of the growth rate in assets according to currency, Figure 4.1 shows 
that assets in foreign currency significantly increased during 1997-2001, with the 
growth rate reaching 26% in 2000. The main reason for this may be largely attributed to 
the CBJ's having removed all restrictions from the foreign exchange system (see Table 
4.3). After 2001, assets in foreign currency decreased considerably as a result of a 
decrease in foreign currency deposits. In this context, it should be noted that the CBJ 
had been working since 1995 to increase confidence in the national currency and 
promoted the Jordanian dinar as an attractive saving instrument. The main procedure 
used involved pegging the JOD with the US dollar and maintaining a spread of 2% 
between the interest rate of the indirect instrument of the CBJ (i.e. the CD) and that of 
the United States. 
Figure 4.1 Growth in Jordanian Banks' Assets 1993-2006 
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Regarding the structure of assets in Jordanian banks, Table 4.7 suggests that in 1993-
1997, the average percentage ofloan to total assets was about 42%, whereas the average 
percentage of investments to total assets in the same period was about 6% and other 
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earning assets (i.e. due from banks) around 36%. After 1997, the structure of the assets 
of Jordanian banks changed little; the percentage of loans from total assets decreased 
slightly to around 35% and the investment to total assets increased to around 13%. This 
change in the structure of the Jordanian banks' assets which can be attributed mainly to 
the CBI's removal of restrictions in investment activities, especially those related to 
foreign investments (see Table 4.3), helped to change banks' attitudes towards asset and 
liability management and seeking new sources of income. 
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Table 47 Assets Structure and Growth for Jordanian Banks 1993·2006 
Assets Side 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total Assets -<in foreien and local cnrrencyHMJOD)' 5979 6679 7526 7824 8616 9425 
Assets in foreign currency (MJOD) 1382 1492 1681 1782 1942 2304 
Assets in Local currency(MJOD) 4596 5187 5845 6043 6674 7120 
Growth in total assets(%) 12 13 4 10 9 
Growth in assets in local currency (%) 13 13 3 10 7 
Growth in assets in foreign currency (%) 8 13 6 9 19 
% of assets in local currency to total assets 77 78 78 77 77· 76 
% of assets in foreign currency to total assets 23 22 22 23 23 24 
Assets Components 
I.Loans in local and foreign currency(MJOD) 2367 2827 3292 3401 3482 3614 
Loans in local currency (MJOD) 2244 2703 3160 3275 3360 3466 
Loans in foreign currency (MJOD) '123 124 132 126 122 148 
Annual growth ofloans (%) 19 16 3 2 4 
Annual growth ofloans in local currency (%) 20 17 4 3 3 
Annual growth ofloans in foreign currency (%) 1 6 -4 ·3 22 
% of total loans to total assets 40 42 44 43 40 38 
2.Total Investments (MJOD) 484 457 366 375 526 751 
Investment in local currency (MJOD) 370 360 265 281 320 507 
Investments in foreign currency: (MJOD) 114 97 101 94 206 243 
Annual growth of total investments (%) -6 ·20 2 40 43 
Annual growth in investments in local currency (%) ·3 ·26 6 14 59 
Annual growth of investments in foreign currency (%) ·15 4 ·7 119 18 
% of total investments to total assets 8 7 5 5 6 8 
3.Total Due from banks (otber earninl! assets) (MJOD) 2158 2309 2672 2832 3169 3327 
Due from hanks in local currency (MJOD) 622 591 844 816 1353 1214 
Due from banks in foreign currency (MJOD) 1537 1718 1828 2017 1816 2113 
Annual growth of total Due from banks (%) 7 16 6 12 5 
Annual growth of Due from banks in local currency.{%) ·5 43 ·3 66 -10 
Annual growth of Due from banks in foreion currency (%) 12 6 10 ·10 16 
% of Due from banks to total assets 36 35 36 36 37 35 
.. MJOD refers to mdltons of JordanIan Dmars and the JOD equals 1041 US Dollars. Values m nommal tel1lls. 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan Database 1993·2006. 
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
10436 11474 12542 13225 13807 16090 19390 22523 
2627 3298 3835 3930 3853 4516 4930 5764 
7809 8176 8707 9295 9954 11574 14460 16758 
11 10 9 5 4 17 21 16 
10 5 6 7 7 16 25 16 
14 26 16 2 ·2 17 9 17 
75 71 69 70 72 72 75 74 
25 29 31 30 28 28 25 26 
3656 3698 4108 4131 4346 5269 6861 8902 
3502 3550 3952 3962 4150 5095 6697 8671 
154 148 156 169 196 174 165 231 
I I 11 I 5 21 30 30 
1 1 11 0 5 23 31 29 
4 ·4 6 8 15 ·11 ·5 41 
35 32 33 31 31 33 35 40 
916 1231 1727 1802 1735 2234 2813 3385 
622 804 1074 1067 935 1262 1870 2278 
294 427 653 735 800 972 942 1107 
22 34 40 4 -4 29 26 20 
23 29 34 ·1 -12 35 48 22 
21 45 53 13 9 21 ·3 17 
9 11 14 14 13 14 15 15 
3883 4901 5570 5894 6201 6834 7570 7908 
1410 1897 2317 2646 3138 3198 2718 2791 
2474 3004 3253 3248 3064 3636 4852 5116 
17 26 14 6 5 10 11 4 
16 35 22 14 19 2 -15 3 
17 21 8 0 ·6 19 33 5 
37 43 44 45 45 42 39 35 
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1. Sources of Funds of Banks in Jordan 
Sources of Jordanian banking fimds can be generally divided into two main types: 
internal and external sources. Internal sources normally are long-term, and include 
banks' capital and reserves and subordinated debt by shareholders, whereas external 
sources are medium or short-term and include deposits from customers, inter-bank loans 
and loans from the CBJ. 
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.8 show the structure of fimding for Jordanian banks. Table 4.8 
shows that the average percentage of equity to total sources of funds is about 8% and, 
according to the CBJ regulations, this ratio should be not less than 6%. In addition, the 
CBJ regulations require that the minimum paid-up capital for local banks should be 40 
million JD (20 million prior to 2003) and 20 million JD (5 million prior to 2003) for 
foreign banks. One of the most important external sources of fimds is customers' 
deposits and Table 4.8 suggests that the average customer deposit to total sources of 
fimds is about 72%. Figure 4.2 shows that there is a steady decrease in the dependency 
of the banks on customers' deposits as a source of fimds; however, there is a steady 
increase in dependency on equities and deposits of banks as sources. This could reflect 
that the CBJ encouraged banks to increase their equity by raising capital through 
capitalisation of profit. Also, the CBJ encouraged banks to deal in inter-banking 
operations, in order to form active money markets between banks. This helped those 
suffering from liquidity problems to have instant access to the active money market. 
From November 1996, the CBJ began to publish the weighted average of interest rates 
of inter-banks loans and this disclosure helped banks in increasing their effectiveness in 
managing their liabilities and assets and obtaining instant money from the market. 
Customers' deposits still remain the cheapest and main source of funding for banks in 
Jordan. 
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Table 4.8 Sources of Funds of Jordanian Banks (liabilities) 1993-2006 
Liability Side 1993 1994 
1. Deposits from Customers (local and foreign 
currency) (MJOD)' 4956 5404 
Deposits in local currency (MJOD} 3483 3734 
Deposits in foreign currency (MJOD) 1474 1670 
Annual growth of deposits (local and foreign currency) 
(%) 9 
Annual growth of deposits in local currency (%) 7 
Annual growth of deposits in foreign currency (%) 13 
% of deposit from total liability and e'Luitv 83 81 
Annual percentage change of customer deposits 9 
2. Deposits from Banks (MJOD) 136 204 
% of deposits from banks to total liability and equity 2 3 
Annual percentage change of deposit from banks (%) 49 
3. Equity (MJOD) 344 378 
% of equity from banks totalliabiIities and assets 6 6 
Annual percentage change of equity (%) 10 
Other Liability (MJOD) 542 692 
Total Liability and Equity (MJOD) 5979 6679 
.. MJOD refers to mIllIons of JordanIan dmars. All values m nommal terms. 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan Database 1993-2006. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
5791 5944 6357 6806 7502 
3893 3970 4379 4802 5374 
1898 1974 1978 2004 2128 
7 3 7 7 10 
4 2 la 10 12 
14 4 0 I 6 
77 76 74 72 72 
7 3 7 7 10 
476 650 699 686 866 
6 8 8 7 8 
133 37 8 -2 26 
444 514 739 870 916 
6 7 9 9 9 
17 16 44 18 5 
815 717 821 1063 1152 
7526 7824 8616 9425 10436 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
8226 6588 9229 10067 11685 13137 14566 
5804 4602 6346 7293 8536 9851 10901 
2422 1986 2883 2774 3149 3286 3665 
10 
-20 40 9 16 12 11 
8 -21 38 15 17 15 11 
14 -18 45 -4 14 4 12 
72 53 70 73 73 68 65 
10 -20 40 9 16 12 11 
1063 3457 1513 1225 1302 2056 2625 
9 28 II 9 8 11 12 
23 225 -56 -19 6 58 28 
948 1046 1073 ll65 1641 2008 2948 
8 8 8 8 10 10 13 
3 10 3 9 41 22 47 
1238 1451 1410 1350 1463 2189 2384 
11474 12542 13225 13807 16090 19390 22523 
._------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Figure 4.2 Sources of Funds for Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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Figure 4.3 and Table 4.8 show the annual growth rate of the sources of fimds for 
Jordanian banks between 1993-2006 and suggests that there is a steady increase of 
equities between 1993 and 1996: the average annual growth for this period is about 
14%. In 1997, the growth rate in equities increased sharply and reached 44%, due to that 
the CB]' s requiring banks to increase their capital in order to meet Basel I guidelines 
regarding the capital adequacy ratio. In the years 1998-2003, the average growth rate in 
equities was about 8%, with growth increasing remarkably after 2003 as a result of the 
new CB] regulations' requiring banks to increase paid-up capital. 
Regarding customer deposits, Figure 4.3 shows how, during the years 1994-2000, the 
growth rate in customer deposits increased slightly and that the average increase was 
only 7%. In 200 I, the growth rate decreased dramatically by 20%, due to the crises 
mentioned earlier. After 2001 and as a result of the crises, the govemment guaranteed 
banks' deposits and customer confidence returned: in 2002, the growth rate in 
customers' deposits reached 40%. The years 2003-2006 saw a steady growth rate in 
customer deposits and the average growth rate was about 12%. When the growth rate in 
deposits from banks is analysed, it is apparent that there was big growth during the 
years 1994-1996, with an average growth rate of 73%, related to the fact that the banks 
in Jordan became more aware of the importance of depending on each other to fill the 
gaps in liquidity and for the purposes of finding another source of funds, in view of the 
slowdown of a growth in deposits. In addition, the CB] encouraged banks to deal with 
each other through inter-bank operations as a good motivation for banks with less 
liquidity to fill the gap by using inter bank loans with other banks with excess liquidity. 
During the years 1997-2000, the growth rate of deposits from banks slowed and the 
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average growth was about 16%. However, in 2001, the growth rate increased 
remarkably, reaching 225%, and the main reason for this huge increase related to the 
crises facing Jordanian banks. This led to a decrease in the growth rate of customers' 
deposits and, in the following years, the growth rate in deposits from banks decreased 
sharply, in accordance with the fact that customers' confidence in the banks was 
restored and the growth rate of customers' deposits began to increase. 
Figure 4.3 Annual Growth for Source of Funds of Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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The previous section concentrated on the sources of funds for the Jordanian banks and 
showed that the main source of funds in Jordanian banks is the customers' deposits. 
This section will establish how the funds in Jordan banks have been used. The banking 
sector in Jordan is one ofthe leading sectors in the national economy and has effectively 
contributed to enhancing economic development through its important role in 
mobilising domestic savings and channelling them into different fields of investment 
(CBJ, 2007). The funds in Jordanian banks were used to: 
1. grant loans for the private and public sectors; 
2. invest in firms' stocks and governments bonds; 
3. deposit with local and international banks; 
4. purchase the CBI's certificate of deposits. 
Figure 4.4 and Table 4.7 show the percentage of total loans, investments and due from 
banks to total assets: Figure 4.4 shows that, on average, loans in 1993-2006 totalled 
around 35% of total assets. A closer look at the development of the movement ofloans 
in Jordanian banks indicates that the percentage of loans to total assets changed during 
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the years 1993-2006. In the period 1993-1996, the average percentage was around 42% 
and this began to decrease between 1997-2003, when the average percentage ofloans to 
total assets dropped to 34%. After 2004, the percentage of loans to total assets began to 
increase and reached the maximum of 40% in 2006. Figure 4.4 also shows that the 
percentage of investments to total assets in Jordanian banks has changed over the period 
1993-2006: the average percentage of investments to total assets during the years 1993-
1997 was about 6% and, in this period, there were many CBJ restrictions on banking 
investment, particularly in foreign currency. After 1997, many of these restrictions were 
removed and consequently the percentage of investments to total assets began to 
increase from 1998, reaching 15% in 2006. Finally, a closer look at the movement of 
due from banks over the period 1993-2006 indicates that the average of due from banks 
to total assets during 1993-1999 was 36%. After 1999, the average percentage of due 
from banks to total assets increased to 45%, an increase which can be attributed to the 
fact that, as mentioned earlier, some banks in Jordan faced a quality ofloans problem. 
As a result of this, most banks reduced the granting of loans to customers and 
substituted this with purchasing CDs from the CBJ since the CBJ used to offer high 
interest rates on the CDs. 
Figure 4.4 Percentage of Loans, Investments and due from Banks to Total Assets 1993-2006 
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To sum up, in 1993-2006, the structure of banks' assets and liabilities altered 
considerably. As a result of deregulation, banks had more sources from which to raise 
money and to produce a variety of products and services. For example, the use of a non-
traditional source offunds - such as inter-banks loans - to fund loans' demand and other 
activities developed rapidly after 1997, as a result of the CB]' s beginning to publish the 
inter-banks loans' interest rate between banks. Liability management has received 
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special attention from banks, due to the effects of volatile interest rates from interest 
rate deregulations. On the assets' side, banks had more choice in offering a variety of 
products and services, especially products related to foreign currency. From 1997, 
banks found it necessary to manage their interest rate-sensitive liabilities by increasing 
the proportion of variable rate lending and by shortening the maturities of loan 
contracts. Also, the banks in Jordan became more concerned about their liquidity, 
because new CBJ regulations helped banks to maintain a high level of liquidity and at 
the same time earn returns on it: for example, the issue of certificate deposits (CDs) 
from 1993 allowed banks to invest their funds in highly liquid assets and at the same 
time earn interest on these CDs. However, the change in the structure of banks' balance 
sheets could imply that banks might be becoming more risky. As mentioned earlier (see 
Table 4.3), the period 1996-2001 is characterised by removing restrictions oil the scope 
of banks' operations. As a result, banks tend to use funds to invest in assets that may 
bring more revenues (e.g. purchasing stock). However, this kind of investment may be 
exposing banks to higher risks because of its high volatility. 
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4.4.4 Income Statements' Structure of Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
This section analyses the structure of the income statements of Jordanian banks and 
shows how deregulation has affected bank revenues and costs. 
1. Revenues 
Figure 4.5 and Table 4.9 show the sources of revenue in Jordanian banks. It is clear that 
the Jordanian banks depended on the income from interest on loans as the main source 
of income, with the average interest income from loans totalling 81 % of all revenues 
during 1993-2006. 
Regarding the movement of sources of income in Jordanian banks, Figure 4.5 shows 
how, during 1993-2001, interest from loans made up more than 80% of total revenue 
and after 2001 this percentage began to decrease, falling to 68% in 2005. It should be 
noted that in 2001-2005 there was a boom in the Amman Stock Market, as a result of 
many investors from Gulf Area invested heavily in the Jordanian companies, and many 
banks increased their investment in trading in stocks. This was reflected in the banking 
sector's performance to varying degrees: many banks were highly dependent on gains 
made from investment stock. The revenue from non-interest income after the year 2001 
increased markedly. Overall, non-interest income has gradually become more important 
to Jordanian banks. The contribution of non-interest income to total revenues increased 
from 16% in 1993 to 32% in 2005. Moreover, during 2001-2005, the CBJ made a 
number of reductions in the interest rates of its instruments (e.g. CD) as a result of a 
reduction of interest rates within the international financial markets and also to reduce 
the cost of borrowing (Miani and Daradhah, 2008). As a result of this reduction, interest 
rates on loans decreased from 10% to 7% and the banks found it more profitable to 
invest their funds in stocks from the Amman Stock Market rather than to grant loans. In 
2006, the CBJ raised the interest rate on its instruments and thus interest rates on loans 
increased. In this year, the income from interest rates on loans totalled 82% of all 
revenue. 
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Table 4 9 Income Statements Structure for Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Revenues (TR)(MJOD)' 418 472 618 664 721 779 807 
Annual percentage growth in TR (%) 13 31 7 9 8 4 
Component of revenues 
1. Interest Income'iMJOD). 350 401 526 576 615 657 692 
% of interest income of TR 84 85 85 87 85 84 86 
2. Non-interest income' (MJOD). 67 72 92 88 106 122 116 
% of non-interest income ofTR 16 IS IS 13 IS 16 14 
Costs (TC) (MJOD). 368 415 534 574 634 671 742 
Annual percentage change in TC (%) 13 29 7 10 6 11 
Component of costs 
1. Interests expenses' (MJOQ). 226 258 338 378 426 425 454 
% of interest expenses of TC 61 62 63 66 67 63 61 
2. Non-interest expenses (operating 
expenses)' (MJODJ, 142 157 196 196 208 245 288 
% of non-interest expenses ofTC 39 38 37 34 33 37 39 
Net Profit (NP) (TR-TC) (MJOD). 50 57 84 90 87 108 66 
Annual percentage growth in NP (%). 15 47 7 -3 24 - 39 
Average interest rates for loans. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Average interest rates for deposits. 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Average margin'. 0.054 0.053 0.049 0.058 0.060 0.067 0.070 
. . Mllhons of JordanIan dmars. All values m nommal terms . 
'Interest income includes interest received from loans and deposits in banks. 
3Non~interest income includes commissions and incomes from investments. 
4Interest expenses include interest paid on deposits from customers and banks. 
'Non-interest expenses include staff expenses, maintenance costs, depreciation and other administrative cost. 
6 Average margin equals average interest rates on loans minus average interest rates on deposits. 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan Database 1993-2006. 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
857 855 715 669 766 1192 1444 
6 0 -16 -6 IS 56 21 
738 696 563 501 527 808 1187 
86 82 79 75 69 68 82 
119 158 152 168 239 384 258 
14 18 21 25 31 32 18 
792 729 593 521 527 693 926 
7 -8 -19 -12 I 32 34 
492 423 293 216 204 319 546 
62 58 49 41 39 46 59 
301 305 300 305 323 374 380 
38 42 51 59 61 54 41 
65 126 122 147 239 500 518 
-I 94 -3 21 62 109 4 
0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 
0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.Q3 
0.067 0.062 0.064 0.061 0.054 0.052 0.049 
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Figure 4.5 Revenues Structure of Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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Figure 4.6 and Table 4.9 show the sources of costs in Jordanian banks. As Figure 4.6 
suggests, average interest and non-interest expenses, as a proportion of total costs, were 
57% and 43%, respectively, between 1993-2006. Figure 4.6 also indicates that during 
1993-2001 the percentage of average interest expenses as a proportion oftotal costs was 
more than 60%. In the period 2002-2005, the average of non-interest income as a 
percentage of total costs exceeded 50%, more than interest expenses. As mentioned 
earlier, during this period, the CBJ reduced interest rates on its instruments; banks 
responded by reducing interest rates paid on deposits and charged on loans. In 2006, the 
CBJ increased the interest rates on its instruments and interest rates paid on deposits 
were raised accordingly. 
Figure 4.6 Cost Structure of Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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With regard to non-interest expenses, Figure 4.7 shows how the average of 
administrative expenses to non-interest expenses totalled more than 65% of non-interest 
expenses over the years 1993-2006: this high percentage suggests that operating 
expenses are considered high within the Jordanian banks. The increase in the staff and 
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management expenses could be an indicator for the slack management (see Chapter 2) 
in Jordanian banks. 
Figure 4.7 Personnel Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses 1993-2006 
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3. Net Profits 
• Non~interest expenses 
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The net profit for banks is considered a main factor in gauging banks' performance 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). Figure 4.8 shows the Jordanian banks' revenues, costs, and 
net profits,48 and Figure 4.9 shows the annual growth rate of revenues, costs and net 
profits for Jordanian banks. 
Figure 4.8 Development of Jordanian Banks' Profitability 1993-2006 
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Figure 4.8 indicates that there was a steady increase in banks' revenues and costs during 
the years 1993-2000 and a close look at the gap between revenues and costs reveals that 
between 1993-2000 the gap was fairly constant but after 2001, the gap began to widen. 
This indicates that, during 1993-2001, banks.were concentrating on traditional banking 
48 fi . Net pro Its equal revenue mmus costs. 
134 
Chapter 4 Jordanian Banking Sector 1993-2006 
activities which depended on taking deposits from customers and granting loans with a 
specific margin of profits (i.e. the difference between the interest rates paid and 
received). After :WOO, as a result of the CBJ allowing the banks to engage in different 
activities and services (see Table 4.3), the gap between the banks' revenues and costs 
became wider, which shows that banks began to vary there sources of income (i.e. non-
interest income). A close look at the movement of banks' net profits (Figure 4.8) shows 
that, during 1993-1997, profits were almost steady, with little improvement: this is 
understandable, since banks in this period were dependent on traditional activities (i.e. 
receiving deposits and granting loans). During 1998-2000, Jordanian banks faced a 
decline in their profits because most were under provision because of to the weak 
structure of the supervision in the CBJ. Before 1997, there were two departments 
responsible for banks' supervision: on-site and off-site supervision departments. The 
off-site supervision staff at the CBJ are provided with financial statements and 
periodical reports on banks' performances, in order to evaluate estimates and analyse 
risks associated with their conduct and performance. Whereas, on-site supervision is 
concerned with on-site visits to banks by inspectors, aimed at inspecting the accuracy of 
the financial data and periodical reports submitted to the CBJ. The periodicity of on-site 
visits by CBJ supervisors differs from one financial institution to another, depending on 
their risk rating. The level of coordination between the two departments was very 
limited and the off-site department had the power in deciding all issues relating to bank 
supervision and regulation, in particular the appropriateness of banks' bad loans 
provision. The decision-making of off-site departments depended on the periodic 
reports sent by banks; on-site reports were not really taken into account. In 1997, the 
management of the CBJ discovered that most Jordanians banks were suffering from 
non-performing loans (i.e. the non-performing loans increased from 20% in 1996 to 
45% in 1997) and under-provision (i.e. the bad loan provision was not enough) and 
decided to merge the two departments. The main aim ofthe CBJ in this decision was to 
ensure that all parties (i.e. off-site and on-site) were responsible for all decisions 
regarding the banks' supervision. After merging the on-site and off-site in one 
department, the CBJ asked banks to increase their provision, which in turn decreased 
their profits. Moreover, in the light of the weak supervision structure within the CBJ 
and as a result of removing restrictions on the scope of banks' operations, the Jordanian 
banks engaged in very risky products (e.g. derivatives) and this led to many Jordanian 
banks' incurring big losses between 1997-2001. 
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Figure 4.9 Growth Rates of Revenues, Costs and Net Profits 1993-2006 
120 
100 
80 
60 
... 
40 
20 
0 
·20 
·40 
·60 
-
~ V ~ 
-+- Annual groYAh in total revenues 
____ Annual gromh in total costs 
-I:r- Annual gromh in net profits 
During 2001-2006, net profits yielded an increase, especially in 2004 and 2005: growth 
in net profits (see Figure 4.9) reached 62% in 2004 and an amazing 109% in 2005. This 
remarkable increase can be attributed to the boom in the Amman Stock Market as most 
of the banks' profits in these two years came from stock trading. 
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4.5 Financial Ratio Analysis for Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
Financial ratios performance measures are heavily used by regulators and are based on 
accounting information rather than on microeconomic theory (i.e. consider input prices 
and output mix) (Fiorentino et aI., 2006). In this section, key financial ratios are 
presented as a measure for banks' performance. These are return on average assets 
(ROA), return on average equity (ROE), total cost to total revenues, cost-income-ratio 
(CrR), non-performing loans to total loans and staff-expenses to total assets. The first 
two ratios measure the ability of banks to generate earnings and profits and the next four 
measure the ability of banks to save costs. It should to be noted that this analysis is built 
in ratio analysis and this does not mean that cost and profit efficiency is improved, 
based on the frontier methods. Thus improvement in financial ratios does not necessary 
lead to the same conclusion in frontier analysis. 
4.5.1 Profit Performance Measures 
The most commonly-used ratios for measuring banks' (profit) performance are ROA 
and ROE (Tian and Zeitun, 2007). ROA is calculated as net profit before tax divided by 
average assets, and it measures the ability of assets used by bank to generate profits. 
The ROE equals profits before taxes divided by average equity, and it measures the rate 
of return shareholders receive on their investment. 
Figure 4.10 and Table 4.10 show the ROA and ROE for Jordanian banks between 1993-
2006. As Figure 4.10 suggests, between 1993-2001 there was little or no improvement 
in the profitability indicators for Jordanian banks. The ROA is almost constant, while 
the ROE increased during 1993-1996, then dropped off from 1997 onwards. A close 
look at Figure 4.1 0 indicates that Jordanian banks witnessed a remarkable improvement 
in their performance between 2001-2005. For example, ROA and ROE reached 2.58% 
and 24.88%, respectively, in 2005, compared with 1.5% and 14.5% in 2004. The stock 
market boom, especially in 2005, was the main driver of this improvement (Standard 
and Poor's, 2007). As result of the deregulation brought about by the CBJ, the 
contribution of non-interest income to total income increased sharply in 2001-2005, 
mainly from the brokerage services and market-related gains. The downturn in the stock 
market in 2006 affected the performance of Jordanian banks; both the ROA and the 
ROE decreased to 23% and 17.59%, respectively. 
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Figure 4.10 ROE and ROA of Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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Table 4 10 Profit Performance Measures 1993-2006 
Year ROE(%) ROA(%) 
1993 14.44 0.83 
1994 15.11 0.86 
1995 18.92 1.12 
1996 17.48 1.15 
1997 11.81 1.01 
1998 12.46 1.15 
1999 7.16 0.63 
2000 6.84 0.56 
2001 12.02 1.00 
2002 11.36 0.92 
2003 12.63 1.07 
2004 14.58 1.49 
2005 24.88 2.58 
2006 17.59 2.30 
4.5.2 Cost Performance Measures 
The most commonly used ratio to measure the ability of banks to control costs is the 
cost-income-ratio (CIR) (Forster and Shaffer, 2005). This ratio is defined by the US 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council as: CIR= non-interest expenses491 
(non-interest income + net interest income50). A smaller CIR ratio indicates greater cost 
savings. In addition to this, the following ratios are calculated (1) the ratio of staff 
expenses over total assets (S/TAi l measures manpower expenses, (2) the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (NPL)52 measures extra expenses (e.g. provisions costs, 
monitoring costs) that banks pay, due to non-performing loans, and (3) total costs to 
total revenues CTCITR)53 measures how much of revenues the bank uses to cover costs. 
49 Non-interest expenses include salaries, technology, buildings, supplies and administrative expenses. 
50 Net interest income equals interest income less interest expenses. 
SI Smaller SITA ratio indicates greater costs saving. 
52 Smaller NPL ratio indicates greater costs saving. 
" Smaller TC/TR ratio indicates greater costs saving. 
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Figure 4.11 and Table 4.11 show the CIR, NPL, S/TA and TC/TR for Jordanian banks 
between 1993-2006. As Figure 4.11 indicates, CIR for Jordanian banks between 1993-
1998 was high (in excess of 70%) and almost constant. In 1999-2000, this ratio 
increased, but in 2001 it began to decrease, reaching 41 % in 2006, which indicates that 
the cost performance for Jordanian banks improved after 2001. NPL decreased between 
1993-1996, but this ratio increased remarkably between 1997-1999 as a result of the 
crises that faced Jordanian banks. From 2000 onwards, the ratio began to decrease and 
reached 7% in 2006. TCI TR for Jordanian banks between 1993-1998 was high (in 
excess of 80%) and almost constant. During 1999-2000, this ratio increased and reached 
90%, but in 2001 it began to decrease, reaching 64% in 2006. Finally, staff expenses to 
total assets were almost constant between 1993-2000 and began to decrease after 200 I. 
Figure 4.11 Cost Performance Indicators for Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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Table 4 11 Cost Performance Indicators for Jordanian Banks 1993 2006 
-
Cost-income Non-Performing Staff expenses Total costs to total 
Year ratio (CIR) (%) loans (NPL) (%) to total assets revenues (TC/TR) (%) (S/TA)(%) 
1993 74 30 1.55 88.12 
1994 73 25 1.63 87.90 
1995 70 20 1.66 86.40 
1996 69 20 1.73 86.46 
1997 71 45 1.77 87.90 
1998 69 35 1.71 86.09 
1999 81 30 1.59 91.87 
2000 83 25 1.48 92.44 
2001 71 20 1.47 85.28 
2002 70 20 1.49 82.95 
2003 66 19 1.51 77.98 
2004 57 13 1.49 68.77 
2005 42 9 1.72 58.09 
2006 41 7 1.48 64.11 
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Thus, the profit and costs indicator for Jordanian banks showed no significant 
improvements over 1993-2000 but witnessed remarkable improvements after 2001. 
4.6 Competition in the Jordanian Banking Industry 
As discussed earlier, one of the key objectives of the deregulation of banks was to 
promote competition by (i) allowing foreign banks to enter the domestic market and (ii) 
allowing foreign investors to hold common stocks in domestic banks. The Herfindahl 
index (HI) and the spread of interest rates between loan interest and deposit interest 
rates are the most commonly used tools to measure the level of competition within the 
banking industry (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The HI is the sum of squared market 
share (e.g. deposits) of all banks in the market and the formula is used: 
h 2 
HI= I(x,lx) 
i=1 
where x. represents the deposits of the i-th bank and x represents the total deposits for , 
the banking sector as whole. HI can take a value between zero and one. 
When HI is approaching one, this implies the market is highly concentrated and the 
level of completion is very weak; when HI is approaching zero, this" implies the market 
is more competitive. Molyneux et al. (1996) suggest that the HI is responsive to the 
number and dispersion of firms in the market and is therefore generally viewed as a 
superior measure of concentration in the market than other measures such as three-firm 
concentration ratio (CR3). Thus a declining HI shows a declining trend in concentration 
or an increase in competition. 
The spread of interest rates measures price competition among Jordanian banks and is 
calculated as the difference between the interest rates on loans and deposit interest rates. 
A high spread of interest rates could imply that banks have market power to impose 
high interest rates on lending and low interest rates on deposits (Molyneux et aI., 1996). 
Thus, a declining rate of spread in interest rates is a signal of an increase in competition. 
Figure 4.12 and Table 4.13 show the trends of the HI and the spread of interest rates 
within the Jordanian banking industry between 1993-2006. Figure 4.12 shows a 
declining trend in concentration between 1993-2000, which implies that there was an 
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increase in competition levels within Jordanian banking. In 2001, the trend of 
concentration increased, which might suggests that the level of competition will have 
decreased. In this year and as mentioned earlier, some banks suffered from severe asset 
quality problems after extended loans to fake companies and thus confidence within the 
banking sector waned significantly. During this year, most depositors withdrew their 
deposits from banks facing problems and re-deposited their monies in banks without 
them. This led to increase in the market shares of such banks, which in turn was 
reflected by the increase in concentration in the market. After 2001, the concentration 
trend of the Jordanian banking industry declined due to the intervention of the Jordanian 
government and the CBJ, which resulted in renewed customer confidence in banks 
facing problems and return of their deposits to these banks. The CBJ also allowed three 
foreign banks to operate in Jordan, which further promoted competition levels in 
Jordanian banking (i.e. the HI decreased from 0.16 in 1993 to 0.13 in 2006). 
With regard to price competition measured by interest rate spread, the figure shows that 
between 1993-1995 and as a result of the liberalisation of interest rates, the spread of the 
interest rates declined, suggesting that the price competition amongst Jordanian banks 
increased slightly as the banks became more able to decrease interest rates on loans and 
increase rates on deposits. During 1996-1999, the interest rate spread increased as a 
result of the CBJ issuing CDs at high interest rates, which in turn encouraged banks to 
invest in these CDs and raise the interest rate on loans. From 2000 onward, the price 
competition heated up amongst Jordanian banks, with the interest rate spread faIling to a 
low of 0.04 in 2006. 
Figure 4.12 Competition Trends in Jordanian Banking 1993-2006 
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Table 4.12 CODlJletition Trends in Jordanian Bankine 1993-2006 
Herfindhal Interest rate Herfindhal Interest rate 
Year index (HI) spread Year index (HI) spread 
1993 0.17 0.054 2000 0.16 0.067 
1994 0.17 0.053 2001 0.24 0.062 
1995 0.17 0.049 2002 0.16 0.064 
1996 0.17 0.058 2003 0.16 0.061 
1997 0.17 0.06 2004 0.15 0.054 
1998 0.17 0.067 2005 0.13 0.052 
1999 0.17 0.07 2006 0.12 0.049 
4.7 Deriving Research Hypotheses 
As explained earlier, this research seeks to investigate the efficiency of Jordanian banks 
in the context of financial sector liberalisation implemented in Jordan in the early 1990s. 
Chapter 3 outlined that the operation of banks may be highly correlated to the 
regulations that govern banking operations (see Mahoon and Murray, 1981). It was 
argued that the banking system in many developing· countries experiences poor 
performance and low levels of efficiency, which are attributed to heavy governmental 
intervention in the banking system and the restrictions imposed on the scope and 
operation of banking activities (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). Mahoon and Murray 
(1981) argued that government regulation and deregulation were important factors that 
could affect the strategic choice of managers, which in turn could affect financial 
performance and risk. Within a strict regulatory environment, the banks' choices are 
limited and this will have a direct and indirect effect on bank performance through a 
restriction of the banks' strategic options. Deregulation of the financial system can also 
reap benefits, such as producing a variety of the products and services that may enhance 
profitability and efficiency through the optimal use of resources when producing bank 
outputs (Merrick and Saunders, 1985). It could also create a competitive banking 
system with the potential to produce the optimum quantity of money and optimising 
resources used in producing bank services and products (Friedman, 1969). 
However, deregulation may be accompanied with costs that can threaten the safety and 
soundness of the financial system, such as banks being more likely to invest in risky 
products (Memck and Saunders 1985). Gruben and McComb (1997) reported that the 
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newly deregulated banks' portfolios in Mexico became more risky because they could 
not evaluate the riskiness of loans and higher real interest rates under deregulation. 
Studies investigating the effects of deregulation in developing countries (see Chapter 3) 
in general, reported a positive impact of deregulation on banking efficiency (Gilbert and 
Wilson, 1998; Leightner and LoveIl, 1998 Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003; Isik and 
Hassan, 2003; AtauIlah et al. 2004; Williams and Nguyen, 2005); many studies, 
however, conclude that deregulation has no significant impact on banking efficiency 
(Katib and Mathews, 2000; Hao et al., 2001; Okuda et aI., 2002; Williams and 
Intarachote; 2002; Kraft et al. 2006). 
Indeed, empirical evidence (for more details see Chapter 3) on the impact of 
deregulation on banks' efficiency has been mixed: Berger and Humphrey (1997) point 
out that the results of deregulation may essentially depend on how the conditions of the 
industry have been regulated and also on the type of deregulation measures 
; 
implemented. The institutional environment of the banking system plays a vital role in 
determining deregulation effects on bank efficiency. For example, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) have mentioned that countries with weak institutional environments, 
characterised by weak legal enforcement, inefficient bureaucracies and corruption, are 
more prone to instability in their financial systems after deregulation; and thus 
deregulation could lead to a decrease of efficiency in the banks in the period 
immediately after liberalisation. In the light of measures taken by the CBJ to deregulate 
the banking system in Jordan and as this research is looking at the efficiency levels of 
Jordanian banks before and after the liberalisation process, accordingly we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 1: Bank efficiency has improved since the implementing of deregulation in 
Jordanian banking system. 
This hypothesis will be tested by comparing efficiency scores over the study period. 
This will give an indication of the extent to which the steps taken by the CBJ have 
affected positively or negatively the banks' efficiency level. Moreover, dummy 
variables will be used to account for specific years when many important deregulation 
processes were undertaken by the CBJ. 
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In addition to hypothesis I, and as mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3 there are many factors 
may have an impact on the level of banks' efficiency, such as internal bank-specific 
factors (size, ownership structure, specialisation, age, corporate control) and external 
environmental factors (concentration) and their impact on banks' efficiency. This 
research seeks to test many conceptual issues that are related to bank-specific factors 
and market condition. As shown in Chapter 2, there are many theories which have 
emerged (e.g. managerial discretion theory, behavioural theory) which considered the 
firm (bank) as nexus of contracts among different 'opportunistic' parties. The ability of 
the firm (bank) therefore to transfer inputs into outputs is a function of internal specific 
variables and external factors. 
In the light of the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 and the main characteristics of the 
Jordanian banks reviewed earlier in this chapter, the following hypotheses will also be 
tested: 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign banks are more cost (profit) efficient than domestic banks. 
Hypothesis 3: Specialised banks are less cost (profit) efficient. 
Hypothesis 4: Bank size is positively related to cost (profit) efficiency. 
Hypothesis 5: Well-established banks are more cost (profit) efficient than newly 
established banks. 
Hypothesis 6: CEO-Chairman affiliation is negatively related to banks' cos( profit) 
efficiency (i.e. chairman o/bank board and CEO are the same person). 
Hypothesis 7 a: High concentration is negatively related to cost (profit) efficiency. 
Hypothesis 7b: High market share is positively related to cost (profit) efficiency. 
The variables that will be used to test hypotheses 2-7 and the justification for 
hypotheses 2-7 will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 when selecting variables 
that will be used to account for differences between Jordanian banks. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The main features of the Jordanian banking system during 1993-2006 were reviewed in 
this chapter. The system is made up of commercial banks, Islamic banks and investment 
banks. The commercial banks dominate the banking market in Jordan with market share 
exceeding 80 per cent. There are two types of banks according to ownership: foreign 
banks and domestic banks. 
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The banking and financial system accounted for an average 17 per cent of Jordan's GDP 
and the value of Jordanian banks' assets exceeded GDP in all years 1993-2006. This 
may give an indicator about the crucial role the banking system is playing in economic 
development and growth in Jordan. 
A programme of economic and structural reforms was initiated in Jordan in early 1989, 
triggered by an economic crisis that included low foreign currency reserves, high fiscal 
deficits, high inflation rates and high unemployment rates. A key element of the 1989 
reforms, the financial deregulation prograrmne, included: efforts to increase competition; 
allowing banks to operate with more freedom; and strengthening supervision and 
prudential measures. The CBJ took several steps to liberalise the banking system in 
Jordan. The liberalising procedures included removing restrictions on interest rates, 
reducing government-directed lending, expanding of product deregulation and removing 
of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. Also, the maximum limit of 49 per cent, 
regarding the size of foreign investment in the Jordanian banks, was eliminated and 
banks were given greater autonomy to manage their assets and liabilities. In line with its 
objective to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the monetary policy ( in 
addition to developing the. money market and activating the inter-bank market), the CBJ 
took many steps, such as publishing weekly interest rates regarding inter-bank loans and 
introducing an overnight deposit facility to help banks to manage their liquidity better. 
To promote the soundness and safety of Jordanian banks, the CBJ adopted the best 
practices of the international central banks, such as enhancing the culture of risk 
management and adopting Basel's guidance on capital adequacy and corporate 
governance. Despite the CBJ taking many steps to deregulate the banking system in 
Jordan, banks are still subject to many restrictions such as those on investments and 
lending. 
The deregulation put in place by the CBJ directly affected the structure of banks' 
balance sheets and income statements. The use of non-traditional fund sources (Le. 
inter-bank loans) to fund loans and other activities developed rapidly after 1993 and 
liabilities-assets management received considerably more attention, due to the removal 
of interest rate ceilings; interest rates became more volatile, which in turn forced banks' 
management to balance their interest- sensitive liabilities by increasing the proportion of 
variable rate lending. After 1993, Jordanian banks concentrated on short-term lendfng, 
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with only a few corporate loans stretching beyond three years. On the income 
statements' side, banks became more aware of non-interest income and this source of 
income increased after 1993: the percentage of non-interest income of total revenue 
increased from 16% in 1993 to 32% in 2005. However, such deregulation measures 
subjected Jordanian banks to high risks and instabilities within their financial system, 
particularly the measures taken in 1997-2001. 
Competition in Jordanian banking improved after 1993, as a result of non-Jordanians' 
being permitted to own more than 50% of Jordanian bank stocks and the allowing of 
more foreign banks to operate in Jordan. The concentration ratio in Jordanian banking 
decreased from 17% in 1993 to 12% in 2006 and an analysis of the financial indicators 
of Jordanian banks in 1993-2006 shows that there was little improvement in these 
indicators over the period 1993-2000. At this time, the Jordanian banks were adversely 
affected by political situations within the region and the crises that Jordanian banks 
faced in 1999-2001 also did not help. From 2001, all the financial indicators of 
Jordanian banks improved, suggesting that the efficiency of the financial and banking 
system is likely to have improved after this time. The remaining chapters will 
investigate empirically the efficiency of the banks in Jordan by employing parametric 
and nonparametric approaches to see how the deregulation measures put in place 
affected the level of banks' efficiency. Moreover, the next chapters will explore many 
conceptual issues regarding efficiency of Jordanian banks. These issues will concentrate 
on bank-specific factors, ownership structure and market conditions. The exploration of 
these issues may help in understanding why banks differ with respect to theirs levels of 
efficiency. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The financial intermediaries, especially banks, play a crucial role in the process of 
economic growth by intermediating scarce resources in the economy (Levine, 1997). 
Given that the commercial banks in developing countries handle most of the 
intermediating activities (Fry, 1995) by collecting deposits from customers and re-
channelling these into various economic activities. For example, restrictions imposed by 
the regulatory authorities limit the options available to banks in transforming their funds 
into earning assets. 
The preceding chapter reviewed the bank deregulation measures introduced in Jordan 
during 1993-2006. The main aims were to promote a diversified, efficient and 
competitive financial system, through measures such as improving resources' allocation 
and financial viability and operational flexibility (Toukan, 2002). This chapter describes 
and employs parametric stochastic frontier approach (SF A) and nonparametric data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure cost and profit efficiency within Jordanian 
banks during 1993-2006. The aim is to examine whether the cost and profit efficiency 
of banks improved after the introduction of the deregulation. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the SF A and DEA 
methodologies used in this study to estimate the cost and profit efficiency measures for 
Jordanian banks. Section 5.3 describes the sample which comprises data for all banks 
operating in Jordan in 1993-2006 and also presents and explains the different variables 
used in this study. Section 5.4 outlines the model specification: that is, the functional 
form used to derive cost and profit functions, estimation of different models, structure 
tests to obtain the preferred model and deriving the best model that will be used to 
measure the efficiency scores. 
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5.2 Methodology 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are two approaches used in the literature for frontier 
estimation of various industries: nonparametric and parametric. Both of these 
approaches attempt to benchmark the relative performance of production units by 
estimating the best-practice frontier although they differ in the assumptions imposed on 
the data. In this study, a parametric approach (i.e. SF A) will be mainly employed in 
order to estimate cost and profit efficiency for Jordanian banks. To test the consistency 
of the efficiency estimates derived from SF A, this study will also use a nonparametric 
approach (i.e. DEA) to measure cost and profit efficiency. This section provides some 
technical details of the SFA and DEA approaches. 
5.2.1 Stochastic Frontier Approach (SF A) 
The most commonly used technique to measure efficiency is the SF A. As mentioned in 
, 
Chapter 2, the SFA was proposed independently by Aigner, LovelI and Schmidt (1977) 
and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). The general model for SF A can be written as: 
(5.1) 
wherelnYj is the natural logarithm of the output of the i-th bank, x mj is a vector of M 
inputs of the i-th bank, Pm is a vector of unknown parameters and Cj is a two-
component error term of the form: 
(5.2) 
Vi is a random error component that permits the random variation of the frontier across 
banks and captures the effects of measurement errors, other statistical noise and random 
shocks outside the bank's control. This error term is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed normal random variables, with zero mean and variance ri. u j is a 
non-negative and one-sided error component that follows an asymmetric half-normal 
distribution that captures the effects of inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier. 
The value of u j indicates the level of inefficiency: if u j is equal to zero, there is no 
inefficiency, and if U j is more than zero, the inefficiency is present and is called 
technical efficiency (TE ).The most common output-orientated measure of TE is the 
ratio of observed output to the corresponding frontier output (Coelli et al., 2005): 
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TE. = y, 
, exp(~xmi + v) (5.3) 
where TE, is a measure of technical efficiency of the i-th bank and takes a value 
between zero and one, y)s the observed output of the i-th bank and exp(~xm, + v,) is 
the frontier output. Thus TEi measures the output of the i-th firm relative to the output 
that cDuld be produced by a fully-efficient firm using the same inputs vector (Coelli et 
al.,2005). 
Cost and Profit Efficiency 
EquatiDns 5.1 and 5.3 focuse on the technical-physical aspect ofprDduction. When price 
data are available fDr inputs and outputs and it is assumed that banks aim tD minimise 
costs or maximise profit, we can estimate cost and profit efficiency for banks. The 
behavioural assumptions of cost minimisation and profit maximisatiDn are appropriate 
fDr banks (CDelli et aI., 2005). Berger and Mester (1997) determined three cDncepts that 
offer a definitional framework for the meauring of cost and profit efficiency in the 
banking industry: CDst efficiency, standard profit efficiency and alternative profit 
efficiency. 
1. Cost Efficiency 
Cost efficiency gives a measure Df how close a bank's cost is tD the cost Df best practice 
bank producing the same output bundle under the same conditions (Berger and Mester, 
1997). It is derived from a cost function in which variable costs depend on the prices of 
variable inputs, the quantities Df variable DUtPUtS, any exogenDus variables, randDm 
error and inefficiency. 
To measure the CDst efficiency (CE) of the i-th bank (i = 1.. ... .1), a banking firm's 
Dbserved total CDSt is modelled to deviate from the cost-efficient frontier, due to randDm 
error and inefficiency. The stDchastic CDSt frontier model can be written as: 
(5.4) 
where InTe, is the naturallDgarithm Df the Dbserved total CDSt Df the i-th bank, f 0 is 
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the functional form of the cost frontier, W m is a vector of input prices (n= 1.. ... N) for 
the i-th bank, Yid is the vector of output levels (k=1. .... K) for the i-th bank, cri 
represents the vector of control variables (c=1. ... C) that may have an effect on the i-th 
bank cost frontier, P represents a set of parameters to be estimated and z; represents a 
set of environmental variables (using control and environmental variables will be 
discussed in detail in the data section) that may have an effect on the level of a bank's 
inefficiency (i.e., on U;)54. The measure of CE; for the i-th bank is given by the ratio 
of minimal cost (estimated cost) to actual cost (observed cost) and can be written as: 
CE. = exp(f(WnPYkpC,;;P,Z;) + v;) = __ 1_ 
• exp(f(wn;'Ykpc,;;P ,z;)+v; +u;) exp(u;) 
(5.5) 
Equation 5.5 measures the minimal cost that can be incurred by an efficient bank 
(numerator in equation 5.5) against the actual costs incurred by the i-the bank 
(denominator in equation 5.5). The cost efficiency ratio may be thought of as the 
proportion of costs that are used efficiently. For example, a bank with CE; of 0.70 is 
70% efficient or equivalently wastes 30% of its costs relative to the best-practice firm 
facing the same conditions. Cost efficiency ranges over (0, 1) and equals one for the 
best-practice firm within the observed data . 
. 2. Standard Profit Efficiency 
Standard profit efficiency (SPE) measures how close a bank is to achieving the 
maximum possible profit given a particular level of input prices and output prices (and 
other variables) (Berger and Mester, 1997). In contrast to the cost function, the standard 
profit function specifies variable profits in place of variable costs. 
To measure the standard profit efficiency (SPE;) for an individual banki (i = 1 ...... N), a 
banking firm's observed profit is modelled to deviate from the profit-efficient frontier, 
due to random error and inefficiency. The stochastic profit frontier model can be written 
as: 
(5.6) 
54The composite error term for the cost frontier is equal to V; + u; becuase u;. representing inefficiency 
increases the cost. The composite error term for the profit frontier equals Vi - Uj since, Uj representing 
inefficiency decreases profit. 
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where InNP; is the natural logarithm on net profit (revenues minus total costs) and Priis 
the vector prices of variable outputs for the i-th banle 
The measure for profit efficiency (SPE;) for the i-th bank is given by the ratio of actual 
profit to maximum profit and can be written as: 
SPE. = exp(f(wnPPtPC,;;~ ,z)+v; -u;) 
, exp(f(wnpp,pc,;;~ ,z;)+v) exp(-u) (5.7) 
SPEj is the proportion of maximum profits earned, so that a SPE ratio of 0.70 would 
indicate that the bank is losing about 30% of the profits it could be earning. Similar to 
cost efficiency, profit efficiency equals one for the best-practice firm that maximises 
profits. 
3. Alternative Profit Efficiency 
Berger and Mester (1997) argued that the profit frontier in equation 5.6 may not be an 
appropriate measure of bank efficiency if the following conditions are not met: 
1. There are no differences in banks' output quality; 
2. Banks have no power over the prices they charge, as a result of the market's being 
perfectly competitive; and 
3. Output prices are accurately measured. 
However, in reality, some banks do earn more revenue because of differences in the 
quality of outputs. Also, the banking market cannot be described as being a perfectly 
competitive industry, as some banks do exercise market power to earn abnormal profits 
(Berger and Hannan, 1998). The concept of alternative profit efficiency was developed 
by Berger and Mester (1997) as a solution to the problems that may arise when the 
assumptions underlying profit efficiency are not met. The alternative profit efficiency 
( APE ) uses the same dependent variable as the profit function and the same 
independent variables as the cost function. APE may be written as: 
(5.8) 
The measure for APE for the i-th bank is given by the ratio of actual profit to maximum 
profit and can be written as: 
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exp(f(wni'Yki,C'i;~ ,z,)+ Vi -uJ 
APE. = exp(-u,) 
, exp(f(wni'Yki'c'i;~'z,)+v,) (5.9) 
Similar to standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency equals one for the best-
practice firm that maximises profits. 
The first step in predicting the cost, standard profit and alternative profit efficiency (CE, 
SPE and APE) is to estimate the parameters (~ ) of the stochastic cost/profit frontiers in 
equations 5.4, 5.6 and 5.8. As the right-hand side of these equations includes two error 
terms (ui and v,), the estimation is slightly complex. As is typical of most efficiency 
studies, it is assumed that the Vi are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance cr~ 
and the Ui are non-negative and half-normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
cr~ . Also, Vi and Ui are assumed to be distributed independently of each other and 
independently of the input and output variables. With these distribution assumptions, 
the method of maximum likelihood (ML) is used in the estimation of the parameters 
(~). This method is an estimation technique that estimates the unknown parameters in 
such a marmer that the probability of observing the given data (i.e. total cost) is as high 
(or maximum) as possible (Gujarati, 2003). The use of this method of estimation 
requires assumptions about (1) the distribution of the error terms Ui and Vi (e.g. normal 
distribution), (2) density functions for Ui and Vi, and (3) the joint density function foru i 
and Vi (for details, see Kumbhakar and LovelI 2000). Maximising the log-likelihood 
function usually involves taking the first-derivatives with respect to the unknown 
parameters and setting them to zero (CoelIi et al., 2005). In many cases, when the first 
derivative conditions are highly nonlinear and cannot be solved, iterative optimisation 
procedures are needed to find the value that maximises the log-likelihood function 
(CoeIIi et aI., 2005). The likelihood function which represents the joint density function 
of ui and Vi can be defined as enabling one to employ maximum likelihood techniques 
in order to estimate the parameters in the equations (5.4), (5.6) and (5.8)". Taking the 
log of the likelihood function, we get the log-likelihood function56 for equation (5.4i7 : 
55 For more detail, see Kumbhakar and Lovel! (2000). 
56 Use oflog-likelihood function rather than likelihood function is for computational reasons, and the two 
functions give the same value. 
"In estimating profit efficiency, the procedures followed are same as for estimating cost efficiency. 
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Inl(TCJP,cr,A) = -In--Nlncr--z LS~ + Lln <1>(_i_) N 2 1 N N [ SA] 2 1t 2cr i-I i=1 cr (5.10) 
where TCi is a vector oflog-total costs, P a set of parameters to be estimated, N is the 
cr 
number of banks, cr Z = cr~ + cr~, A = u , Si = Vi + Ui = InTCi - f(wni, Yki. Cri. Pi) 
O'v + a u 
and <1> (.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (Alien and Rai, 1996). 
After estimating the parameters (P, cr, A) in equation (5.1 0), using maximum likelihood 
techniques, the composite error term Ei = Vi + u i is calculated. Then, the existence of 
inefficiency ( u i) in composite error terms (Si) is tested58 by observing the skewness of 
the joint distribution of Si + Vi + u i . If the distribution of the composite error terms is 
positively skewed in the case of the cost frontier (or negatively for the profit frontier), 
the one-sided error component Ui dominates the random error Vi in the determination of 
Si' Aignar et al. (1977) showed that for the half-normal case, an estimate of the mean 
inefficiency is given as: 
E(U)=crul (5.11) 
where E(u) is the expected mean for Ui. Aignar et al. (1977) suggested that 
[1- E(u)] should be used as an estimator of the mean of cost efficiency for all banks. 
The above estimation is the estimated mean of cost efficiency for all banks. To obtain 
estimates of the cost efficiency for each bank, stochastic frontier analysis is directed 
towards the separation of the random error (Vi) from inefficiency (ui ) and the 
prediction of the inefficiency effects for each bank. Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and 
Schmidt (1982) presented a solution to separate the random error from inefficiency by 
obtaining the conditional distribution of Ui given Si. The expected value of Ui 
conditional on the composed error term (Ei = Vi + u i), for the half-normal model is 
shown as: 
E[u/E]= crA [<P(E).Jcr) + Ei A] 
" (1+Az) cD(SilJcr) cr (5.12) 
ss Details of testing for the existence of inefficiency in the composite error term will be discussed later in 
the model specification section. 
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where E[.] is the expectation operator, <p [.] is the density of standard normal 
distribution, <l> [.] is the cumulative density function, cr = J(cr~ + cr~) and A. = cr. 
0v + O'u 
The value of A. provides an indication of the relative contribution of u; and v; to s; . 
As A. approaches 0, with either cr~ approaching + 00 or cr~ approaching 0, the random 
error component dominates the one-sided error component in the determination of s; 
(when A. = 0 all deviation from the efficient frontier is due to the random error and 
hence no cost inefficiency). As A. approaches + 00, with either cr~ approaching + 00 or 
cr~ approaching 0, the one-sided error component dominates the random error 
component in the determination of s (when A. = 1 all deviations from the frontier are 
due to cost inefficiency) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000)59. 
4. Scale Efficiency 
As indicated in Chapter 2, scale economies refer to the proportional increase in cost 
resulting from a proportional increase in the level of output (i.e. the elasticity of total 
cost with respect to output). Following Mester(1996) and Altunbas et al. (2001), scale 
economies will be calculated at the mean values of outputs, input prices and control 
variables for the respective size quartiles 60 of banks and within all banks. As the 
calculation is based on the means of outputs, input prices and control variables, the 
estimated first order coefficients of outputs can be interpreted as cost elasticities 
regarding outputs. A measure of economies of scale (SE) is given by differentiating the 
cost function (i.e. cost elasticity) in equation (5.4) with respect to outputs (i.e. y). This is 
presented as: 
SE= ±8InTC 
k=181nYk 
(5.13) 
The degree of scale economies is given by the sum of individual cost elasticities: if the 
calculated SE < 1, then we have increasing returns to scale (implying economies of 
" It should be note that all discussions in section 5.2.1 are based on assumptions that u and v are 
distributed half-normal. For other models of distribution (e.g. exponential distribution), procedures 
remain the same but the log-likelihood function should be based on the density function of exponential 
distribution. For more details of other distributions, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
60 Banks under study will be divided into many groups according to asset size. 
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scale); if SE ~ 1, then we have constant returns to scale, and if SE > I, then we have 
decreasing returns to scale (implying diseconomies of scale). 
5.2.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
In this study, DEA will be used to check the robustness of SFA results. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, DEA is a nonparametric approach, using a linear programming method to 
construct a piece-wise combination yielding a convex production possibility set that 
enveloped all firms (banks) in the sample. The efficiency of each bank within the 
sample is then calculated relative to the surface (i.e. frontier) (Coelli et al., 2005). 
Below is a mathematical explanation of different DEA models. 
1. Constant Returns to Scale 
Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) introduced a basic DEA model (CCR model) able 
to deal with many inputs and outputs by assuming constant returns to scale and the ' 
efficiency measures derived are based on maximising the ratio of all outputs over all 
inputs. Coelli et al. (2005) explained the approach of DEA by assurning there are data 
on M inputs m = (L.M) and K outputs k ~ (1....K) for each I firm. For the i-th firm, 
the set of inputs and outputs can be represented by the column of input vector Xi and 
the column of output vector y i, The input matrix, X ~ (N x I) and the output matrix 
Y = (K x I) represent the data for all I firms. 
Efficiency measures derived using DEA are based on the maximisation of the ratio of 
outputs over inputs for each firm; for example, u 'y, Iv'x" where u is an (K x I) vector of 
output weights and v is an (N x I) vector of input weights. The optimal weights are 
obtained by solving the following mathematical problem: 
Maxu v (u'y ./v'x.) 
, 1 1 
subject to u'y /v'x j :;; I j = 1,2, .... , I 
u, v~O (5.14) 
Equation 5.14 implies that finding the values of u and v will maximise the efficiency 
measure for the i-th firm, subject to the constraints that the ratio of 'virtual output' vs. 
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'virtual input' should not exceed 1 for every firm. However, at this stage, a problem 
regard the infinite number of solutions to linear programming appears but to overcome 
this problem, the constraint v'x i = 1 is imposed in order to replace the fractional 
programme to linear programme that is: 
Max v•u (J!'y,) 
subject to vx; = 1 
II'y.-v'x.<O J'-12 I 
,... J J - -, , .... , (5.15) 
where the change of notation from u and v to J! and v is used to reflect that this is a 
different linear programming problem. By using the duality in linear programming61 , 
the dual of the above maximisation problem can be written in the following 
envelopment form: 
MinaA a 
subject to YA:::: y. 
1 
ax. :::: XA. 
1 
A:::: 0 (5.16) 
where a is an efficiency score and A represents the weights given to the reference firms. 
used to evaluate the performance of the i-th firm under evaluation to become efficient 
(the reference firms represent firms that are efficient and located on the efficient 
frontier). The weight represents the percentage of inputs of reference firms that 
inefficient firms should use to become efficient. The value of a obtained is the 
efficiency score of the i-th firm, where 0 ::s a ::s 1. If a has a value equal to one, the firm 
lies on the frontier and hence is a technically efficient firm, according to Farrell's (1957) 
definition. It should be noted that the linear programming problem must be solved n 
times, once for each firm within the sample (Coelli et aI., 2005). A value of a is then 
obtained for each firm. The objective function of DEA is to minimise the efficiency 
61 Duality means changing objective from maximising output/input ratio to minimising input usage. For 
more detail, see Cooper et al. (2007). The dual for equation (5.15) is minimisingv'x i = I, denoted bye, 
and the dual for U'Yi _ V'Xj ~ 0 is A. It should be noted that each of primal and dual gives the same solution. 
Using dual aims to reduce the number of constraints, since the number of constraints under primal equals 
the number of firms under evaluation, whereas the numbers of constraints under dual equal the number of 
inputs and outputs. 
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score9 (which represents the amount of radial reduction in the use of input vector x) as 
much as possible, whilst still remaining within the feasible input set. The radial 
contraction of the vector Xi produces a projection point (YA., XA,) on the efficient frontier 
and the constraints ensure that this projection belongs to the feasible production set 
(Coelli et aI., 2005). DEA generates the efficiency frontier as a linear combination of 
the efficient observed data, rather than assuming an explicit functional form a priori; the 
difference between the vector Xi and the projection point (U, XA,) measures 
inefficiency. 
2. Variable Returns to Scale 
Equation 5.16 assumes that constant returns to scale (CRS) are imposed on every 
observation in the sample. However, factors, such as imperfect competition and 
government regulation, may cause a firm not to operate at an optimal scale (Coelli et al., 
2005). It is therefore sometimes reasonable to adopt a variable returns to scale (VRS) 
model, as suggested by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984): the VRS ensures that a 
firm is only compared with firms of a similar size. Therefore the CRS linear 
progranuning may be modified to account for VRS by adding the convexity constraint 
LA. = I to the equation (5.16), as below: 
Mine., 9 
subjectto YA.:;>: Yi 
9x i :;>:XA, 
LA. = 1 
A.:;>: 0 (5.17) 
The introduction ofthe constraint LA. = I ensures that firms operating at different scales 
are recognised as efficient; therefore envelopment is formed by the multiple convex 
linear combinations of best practice (incorporating VRS) (Ramanathan, 2003). It should 
be noted that with this approach a firm is only benchmarked against firms of a similar 
size, whilst under CRS a firm may be benchmarked against firms that are substantially 
larger (or smaller) (Coelli et aI., 2005). 
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3. Cost Efficiency and Profit Efficiency 
The above focused on the technical efficiency of banks. However, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the concept of technical efficiency does not consider input and output prices 
and therefore does not consider whether firms in the industry are allocating their inputs 
and outputs according to their prices in the optimal proportion. Similar to the SF A 
approach, if the behavioural assumptions of a firm's objectives, such as cost 
minimisation, profit maximisation and reliable prices information, are available for 
inputs and outputs, DEA can be used to identifY cost and profit efficiency (allocative 
efficiency) (Cooper et aL, 2007). 
(i) Cost efficiency 
For cost minimisation, this research'measures input-orientated efficiency with YRS. 
The cost model is written as: 
Min"" , 
subject to 
w'x~ , 
Y/o.;:;:y; 
x; ;:;:X/o. 
/0. = I 
/0.;:;:0 (5.\8) 
where w i is a vector of input prices for the i-th bank and x: is the cost minimisation 
vector of input quantities for the i-th bank, given the input prices w i and the output level 
Yi (input orientation technical efficiency, see Chapter 2). Cost efficiency (CE) can be 
presented as a product of technical and aIlocative efficiency measures and the CE of the 
i-th bank is calculated as: 
(5.\9) 
where CE is cost efficiency, w;x; is minimum cost and W;Xi is the observed cost. Thus, 
CE is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost, for the i-th bank, and takes a value 
ranging from 0 to I, where a value of I refers to full efficiency. 
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(ii) Profit efficiency 
For profit maximisation, this research measures output-orientated efficiency and .the 
profit model is written as: 
Max •• (p~y~ -w~x~) 
-")"Yi ,XIII 1 I 
subjectto YA~y; 
x; ~JO.. 
A.= I 
A.~O (5.20) 
where Pi is a vector of output prices for the i-th bank and y; is the revenue-maximising 
vector of output quantities for the i-th bank, given the output prices Pi and the input 
level Xi (for output orientation technical efficiency, see section 2.3.1). The profit 
efficiency (PE) can be presented as the product of technical and allocative efficiency 
measures and the (PE) of the i-th bank is calculated as: 
(5.21) 
where PE is the profit efficiency, P;Yi -W;Xi is the observed profit and p;y; -w;x; is 
the maximum profit. Thus PE is the ratio of observed profit to maximum profit, for the 
i-th bank and takes values ranging from 0 to 1, where a value of 1 refers to full 
efficiency. 
4. New Cost and Profit Efficiency 
The cost and profit efficiency in equations 5.19 and 5.21 are based on the technical 
aspects of the banks and assumes that al1 banks are operating in a competitive market 
and facing the same input and output prices. However, Tone (2002) pointed out that 
there was a shortcoming with the cost and profit efficiency measures as used in the 
DEA literature. He observed that if two decision making units (DMU) held the same 
amounts of inputs and outputs, and one's unit cost for inputs was twice as much as the 
other's, using the traditional cost efficiency model will show that the two units have the 
same cost efficiency (for more details, see Cooper et a\., 2007). To solve this problem, 
Tone (2002) proposed new cost efficiency (NCE) by taking the total cost of each unit, 
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which is equal to the price of inputs multiplied by the quantity of inputs. The NCE 
model of the i-th bank is written as: 
MinXl ex 
subject to x <: XI.. 
y; :<> Yl.. 
A. = 1 
1..<:0 (5.22) 
where e is a row vector with all elements being equal to 1, x = w; x x; (w; the price of 
inputs and x; the quantity of inputs). NCE for the i-th bank is equal to: 
NCE = ex; lex; 
where ex; is the minimum cost and ex; is the observed cost. 
Similiarly the new profit .efficiency (NPE) of the i-th bank is written as: 
Max .. , e-y-ex 
x,y,1I. 
subj ect to x <: XI.. 
x <: XI.. 
y; :<> YA. 
A. = I 
1..<:0 
(5.23) 
(5.24) 
where e is a row vector with elements being equal to I, Y = p; x y; (p; the price of 
outputs and y; the quantity of outputs). The NPE of the i-th bank is: 
NPE=(ey; -exJ!(ey; -ex;) (5.25) 
where ey; - ex; is the observed profit and ey; - ex; is the maximum profit. 
5. Scale Efficiency 
As shown in Chapter 2, scale efficiency (SE) can be measured as the ratio of efficiency 
of constant returns to scale to the efficiency of variable return to scale. Thus the SE for 
each bank can be calculated using both CRS and YRS. If calculated CE under CRS is 
different from CE under VRS, then this proves that the firm has scale inefficiency 
(Coelli et aI., 2005). Scale efficiency (SE) is defined as: 
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SE (5.26) 
where CEcRs is cost efficiency under constant returns to scale and CEvRs is cost 
efficiency under variable returns to scale. 
5.3 Data and Variables: Definition and Measurement 
The data used in this study are obtained from the CBJ database and covers the period 
1993-2006. Our sample includes all 22 banks62 (domestic and foreign) operating in 
Jordan. In total we have 281 observations. The inclusion of foreign banks allows the 
comparison of efficiency in both foreign and domestic banks. Moreover, as the data 
come from different kinds of banks (Le. Islamic, investment and commercial banks), 
this allows us to identifY which kind of banks is more efficient. The data also covers the 
period both before and after liberalisation: this allows to test the impact of deregulation 
on the Jordanian banks' efficiency. The total number of banks operating in Jordan 
(foreign and domestic) was 21 in 1993 and 23 in 2006. Table 5.1 shows the total assets 
and number of domestic and foreign banks between 1993-2006. 
62 One bank excluded from sample. Iraqi Rafdien bank has not exercised any banking operations since 
1990 as result of UN sanctions on Iraq 1993-2003. 
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Table 5. 1 b ks Domestic and orelgn an 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Assets (MJOD) I 5979 6679 7526 7824 8616 9425 10436 11474 12542 13225 13807 16090 19390 22523 
Number of Banks 21 21 21 20 19 21 . 21 21 21 20 20 23 23 23 
Domestic Banks 16 16 16 15 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 \3 15 
Foreign Banks 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 8 8 
Domestic Banks' Assets (MJOD) 5465 6112 6888 7128 7848 8239 9099 10015 ll080 11485 12488 14144 17049 19604 
Percentage of domestic banks' 
assets from total assets 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.87 
Foreign Banks' Assets (MJOD). 514 567 638 697 768 1185 1337 1459 1462 1740 1537 1947 2342 2918 
Percentage of foreign banks' assets 
from total assets 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.\3 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Percentage of foreign ownership 
from national banks 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.55 
. . MJOD. MIllIons of lordaman dmar. All values m nommal terms . 
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5.3.1 Input and Output Variables 
After the decision to measure cost and profit efficiency using SFA and DEA, the total 
costs, net profits, inputs, outputs, input prices and outputs prices need to be determined. 
When measuring the cost and profit efficiency of multi-product firms such as banks, 
there are many problems regarding the definition of their inputs and outputs (Maggi and 
Rossi, 2003). Unlike manufacturing firms, banks' outputs cannot be measured in 
physical quantities, as a bank is an entity engaged in the intermediation of services 
between lenders and depositors. Banks also provide a wide array of services, such as 
low-risk assets, credit and payment services and the running of investment portfolios 
(Molyneux et al., 1996); fortunately, the literature on banks' efficiency outlines a 
number of approaches to define their inputs and outputs (see Chapter 3). 
This study employs the intermediation approach proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977), 
as indicated earlier, for defining bank inputs and outputs. This approach assumes that 
banks collect deposits to transform them, using labour and capital, into loans, 
investments and other earning assets (e.g. balances with other banks). As pointed out by 
Aly et a!. (1990), Berger and Mester (1997), Altunbas et al. (200 I), Casu and Molyneux 
(2003), Weill (2004) and Bos et a!. (2009), the inputs used in the calculation of the 
various efficiency measures are funds, labour and physical capital and the outputs used 
are loans, investments and other earning assets. Table 5.2 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the Jordanian banks' total costs, net profit, inputs and outputs, price of 
inputs and price of outputs variables during 1993-2006. 
As shown earlier, banks' cost is modelled as a function of input prices and outputs and a 
set of control variables. Similarly, banks' profit is modelled as a function of input prices, 
output prices and a set of control variables. Table 5.2 shows total costs, net profit, input 
prices, output and output prices63 for Jordanian banks in 1993-2006. 
Regarding estimation of the cost stochastic frontier, total cost (IC) will include interest 
expenses on customers' deposits, banks deposits and cash margins, commission 
63 Total costs, net profit, inputs, outputs, input prices and output prices are obtained from the banks' 
balance sheets and income statements. 
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expenses, personnel expenses, depreciation, provision expenses, trading expenses and 
trading losses, and other expenses related to bank operations. 
For estimation of the profit stochastic frontier, net profit (Np)64 will include interest 
income from loans, investments, bank deposits, revenue from investments and other 
revenues related to banking operations, minus total costs. 
Input Prices, Outputs and Output Prices 
Funds include deposits from banks and financial institutions, customer deposits 
(demand and current deposits, saving accounts, time and notice deposits and certificate 
deposits), cash margins and borrowed funds. The price of funds (wJ) is calculated, as 
percentage, by dividing total interest expenses from customer deposits, bank deposits, 
cash margins and borrowed funds by. the average of funds. 
Labour relates to the number of full-time employees at a bank and the price of labour 
(w2) is measured, as millions of JOD, by dividing personnel expenses by the number of 
employees. 
Physical capital includes the book value of premises and equipments and other assets, 
including prepaid expenses. The price of physical capital (w3) is measured, as 
percentage, by dividing the depreciation and other non-interest expenses by the average 
of physical capital. 
The three outputs to be used in this study include loans (yl), investments (y2) and other 
earning assets (y3), measured in millions of JOD dinar. The total customers' loans (yl) 
include advances and loans, discounted bills and debentures, overdrafts, credit cards and 
syndicated loans. The price ofloans (PI) is measured as percentage by taking the sum of 
interest income and fees from loans over the average of loans. 
64 As a number of banks in the sample the exhibit negative profits (i.e. losses) and log does not accept 
negative values, the dependent variable net profit (NP) in the profit model is transformed to 
In(NP + l(Np)min 1+ 1), where l(Np)minl is the minimum absolute value ofNP (Le. maximum losses) 
over all banks in sample. This transformation is common in the literature and recommended by Berger 
and Mester (1997). 
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Investments (y2) include trading securities, available for sale, held to maturity and 
investments in associations and affiliates. The price of investment (P2) is measures as 
percentage of all interest income, dividends and trading profits by the average of 
investment. 
Other earning assets (y3) include balances and deposits in domestic and foreign banks 
and certificate of deposits issued by Central and other banks. The price of other earning 
assets (P3) is measured as percentage of all interest income earned from domestic and 
foreign banks by the average65 of other earning assets. 
In addition to the above variables, this research will also include financial capital (E) 
(equity) as an additional input, and a time trend (T)66. 
Maudos et al. (2002) argued that the inclusion of financial capital in cost and profit 
frontier estimation offers many advantages: (i) capital affects costs, because it is a 
source of funding, other than deposits, that does not generate financial costs, and (ii) 
capital increases generate more costs than any deposit increases. Also, the inclusion of 
financial capital allows for the accounting of various risk preferences regarding the 
operation of banks; thus, if some banks are more risk averse than others, they may hold 
a higher level of financial capital than maximising profits or minimising costs (Maudos 
et aI., 2002). Berger and Mester (1997) argued that a bank's capital level directly affects 
costs by providing an alternative to deposits as a funding source for loans. Interest paid 
on deposits counts as cost, whilst dividends paid to the shareholder are not included in 
cost. If the financial capital is not included, the estimated efficiency for banks will be 
under/overestimated (Mester, 1997). Hughes and Mester (2008) argued that financial 
capital is a part of a bank's production technology and should be included in the 
estimation of cost and profit functions. Hughes and Mester (1993), Clark (1996), 
Hughes et al. (1996), Akhavein et al. (1997), Berger and Mester (1997), Mester (1997), 
Hao et al. (2001), Maudos et al. (2002) and Delis et al. (2009) are all examples of 
studies including financial capital in the estimation of the cost and the profit frontiers. 
'5 In calculating input and output prices, the average of inputs and outputs amount was used. The average 
of inputs and outputs is equal to balance at beginning of the year plus balances at end of the year, divided 
b12. An average is used to eliminate the effect of fluctuations throughout year. 
• Note that financial capital (E) and time trend (T) will be fully interactive with outputs (Y) and input 
price variables, which will be shown in the model specification. 
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A time trend (T=1 for 1993, T=2 for 1994, ........... T=14 for 2006) is included in the 
model in order to test for changes in technology over time, regarding estimated costs: 
Coelli et al. (2005) pointed out that if observations are available over time, the 
technological changes may be observed by including a time trend within a model. 
McKillop et al. (1996), Lang and Welzel (1996) and Altunbas et al. (1999) showed that 
the rate of technical progress may be inferred from changes in a firm's cost function 
over time. The time-trend (T) is a 'catch-all' variable that captures the effects of 
technological factors, i.e. learning by doing and organisational changes, allowing for the 
more efficient use of existing inputs together with the effects of other factors, such as 
changing enviromnental regulations (Altunbas et al. 1999). Under technical progress, 
banks may produce a given output at lower costs over time. 
Technical change can be estimated by calculating the variation in total cost due to a 
given change in technology. This can be measured by the partial derivative of the 
alnTC 
estimated cost function, in respect of the time trend and can be shown as ---:c::-
aT 
(Altunbas et al., 1999). 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of banks' inputs and outputs' 1993-2006 
Variables Descriptiou 
Dependent Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
TC(MJOD), Total costs include interest expenses on customers' deposits, bank deposits and cash margins, 29 35.6 0.8 218.3 
commission expenses, personnel expenses, depreciation and other expenses. 
NP(MJOD) Net profit includes interest income from loans, investments and deposits with banks, revenue from 
7.4 14.3 -14.7 110.6 investments and other revenue related to banking work, minus total costs. 
Independent variables! Inj1ut(ll'ices 
WI(%) Price of funds equals total interest expenses on customers' deposits, bank deposits and cash margins 
! average customer deposits per year. 4.4% 1.9% 0.8% 8.9% 
W2(MJOD) Price of employees' equal total personnel expenses/ number of employees. 0.018 om 0.006 0.066 
W3(%) Price of physical capital (depreciation and other non-interest expenses / average physical capital per 1.4% 1% 0.09% 8.2% year) 
Independent variables! Outputs Quantity 
YI(MJOD) Loans include all types of loans net of provision, interest and commission in suspense. 189 218.9 4.8 1372 
Y2(MJOD) Investments include trading securities, available for sale, held to maturity and investment in 58 113.3 0.2 880.3 
associations and affiliates 
Y3(MJOD) Other earning assets includingdeposits with domestic and foreign banks. 204.7 364 3.8 2224.3 
Independent variables /Outputs Prices 
PI (%) Price ofloans (total interest and commission income from loans/ average loans per year) 11% 2.7% 0.8% 17.8% 
P2 (%) Price o[investments (interest and revenue of investments/ average investments per year) 6.3% 5% -14% 36.5% 
P3 (%) Price of other earning assets (interest and commissions from banks/ average balances with domestic 5% 
and foreign banks per year). 2.3% 0 14.3% 
Other variables 
E(MJOD) Banks' financial capital. 
. 
52.3 79.4 -17.1 789.6 
T Time trend (T-I for 1993, T-2for 1994, ................. , T-14 for 2006) I 14 
FIgures deftated USlOg GDP deftator and taklOg 1993 as base year. 
'MJOD = Millions of Jordanian Dinar. Jordanian Dinar is equal to 1.4 US dollars. 
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Table 5.2 highlights a large disparity between banks in Jordan, in terms of total cost 
(TC), net profit (NP) and outputs (for more details of characteristics of Jordanian banks, 
see Chapter 4). For example, the maximum value of total cost is about 218.3 million 
JOD, whereas the minimum value is about 0.8 million JOD and the standard deviation 
around 35.6 million JOD. In terms of input prices, Tahle 5.2 shows that there is no 
significant disparity between them, which suggests that input prices are exogenous (i.e. 
determined by market). However, there is a disparity between output prices (e.g. the SD 
ofloans is 2.7%) amongst banks. This suggests that many banks may have some market 
power in setting their output prices. 
5.3.2 Control and Environmental Variables 
The estimation of cost/profit efficiency, using just input and output variables, is based 
on the assumption that all banks face the same conditions and there are no differences 
between them. In reality, as shown in Chapter 2, the ability of a manager to convert' 
inputs to outputs varies over time and space, due to internal bank-specific characteristics 
(e.g. level of risks, ownership structure) and/or external environment factors (e.g. level 
of competition). These internal and external factors may be exogenous and influence 
either the production process itself or the efficiency at which a bank operates (Kuenzle, 
2005). 
HUghes and Mester (2008) argued that inefficiency is derived from the residuals (i.e. u) 
and thus the selection of the characteristics of the banks and environmental variables to 
include in the frontier estimation is very important. These variables define the peer 
group that determines best-practice performance against which a particular bank's 
performance is judged. Exogenous variables have been incorporated into efficiency 
measurement models in a variety of ways. In one approach, one may specify a 
cost/profit function by assuming that the exogenous variables may influence the 
structure of the cost and profit functions (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000). In this 
specification, the heterogeneity variables (exogenous variables) influence the cost of 
production directly and alter the shape of the frontier. However, any variation in 
inefficiency is unexplained by this specification (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000). A 
second approach is where one may specify the cost and profit functions by assuming 
that the exogenous variables have an influence on the distance that separates each bank 
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from the best practice function (Battese and Coelli, 1995); in other words, the 
exogenous variables will affect the inefficiency (Uj) in equations (5.4), (5.6) and (5.8). 
In this study, in addition to the input and output variables, two kinds of variables will be 
used. The first will be called control variables and we assume that they have a direct 
influence on the banks' performance. The second are called environmental variables and 
we assume that these variables have an influence on the inefficiency ( Uj). 
1. Control Variables 
Control variables include bank-specific variables, which may have a direct influence on 
the position of the frontier (i.e. the frontier shifts down or up) (Coelli, 1999; Bos et aI., 
2008). The introduction of bank-specific variables allows one to account for 
heterogeneity between banks, in terms of risks and the quality of banks' output. 
Hughes and Mester (2008) argued that estimating the cost or profit functions without 
taking into account a bank's choice of risk is a serious omission. They also argued a 
bank's choice of risk is an important part of banking technology and thus should be 
taken into account when estimating cost/profit functions. Similarly Mester (1993, 1997) 
and Berger and Mester (1997) argued that a failure to account for heterogeneity among 
banks is likely to cause biased efficiency scores, with Mester (1997) reporting that some 
banks may be mislabelled as inefficient because they are operating in a more risk-averse 
manner than others, whilst others may be mislabelled as efficient because they are 
producing a lower quality of outputs than others. Control variables enter into the 
estimation of the bank's cost and profit frontier in the same way as the input and output 
variables and they fully interact with input prices and outputs in order to reflect the 
impact of these variables on the input prices and output quantity and on the estimated 
cost/profit efficiency scores. Table 5.3 shows the control variables included in this study. 
Table 5.3 Control Variables 
Control Description Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Variables 
Cl Asset quality (loan loss provisions plus interest 10.7% 10.% 0.3% 66.1% 
and commission in suspense / average loans). 
C2 Capital adequacy according to Basel I 
(equity/risk weighted assets). 10% 6.1% -16% 68.% 
In this research we follow Berger and Mester (1997) and Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2003) 
by identifying two control variables. These are the size of loan loss provisions plus 
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interests and commissions in suspense as a percentage of banks' loans (Cl) to proxy for 
the volume on non-performing loans67 in banks and the capital adequacy ratio (C2) to 
proxy for the management incentives to take risks. 
The volume of non-performing loans in banks can be associated with high risks, bad 
asset quality and bad management efficiency in follow-up loans granted (Berger and De 
Young, 1997). Non-performing loans may also be a signal of a misallocation of credit, 
which may in turn cause a decrease in the funds available for good and safe investments 
(Dongili and Zago, 2005). Berger and De Young (1997) also indicated that an increase 
in the volume of non-performing loans was associated with extra costs, such as 
underwriting provisions and monitoring expenditures: this increases bank costs and in 
turn decreases profit. Some regulatory authorities impose many restrictions on banks' 
activities (e.g. prohibiting the granting of new loans) if the non-performing loans exceed 
a specified ratio and these restrictions may mean that producing a variety of products 
and services is not allowed, decreasing bank revenue in the process (Mester, 1997). 
Moreover, many studies (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Barr and Siems, 1994; De 
Young and Whalen, 1994; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995) found that banks facing 
financial distress and thus approaching failure carried a large volume of non-performing 
loans. Thus, in addition to having a high volume of non-performing loans, failed banks 
or those approaching failure also tended to have low cost and profit efficiency and poor 
management quality. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996) and Resti (1996) found negative 
relationships between efficiency and non-performing loans. An example of studies 
where the volume of non-performing loans has been included as a control variable 
include Hughes et al. (1996), Mester (1996) and AI-Jarrah and Molyneux (2003). 
However, whether it is appropriate to include non-performing loans in banks' cost/profit 
functions depends on the extent to which this variable is exogenous (i.e. caused by 
external variables). This variable could be exogenous if caused by negative economic 
shocks (bad luck), but it could be endogenous because of bad management. Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) tested the bad luck and bad management arguments and found mixed 
evidence on the exogeneity of non-performing loans. 
67 Banks did not report non-performing loans in their financial statements, therefore different stndies (e.g. 
Rao, 2006) use loans' loss provision as proxy for non-performing loans. 
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With respect to the Jordan banking industry, the problem ofnon-perfonning loans could 
be exogenous as a result of the shocks that faced Jordan during 1990-2003, especially 
the impacts of the first and second Gulf Wars on the Jordanian economy. As mentioned 
in Chapter 4, Iraq was the main trading partner of Jordan and many banks granted loans 
to finance trade between them. After sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990 by the United 
Nations, many banks suffered from the non-perfonning loans' problem because most of 
the companies and individuals used to dealing with Iraq and already having loans from 
banks were unable to meet their obligations to them. Thus, we hypothesis that: 
Hypothesis 8: Banks with a high percentage oJ non-perJorming loans are incurring 
more costs and generating less profits. 
The second control variable included in this study is the capital adequacy ratio (C2), 
measured according to the Basel I Accord. One of the most important risks that banks 
face is insolvency (Maudose et aI., 2002). The financial capital of banks is viewed as the 
first line of defence and is used to absorb unexpected loss that banks may face (Basel 
Committee, 1988). Consequently, the financial capital of banks is subject to prudential 
capital requirements 68 , featuring many objectives. Firstly, to reduce risk-shifting by 
bankers whose assets are insured. As a result of introducing a deposit insurance scheme, 
bankers may become involved in more risky activities because they are aware that the 
deposit insurance company will pay for depositors when the bank goes bankrupt. Thus 
the existence of a capital adequacy ratio could reduce the attitude of banks towards risks 
(Rochet, 1992). Secondly, to prevent banks' insolvency and minimise destructive banks 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2000). Maudos et al. (2002) argued that a bank's insolvency risk 
is dependent on the composition of its assets and on the financial capital available to 
absorb any failed investments. Insolvency risk affects a bank's costs and profits through 
the increase in the prices of its inputs through the risk premium that banks must pay to 
depositors (Berger and Mester, 1997). The capital adequacy ratio is used by regulatory 
authorities to detennine which banks hold risky assets, and the different attitudes 
amongst banks regarding risk taking could have a direct impact on the position of the 
68 Regulatory Authorities try to ensure banks have sufficient capital to keep them out of difficulty. Most 
Regulatory authorities follow Capital Adequacy Requirement specified by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision called Basel!. Minimum capital requirement that banks should hold is at least 8 % 
of assets (minimum for Jordan is 12 %). Basel I replaced by Basel II based on three pillars: minimum 
capital requirement, supervisory review process and market discipline. 
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cost/profit frontiers. Therefore Hughes and Mester (2008) argued that the estimation of 
the cost and profit functions without taking into account a bank's choice of risk is a 
serious mistake. Capital adequacy provides assurance regarding financial soundness 
against unforeseen contingencies; Delis et al. (2009) found that banks with a high 
capital adequacy ratio are superior in performance to all other banks, whilst banks with 
a low capital adequacy ratio seemed to perform the worst. Thus, we hypothesis that: 
Hypothesis 9: Banks with low level of capital adequacy are incurring more costs and 
generating less profit. 
Table 5.3 shows that the Jordanian banks are heterogeneous in terms of risk and 
management quality. For example, the mean for asset quality is 10.7% and the standard 
deviation is 10.1%, which suggests that some banks faced substantial credit quality 
problems. Thus the figures in Table 5.3 highlight the importance of including control 
variables in the cost and profit frontiers, in order to account for heterogeneity among 
Jordanian banks. 
2. Environmental Variables 
In this research we follow Berger and Mester (1997), AI-Jarrah and Molyneux (2003) 
and Bos et aI., (2009) to identify the environmental variables that could have an 
influence on the inefficiency (i.e. Uj ) (Battese and CoeIli, 1995)69. In this study, 
environmental variables that control banking and market conditions are included: 
ownership structure (ZI), specialisation (Z2), bank size (Z3), age of bank (Z4), 
corporate governance (Z5), market structure (Z6), dummy variable for years 1997-2002 
(Z7) and dummy variable for years 2003-2006 (Z8). Table 5.4 presents the 
environmental variables. 
69 Some authors, such as Stevens (2004), mentioned that, in the absence of a convincing theoretical 
argument with regard to appropriate modelling of exogenous variables in the cost frontier itself or in the 
determinant of inefficiency, the researcher can try both models and use statistical testing (Le. log ratio test) 
to choose the best specification. Coelli et a1. (1999) estimated production function by inCluding 
exogenous variables in the estimation of the production function and in the determinant of inefficiency. 
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Table 54 Environmental Variables 1993-2006 
Environmental . Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Variables 
Zl Ownership structure (dummy variable equals 1 if bank is foreign or foreign ownership exceeds 50% 
of bank's capital, otherwise variable = 0). 
Z2 Specialisation: 
Dummy variable equals I ifbank is commercial, otherwise equals O. 
Dummy variable equals I if bank is Islamic, otherwise equals O. 
Dummy variable equals I if bank is investment bank, otherwise equals O. 
Z3 Size of bank (total assets) (MJOD'). 548.6 788.7 27.4 5127.4 
Z4 Age of bank (years) 25 Yrs 18Yrs 0 76Yrs 
Z5 Corporate control (dummy variable equals I if CEO and Chairman are same person, otherwise 
equals 0). 
N 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.25 
Z6a Market structure/concentration (Herfindahl index of local market concentration (Z6a) = L ( ~) 2 , 
j",,} x 
where Xi is measure of size of deposits of the i-th bank and x represents total deposits for banking 
sector as a whole. 
Z6b Market structurel Market share. (Z6b) - x/x, where Xi is measure of size of deposits of the i-th 
bank, and x represents total deposits for banking sector as a whole. 
0.05 0.07 0.002 0.34 
Z7 Dummy variable for years 1997-2002 equals I, otherwise equals O. 
Z8 Dummy variable for years 2003-2006 equals I, otherwise equals O. 
. . MJOD. MIlhons of Jordanian dmar. Values ID nommal terms . 
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The first ,environmental variable is the ownership structure (ownership structure) (ZI), 
which accounts for the difference of ownership between banks in Jordan, i.e. foreign or 
domestic. To measure this variable, dummy variables were assigned, equalling 1 for 
foreign and 0 for non-foreign banks. As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are two types of 
banks in Jordan, according to ownership structure: foreign and domestic banks. Foreign 
banks are branches of international banks and are fully owned by foreigners and 
domestic banks are public ownership banks owned by Jordanians and foreigners. 
As shown in Chapter 3, Mahajan et al. (1996) and Chang et al. (1998) argued that 
foreign banks may possess relative comparative advantages, sternming from different 
operating strategies, differences in organisational structure and support from home 
governments. Foreign banks also seem to have a relatively lower cost of funds and 
operate with a higher capital ratio. Berger et al. (2005) pointed out that foreign banks 
have an advantage over domestic banks, on the grounds that foreign banks are usually 
part of large banking organisations and so generally face the same scale economies as 
large domestically-owned banks. Moreover, foreign banks have better access to the 
capital market, superior technology and multinational customers, along with a superior 
ability to diversify risks. Stiglitz (1994) argues that domestic banks may incur extra 
costs, as they have to compete with large and strong international banks with better 
management and a better reputation. In addition, foreign banks have better access to 
cheap funds that are not available to domestic banks. Additionally, in some countries, 
depositors have little confidence in national banks and they direct their deposits to 
foreign banks as they provide greater security and confidence. As a result, the domestic 
banks would have to pay substantially higher interest rates to attract depositors. Stiglitz 
(1994) also argues that foreign banks are less sensitive to government pressures to 
finance specific proj ects that may not be profitable, whereas local banks are more 
sensitive to such government pressures. On the other hand, foreign banks are subject to 
some adverse factors that may offset comparative advantages, such as long-distance 
management, dealing within a more regulatory environment, obtaining inside 
information (qualitative) about local conditions and a lack of exposure and training 
within the lesser-known markets (Isik and Hassan, 2003). However, as shown earlier 
(Chapter 3) many studies have shown foreign banks to be more efficient than domestic 
banks (Hao et aI., 2001; Isik and Hassan, 2002; Harvy1chyk, 2006; Kraft et aI., 2006). 
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The second environmental variable used is a dummy variable for specialisation (Z2): 
there are three different groups of banks operating in Jordan: commercial, investment 
and Islamic banks, and to see the effects of specialisation on the level of cost and profit 
efficiency, we assign dummy variables for each group of banks. Commercial banks 
practise traditional banking activities, such as taking deposits and granting loans; 
investment banks practise all financial and investment activities, in addition to the 
brokerage services at the Amman Stock Exchange; and Islamic banks practise all 
banking, financing and investing on a non-usury basis under Islamic (Shariah) law. 
Unlike commercial and investment banks, Islamic banks do not have a fixed or 
predetermined rate of return on financial transactions and they follow Islamic religious 
restrictions by avoiding any transaction based on interest rates (Hassan, 2005). 
According to Islamic (Shariah) law, the participants (customers) are allowed to share in 
business profits and, accordingly, Islamic banks have developed a variety of products 
based on the participation between the bank and the customer (e.g. equity participation, 
profit-and-loss sharing7o) (lsik et al., 2004). Tortosa-Ausina (2004) found specialised 
banks less efficient (i.e. investment banks), as they produce distinct services and 
different product mixes requiring a more intense input use and more specialised 
personnel. Producing different products requires specialised banks to adopt different 
strategies and adopting these strategies may influence and increase their average cost 
levels (Maudos and Pastor, 2002). Aly et al. (1990), Femer et al. (1993) and Tortosa-
Ausina (2003) found that specialised banks are less cost (profit) efficient than 
commercial banks. 
The third environmental variable included is the size of bank proxied by total assets 
variable (Z3) is included to control for bank size. Within the banking literature, it is 
considered that bank size should be strongly associated with efficiency, as size may 
allow of scale of economies. Evanoff and Israilevich (1991) pointed out that larger 
banks might have a more skilled management team andlor be more cost conscious, due 
to greater pressure from the owners concerning bottom line profit. Similarly, Casu and 
Girardone (2006) mentioned that larger banks may have been able to decrease costs by 
exploiting economies of both scale and scope, achieving market power in their local 
market and therefore increasing both prices and profits. Berger (1993), Miller and 
70 For more details about Islamic banks' products, see Molyneux and Iqabal (2005). 
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Noulas (1996), Rangan et al. (1998) and Worthington (1998) all found a positive 
relationship between bank size and cost/profit efficiency. However, Hermalin and 
Wallace (1994) and DeYoung and Nole (1996) also found significant negative 
relationships between bank size and cost and profit efficiency. 
The fourth environmental variable is the age of bank (Z4) because It is possible that 
banking technology inherits learning by doing71, suggesting that as banks grow older, 
they could manage their operations better and become more efficient (Isik and Hassan, 
2003). Newly established banks may experience higher establishing costs and need time 
to establish customer relationships (Mester, 1996). Consistent with the 'learning by 
doing' hypothesis, Mester (1996) found that inefficient banks tended to be newly 
established (less than 5 years) and Berger and Mester (1997) and Kulasekaran and 
Shaffer (2002) found a significant positive relationship between efficiency and age. De 
Young and Hassan (1998) found that during the first three years of operation de novo 
(Le. banks aged less than 5 years) banks improved their profit efficiency rapidly but on 
average it took them about nine years to catch up with established banks. On other hand, 
Isik and Hassan (2003) established a negative relationship between age and efficiency in 
the Turkish banking market and this was attributed to the older Turkish banks' being 
strangled by bureaucracy. 
The fifth environmental variable relates to corporate control (Z5), included to test the 
principal-agent problem within Jordanian banks. To measure corporate control within 
Jordanian banks, a dummy variable is assigned, equal to I if the CEO and the chairman 
are one and the same, otherwise the variable equals O. As shown in Chapter 2, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argued that the principal-agent problem would have a negative impact on 
a firm's performance unless there is an optimally-devised compensation package or 
external corporate control mechanism designed to align the objectives of the managers 
and the shareholders (further details in Chapter 2). The ownership/management 
ri:Iationship is an important element in the operation of banks and the motivation and 
goals of bank management and stockholders may be a major determinant in the firm's 
efficiency and performance; such factors may differ widely from one firm to another 
(Spong et aI., 1995). One way to alleviate agency problems is to separate decision 
71 This is a concept in economic theory referring to the capability of workers to improve their productivity 
and efficiency by regularly repeating same type of action. 
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management from decision control: the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of firms 
generally has the most power regarding decision making, being highly engaged in the 
preparation of investment projects and their follow-up implementation (Pi and Timme 
1993). The Board of Directors, elected by the stockholders and led by the chairman, are 
assumed to take the role of decision control, setting financial goals and the adoption of 
written policies that define the criteria and terms for the investment decisions 
implemented by the CEO. The Board of Directors are also assumed to assess the 
performance of the CEO and to design and approve the compensation package of key 
executives (Pi and Timme 1993). Thus, if a CEO is also the chairman of the board, 
principal-agent conflicts may arise as a result of the concentration of decision 
management and control within one person. The relationship between separate decision 
management and decision control and the impact on a bank's efficiency has been 
analysed by Glassman and Rhodes (1980), Pi and Tommi (1993), Spong et al. (1995), 
Berger and Hannan (1998), Isik and Hassan (2003). The majority of these studies 
reported a negative outcome regarding banking efficiency levels when the CEO and the 
chairman were the same person. 
The next environmental variable included involves the market structure (concentration), 
so the Herfindahl Index (Z6a) and market share (Z6b) control for market structure in 
accordance with the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. With 
the exception of the case of perfect competition, other market structures show how firms 
can exercise some kind of market power by setting their prices above a competitive 
price (more details in Chapter 2). Berger and Hannan (1998) asserted that if high levels 
of concentration exist in the banking market, this would allow banks to charge prices in 
excess of competitive levels. Thus, managers will not work as hard to keep costs under 
control. 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model is a general statement of the 
determinants of market performance. Simply, the conduct or rivalry within the market is 
determined by market structure conditions, especially the number and size distribution 
of firms and the conditions of rivalry (Molyneux et aI., 1996). There are two SCP 
hypotheses that can be tested in order. to examine the relationship between the market 
structure and banks' efficiency: the traditional and the efficient hypotheses. The 
traditional SCP hypothesis asserts that banks in less competitive markets can charge 
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higher prices for their services and eventually make supernormal profits; thus, such 
banks may feel under less pressure to control their costs. Demsetz (1973) argued that a 
positive relationship between profit rates and concentration may reflect the 
differentiated efficiency of the largest and smaller banks within various markets, rather 
than reflecting a more effective collusion within the more concentrated markets. In 
other words, by explaining the links between market structure and performance, the 
efficient structure hypothesis proposes that an industry's structure may arise from 
superior operating efficiencies by a particular firm. According to this hypothesis, a 
positive relationship between firms' profit and structure is attributed to the gains made 
in market share by more efficient firms, leading in turn to increased concentration. 
The seventh and eighth environmental variables (Z7) and (Z8) are dummy variables 
which control for the years 1997-2002 and 2003-2006: these variables are incorporated 
to capture the effects of the deregulation measures introduced during these two periods 
(see Table 4.3). In the years 1997 and 2003, there were many important deregulation 
measures undertaken by the CBJ. In 1997, the maximum limit of 49% on the size of 
FDI within Jordanian banks was eliminated and the CBJ fully removed all restrictions 
from the foreign exchange system. This included: 
1. Allowing non-resident accounts in Jordanian dinars and or / foreign currency. 
2. Allowing resident account holders to maintain an account in foreign currency of 
any amount. 
3. Transferring the value of imports to foreign beneficiaries without CBJ approval. 
In 2003, to promote and enhance competition within the Jordanian banking industry, the 
CBJ allowed three branches of foreign banks to operate in Jordan: these belonged to 
large financial institutions in the Middle East which had a strong financial position and 
good risk management practices. The CBJ hoped that their introduction would help to 
promote competition within the Jordanian banking market and would also motivate the 
existing banks to operate more efficiently in order to be able to compete with the new 
banks. To test the effects of the CBJ deregulation processes in these years, we follow 
Allen and Liu (2005) and assign a dummy variable equal to I for years 1997-2002, 
otherwise equal to zero, and a dummy variable for years 2002-2006 equal to 1, 
otherwise zero. 
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5.4 Model(s) Specification 
Having decided to estimate cost and profit efficiency and having identified and 
measured dependent and independent variables 72, the functional form needs be specified 
(see Chapter 3): this study uses the translog functional form73 and for the cost function74 
IS: 
. TC. 2 3 2 
In(--") = U o + L~nln(wni,lw3)+ LI\lnYkit + 1il]lnE;t + 'tiT + LJ(,lncrit 
w 3 n=1 k=1 r=1 
+ 2. [± ± ~ niln(w n;/W 3 )In(w i;/W 3)] + 2. [± ± Okmlny k;tlny m;t ] 
2 n=] i=] 2 k=] m=] 
(5.27) 
2 2 3 2 
+ L LP",ln(wn;/w3)ln(crit )+ L LOllcrlnYkitlncrit +lnS;t 
n",,1 r=1 k=l £=1 
where InTCit is the natural logarithm of the total cost ofthe i-th bank at time t; Wni! is the 
natural logarithm for the input price vectors for the i-th bank at time t (i.e. price of funds 
(wl), employees (w2) and physical capital (w3) ); Yki! is the natural logarithm of 
outputs for the i-th bank at time t (i.e. loans (yl), investment (y2) and other earning 
assets (y3»; Ei! is a financial capital of the i-th bank at time t; T is a time trend (T=1 for 
1993, T=2 for 1994, ........... T=14 for 2006); C'itiS a set of control variables for the i-th 
72 Please note the following discussion applies to only (SFA). 
73 Despite translog function forms being most popular in the literature, it has many limitations, especially 
in estimation of economies of scale (see Chapter 3). These limitations could be overcome by using 
Fourier-flexible functional form, as suggested by McAllister and McManus (1993). The Main problem 
with the Fourier flexible form, however, is that there are more parameters to estimate and it requires 
large numbers of observations to estimate cost and profit efficiency (Maudos and Pastor, 2003; 
Bakhouche, 2004; Coelli et al., 2005). Moreover, Altunbas and Chakaravarty (200 I) indicate that, 
while the Fourier flexible form is better in terms of goodness of fit, its forecasting ability to generate 
efficiency scores is worse, which may imply the use of the translog form could be justified by its better 
predictive ability (Molyneux and Iqbal, 2005). Given the number of observations in this research is 
281, use of Fourier flexible form would lead to losing a degree of freedom, which in turn may affect 
the estimation of efficiency scores . 
. 74 The Functional form for standard and alternative profit frontiers is same as the functional form of the 
cost function, except that the dependent variable in equation (5.27) becomes net profit (NP) and the 
composite error term is Ej = Vj-Uj. 
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bank at time t (i.e. asset quality (Cl), capital adequacy (C2»; Eit~Vit+Uit is a composite 
error, where Vit is a random error which is assumed to be two-sided, usually normally 
distributed with Vit - N(O, C1";) and independent from Uit and the explanatory variables. 
uit is non-negative errors, which represents an inefficiency and is assumed to be one-
sided and independently distributed from ViI, whilst cr, ~, 0, 1ll, "t, X, 11, cp, 1;, K, e, P and Ol 
are the unknown parameters to be estimated. 
Since the cost function is required to be linearly homogeneous in terms of input prices 
(Coelli et al., 2005) (i.e. an increase in input prices leads to an increase in the total cost 
of the same proportion), the following restrictions must be applied to the parameters of 
the cost function in equation (5.27) (Lang and Welzel, 1996): 
3 3 3 3 3 
L~n = I;L~nj =O;Le'n =O;Lll"" =O;LP", =0 
n=l n=l n=l n=l n=l 
Also, the second order parameters of the cost function must be symmetric: 
okm = omk and ~nj = ~ jn 
Therefore, by normalising total costs, price of funds (wl) and price of employees (w2) 
by price of capital (w3), we impose the theoretical condition that the cost function is 
linearly homogeneous, in terms of input prices. 
As discussed in section 5.3, the control variables (cr) are included directly in the model 
to estimate the cost and profit frontiers in the same way as the input and output 
variables and they fully interact with input prices and output, as reflected in equation 
(5.27). On the other hand, the environmental variables are assumed to directly affect Ui 
(inefficiency). Battese and Coelli (1995) developed a model that defines the inefficiency 
term Ui as a function of a set of environmental variables: they asserted that Ui represents 
non-negative random variables, which are assumed to account for cost/profit 
inefficiencies and are also thought to be independently distributed as truncations at 
zer075 ofthe N (mit, C1"; ) distribution, where: 
(5.28) 
where mit is the mean of cost/profit inefficiency (i.e. Ui), Zit represents a vector of 
environmental variables which may influence the inefficiency of the i-th bank at time t, 
and'¥ is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. In this study, regarding the control of 
environmental variables, mit in equation (5.30) is defined as: 
75 Half-nonnal distribution of inefficiency (Ui) truncated at zero to obtain mean difference from zero. 
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(5.29) 
where zl is ownership structure, z2 bank specialisation, z3 size of bank, z4 age of bank, 
z5 corporate control, z6 market structure/concentration/market share, z7 dummy 
variable for years 1997c2002 and z8 dummy variable for years ;2003-2006. 
5.4.1 One-Stage Analysis 
Some studies explore the relationship between the explanatory variables and predicted 
efficiency using the two-stage analysis (e.g. Pitt and Lee, 1981; Berger and Mester, 
1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003). The first stage involves estimating a conventional frontier 
with traditional inputs and outputs, while the second stage involves regressing of the 
predicted cost efficiencies onto the explanatory variables. However, Coelli et al. (1999) 
have noted that a failure to include firm-specific and environmental variables in the first 
stage leads to a biased estimation of the estimated parameters of the cost frontier and to 
biased predictors of cost efficiency. Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) have identified 
another problem in second stage analysis: in the first stage, the term Uj is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed and, in the second stage, the inefficiencies 
should vary with control variables Cr and environmental variables Zjt which contradicts 
that the Uj should be identically distributed (Coelli et al., 2005). Battese and Coelli (1995) 
presented models to overcome these problems that estimate the production/cost frontier 
in one stage, by introducing control (firm-specific variables) and environmental 
variables directly into the model. 
Therefore, to measure the cost and profit efficiency for Jordanian banks (1993-2006), 
one-stage analysis will be used. Three models will be estimated: cost efficiency (model 
A), standard profit efficiency (model B) and alternative profit efficiency (model C)76. 
In developing each model, many different models will be estimated and one will then be 
selected as the preferred model for calculation of the cost and profit efficiency scores 
for Jordanian banks. The cost and profit frontiers are estimated using the panel data 
approach 77, as suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) and for each model there are 
76 The following discussion will centre on cost efficiency estimation; the procedure for estimating profit 
efficiency is the same. 
77 Panel data sets usually contain more observations than cross-sectional data and thus panel data allow 
relaxing some of the strong distributional assumptions necessary to disentangle the separate effects of 
inefficiency and random error and investigate change in efficiency over time (Coelli et aI., 2005). The 
most popular panel models are time-varying and time-invariant. For more details about panel models in 
estimating cost and profit efficiency, see Kumbhaker and Lovell (2000) and Kuenzle (2005). 
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several stages before the preferred model is identified. These include estimation of the 
general model with all control and environmental variables, which will later be 
compared to other models with different combinations of control and environmental 
variables. The preferred model will be chosen based on maximum-likelihood tests. 
Table 5.5 shows the different cost models to be estimated in order to identify the 
preferred model 
Table 5.5 Sta2es in Identifyin2 Preferred Model 
AI General model includes: Input prices (WI, W2 and W3), outputs (YI, Y2 and Y3), control 
variables (Cl and C2), environmental variables <-21-28), equity (E) and time trend (T). 
A2 General model with reduced control variables (i.e. Cl and C2) and with environmental variables 
(21-Z8). 
A2.1 General model without asset quality (Cl) and with environmental variables (21-28). 
AZ.2 General model without capital adequacy (C2) and with environmental variables (ZI-Z8). 
A3 General model without control variables (i.e. Cl and C2) and with environmental variables (21-
28). 
A4 General model with control variables only (Cl and C2) and without environmental variables 
(21-28). 
A5 General model without control variables (Cl and C2) and without environmental variables (21-
Z8). 
Notes. WI: prIce of funds, W2: PrIce oflabour, W3: prIce of physIcal capItal, YI: loans, 
Y2: investments, Y3: other earning assets, Cl: asset quality, Cl: capital adequacy, 21: ownership 
structure, Z2: specialization, 23: size of bank, 24: age of banks, 25: corporate control, 26: market 
structure, Z7: years 1997-2002 and Z8: years 2003-2006. 
5.4.2 Identifying the Preferred Model 
Stage AI: Deriving the General Cost Model 
This stage estimates the stochastic frontier for the cost function, by assuming that the 
cost frontier is determined by the banks' outputs (Yk), input prices (wn), financial capital 
(E) and bank specific variables/control variables (c, ). Also, in this model, we assume 
that cost inefficiency (Ui) is a function of a set of environmental variables (Zi). This stage 
uses the approach suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995), the technical inefficiency 
model. To estimate this model, equations (5.27) and (5.29) will be used. 
After estimating the general model (see Table 5.5a), the model is checked for the 
existence of inefficiency. As discussed earlier, the composite error terms (e) consist of a 
random error (v) and inefficiency (u) and, initially, a check should be made for 
inefficiency (u) within the composite error (s). Table 5.5a shows the tests for the general 
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model estimated for the cost frontier of Jordanian banks: colwnn (1) shows the 
maximum log-likelihood measure and column (2) shows the log-likelihood ratio (LR). 
The LR provides a check on the assumption of inefficiency in the composite error (s), 
while colwnn (3) shows the gamma outcomes (y). Battese and Corra (1977) 
a2 
parameterised y as 2 u 2 ,where a~ is the variance of the inefficiency and a~ is (a v +au ) 
the variance of the random error. The y parameter lies between zero and one and, as 
discussed earlier, the value of y provides an indication of the relative contribution of u 
and v to s (for example, if y approaches zero, then the random error (v) dominates the 
composite error (s); if y approaches 1, then the inefficiency (u) dominates the 
composite error). The null hypothesis to be tested is Ho : y = 0, which implies no 
inefficiency in the error term (s). The alternative hypothesis is HI : y # 0 , which 
implies inefficiency exists in the error term(s). To test this hypothesis, the values of the 
log-likelihood ratio test (colwnn (2) in Table 5.5a) were used, as produced by frontier 
4.1 program, in three steps. In the first step, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates 
of the parameters are obtained and the log likelihood for the OLS is reported. At this 
stage, the main assumption is that the total error term (s) consists solely of random error 
(v) and that a~ is equal to zero. In the second step, the joint density function ofu and v 
is tested: if the distribution of the total error (s) is positively skewed (or, in the case of 
profit, negatively skewed) then the one-sided error component (inefficiency) dominates 
the random error component in the determination of s. In the final step, if inefficiency 
exists in the error term (s), the log likelihood ratio (LR) of the stochastic model is 
calculated. The LR test in colwnn (2) is equal to: 
LR = -2[lnLR -lnLu 1 (5.30) 
where InLR denotes the maximum log likelihood values of the restricted model (the 
maximum log likelihood for OLS model that is restricted as a~ = 0), and InLu denotes 
the maximum log likelihood values of the unrestricted model (the stochastic model). 
Coelli (1995) shows that the LR test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared (r:) 
distribution, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. 
The number of restrictions imposed in the restricted model (Le. OLS model) is one, Le. 
a; = O. The 5% critical value of r: at one degree of freedom equals 3.84 (see column (5) 
183 
Chapter 5 Methodology and Data 
of Table 5.5a). If the outcome of the LR test (column (2)) exceeds the 5% critical value 
at the given degree of freedom (column (5)), the null hypothesis of no inefficiency is 
rejected. If we accept the null hypothesis, it implies that the model cannot follow a 
stochastic path and therefore should be discarded. As Table (5.5a) shows, the LR 
(column (2)) of the general model exceeded the 5% critical value at one degree of 
freedom, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis of no inefficiency effects: this 
implies that inefficiency is present in the general model. 
Stage A2: Deriving the General Cost Model with Reduced Control Variables (Cl 
and C2) and with Environmental Variables (Zl-Z8) 
As mentioned before, there are two control variables; asset quality (Cl) and capital 
adequacy (C2). At this stage, we estimate the following models: 
Model A2.l: General model without asset quality (Cl) and with environmental 
variables (Zl-Z8). 
Model A2.2: General model without capital adequacy (C2) and with environmental 
variables (Zl-Z8). 
There are two null hypotheses to be examined: 
Hlo: The specification of the model without asset quality (Cl) is better than that of the 
general model. 
H2o: The specification of the model without capital adequacy (C2) is better than that of 
the general model. 
The alternative hypotheses against the above null hypotheses are that the general model 
Al is better specified than models A2.l and A2.2; equations (5.27) and (5.29) will be 
used in the estimation. 
= 
Stage A3: Deriving the General Cost Model without Control Variables (Cl and C2) 
and with Environmental Variables (Zl-Z8) 
At this stage, the following model is estimated: 
Model A3: The general model without control variables (Cl and C2) and with 
environmental variables (Zl-Z8). 
The model will therefore be specified without any control variables and with 
environmental variables according to equation (5.27) but without Cr variables and 
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equation (5.29). 
At this point, the null hypothesis (H30) to be tested is that the specification of the model 
without control variables is better than that of the general model AI. 
Stage A4: Deriving the General Cost Model with Control Variables (Cl and C2) 
and without Environmental Variables (Zl-Z8) 
At this stage, the following model is estimated: 
Model A4: Cost frontier with control variables only. 
The cost frontier with control variables is estimated using only equation (5.27). The 
main assumption is that there are no exogenous factors that affect the banks' 
inefficiency, but at the same time it is assumed that there is a difference between banks, 
in terms of asset quality and risk (Le. Cl and C2). The null hypothesis (H4o) to be tested 
is that the model with control variables only is better than the general model. 
Stage AS: Deriving the General Cost Model without Control Variables (Cl and C2) 
and without Environmental Variables (Zl-Z8) 
This stage estimates the cost frontier by assuming that the cost frontier is determined 
only by the banks' outputs (Yk), input prices (wn) and the level of financial capital (E), 
using equation (5.27) without Crand Zi variables. 
At this stage, the main assumption is that all banks share the same production 
technology and face the same environmental conditions. In this case, the null hypothesis 
(H50) states that the model excluding control and environmental variables is better than 
the general model. 
As with the general model, all the other model(s) estimated (i.e. A2.l, A2.2, A3, A4 and 
A5) need to be checked for the presence of inefficiency (Ui) within the composite error 
term (eD. Table 5.5a, Part A, lists all the estimated models and the LR for each model. 
The null hypothesis is Ho: Y = 0, which implies no inefficiency in the error term ( e), 
whereas the alternative hypothesis, Hi : Y of 0, implies that inefficiency exists in the 
error term(s). Following the same procedure (i.e. comparing the LR for each model with 
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the 5% critical value of a t distribution of one degree of freedom) as used to test the 
existence of inefficiency in the general model leads to the rejection of the null 
hypotheses for each model (column 6, Table 5.5a, Part A). That is the inefficiency is 
presented in all models. 
After testing for inefficiency in all models, the next step involves selecting the preferred 
model. Since there is no convincing theoretical argument for one particular specification 
over another, Coelli (1996) recommends that when such a decision must be made, the 
best approach is to estimate many models and the best model is selected using the 
likelihood ratio statistic (LRS). The process of selecting the 'preferred' model(s) is 
therefore associated with testing a number of different hypotheses. As mentioned earlier, 
the modelling process starts by estimating a general model (A 1) and this is then 
compared with the other models (A2-A5), with the 'preferred' model being decided 
through the maximum-likelihood tests. The log-likelihood provides a convenient way to 
test the hypotheses in the form of the log-likelihood ratio statistic (LRS), which 
examines whether a reduced model provides the same or better fit as a general model 
(Coelli et aI., 2005). LRS allows the testing of whether the log-likelihood estimates for 
the parameters of the reduced model are significantly different from those for the 
parameters of the general model and the LRS test statistic is given as: 
LRS = -2(lnLreduced -1nL unreduced) (5.32) 
where InLreduced denotes the log-likelihood for the reduced model and InLunreduced denotes 
the log likelihood for the general model. Coelli (1995) shows how the LRS is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared distribution with the degrees of freedom 
being equal to the difference in the number of parameters of the general/unreduced 
model and the reduced models. The null hypothesis to test at every stage is Ho: Model(s) 
with a reduced number of variables (i.e. control and environmental variables) give(s) a 
better estimation than the general model (i.e. unreduced model). If the value of the LRS 
exceeds the 5% critical value of the t distribution at the given degrees of freedom, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the reduced model gives a better estimation than the 
general model. On the other hand, if the LRS is less than the 5% critical value of the t 
distribution, the null hypothesis is accepted, which implies that the reduced model gives 
better estimation than the general/unreduced model. The selection criterion for the 
'preferred' model is that the model passes the null hypothesis test (i.e. the coefficients 
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attached to excluded variables are equal to zero). In the case where more than one 
model passes this test, the preferred model will be the one with the highest log 
likelihood value (Stevens, 2004). Table 5.5a summarises all models estimated during 
the process of arriving at the preferred cost model: part B of the table reports the value 
of the log likelihood ratio statistics (LRS) (column 7), the degrees of freedom (DF) 
(column 8) and the 5% critical value of the t distribution at the given degrees of 
freedom (column 9). 
From Table 5.5a and according to the above criteria, the 'preferred' cost model is model 
A2.2. This model includes one control variable (i.e. asset quality (Cl» and all 
environmental variables (Zl-Z8). Tables 5.6 and 5.7 report the stages involved in the 
estimation of the standard and alternative profit models. For standard profit, the 
'preferred' model is model B 1 (the general model) which includes all control variables 
(Cl and C2) and all environmental variables (Zl-Z8), and for alternative profit the 
preferred model is C2.2 which includes one control variable (i.e. Cl) and all 
environmental variables (ZI-Z8). 
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Table 5 5a Estimated Cost Frontier Models 
Part A: Testing for Inefficiency Part B: Choosing 'Preferred' Model 
Models (I) (2) (3) (4) ~ (6) (7) (8) ~ (10) Log LR r Number of Presence of LRS DF Decision 
Likelihood Restrictions critical inefficiency critical Ho= reduced 
value r *0 value model is 
at 5% at 5% better than 
general 
model (AI). 
Al General model includes: Input prices (WI, W2 and W3), 379.13 91.42 0.26 I 3.84 yes 
outputs (YI, Y2 and Y3), control variables (Cl and C2), :~~ environmental variables (ZI-Z8), equity (E) and time trend (T) 
A2 General model with reduced control variables (Le. Cl and ~q C2) and with environmental variables (ZI-Z8). 
A2.1 General mode without asset quality (Cl) 341.43 108.3 I I 3.84 yes 75.4 7 14.07 Reject 
A2.2 General model without capital adequacy (C2) 372.17 139.6 0.46 1 3.84 yes . 13.92 7 14.07 Accept 
A3 General model without control variables (i.e. Cl and C2) 293.30 95.47 0.96 I 3.84 yes 171.7 14 23.69 Reject 
and with environmental variables (ZI-Z8) : 
A4. General model with control variables (Cl and C2) and 342.15 17.46 0.99 I 3.84 yes 73.96 10 18.31 Reject 
without environmental variables (ZI-Z8) 
AS General model without control variables (C I and C2) and 259.05 26.98 0.99 I 3.84 yes 240.1 24 36.42 Reject 
without environmental variables (ZI-Z8L 
.. Notes. (I) The log-hkelihood: represents a value where the unknown parameters of models are estImated m a way that makes the probabIlIty of observmg a gIven data (I.e. total cost) 
as high (or maximum) as possible. (2) LR (log-likelihood ratio test: is the ratio equals difference of log-likelihood of stochastic frontier minus log-likelihood of OLS estimation 
2 
multiplied by (-2) and used to test for inefficiency (u) in composite error term (E) (Coelli, 1995; Kumbhakar and LoveH, 2000; Coelli et aI., 2005). (3) Y 2 au parameterisation 
(ov+oh, 
suggested by Battese and Corra (1977), where (j~ is variance of inefficiency and (j~ is variance of random error. r -parameter lies between zero and one. Value of r indicates of 
relative contribution ofu and v to 8 (i.e. if r approaching zero, then random error (v) dominates composite error (E). If r approaching I, then inefficiency (u) dominates composite 
error). (4) The restriction that the composite error term (E) is consist only from random error (Le. v) and there is no inefficiency (u).This implies there is I restriction, Le., 0.=0. (5) 
LRS log-likelihood of general model (Le. AI) minus log-likelihood of given reduced model multiplied by (-2). (6) DF degree of freedom which equals number of parameters of 
general model minus number of parameters of given reduced model. 
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Table 5 6 Estimated Standard Profit Frontiers Models 
Part A: Testing for Inefficiency , , Part B: Choosing 'Preferred' 
Model 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) ~ (6) (7) (8) ~ (10) Log LR 'Y Number of Presence t LRS DF Decision Likelihood Restrictions critical of critical Ho= 
value inefficienc ,; value reduced 
a15% Y at 5% model is 
r to better than y general 
model (BI) 
BI General model includes: Input prices (wt, W2 and W3), 170.76 284.3 1 3.84 yes ~; 
outputs (Yl, Y2 and Y3), control variables (Cl and C2), 
environmental variables ( Zl-Z8), e'luitv (E) and time trend (T) k 
B2 General model with reduced control variables (i.e. Cl and C2) ~: 
and with environmental variables (ZI-Z8). 
B2.1 General model without asset quality (Cl) 159.94 267.0 0.99 I 3.84 yes 20.12 6 12.59 Reject 
B2.2 General model without capital adequacy (C2) 122.05 223.1 I I 3.84 yes 95.9 6 12.59 Reject 
B3 General model without control variables (Cl and C2) and with 112.69 209.5 0.99 I 3.84 yes 114.6 12 21.03 Reject 
environmental variables (ZI-Z8) ; 
B4 General model with control variables (Cl and C2) and without 158.97 260.7 0.66 1 3.84 yes f' ,: 22.06 10 18.31 Reject 
environmental variables (ZI-Z8). ~." 
B5 General model without control variables (Cl and C2) and 99.3 182.8 0.99 3.84 yes I 141.4 22 33.92 Reject 
without environmental variables (ZI-Z8) I 
.. Notes. (I) The log-hkehhood: represents a value where the unknown parameters of models are estlmated m a way that makes the probabIlIty of observrng a gIVen data (I.e. total cost) 
as high (or maximum) as possible. (2) LR (log-likelihood ratio test: is the ratio equals difference of log-likelihood of stochastic frontier minus log-likelihood of OLS estimation 
2 
multiplied by (-2) and used to test for inefficiency (u) in composite error term (e) (Coelli, 1995; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Coelli et aI., 2005). (3)'Y 2 cr" 2 pararneterisation 
(av + °u) 
suggested by Battese and Corra (1977), where cr~ is variance of inefficiency and cr~ is variance of random error. r -parameter lies between zero and one. Value of r indicates of 
relative contribution ofu and v to s (i.e. if r approaching zero, then random error (v) dominates composite error (e). If r approaching I, then inefficiency (u) dominates composite 
error). (4) The restriction that the composite error term (e) is consist only from random error (i.e. v) and there is no inefficiency (u).This implies there is I restriction, i.e., ",=0. (5) 
LRS log-likelihood of general model (i.e. AI) minus log-likelihood of given reduced model multiplied by (-2). (6) DF degree of freedom which equals number ofpararneters of 
general model minus number ofpararneters of given reduced model. 
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Table 5 7 Estimated Standard Profit Frontiers Models 
Part A: Testing for Inefficiency Part B: Choosing 'Preferred' 
: Model 
Models (I) (2) (3) (4) ~ (6) (7) (8) ~ (10) Log LR Y Number of Presence i LRS DF Decision Likelihood Restrictions critical of I····· critical Ho= 
value inefficienc t·, value 
reduced 
at 5% Y at 5% model is 
y 1- 0 [; better than general 
::; model (BI) 
Cl General model includes: Input prices (WI, W2 and W3), outputs 83.11 224.6 0.99 I 3.84 yes 
(Yl, Y2 and Y3), control variables (C I and C2), environmental 
variables (ZI-Z8), equity (E) and time trend (T) 
C2 General model with reduced control variables (i.e. Cl and C2) 
and with environmental variables (ZI-Z8). 
C2.1 General model without asset quality (Cl) 53.34 210.2 0.75 I 3.84 yes 59.5 7 14.07 Reject 
C2.2 General model without capital adeguacy JC2L 76.49 229.9 0.66 1 3.84 yes 
" . 
13.24 7 14.07 Accept 
C3 General model without control variables (Cl and C2) and with 48.77 210.5 0.99 I 3.84 yes 68.68 14 23.69 Reject 
environmental variables (ZI-Z8) 
C4 General model with control variables (Cl and C2) and without 43.69 145.8 0.99 I 3.84 yes I"; 78.8 10 18.31 Reject 
environmental variables (ZI-Z8). I", 
C5 General model without control variables (Cl and C2) and 11.93 136.8 0.65 1 3.84 yes f? 142.4 24 36.42 Reject without environmental variables (ZI-Z8) 
.. Notes. (I) The log-hkehhood: represents a value where the unknown parameters of models are eslimated III a way that makes the probablhty of observmg gIven data (I.e. total cost) 
as high (or maximum) as possible. (2) LR (log-likelihood ratio test: is the ratio equals difference of log-likelihood of stochastic frontier minus log-likelihood of OLS estimation 
2 
multiplied by (-2) and used to test for inefficiency (u) in composite error term (c) (Coelli, 1995; Kumbhakar and Lovel!, 2000; Coelli et aI., 2005). (3) Y = 2°' c?. 
(ov + u) 
pararneterisation suggested by Battese and Corra (1977), where cr~ is variance of inefficiency and cr~ is variance of random errOr. y -parameter lies between zero and one. Value of 
y indicates of relative contribution of u and v to E (i.e. if y approaching zero, then random error (v) dominates composite error (E). If y. approaching I, then inefficiency (u) 
dominates composite error). (4) The restriction that the composite error term (E) is consist only from random error (i.e. v) and there is no inefficiency (u).This implies there is I 
restriction, i.e., ".=0. (5) LRS log-likelihood of general model (i.e. AI) minus log-likelihood of given reduced model mUltiplied by (-2). (6) DF degree of freedom which equals 
number of parameters of general model minus number of parameters of given reduced model. 
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Finally, it should be noted that there are many models which were estimated by 
excluding the time trend variable (T). In all such models, the null hypothesis that the 
estimated models without the time trend are better than the general model was rejected: 
this suggests that there is technological change within the Jordanian banking market and 
that the time trend should appear in the model to account for this. In addition, the 
model(s) without financial capital (E) was also estimated and the hypothesis that this 
model(s) is better specified than the general model was rejected. Moreover, it should be 
noted that there is another model, known as Battese and Coe!li's (1992) time variant and 
invariant approach. Under the time invariant approach, the inefficiency (u) is assumed 
to be constant through time, while under the time variant approach the inefficiency is 
assumed to change through time. This model allows some flexibility in the distribution 
of inefficiency (Ui) and allows estimation of the stochastic frontier by using truncated or 
half-normal distribution (Coelli et aI., 2005). It also allows the examination of the time-
varying efficiency model against the time-invariant model. The main limitation of 
Battese and Coelli's (1992) model is that it does not allow for any change in the rank 
ordering of firms over time; the firm ranked n-th at the first period is always ranked n-th 
for all periods (Coelli et al., 2005). Battese and Coelli (J 995) suggested that the 1992 
model did not account for those situations in which some firms were relatively 
inefficient initially but subsequently become substantially more efficient. Also, this 
model does not allow the adding of environmental variables. The Battese and Coelli 
(1992) model was estimated in this research, but the results are not reported because 
there is no statistical test that can be used to compare Battese and Coelli (1995) and 
(1992): the two models are not nested. Due to the disadvantages of Battese and Coelli 
(1992), only the results of Battese and Coelli's (1995) model were used to measure 
efficiency scores for Jordanian banks. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the data and the variables measurement. The three types of 
variables used are: (1) Traditional input prices and outputs used in the literature to 
estimate cost and profit functions by using the intermediation approach. (2) Control 
variables to account for the factors that may affect the estimated cosVprofit functions 
and (3) Environmental variables that could have an impact on the levels of inefficiency. 
This chapter showed two methodologies used in this research: the SFA and DEA. Three 
concepts offer a definitional framework for the testing of cost and profit efficiency in 
the banking industry: cost efficiency, standard profit efficiency and alternative profit 
efficiency; these were used in this chapter. With regard the SFA methodology, the 
translog functional form is identified to estimate cost and profit functions. The process 
of obtaining a preferred cosVprofit model from SFA follows recent banking efficiency 
literature by using one-stage analysis. The choice of models to measure cost and profit 
efficiency scores was determined using maximum likelihood estimates and the log-
likelihood test. Various models of cost and profit frontiers are estimated with different 
combinations of control variables and environmental variables and the preferred models 
were chosen according to the log-likelihood ratio test, as recommended by Coelli et al. 
(2005). The general model without capital adequacy and environmental variables is the 
preferred cost model. With regard profit models, the preferred model of standard profit 
is the general model including asset quality and capital adequacy and all environmental 
variables, whilst the preferred model of alternative profit is the general model without 
capital adequacy and with environmental variables. With regard DEA estimation the 
input and output variables only used in the estimation because the DEA methodology 
does not allow for using control and environmental variables directly in the model 
In the next chapter, some properties of the cost and profit functions as identified by 
economic theory will be tested using the SFA preferred models. Additionally, the 
research hypotheses outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 will be tested using the preferred cost 
and profit models. Moreover, the next chapter will analysis the efficiency scores 
obtained from SFA and DEA in terms of trend of efficiency scores In 1993-2006, to 
examine how the deregulation processes affected on the level of Jordanian banks' 
efficiency over the period 1993-2006. 
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6.1 Introdnction 
Chapter 4 reviewed the deregulation measures introduced by the CBJ between 1993-
2006 and Chapter 5 explained the different methodologies used to measure efficiency 
scores for Jordanian banks over this time period. Moreover, Chapter 5 also showed the 
different stages followed to identify the preferred cost and profit models using the SF A 
methodology. In this chapter, the preferred SF A models identified in Chapter 5 will be 
used to derive the cost and profit efficiency scores for Jordanian banks after some of the 
properties of the cost and profit frontiers are analysed to ensure that the estimated cost 
and profit frontiers are satisfy the main theoretical requirements outlined in Chapter 2. 
That is, this chapter will examine the maximum likelihood parameters' estimation of the 
preferred cost, standard profit and alternative profit frontiers and from these, the main 
properties of the cost and profit functions will be analysed and many of the research 
hypotheses (see Chapter 4) will be tested. Additionally, this chapter (i) analyses the 
efficiency scores obtained from SFA and DEA, (ii) shows how the efficiency scores 
have changed over time and (iii) tests the robustness of the efficiency scores obtained 
from SFA and DEA. The main characteristics of the more and less efficient banks; scale 
efficiency and technological change in Jordanian banks will be also examined. 
This chapter therefore is organised as follows. Section 6.2 tests the coefficients of the 
SF A preferred cost and profit frontier models and the maximum likelihood parameters' 
estimated will be reported. From these the main properties of the cost and profit 
frontiers (see Chapter 2) will be analysed. Section 6.3 tests research hypotheses 2-7 
outlined in Chapter 4 using the preferred SF A cost and profit frontiers identified in 
section 6.2. Section 6.4 presents the cost and profit efficiency scores obtained from both 
SFA and DEA and analyses the trend of the efficiency scores between 1993-2006 to 
examine how the efficiency scores have reacted to different policies applied by the CBJ. 
This analysis will also give (i) an indication of the extent to which steps taken by the 
CBJ have affected, positively or negatively, the banks' efficiency levels and (ii) test the 
main research hypothesis (see Chapter 4) that the efficiency of banks in Jordan 
improved after the implementation of liberalisation. Section 6.5 presents a robustness 
check between the SF A and the DEA efficiency scores, based on the Bauer et al. (1998) 
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criteria. Section 6.6 analyses the difference between the more and less efficient banks in 
terms of: the CAMEL rating system; specialisation; ownership structure; and bank size. 
Section 6.7 shows change in scale efficiency for Jordanian banks and technological 
change in Jordanian banks over the period 1993-2006. 
6.2 Testing the Coefficients of the Preferred SFA Model(s} 
The maximwn likelihood estimates for the preferred SF A cost, alternative and standard 
profit frontiers models are reported in Tables. 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. However, the 
interpretation of the maximwn likelihood estimates for the cost and profit models 
requires more attention, given that there are many interactions between the input prices, 
the outputs and the control variables. Coelli (1996), Worthington (1998) and Bos et al. 
(2005) highlight that when variables interact, care should be taken in the interpretation 
of an individual coefficient's significance, as the inclusion of squared and interaction 
terms is likely to result in multicollinearity 78, contributing to an artificially high 
standard error. In general, with these caveats in mind, as total costs, profits and all 
independent variables are in logarithms and normalised by their mean79, the estimated 
first order coefficients can be interpreted as cost and profit elasticities evaluated at the 
sample mean. 
6.2.1 Coefficients ofthe Preferred Cost Frontier 
According to the selection criteria discussed in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.5), the preferred 
cost frontier model included asset quality (Cl) but excluded capital adequacy (C2). The 
t-ratios for the preferred cost frontier (see Table 6.1), which defines the ratio of the 
estimated coefficients to their corresponding standard errors, indicates that the 
coefficients of banks' input prices and outputs are highly significant and positive. This 
suggests that the theoretical requirements of the cost function are fulfilled (see cost 
function properties in Chapter 2). Table 6.1 shows that the coefficients of inputs prices 
are positive and highly significant and the estimated coefficients of input prices are (p 1) 
78 When multicollinearity occurs as a result of interaction between variables, maximum likelihood 
estimates are still unbiased and efficient. The problem with multicollinarity is that the estimated error of 
the coefficient tends to be large, leading to a smaIl value of the t-ratio which in turn will lead to accepting 
null hypothesis that coefficient is equal to zero (for more details, see Gujarati, 2003). 
79 Since mean values of variables are regarded as expansion point for translog function, all variables have 
to be divided by their mean in order to locate correct evaluation point before estimation of translog 
function. In addition, this will help in estimation of scale elasticities. 
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(i.e. coefficient of price of funds) and (~2) (i.e. coefficient of price of labour) 
representing the share of cost attributed to funds (deposits) and employees 80. The 
coefficients of the input prices wl (price of funds), w2 (price of labour) and w3 (price 
of physical capital) are equal to 0.614, 0.122 and 0.264, respectively, which means that, 
on average, a 1% increase in input prices will increase the cost by 0.614%,0.122% and 
0.264%, respectively (property number 2 in Chapter 2). The magnitude of the 
coefficient of the price of funds (wl) reflects the actual data, where the price of funds 
forms about 50% to 70% of the total costs of the Jordanian banks. The outputs (Yk) 
coefficients show that, on average, a 1 % increase in outputs yl (loans), y2 (investments) 
and y3 (other earning assets) will increase costs by 0.398%, 0.083% and 0.473%, 
respectively (property number 3 in Chapter 2). Equity (E) is introduced in the model as 
an additional input as a source of funding, but the coefficient of equity is only 0.023 and 
is not significant; this suggests that the level of equity in Jordanian banks does not have 
a significant impact on banks' costs. A possible explanation of this is that Jordanian 
banks depended on deposits more than equity to finance their operations, as the raising 
of equity typically involves higher costs81 than the raising of deposits (Berger and 
Mester, 1997). With regard to the time trend (T), the coefficient of time is negative 
(-0.02) and highly significant at 1%. This means that a technological change has 
occurred within the Jordanian banking market and through technical progress, Jordanian 
banks have over time been able to produce a given output at lower levels of cost. With 
regard to property number 4 in Chapter 2, which relates to homogeneity (i.e. an increase 
in input prices leads to an increase in the total cost of the same proportion), this property 
is fulfilled by imposing restriction on the parameters of input prices being equal to unity 
before estimation (i.e. ~1+ ~2+ ~3=1). 
80 Since the price of funds (wl) and the price of labonr (w2) are nonnalised by the price of physical 
capital (w3) to impose homogeneity of degree one. The coefficient of physical capital (w3) is equal to 1 
minus sum ofthe coefficients of the price of funds and the price oflabonr. Thus coefficient of the price of 
capital equals 1- 0.614+ 0.122= 0.264. 
81 The main costs of raising new equities include fees charged by investment banks in the underwriting 
processes, fees paid to advisers, accountants and lawyers in preparing the issue, initial listing fees and 
marketing costs. 
195 
Chapter 6 Analysis and Discussion l 
Table 6 1 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Cor the PreCerred Cost Frontier 
Coefficients Standard t-ratio' 
Parameters Variables error 
<1f} constant (-0.155)* 0.032 -4.812 
PI 
wl ( price of funds ) In-
w3 price of physical capital (0.614)* 0.040 15.382 
P2 In w2 ( price of labour ) (0.122)* 0.033 3.680 
w3 price of physical capital 
01 Inyl (loans) (0.398)* 0.051 7.880 
02 lny2 (investments) (0.083)* 0.024 3.420 
0, Iny3 (other earning assets) (0.473)* 0.037 12.721 
liT I !nE (equity) (0.023) 0.061 0.370 
PII 0.5(1n WI)2 (0.250)* 0.045 5.570 
w3 
PI2 (1n~)(1n w2) (-0.106)* 0.041 -2.596 
w3 w3 
P22 0.5(1n w2)2 (0.126)* 0.041 3.093 
w3 
011 0.5(lnyl)2 (0.200)* 0.038 5.325 
012 (lnyl)(lnyl) (-0.040)** 0.019 -2.093 
013 (lnyl)(lny3) (-0.210)* 0.031 -6.784 
022 0.5(lny2)2 (0.007) 0.013 0.572 
023 (lny2)(lny3) (0.040)* 0.017 2.379 
0" 0.5(lny3)2 (0.202)* 0.032 6.224 
1]11 (In wl)(lnyl) (-0.003) 0.029 -0.113 
w3 
1]12 
(In ~ )(lny2) (-0.002) 0.018 -0.085 
w3 
1]13 (In w I )(lny3) (-0.010) 0.028 -0.353 
w3 
1]21 w2 (In -)(1ny I) 
w3 (0.066)* 0.027 2.422 
1]22 (In w2 )(lny2) (-0.028)** 0.017 -1.683 
w3 
1]23 w2 (0.035)*** 0.029 1.204 (In -)(1ny3) 
w3 
(contmued) 
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Table 6.1 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters for the Preferred Cost Frontier (continued) 
coefficients standard t-ratio 
Parameters Variable error 
lUll 0.5(1nE)2 (O.IOS)' 0.033 3.253 
<PI! (In w I )(JnE) (-0.034) 0.047 -0.725 
w3 
(In w2 )(JnE) (-0.029) 0.053 -0.541 
<P 21 w3 
Sll (Iny I )(JnE) (-0.041) 0.040 -1.009 
S21 (lny2)(InE) (0.030) 0.029 1.050 
~ 31 lny3lnE (-0.073)" 0.043 -1.684 
t1 t (time trend) (-0.019)" O.OOS -2.293 
tl1 O.5(t)' (0.001) 0.001 0.706 
K1 In(yl)(t) (0.011)" 0.005 2.195 
K2 In(y2)(t) (-0.003)'" .0.003 -1.279 
K3 1n(y3)(t) (0.000) 0.004 -0.OS3 
91 In( WI)(t) (0.005) 0.005 1.095 
w3 
9, 
In( w2 )(t) (0.000) 0.004 0.121 
w3 
Xl Ine I (asset quality) (0.033)'" 0.022 1.465 
XII 0.5(lncl)2 (O.OIS)" 0.010 1.733 
Pll wl 
In(-)(lnc I) (0.047)' 0.017 2.S32 
w3 
P2I w2 In(-)(lnc I) 
w3 (-0.033)" 0.015 -2.20S 
Cllll In(y I )(lncl) (-0.003) 0.016 -0.179 
Cll2I 1n(y2)(lncl ) (-0.04S)' 0.009 -5.240 
Cll" In(y3 )(lncl) (-0.013) 0.015 -0.869 
X, Inc2 (capital adequacy) 
x" 0.5(1nc2)2 
P12 wl 
In( w,)(lnc2) 
p" w2 1n(-)(lnc2) 
w3 
(contmued) 
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Table 6.1 Tbe Maximum Likelibood Parameters for tbe Preferred Cost Frontier (continued)_ 
Coefficients Standard t-ratio 
Parameters Variables error 
co" In(yl)(Jnc2) 
C022 In(y2)(Jnc2) 
CO'2 In(y3)(Jnc2) 
'P constant (0.469) 0.588 0.796 
'PI Ownership Structure (ZI) (-0.143)* 0.028 -5.061 
'P2b Islamic (Z2b) (0.203)* 0.043 4.737 
'P20 . Investment (Z2c) (0.318) 0.581 0.547 
'P, Total assets (Z3) (-0.134)* 0.031 -4.296 
'P4 Age of bank (Z4) (0.010)* 0.001 9.511 
'P, Corporate control (Z5) (0.028) 0.024 1.181 
'P .. Market structure! concentration (-0.015) 0.017 -0.900 
(Z6a) 
'P6b Market structurel market share (-0.07)* 0.02 -3.488 (Z6b) 
'P, Years 1997-2002 (Z7) (-0.032) 0.028 -1.119 
'P. Years 2003-2006 (Z8) (-0.083)** 0.045 -1.841 
,,2 (0.006)' 0.001 8.442 
r (0.457)* 0.079 5.784 
log-likelihood 372.17 
LR 139.57 
No. of 
observations 281 
Degrees of 
freedom2 230 
t-ratio defines the ratio of the estimated coeffiCients to the correspondmg standard errors. 
2Degrees of freedom equals tbe number of observations in the sample minus the number of estimated 
coefficients in maximum likelihood model (Le. 281-51 ~230). 
*, ", "* significance ofpararneters of coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels using the t-distribution 
table and the t-ratios obtained at the given degrees of freedom (Le. 230). The Critical value of the t-ratios 
at significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282, respectively. 
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6.2.2 Coefficients ofthe Preferred Standard and Alternative Profit Frontiers 
Again using SFA, Tables 6.2 and 6.3 report the preferred standard and alternative profit 
models. According to the selection criteria discussed in Chapter 5 (see Tables 5.6 and 
5.7), the preferred model of standard profit includes all the control variables (i.e. asset 
quality (Cl) and capital adequacy (C2», whilst the preferred alternative profit model 
excluded capital adequacy (C2). As with the cost model, we first checked the 
coefficients of estimated alternative and standard profit frontiers and, in contrast to the 
cost model, the results for the alternative and standard models showed some unexpected 
signs for the coefficient of the price of funds (~l). The expected sign for ~l should be 
negative (i.e. an increase in the price of funds should decrease profit) but the sign 
obtained in the model is positive (Le. 0.14 for standard profit model and 1.24 for 
alternative profit model), which means that an increase in the price of funds (wl) leads 
to increase in profits. Seemingly surprising result could be explained with reference to 
the effect of increases in interest rates on deposits. That is as Humphrey and Pulley 
(1997) suggested that when interest rates on deposits rise the banks respond by 
increasing the interest rates on loans proportionally more than the increase in deposit 
interest rates. For other input/output prices and outputs, the signs are consistent with the 
theoretical requirements of the profit function. For example, the coefficients of output 
prices in Table 6.2, 0, (i.e. the coefficient of the price of loans) and 0, (i.e. the coefficient 
of the price of investments) represent the share of profits attributed to loans and 
investment82• Coefficients of output prices p I (price of loans), p2 (price of investments) 
and p3 (price of other earning assets) are equal 0.05, 0.74 and 0.21 respectively, 
showing that, on average, a 1% increase in output prices will increase profits by 0.05%, 
0.74% and 0.21, respectively. The coefficients for outputs yl (loans), y2 (investments) 
and y3 (other earning assets) in the alternative profit frontier model (Table 6.3) suggest 
that, on average, a 1% increase in outputs yl, y3 and y3 will increase profits by 0.05%, 
0.14% and 0.11 %, respectively. Both the standard and the alternative profit models have 
a positive and significant coefficient for equity (E) (Le. 0.34 for the standard profit 
model and 0.29 for the alternative profit model). This would suggest that banks with 
higher equity can achieve more profits because banks with more 'equity are capable of 
82 Since price ofloans (p I) and price of investments (P2) are nOnDalised by price of other earning assets 
(P3) to impose homogeneity of degree one. The coefficient of other earning assets (p3) is equal to I minus 
sum of coefficients of price of loans and the price of investments. Thus coefficient of price of other 
earning assets equals 1- 0.05+ 0.74= 0.21. 
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producing more outputs, which in turn increases their profits. Both the alternative and 
the standard profit models show that the coefficient of the time trend (T) is negative and 
significant (Le. -0.05 for the standard profit model and -0.14 for the alternative profit 
model). This suggests that over time the profit efficiency of Jordanian banks has 
worsened and they have been achieving lower level of profit for any given level of 
output. 
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Table 6 2 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred Standard Profit 
Parameters Variables Coefficients Standard t-Ratio' 
error 
no constant (O.OS)*'- 0.05 1.53 
In w I ( price of funds ) 
p, w3 price of physical capital (0.14)** 0.07 2.07 
In w2 ( price of labour ) 
P2 w3 price of physical capital (-0.03) 0.06 -0.51 
In E.!. ( price of loans ) 
0, p3 price of other earning assets (0.05) 0.11 0.44 
02 In p2 ( price of investment (0.74)' 0.10 7.55 
p3 price of other earning assets 
w", lnE (equity) (0.34)- 0.06 5.80 
PII O.5(1n wl)2 (0.06) 0.07 0.85 
w3 
PI2 wl w2 (-O.OS)-- 0.05 -1.54 (In-)(In-) 
w3 w3 
jl,2 0.5(1n w2)2 (0.09)-- 0.05 I.S9 
w3 
011 0.5(1n E.!.)2 (0.34)- 0.10 3.43 
p3 
012 (In E.!.)(1n p2) (-0.37)* 0.06 -6.39 
p3 p3 
0" 0.5(In p2)2 (O.3S)* 0.04 S.98 
p3 
1]11 wl pi (-0.10) O.OS -1.21 (In-)(In-) 
w3 p3 
1]12 wl p2 (0.27)* 0.06 4.23 (In-)(In-) 
w3 p3 
1]" w2 pi (0.02) O.OS 0.32 (In-)(In-) 
w3 p3 
1]21 w2 p2 (-0.22)- 0.05 -4.04 (In-)(In-) 
w3 p3 
W"II 0.5(lnE)2 (0.\3)' 0.05 2.40 
'I'll wl (0.10)** 0.04 2.23 (In w)(lnE) 
'I' 21 (In ~)(InE) (-0.Q4) 0.05 -0.S6 
~ 11 (In :~)(InE) (-0.07) 0.09 -0.72 
(contmued) 
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Table 6.2 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred Standard Profit 
continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficients Standard t-Ratio' 
error 
1;21 (In p2 )(IoE) 
p3 (0.11)'" 0.07 I.S6 
T, t (time trend) (-O.OS)* 0.02 -3.28 
tll 0.S(t)2 (0.01)' '0.00 4.56 
!c, wl (-0.03)' 0,0] . -3.28 
In(-)(t) 
w3 
1<, w2 
In(w3 let) (0.02)' 0.01 2.53 
1<, In(:~)(t) (0.03)* om 2.69 
s, 
In(p2)(t) (-0.02)** om -2.09 
p3 
. 
X, Inc I (asset quality) (-0.13)* 0.03 -3.90 
XlI 0.5(lncl)2 (0.02) 0.02 0.87 
Pll wl (0.01) 0.03 0.29 In(-)(lnc I) 
w3 
P21 w2 In(-)(lncl ) 
w3 (0.03) 0.02 1.27 
"'ll pi 
In(p3)(lnc1) 
(0.08)'" O.OS 1.63 
"'21 pZ In( - )(lnc1) 
p3 (-0.09)*' 0.04 -1.94 
Xl Inc2 (capital adequacy) (-O.IS) 0.13 -l.l6 
Xl' 0.S(lnc2)2 (0.77)' 0.18 4.IS 
p" wl 1n(-)(lnc2) 
w3 (-0.21)** 0.1l -1.91 
p" w2 
In(w3)(lnc2) (-0.02) 0.10 -0.20 
"''' 
pi 
In(-)(lnc2) 
p3 (0.24)'" 0.17 1.42 
"''' 
p2 
In(p3Xlnc2) (0.06 0.17 0.37 
'Po Constant (-S.7S)* 0.90 -6.38 
':1', Ownership Structure (ZI) (-0.12)' 0.22 -0.54S 
'¥2b Islamic (Z2b) (-1.44)* 0.61 -2.38 
'1'" Investment (22c) (-O.SO) 0.82 -0.61 
':1', Total assets (23) (1.00)* 0.08 12.SS 
(contmued) 
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Table 6.2 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred Standard Profit 
Frontier (continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficients Standard t-Ratio' 
error 
'P4 Age of bank (Z4) 0.03 0.01 5.68 
'Ps Corporate control (Z5) (-0.35)** 0.17 -2.01 
'P,. Market structure/ concentration (Z6a) (-2.93)* 0.99 -2.95 
'P'b Market structure! market share (Z6b) (-10.84)* 1.54 -7.04 
'P7 Year 1997-2002 (Z7) (-0.21 ) 0.36 -0.59 
'Ps Year 2003-2006 (Z8) (-0.86)* 0.15 -5.84 
0' (0.49)* 0.08 5.89 
Y (0.99)* 0.00 485.67 
log-likelihood 170.76 
LR 284.29 
No. of 281 
observations 
Degrees of 233 freedom' 
t-ratlO defines the ratIo of the estImated coefficIents to the correspondmg standard errors. 
'Degrees of freedom equals the number of observations in the sample minus the mnnber of estimated 
coefficients in maximum likelihood model (i.e. 281-48~233). 
*, *', *** significance ofpararneters at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, using the t-distribution table and the t-
ratios obtained at the given degrees of freedom (i.e. 233). The critical values of the t-ratios at significance 
levels of 1%,5% and 10% are 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282, respectively. 
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Table 6 3 The Maximum Likelibood Parameters Estimation for tbe Preferred Alternative Profit 
Parameters Variables Coefficients Standard t=ratio' 
error 
no constant (0.12)' 0.04 3.21 
PI 
In w I ( price of funds ) 
w3 price of physical capital (1.24)' 0.04 28.00 
p, In w2 ( price of labour ) (-0.12)' 0.05 -2.71 
w3 price of physical capital 
01 lnyl (loans) (0.05) 0.06 0.73 
0, lny2 (investments) (0.14)' 0.05 2.80 
0, lny3 (other earning assets) (0.11)' 0.05 2.47 
tlT, lnE (equity) (0.29)' 0.09 3.24 
P" 
0.5(ln wl )2 
w3 (-0.38)' 0.06 -5.85 
wl w2 
PI' (In w3 )(In w3 ) (0.20)' 0.05 3.78 
P22 
0.5(1n w2)2 
w3 (-0.10)" 0.06 -1.70 
0" 0.5(lnyl)2 (0.09)'" 0.06 1.62 
.012 (lnYI)(lny2) (0.05)" 0.03 1.73 
0" (Inyl)(lny3) (-0.14)' 0.05 -2.79 
022 0.5(lny2)2 (-0.G3) 0.02 -1.20 
0" (lny2)(lny3) (0.00) 0.03 0.10 
0" 0.5(lny3)2 (0.13)" 0.06 2.06 
1]" wl (In-)(lnyl) 
w3 (0.D4) 0.05 0.76 
1]12 (In wl )(lny2) 
w3 (0.09)' 0.D4 2.45 
1]13 wl (In -)(lny3) 
w3 (-0.20)' 0.05 -3.74 
1]21 w2 (In w3)(lnyl) (0.06) 0.05 1.16 
1]22 w2 (In w3 )(Iny2) (-0.04)'" 0.03 -1.33 
1]" w2 (In -)(lny3) 
w3 (0.19)' 0.05 4.07 
tlT" O.5(lnE) 2 (0.24)' 0.05 4.82 
'P1l (In w I )(JnE) 
w3 (0.31)' 0.09 3.43 
(contmued) 
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Table 6.3 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred Alternative Profit 
continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficients Standard error Fratio l 
q> 21 
(In :~ )(JnE) (-0.52)* 0.12 -4.47 
\11 (Jny I )(JnE) 
-0.07 0.05 -1.31 
I; 21 (lny2)(lnE) (-0.13)** 0.06 -2.25 
I; 31 (Jny3)(lnE) (0.06) 0.10 0.57 
t, t (time trend) (-0.14)* 0.01 -10.37 
tll 0.5(t)2 (0.03)* 0.00 14.18 
K, In(yl)(t) (0.00) 0.01 0.43 
K, In(y2)(t) (0.01) 0.01 0.91 
K, In(y3)(t) (0.02)* om 2.56 
9, wl 
In(w3 )(t) (-0.08)* 0.01 -11.79 
9, w2 
In(-)(t) (0.06)* 0.01 9.97 w3 
X, Inc I (asset quality) (-0.27)* 0.04 -6.51 
XII 0.5(Jncl)2 (0.00) 0.02 0.16 
PII wl 
In(w3)(lncl) 
(0.06)** 0.03 1.98 
P2I w2 In(-)(Jnc I) 
w3 (-0.02) 0.03 -0.59 
"'11 In(yl)(Jncl) (-0.01) 0.03 -0.27 
"'21 In(y2)(Jncl) (-0.03)** 0.02 -1.77 
"''' 
In(y3)(Jnc I) (-0.03) 0.03 -0.93 
X2 Jnc2 (capital adequacy) 
X2, 0.5(Jnc2)2 
PI2 wl 
In(w3)(lnc2) 
P22 w2 In(-)(Jnc2) 
w3 
"'12 In(yI)(Jnc2) 
"'22 In(y2)(Jnc2) 
"'32 In(y3)(Jnc2) 
'¥ constant (-3.03) 0.72 -4.19 
(contmued) 
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Table 6.3 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred Alternative Profit 
continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficients Standard error t=ratio' 
'PI Ownership Structure (zl) (-0.11) 0.16 -0.70 
'P'b Islamic (z2b) (-0.65)'" 0.42 -1.56 
'P" Investment (z2c) (-0.60) 0.63 -0.95 
'P, Total assets (z3) (1.13)* 0.12 9.14 
'P, Age of bank (z4) (0.01)*' om 2.16 
'Ps COlporate control (z5) (-0.00) 0.16 -0.02 
'P6, Market structure/ 
concentration (z6a) (-0045) 0.65 -0.68 
'P6b Market structure/ market 
share (z6b) (-0.53)'*' 0.38 -1.41 
'P7 Year 1997-2002 (z8) (0040)'" 0.27 1.44 
'P, Year 2003-2006 (z9) (-0.97)*' 0045 (-2.18) 
(J2 (0.36)* 0.Q3 14.26 
Y . (1.00)* 0.000 56225.5 
log-likelihood 76049 
LR 229.9 
No. of observations 281 
Degrees of freedom' 230 
t-ralto defines the ratIO of the estImated coeffiCIents to the correspondmg standard errors. 
'Degrees of freedom equals number of observations in the sample minus the number of estimated 
coefficients in maximum likelihood model (i.e. 281-51 =230). 
*, **, *** significance of parameters of coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, using the t-distribution 
table and the t-ratios obtained at the given degrees of freedom (i.e. 230). The critical values of the t-ratios 
at significance levels of 1%,5% and 10% are 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282, respectively. 
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6.3 Testing Research Hypotheses 
Having (i) tested the coefficients of the three preferred SF A models and (ii) analysed the 
main properties of the three models, the seven hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4 can 
now be tested using the cost and two profit efficiency SF A models: 
Hypothesis 1: Bank efficiency has improved since the implementing of deregulation in 
Jordanian banking system, 1993-200rf3. 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign banks are more cost (profit) efficient than domestic banks. 
Hypothesis 3: Specialised banks are less cost (profit) efficient. 
Hypothesis 4: Bank size is positively related to cost (profit) efficiency. 
Hypothesis 5: Well-established banks are more cost (profit) efficient than newly 
established banks 
Hypothesis 6: CEO-Chairman affiliation is negatively related to banks' cost (profit) 
efficiency (i.e. chairman of bank board and CEO are the same person). 
Hypothesis 7a: High concentration is negatively related to cost (profit) efficiency. 
Hypothesis 7b: High market share is positively related to cost (profit) efficiency. 
Additionally, as identified in Chapter 5, two further hypotheses stemming from 
selecting the preferred model, can be tested: 
Hypothesis 8: Banks with a high percentage of non-performing loans are incurring 
more costs and achieving less profits. 
Hypothesis 9: Banks with low levels of capital adequacy are incurring more costs and 
achieving less profits. 
As previously mentioned (see Chapter 5) there are two kind of exogenous variable 
introduced in estimation of cost and profit frontier: control variables and environmental 
variables. Thus hypotheses 2-9 are tested by using the three SF A models using control 
and environmental variables. The control variables are assumed to have a direct 
influence on the cost and profit functions structure (i.e. the position of the frontier) and 
these variables interact fully with bank inputs and outputs. As shown in Chapter 5, 
83 Hypothesis I will be tested using both SFA and DEA in section 6.4 to give an indication of the extent 
to which the steps taken by the CB] have affected positively or negatively the banks' efficiency scores 
level. 
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hypotheses 8 and 9 are relate to the control variables Cl (asset quality) and C2 (capital 
adequacy) and the appropriate testing procedure for hypotheses relating to control 
variables is to test simultaneously the significance of groups of coefficients, using the 
log ratio test (CoeIIi et aI., 2005). 
The environmental variables, included in all three models (i.e. cost, standard profit and 
alternative profit models) will be used to test hypothesis 2-7. As these variables were 
not interacted with input prices and outputs (see Battese and CoeIli, 1995). These 
variables only impact on the measures of inefficiency (Uj) (Battese and CoeIli, 1995). 
Therefore, hypothesis 2-7 will be tested by looking at the t-ratio for each coefficient for 
each of the environmental variable. Additionally, as Uj measures inefficiency, the 
significant and positive coefficients associated with the environmental variable(s) mean 
that inefficiency has increased, whilst the significant and negative coefficients mean that 
inefficiency has decreased. 
In the following analysis it must be noted that for hypotheses 2-9, each hypothesis is 
being tested of: 
(i) Cost efficiency (Table 6. I) and; 
(ii) Profit efficiency (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). 
6.3.1 Testing Hypotheses 2-7 
As mentioned earlier each hypothesis has two parts: the first relates to the cost 
efficiency and the second part relates to profit efficiency. The simple way to test these 
hypotheses is by looking at the t-ratio for each coefficient associated with the 
environmental variables (i.e. ZI-Z7). In testing how these hypotheses relate to the cost 
efficiency, Table 6. I is used, and for profit efficiency, Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are used. 
Hypothesis 2 (foreign banks are more cost (profit) efficient than domestic banks) 
relating to the ownership structure (ZI). The coefficient of ZI in Table 6.1 is negative 
-0.143 and significant at a level of I %. This suggests that, for foreign banks, the 
inefficiency is less than that of domestic banks and this leads to the acceptance of the 
first part of hypothesis 2. This finding is consistent with the literature, as most studies in 
developing countries found that foreign banks were the most cost efficient (see Isik and 
Hassan, 2003). With regard to the second part of hypothesis 2, the coefficient of ZI in 
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Table 6.2 and 6.3 is negative and insignificant for both standard and alternative profit 
models. This leads to the rejection of the second part of hypothesis 2 (foreign banks are 
more profit efficient than domestic banks). This indicates that there is no difference 
between foreign and domestic banks in terms of profit efficiency. A possible 
explanation is that the foreign banks are more concerned in controlling their costs than 
in generating profit. Moreover, foreign banks in Jordan apply strict criteria in granting 
loans and are not allowed to deal with stocks in the Amman Financial Market. These 
factors could have a negative impact on foreign banks' profit efficiency (later in this 
chapter cost and profit efficiency scores for domestic and foreign banks will be analysed 
in detail). 
Hypothesis 3 (specialised banks are less cost (profit) efficient than their unspecialised 
counterparts) relating to specialisation (Z2). As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are three 
kinds of banks in Jordan: commercial, investment and Islamic banks, and to see the 
effects of specialisation on the level of cost and profit efficiency, we assign dummy 
variables for each group of banks (i.e. Z2a for commercial banks84, Z2b for investment 
banks and Z2c for Islamic banks). Table 6.1 shows that the coefficient associated with 
Z2c (investment banks) is positive 0.318 and not significant whereas the coefficient 
associated with Islamic banks (Z2b) is positive 0.203 and significant at the 1 %. This 
indicates that the Islamic banks are less cost efficient than commercial banks (Z2a) 
whereas there is no difference in cost efficiency of commercial and investment banks. 
This leads to an acceptance of the first part of hypothesis 3 (that specialised banks are 
less cost efficient than their unspecialised counterparts). This finding is consistent with 
Hassan (2005), who reported that Islamic banks are less efficient because they follow 
religious exigencies and avoid any transactions based on interest rates. Hassan (2005) 
also reported that Islamic banks operate in regulatory environments which are not 
supportive of their operation (this applies to Jordan, as there are no special regulations 
for Islamic banks). Moreover, the Islamic banks produce distinct services and different 
product mixes requiring a more intense use of inputs and more specialised personnel. 
With regard to profit efficiency Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that the coefficient associated 
with Z2b (Islamic) is negative and significant for both standard profit and alternative 
84 Excluded from equation as base case for technical reason. Since the qualitative variable specialisation 
has three categories (commercial, investment, and Islamic banks) only two categories are used and one 
category is dropped from the equation to avoid the situation of perfect coIlinearity (see Gujarati, 2003). In 
our case we dropped the commercial banks dummy variable as base case. 
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profit and models (-1.44 and -1.56 respectively), whereas the coefficient associated with 
Z2c (investment) is negative and insignificant for both standard profit and alternative 
profit and models. This indicates that the Islamic banks are more profit efficient than 
commercial banks (Z2a) whereas there is no difference in profit efficiency of 
commercial and investment banks. This leads to rejection of the second part of 
hypothesis 3 (later in this chapter efficiency scores of commercial, investment and 
Islamic banks will be analysed in detail). 
Hypothesis 4 (bank size is positively related to cost (profit) efficiency) relates to the 
size of bank (Z3) and the coefficient of Z3 in Table 6.1 is negative -0.134 and 
significant at a level of 1 %: this indicates that large banks are more cost efficient than 
smaller banks. Thus, we accept the first part of hypothesis 4 that large banks are more 
cost efficient than their smaller counterparts. This can be attributed to the larger 
Jordanian banks' enjoying several advantages over smaller banks, such as their ability 
to use more efficient technology at less cost. With regard to profit efficiency Tables 6.2 
and 6.3 show that the coefficient associated with Z3, for both standard and alternative 
profit models, is positive and significant at a level of 1 % (1.0 and 1.13, respectively). 
This indicates that large banks are less profit efficient than smaller banks. Thus, we 
reject the second part of hypothesis 4 that large banks are more profit efficient than their 
smaller counterparts (later the efficiency scores regarding bank size will be analysed in 
detail). 
Hypothesis 5 (well-established banks are more cost (profit) efficient than newly 
established banks) relates to the age of a bank (Z4). Table 6.1 shows that the coefficient 
associated with Z4 is positive 0.010 and highly significant. This suggests that new 
banks are more efficient than older banks, thus leading to rejection of the first part of 
hypothesis 5. With regard to profit efficiency Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that the 
coefficient associated with Z5 in both standard and alternative profit models is positive 
and significant (0.03 and O.oJ, respectively). As cost model we reject the hypothesis 
that old banks are more profit efficient than small banks. Possible explanation for this 
(as suggested by Isik and Hassan, 2003) is that old banks in developing countries suffer 
• from bureaucracy, whilst new established banks employ the most efficient technology 
available. 
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Hypothesis 6 (CEO-Chainnan affiliation is negatively related to banks' cost (profit) 
efficiency) relates to corporate control (Z5). Table 6.1 shows the coefficient associated 
with Z5 is positive 0.028 and not significant: this leads to the rejection of the first part 
of hypothesis. With regard to profit efficiency Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that the 
coefficient of Z5 in the standard profit model is negative and significant and negative 
and insignificant in the alternative profit model. As in the cost model we reject the 
second part of hypothesis 6. The principal-agent problem is not common in Jordanian 
banks and this is possibly because most are owned and managed by families. This is 
consistent with Isik et al. (2004) who reported that the agency problem does not hold in 
the Jordanian banking industry because most of the banks in Jordan are closely held, 
where owners are strongly involved in management. 
Hypothesis 7 relates to market structure (Z6a and Z6b). As mentioned in Chapter 5 
there are two SCP hypotheses that can be tested in order to examine the relationship 
between the market structure and banks' efficiency: the traditional and the efficient 
hypotheses (for more detail see Chapters 3 and 5). Thus hypothesis 7 has two parts. The 
first part is tested for the traditional hypothesis (Z6a) (High concentration is negatively 
related to cost-and-profit efficiency) and the second part is for the efficient hypothesis 
(Z6b) (High market share is positively related to cost and profit efficiency). Table 6.1 
shows that the coefficient associated with concentration (Z6a) is negative -0.015 but not 
significant, whereas the coefficient associated with market share (MS) is negative -0.07 
and significant: this leads to the rejection of hypothesis 7a (that concentration (HI) is 
negatively related to cost efficiency), and the acceptance of hypothesis 7b (that market 
share is positively related to cost efficiency). With regard to profit efficiency, Tables 6.2 
and 6.3 show that the coefficient associated with Z6a is negative for both standard and 
alternative profit models (significant for standard and insignificant for alternative). This 
leads to the rejection of hypothesis 7a relating to profit efficiency (High concentration is 
negatively related to profit efficiency). With regard to market share (Z6b), Tables 6.2 
and 6.3 show that the coefficient associated with Z6b is negative and significant for 
both standard and alternative profit models. This leads to the acceptance of hypothesis 
7b (that market share is positively related to profit efficiency). The main conclusion 
from hypothesis 7 implies that the efficient hypothesis of the SCP paradigm may be 
hold for Jordanian banks. 
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Finally, Table 6.4 summarises the testing of hypotheses 2-7. 
Ta bl 64 T . H h . 27 e estmg. typot eSls -
Standard Alternative 
Hypothesis Cost Profit Profit Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 
Hypothesis 2 Foreign banks are more cost (profit) efficient Accept Reject Reject 
than domestic banks. 
Hypothesis 3 Specialised banks are less cost (profit) Accept Reject Reject 
eirJ<Oient. 
Hypothesis 4 Bank size is positively related to cost (profit) Accept Reject Reject 
efficiency. 
Hypothesis 5 Well-established banks are mOre cost (profit) Reject Reject Reject 
efficient than newly established banks. 
Hypothesis 6 CEO-Chairman affiliation is negatively Reject Reject Reject 
related to banks' cost. (profit) efficiency. 
Hypothesis 7a High concentration is negatively related to Reject Reject Reject 
cost (profit) efficiency. 
Hypothesis 7b High market share is positively related to Accept Accept Accept 
cost (profit) efficiency. 
6.3.2 Testing Hypotheses 8-9 
As shown earlier, hypotheses 8 and 9 relate to control variables Cl (asset quality) and 
C2 (capital adequacy). The control variables assumed have a direct influence on the cost 
function structure and all these variables interact fully with bank inputs and outputs. As 
shown earlier, when variables interact a problem of multicollinearity may be appearing. 
A more appropriate testing procedure for hypotheses relating to control variables is to 
test simultaneously the significance of groups of coefficients, using the log ratio test 
(Coelli et al., 2005). According to the selection procedures mentioned in Chapter 5, the 
general model without capital adequacy is preferred for the cost model: this led to 
acceptance of hypothesis 8 that banks with a high percentage of non-performing loans 
are incurring more costs and rejection of hypothesis 9 states that banks with high capital 
adequacy ratio are incurring less costs. Given the limitations of using t-ratio tests in the 
case of interaction, the coefficient of asset quality (Cl) (see Table 6.1) is significant and 
positive which suggests that banks with high levels of non-performing loans incur more 
costs than banks with low levels of non-performing loans. 
With regard hypotheses 8 and 9 in profit models and according to the selection 
procedures mentioned in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.6), the general standard profit model 
with asset quality (Cl) and capital adequacy (C2) is the preferred model. This led to 
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acceptance of hypothesis 8 that banks with a high percentage of non-perfonning loans 
(Cl) are incurring less profits and rejection the hypothesis 9 that banks with high capital 
adequacy ratio (C2) are incurring more profits. The coefficient of asset quality (Cl) (see 
Table 6.2) is significant and negative (i.e. -0.13): this suggests that banks with high 
levels of non-perfonning loans achieve less profits than banks with low levels of non-
perfonning loans. Although, the capital adequacy (C2) should be included in the 
preferred model according to selection criteria mentioned in Chapter 5 the coefficient of 
capital adequacy (C2) is negative but not significant. This means that the capital 
adequacy ratio does not have impact on the level of banks' profit. 
With regard to alternative profit model and according to the selection criteria 
mentioned in Chapter 5 that the preferred model is the one without capital adequacy (C2) 
and with asset quality (Cl). The coefficient of asset quality (Cl) in the alternative profit 
model is negative (i.e. -0.27) and significant (see Table 6.3). This means that, on 
average, 1% increase in non-perfonning loans will decrease the profit by 0.27%. 
6.4 Impact of Deregulation on the Level of Banks' Efficiency 
The main research hypothesis regarding the impact of deregulation will be tested by 
analysing the trend of the estimated c'ost and profit efficiency scores for Jordanian banks 
over the period 1993-2006. This section will show the cost and profit efficiency scores 
obtained from SF A based on the preferred models and the trend of measured scores over 
the period 1993-2006. Moreover, the efficiency scores from DEA will be reported to see 
whether the efficiency scores from DEA give the same trend that obtained from SF A 
efficiency scores. The main research hypothesis above will be tested by comparing the 
change in efficiency scores using both SFA and DEA over the period 1993-2006. 
6.4.1 Efficiency Scores from SFA 
1. Cost Efficiency Scores 
The cost efficiency scores for Jordanian banks over the period 1993-2006 are derived 
from the preferred cost model (see Table 6.1). The average cost efficiency for Jordanian 
banks over 1993-2006 is 83.1 % although the efficiency scores varied over time from 
85.6% in 1993 to 79.2% in 2006 (Table 6.5). These estimates suggest that the Jordanian 
banks can produce the same levels of output and reduce their cost by about 20%. The 
213 
Chapter6 Analysis and Discussion 
estimates of average cost efficiency for Jordanian banks is well within the range 
estimated for other countries, including the US and European studies. In general, the 
studies using stochastic methodologies have found inefficiency of the order of 15%-
30% (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Goddard et al., 2001). 
Figure 6.1 and Table 6.5 show the trend of efficiency scores over 1993-2006 and 
suggest that average cost efficiency has slightly but not significantly improved over the 
period 1993-1996. As mentioned earlier this period was characterised by the 
deregulation of the interest rate and Humphrey and Pulley (1997) stated that during 
deregulation ofthe interest rate, banks try to respond in three ways. First, cost offset and 
reduction is an attempt to offset higher deposits interest costs with higher explicit and 
implicit fees for small deposits85• The second response is to transfer some of the higher 
funding cost and interest rate risk to borrowers (i.e. floating rate of loans). The third 
response is to expand risky assets to obtain more revenue. 
Jordanian banks responded by creating more floating rate loans. Accordingly, over the 
period 1993-1996 the interest rates on both deposits and loans increased, but the 
percentage increase in the interest rates on loans was more than that the increase in the 
interest rates on deposits (CBJ, 1998). These led to a decrease in funding costs and 
subsequently a decrease in the operating costs for Jordanian banks. 
Despite the CBJ's efforts to put in place many important deregulation measures during 
1997-2000 (see Table 4.3), the average efficiency scores decreased from 86%-80%. 
This can be attributed to the following factors facing Jordanian banks. First, during 
these years, as mentioned earlier (see Chapter 4), there was a decrease in customer 
deposits as a result of many Jordanians who worked in the Gulf having returned to 
Jordan following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the first Gulf War in 1991 
(Isik et al., 2004). More than 300,000 people returned and the remittance of these 
Jordanians was a main source of deposits in Jordanian banks (Tian and Zeitun, 2007). 
To compensate for the decrease in customer deposits, most banks used more expensive 
the inter-bank loans to finance their operations. 
85 In the case of Jordan, from 1995 most banks had started to impose specific fees on deposits ofless than 
100JOD. 
214 
Chapter 6 Analysis and Discussion 
Second, over the years 1997-2000, as mentioned earlier (see Chapter 4) the main 
deregulation applied by the CBJ was concentrated on giving banks greater autonomy to 
produce a variety of products and services. Also, ceilings on credit extended by banks 
were eliminated. The prudential regulations in this period were inadequate, which in 
turn made Jordanian banks more vulnerable to different risks. This resulted in an 
increase in the percentage of non-performing loans, for example the percentage of non-
performing loans increased from 20% in 1996 to an average of35% between 1997-2000. 
The CBJ asked most Jordanian banks to make adequate provisions to face non-
performing loans, which in turn increased banks' costs. 
Through the years 2001 and 2002, the cost efficiency of Jordanian banks improved but 
decreased sharply in the year 2003 to low of about 77%. The main reason for this 
decrease was that the Jordanian banks faced many crises in 2002-2003 (see Chapter 4), 
which in turn negatively affected banks' cost efficiency. 
After the year 2003, the cost efficiency began to improve as a result of many foreign 
banks' having come to operate in Jordan (due to change in regulations), which in turn 
motivated domestic banks to decrease their operating costs. 
Finally, it should be noted that the variables Z7 and Z8 were introduced into the 
estimation of the SF A cost model to see the impact of the deregulation (in specific years) 
on the levels of cost efficiency. The coefficient associated with the years 1997-2002 
(Table 6.1) was negative and insignificant which shows that the measures taken in these 
years did not improve cost efficiency within Jordanian banks. However, the coefficient 
for the years 2003-2006 (Table 6.1) was negative and significant, which suggests that 
the measures taken after the year 2003 improved ·the levels of cost efficiency within 
Jordanian banks. 
Figure 6.1 Average Cost Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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Table 6.5 Avera2e Cost Efficiencv Scores for Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
Years No. of Banks Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1993 20 0.86 0.08 0.74 0.99 
1994 20 0.86 0.09 0.68 1.00 
1995 20 0.86 0.08 0.74 0.99 
1996 19 0.86 0.08 0.74 0.97 
1997 18 0.86 0.08 0.72 0.99 
1998 20 0.85 0.08 0.73 1.00 
1999 . 20 0.84 0.10 0.68 1.00 
2000 20 0.81 0.10 0.61 0.98 
2001 20 0.84 0.09 0.66 0.99 
2002 19 0.83 0.09 0.69 0.99 
2003 19 0.77 0.10 0.62 0.99 
2004 22 0.79 0.11 0.61 0.99 
2005 22 0.79 0.10 0.67 0.99 
2006 22 0.79 0.09 0.64 0.94 
Average 1993-2006 0.83 
2. Standard and Alternative Profit Efficiency 
The average means of the alternative and standard profit efficiency scores for Jordanian 
banks over the period 1993-2006 (see Table 6.6) are 80% and 84%, respectively. This 
suggests that the level of profit could be increased by between 16%-20%, with the same 
level of outputs. From a close look at Figure 6.2 and Table 6.6, we can note the scores 
obtained from both the alternative and the standard profit models vary over the period 
1993-2006. With regard to the average alternative profit efficiency scores, the Jordanian 
banks' efficiency scores worsen from 83% in 1993 to 59% in 2006, while the standard 
profit efficiency model average score varied from 83% in 1993 to 85% in 2006. If we 
segment the average efficiency scores from the alternative and the standard profit 
models over the period 1993-2006 into two periods, 1993-2003 and 2004-2006, we can 
see that the trend of the alternative and the standard profit efficiency scores over the 
period 1993-2003 is the same, while the trend is different over the period 2004-2006. 
Throughout the period 1993-1997, both the alternative and the standard profit models 
show that the profit efficiency scores improved over this period. As mentioned earlier, 
this period was characterised by the deregulation of the interest rate and banks tried to 
respond to such deregulation in three ways (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). With respect 
to Jordanian banks, they actually responded by (i) imposing extra fees on (some) 
deposits less than a specific amount and (ii) floating the interest rate on loans. The 
interest rate structure for deposits and loans for Jordanian banks over the period 1993-
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1997 was increased, but the percentage increase in the loans interest rates was more 
than the increase in the interest rates on deposits (CBJ, 1998). For example, the interest 
rate margin in the banking industry in Jordan increased after the deregulation of interest 
rates from 5% to 6% (see Table 4.12). This means that banks during this period had 
some market power by setting prices less favourably for consumers (lower deposit rate, 
higher loan rates). 
Figure 6.2 shows that the profit efficiency scores for both the alternative and the 
standard profit models worsened over the period 1997-2000. The average alternative 
profit efficiency scores declined from 84% to 74%, whereas the average standard profit 
efficiency scores declined from 86% to 82%. This period was characterised by the 
deregulation of banking products and services, i.e. removing some of the restrictions on 
the scope of banks' operations, (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4). Throughout this period the 
product mix offered by Jordanian banks changed and the banks reacted by expanding 
their risky assets (i.e. investments) in order to reap higher revenue. For example, the 
growth in investments was on average 35% over the period 1997-2001, compared to 
average negative growth during 1993-1996 (see Table 4.7, Chapter 4). This unplanned 
growth subjected many Jordanian banks to higher risks and resulted in many of them 
facing large losses. Additionally during this time, the supervisory and regulatory 
framework in Jordan was arguably inadequate to keep up with banks' attitude to 
increasing the risk taken (Maghyereh, 2002). 
As mentioned earlier, there were two departments responsible for banks' regulation and 
supervision and the level of coordination between these departments was very Iow. The 
non-performing loans for Jordanian banks increased from 20% in 1996 to an average of 
35% between 1998-2000 (see Table 4.11, Chapter 4). Most banks were therefore asked 
by the CBJ to increase their non-performing loans provisions, which in turn negatively 
affected their levels of profit. 
Over the years 2001 to 2004 the average alternative and standard profit efficiency 
scores increased slightly and followed the same trend (Figure 6.2 and Table 6.6). After 
2004, the average alternative profit efficiency scores decreased dramatically from 85% 
in 2004 to only 58% in 2006, whereas the average scores for the standard profit 
efficiency decreased only slightly from 87% in 2004 to 84% in 2006. The different 
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trend depicted by each model after 2004 (see Figure 6.2) could be explained with 
reference to: 
(i) The underlying assumption of each model with respect to market power86. The 
alternative profit efficiency approach was built on the assumption that banks 
have some market power in determination of output prices, thus their prices are 
endogenous and the profit frontier is determined by the price on inputs and the 
outputs produced (see Berger and Mester, 1997). But the standard profit 
approach assumes that the market is competitive 'and no firm has an impact on 
the determining of the 0lltput price. Under standard profit frontier, the profit is 
the function of the output and input prices. 
(ii) The changing level of competition/concentration in the Jordanian banking sector. 
Competition in the Jordanian market improved after the year 2001 and the 
concentration trend measured by the Herfindhal index declined from 24% in 
year 2001 to 13% in year 2006 as a result of the entry of new foreign banks to 
the Jordanian banking market. In addition, the price competition measured by 
the interest rate spread (i.e. the difference between the interest rates on loans and 
deposit interest rates) decreased from 7% in 2001 to 4% in 2006. 
Therefore, after 2004 the efficiency scores provided by the standard profit efficiency 
model would seen to best reflect what has actually been happening in the Jordanian 
banking market and the effects of deregulation. This is further supported by looking at 
the profit ratios which show that most of the profit financial ratio indicators improved 
after the year 2004 (see Chapter 4). 
Despite there being differences in the scores of the alternative profit and the standard 
profit efficiency models, in most cases both approaches placed the most and least 
efficient banks in the same rank order. Additionally, variables Z7 and Z8 (see Tables 6.2 
and 6.3) were introduced in the models to see the impact of the deregulation (in specific 
years) on the levels of profit efficiency. The coefficient associated with the years 1997-
86 The standard profit frontier assumes existence of perfect competition in input and output markets, so 
that fmns are price takers. Given vectors of output prices (p) and of input prices (w), the banking fmn 
tries to maximise profits by adjusting amounts of vectors of output quantity (y) and input quantity (x) 
(Maudos and Pastor, 2003). Whereas alternative profit frontier assumes that possibility of imperfect 
competition or market power in setting of prices existed, banking firms try to maximise profits by 
adjusting input quantities (x) and output prices (P) (Maudos and Pastor, 2003). 
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2002 was negative (-0.21) and insignificant (for the standard profit model) and positive 
(0.40) and significant (for the altemative profit model). This suggests that the measures 
taken in these years did not improve profit efficiency in Jordanian banks. However, the 
coefficient associated with the years 2003-2006 was negative and significant (for both 
the standard and the alternative profit models). This suggests that the measures taken 
after 2003 did improve the levels of profit efficiency in the banks (see Tables 6.2 and 
6.3). Appendices 6.1-6.3 show the efficiency scores based on SF A for all three models 
for all Jordanian banks, 1993-2006. 
To sum up, both profit models show that the efficiency scores improved slightly over 
the period 1993-1996, then worsened markedly over the period 1997-2001. After 2003 
the efficiency scores from the standard profit model improved slightly, where the 
efficiency scores from the alternative profit worsened after 2003. It could be argued that 
the deregulation measure undertaken by the CBJ over the period 1993-1996 and 2003-
2006 had a little positive impact on the level of banks' profit efficiency, whereas the 
measures undertaken during 1997-2002 have great negative impacts on the level on 
banks' efficiency. 
Figure 6.2 Average Alternative and Standard Profit Efficieucy Scores 1993-2006 
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Table 6.6 Average Alternative and Standard Profit Efficiency Scores 1993-2006 
Average Alternative Profit Efficiency Scores Avera e Standard Profit Efficiency Scores 
No. of Std. No. of Std. 
Year banks Mean Dev. Min Max Year banks Mean Dev Min Max 
1993 20 0.82 0.10 0.65 0.95 1993 20 0.83 0.10 0.60 0.97 
1994 20 0.84 0.09 0.66 0.94 1994 20 0.83 0.10 0.58 0.97 
1995 20 0.83 0.07 0.66 0.94 1995 20 0.84 0.10 0.55 0.94 
1996 19 0.83 0.07 0.68 0.94 1996 19 0.88 0.09 0.69 1.00 
1997 18 0.84 0.7 0.65 0.94 1997 18 0.86 0.11 0.67 0.99 
1998 20 0.82 0.10 0.58 0.93 1998 20 0.88 0.09 0.70 1.00 
1999 20 0.73 0.20 0.03 0.96 1999 20 0.76 0.21 0.05 0.99 . 
2000 20 0.74 0.19 0.22 0.94 2000 20 0.82 0.16 0.37 0.99 
2001 20 0.83 0.14 0.49 0.96 2001 20 0.84 0.14 0.51 1.00 
2002 19 0.86 0.15 0.44 0.96 2002 19 0.83 0.13 0.51 1.00 
2003 19 0.87 0.13 0.47 0.97 2003 19 0.86 0.11 0.56 1.00 
2004 22 0.85 0.13 0.43 0.97 2004 22 0.87 0.11 0.61 1.00 
2005 22 0.78 0.15 0.48 0.96 2005 22 0.84 0.12 0.63 1.00 
2006 22 0.59 0.15 0.38 0.85 2006 22 0.85 0.12 0.57 1.00 
Average 
1993-
2006 0.80 0.84 
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6.4.2 Efficiency Scores from DEA 
As mentioned earlier (see Chapter 2) there is no agreement between researchers whether 
the SFA or DEA can produce a better estiinate of efficiency scores (Bauer et al., 1998). 
As outlined in Chapter 5, the DEA methodology is uSed to test the consistency of the 
efficiency estimates from the SF A. This section reports the efficiency measures 
obtained from DEA 87 in order to see whether the trend of the latter is similar to that of 
SF A. This could help in the validity if our conclusion from SF A regards the impact of 
deregulation on the efficiency levels of the Jordanian banks. 
1. Cost and New Cost Efficiency 
The average DEA efficiency scores for Jordanian banks 1993-2006 are 87% for cost 
efficiency (CE) and 83% for the new cost efficiency (NCE) measures, and these 
measures are close to the average efficiency scores obtained from SF A. 
Figure 6.3 and Table 6.7 show the DEA cost efficiency scores for Jordanian banks 
between 1993-2006. The trend of the CE and NCE is very similar to those obtained 
from SFA. That is: the efficiency scores increased between 1993·1997; then decrease 
between 1998-2001. Then there is stability in the efficiency scores from 2002 to 2004. 
After the year 2004 the average efficiency scores based on CE is increased, where the 
average of the NCE is decreased. 
Figure 6.3 Average DEA Cost Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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87 We follow Isik et al. (2004) and DeYoung and Hasan (1998) by constructing 14 separate annual 
efficiency frontiers, one for each year under study, to account for change in the regulatory conditions 
1993-2006. However, the efficiency scores are also obtained by constructing single frontier for all banks 
over the period \993-2006 and there are no significant differences in efficiency scores. 
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T bl 67 A a e . ver32e DEA C t Em . s ~ J d . B ks 1993 2006 os lClencv cores or or aman an 
-
Cost efficiency New cost efficiency 
No. 
No.of Std. of Std. 
Vear Banks Mean Dev. Min Max Vear Banks Mean Dev. Min Max 
1993 20 0.92 0.10 0.66 1.00 1993 20 0.84 0.17 0.46 1.00 
1994 20 0.89 0.12 0.54 1.00 1994 20 0.84 0.15 0.47 1.00 
1995 20 0.92 0.10 0.67 1.00 1995 20 0.87 0.15 0.46 1.00 
1996 19 0.92 0.09 0.75 1.00 1996 19 0.87 0.15 0.51 1.00 
1997 18 0.93 0.08 0.76 1.00 1997 18 0.86 0.15 0.54 1.00 
1998 20 0.88 0.12 0.65 1.00 1998 20 0.86 0.12 0.64 1.00 
1999 20 0.81 0.14 0.55 1.00 1999 20 0.83 0.15 0.58 1.00 
2000 20 0.86 0.11 0.61 1.00 2000 20 0.84 0.14 0.53 1.00 
2001 20 0.87 0.10 0.7 1.00 2001 20 0.79 0.16 0.6 1.00 
2002 19 0.86 0.11 0.68 1.00 2002 19 0.79 0.2 0.38 1.00 
2003 19 0.82 0.13 0.64 1.00 2003 19 0.77 0.21 0.37 1.00 
2004 22 0.80 0.19 0.42 1.00 2004 22 0.78 0.18 0.51 1.00 
2005 22 0.84 0.16 0.6 1.00 2005 22 0.87 0.14 0.57 1.00 
2006 22 0.87 0.12 0.64 1.00 2006 22 0.77 0.15 0.57 1.00 
Average Average 
1993- 0.87 1993- 0.83 
2006 2006 
2. Profit Efficiency 
Figure 6.4 and Table 6.8 summarise the mean values of the Jordanian banks' profit 
scores over the year 1993-2006 based on the DEA profit efficiency (PE) and the DEA 
new profit efficiency (NPE). The PE measures average around 73% for the whole 
period, while the NPE score average around 75%. However, the scores mean for PE 
varied from 64% in 1993 to 80% in 2006, while the means of the NPE scores varied 
much less from 73% in 1993 to 76% in 2006. Appendices 6.4-6.6 show efficiency 
scores based on DEA for all Jordanian banks. 
A close look at Figure 6.4 and Table 6.8 which show the trend of the DEA profit and 
the DEA new profit efficiency scores reveals that the general trend of the profit 
efficiency scores is almost similar to that of the SF A profit efficiency scores. 
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Figure 6.4 Average DEA Profit Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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Average DE P fi Effi . s ~ J d A ro It lClency cores or or anian Banks 1 9932006 
-
Profit efficiencv New rofit efficiency 
No. No. 
of Std. of Std. 
Banks Mean Dev. Min Max Year Banks Mean Dev. Min Max 
20 0.64 0.27 om 1.00 1993 20 0.73 031 om 1.00 
20 0.70 0.31 0.04 1.00 1994 20 0.72 0.31 0.05 1.00 
20 0.70 0.31 0.04 1.00 1995 20 0.73 0.29 0.04 1.00 
19 0.69 0.25 0.29 1.00 1996 19 0.75 0.24 0.24 1.00 
18 0.80 0.22 0.31 1.00 1997 18 0.76 0.27 0.02 1.00 
20 0.62 0.32 0.13 1.00 1998 20 0.60 0.33 0.08 1.00 
20 0.61 0.28 0.03 1.00 1999 20 0.62 0.30 0.02 1.00 
20 0.78 0.17 0.46 1.00 2000 20 0.81 0.16 0.54 1.00 
20 0.79 0.20 0.43 1.00 2001 20 0.81 0.24 0.22 1.00 
19 0.78 0.29 0.11 1.00 2002 19 0.78 0.29 0.11 1.00 
19 0.72 0.31 0.04 1.00 2003 19 0.82 0.31 0.03 1.00 
22 0.74 0.26 0.3 1.00 2004 22 0.73 0.31 0.21 1.00 
22 0.83 0.23 0.28 1.00 2005 22 0.88 0.24 0.2 1.00 
22 0.80 0.21 0.43 1.00 2006 22 0.76 0.29 0.06 1.00 
Average 
1993-
0.73 2006 0.75 
To sum up, although both the SFA and the DEA are not producing identical efficiency 
scores for Jordanian banks, both of them show almost a similar trend over the entire 
study period 1993-2006. This could be reflecting what happened in the Jordanian 
banking market through the years 1993-2006. Noting the three aforementioned stages of 
deregulation The cost and profit efficiency scores for Jordanian banks improved after 
the deregulation of the interest rates (1993-1996) and then worsened through the period 
1997-2002. As mentioned earlier, this period witnesses the deregulation of banks' 
products and services. The prudential regulations at this period Within the CBJ were 
inadequate to cope with the attitude of banks towards expanding their operations in 
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risky assets, which in turn led banks to become subject to more and/or different risks 
which in turn raised the percentage of non-performing loans. The percentage of non-
performing loans for Jordanian banks rose from 20% in 1996 to an average of35% over 
1998-2000. During this period, most Jordanian banks were under-provisioned (CBJ, 
2004) and most of their profits were directed to cover the shortage in provisions. These 
results are consistent with the views of Gruben and McComb (1997) and Merrick and 
Saunders (1985) who asserted that deregulation may be accompanied with 
consequences that may threaten the safety and soundness of the financial system, such 
as banks' being more likely to invest in risky products. Moreover, Jordanian banks were 
strongly influenced by unstable conditions facing Jordan during the period of the study 
(i.e. the first and second Gulf Wars). 
However, after the year 2003, there was little improvement in the Jordanian bank's 
efficiency as a result of entry of many foreign banks into the Jordanian banking market. 
Moreover, the CBJ worked from the year 2001 to strengthen its regulation on corporate 
governance and the issues relating to risk management. 
Referring to hypothesis 1 (see Chapter 4) it could be argued that the deregulation 
measures undertaken by the CBJ during 1993-1996 and 2003-2006 have positively 
affected the efficiency scores of Jordanian banks, where the measures put in place 
during 1997-2002 distorted the Jordanian banks' efficiency. For the entire period 1993-
2006 the average efficiency scores are worsened. 
Additionally, the results from both the SFA and DEA indicate that the profit 
inefficiencies88 appear to be greater than the cost inefficiencies. Banks therefore need to 
focus more on revenue generation coupled with appropriate risk management practices 
and more prudential supervision from the CBJ regarding risky assets. Given that the 
CBJ was put in place to implement the Basel II Accord from the beginning of the year 
88 These results are consistent with many studies showing cost efficiency more than profit efficiency. For 
example, Berger and Mester (1997) found the profit efficiency in the US banking market is approximately 
half the cost efficiency; Rogers (1998) obtains average efficiency in profit of 69.2% as against 75.6% in 
costs, efficiency in revenue being lower (43.7%). In the case ofEU banking system, Maudos et al. (2002) 
obtain average efficiency in profit of 84% as against 91 % in costs. Maudos and Pastor (2003) stated that 
profit inefficiency is quantitatively more important than cost inefficiency, indicative of significant 
inefficiencies on the revenue side, either due to the choice of not the most suitable composition of 
production, given the prices of outputs, or due to bad pricing policy. 
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2008, this implementation could improve and enhance the risk management practice 
within Jordanian banks and improve their cost and profit efficiency. 
6.5 Robustness of Efficiency Measures from SFA and DEA 
In the light of the Bauer et al. (1998) recommendation, the robustness of the cost and 
the profit efficiency scores from SF A and DEA are tested using five consistency checks. 
That is with respect to: estimated efficiency scores from SFA and DEA should be 
consistent regarding comparable means; ranking of the banks; identification of the best 
and worst banks; stability over time and relation to non-frontier measures of 
performance (i.e. financial ratios) (Fiorentino et aI., 2006). However, it should be noted 
that the scores obtained from SF A accounted for the differences between banks by 
including control and environmental variables, whereas that is not the case for DEA 
scores 
6.5.1 Comparable Means 
Table 6.9 reports a number of distributional characteristics of the cost and profit 
" 
efficiency scores generated by SFA and DEA. The table shows that the means of the 
SFA cost efficiency scores and of the DEA are close. The standard deviation of DEA 
scores is more than that of SF A. This already suggests that failure to control for 
systematic difference (i.e. random error) yields fundamentally different scores between 
the two methods. In terms of skewness (denotes that observations are not spread 
symmetrically around a mean value), the DEA scores give more negative skewness 
since the DEA is more sensitive to measUrement errors and outliers (Coelli et al., 2005). 
One common issue with DEA analysis is that the results can be very sensitive to outliers 
and measurement error since there is no random error embedded in calculation of DEA 
scores (Wanger et al., 2003). With regard to profit efficiency scores, Table 6.9 shows 
that the mean efficiency scores from the two SF A models (i.e. standard profit and 
alternative profit) averaged about 0.82, while the mean efficiency scores averaged about 
0.74 across the two DEA models. The average of standard deviation from the DEA 
models was twice that of SF A models. This suggests again that the DEA scores are 
more sensitive to the outliers because they do not take into account the random error. In 
general both of SF A and DEA produce comparable means. 
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Table 6.9 Descriptive Statistics of Efficienc Scores bv DEA and SF A 
Mean S.D Max Min Skewness 
ost efficiency SF A 0.83 0.09 0.99 0.60 -0.03 
Cost efficien~DEA 0.87 0.13 1.00 0.42 - 0.70 
New cost efficiency D EA 0.83 0.16 1.00 0.37 - 0.51 
Alternative profit efficiency SF A 0.80 0.14 0.97 0.Q3 -1.60 
Standard profit efficiency SF A 0.84 0.13 0.99 0.05 -1.50 
Profit efficiency DEA. 0.73 0.26 1.00 0.01 -0.60 
New profit efficiency DEA 0.75 0.28 1.00 0.01 - 0.70 
6.5.2 The Ranking of Banks 
The second consistency test is the ranking order of banks based on the efficiency scores 
from both SFA and DEA. Bauer et al. (1998) argued that if the different models do not 
rank banks similarly, then policy authorities may not be able to identify which model 
provides a better measure of efficiency scores for banks and therefore can not draw 
proper conclusions based on the estimated efficiency scores. Table 6.1 0 contains 
Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients89 showing how close the rankings of banks 
are among each of the DEA and SFA models. The rank-order correlations are positive, 
high and significant at the 5% level and are on average higher for DEA models. For 
example, the rank correlation between DEA cost efficiency (CE) and DEA new cost 
efficiency (NCE) is about 0.65, which in turn suggests that in most cases the DEA CE 
and the DEA NCE rank banks in the same order. The rank-order correlation between 
DEA CE and SFA CE is about 0.52, while the rank order correlation between DEA 
NCE and SFA CE is about 0.63. This suggests that both DEA and SFA place the banks 
in almost the same ranking. With regard to profit efficiency, the DEA models have high 
rank order correlation coefficients (i.e. 0.63 between DEA PE and DEA NPE). Despite 
the rank-correlations between DEA profit efficiently and SF A efficiency scores not 
being high (i.e. 0.19 between DEA PE and SFA PE), they do stilI rank some banks in 
the same order. 
Having compared the rank order correlation between DEA and SFA models in terms of 
cost scores, such comparisons can be make between cost efficiency and profit efficiency 
scores to see whether cost efficient banks are also profit efficient. The bank ranking 
89 Statistic provides a measure of the association between two or more variables in terms of the rank 
order. It should be noted that this statistic does not measure the linear association between variables 
(Anderson et aI., 1987). 
226 
Chapter 6 Analysis and Discussion 
under the profit efficiency approach differs from the respective cost efficiency ranking 
(i.e. low rank order correlation between cost efficiency and profit efficiency scores). For 
example the rank order correlation coefficient between DEA CE and SFA APE is low 
(i.e. 0.14). This suggests that it is not necessary for the bank to be profit efficient if it is 
to be cost efficient. Delis et al. (2009) found that most cost efficient banks in Greece are 
not the most profit efficient. Berger and Mester (1997) showed that profit efficiency 
may not be positively correlated with cost efficiency, suggesting that the measure of 
profit efficiency may include output features reflecting higher quality or greater market 
power in pricing. The difference in bank order under profit efficiency and cost 
efficiency could relate to the attitudes of management towards optimisation objectives 
and risks. Some banks may be concerned with controlling costs and others with revenue 
generation. Finally, it worth noting that despite the DEA and SFA methodologies' being 
based on different assumptions, they can rank some banks similarly. 
6 S kO del' Table .10 spearman Ran - r er orre atlOn between DEA and SFA Scores 
DEACE DEANCE SFACE DEAPE DEANPE 'SFAAPE SFA SPE 
DEACE 1.00 
DEANCE 0.65* 1.00 
SFACE 0.52* 0.43* 1.00 
DEAPE 0.63* 0.53* 0.35* 1.00 
DEANPE 0.43* 0.43* 0.33- 0.63- 1.00 
SFAAPE 0.14* 0.26* 0.07 0.19* 0.31 - LOO 
SFA SPE 0.21* 0.13* 0.24- 0.19* 0.21 * 0.37* 1.00 
* Correlation coefficient statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
6.5.3 Best and Worst Performing Banks 
Even if the different models do not always rank the banks similarly, they may still be 
useful for regulatory purposes if they are consistent in identifying the best and worst 
performing banks. To define these, we follow the Spong et al. (1995) and Bauer et al. 
(1998) method by ranking banks from the best efficient to the worst and then dividing 
the observations into four quartiles. The first quartile will represent the best efficient 
banks and the fourth quartile the worst efficient banks. 
Table 6.11 shows the correspondence of the best and the worst performing banks using 
the cost efficiency scores and Table 6.12 shows the best and the worst performing using 
the profit efficiency scores. The upper triangle of the matrix in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 
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reports for each pair of frontier efficiency techniques the proportion of banks identified 
by one model as having efficiency scores in the top 25% also identified by the other 
model. Each number in the upper triangle of Tables 6.11 and 6.12 is the proportion of 
banks identified by one model as having efficiency scores in the best efficient 25% of 
banks also identified in the best efficient 25% by the other model. For example, of the 
banks identified in the top 25% by DEA CE, 34% were also identified as being in the 
top 25% by SFA CE. In general, there is good consistency among the DEA models and 
between the DEA and the SFA models. Within the DEA models, the correspondence of 
the best practice 25% of banks in cost efficiency is about 64% and for profit efficiency 
about 59%. The correspondence of the best and worst practice between DEA models 
and SF A models is accepted. For the cost efficiency, the correspondence of the best 
practice 25% of banks was 34% between DEA CE and SFA CE, while the 
correspondence of the worst practice 25% of banks was 59% between DEA CE and 
SFACE. 
Table 6.11 Best and Worst Performin Banks Based on Cost Efficienc 
DEA CE DEA NeE SF A CE 
DEACE 
'" 
F 1 0.64 0.34 
DEA NCE 0.58 , . 0.37 
SFACE 0.59 0.45 
Notes: 
I. Upper right triangle denotes top 25% performers. 
2. Lower left triangle denotes bottom 25% performers. 
3. DEA CE refers to DEA cost efficiency, DEA NCE to DEA new cost efficiency, SF A CE to SFA cost 
efficiency. 
Table 6.12 Best and Worst Performing Banks Based on Profit Efficienc 
DEAPE DEANPE SFAAPE SFASPE 
DEAPE :5j 0.59 0.33 0.44 
DEANPE 0.67 
( ------
0.52 0.41 
SFAAPE 0.42 0.50 0.45 
SFA SPE 0.32 0.32 0.52 
Notes: 
1. Upper right triangle denotes top 25% performers. 
2. Lower left triangle denotes bottom 25% performers. 
3. DEA PE refers to DEA profit efficiency, DEA NPE to DEA new profit effiCiency, SFA APE to SFA 
alternative profit efficiency, SF A SPE to SF A standard profit efficiency. 
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6.5.4 Stability over Time 
Bauer et al. (1998) argued that it is important for regulatory policy that the measures of 
efficiency scores should demonstrate a reasonable stability over time and not vary 
markedly from one year to the next. It is unlikely that a very efficient bank in one year 
would become very inefficient in the next90• Table 6.13 shows the year-to-year stability 
of DEA and SF A efficiency scores over time (1993-2006). 
The numbers in each column are the rank order correlations between each pair of 
successive years. Thus, each number in column 1 depicts Spearman rank order 
correlations between years 1993 and 1994 and in column 2 between years 1994 and 
1995, and so on for all columns. 
Table 6.13 Stabilit of Efficiency S cores 1993-2006 b Paired Successive Years 
I' 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
SFACE 0.69 0.71 0.85 0.92 0.69 0.75 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.92 0.94 0.85 0.76 
SFASPE 0.58 0.73 0.76 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.68 0.45 0.39 0.34 0.50 -0.12 
SFAAPE 0.72 0.50 0.46 0.44 0.65 0.55 0.64 0.47 0.31 0.06 0.52 0.35 
DEACE 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.87 0.40 0.58 0.89 0.63 0.89 0.93 0.86 0.81 
DEANCE 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.82 0.66 0.91 0.76 0.65 0.69 0.83 0.78 0.51 
DEAPE 0.73 0.81 0.71 0.81 0.40 0.68 0.78 0.71 0.59 0.8 0.69 0.78 
DEANPE 0.70 0.64 0.55 0.81 0.72 0.65 0.49 0.82 0.40 0.85 0.44 0.44 
.. CorrelatIon coefficIents statIstIcally slgmficantly dIfferent from zero at the 5% level except numbers m 
bold 
-0.05 
0.64 
0.86 
0.63 
0.86 
0.69 
* I~ 1993-1994, 2 ~ 1994-1995, 3 ~ 1995-1996, 4 ~ 1996-1997, 5 = 1997-1998,6 = 1998-1999, 7 ~ 
1999-2000, 8 ~ 2000-2001, 9 = 2001-2002, 10 = 2002-2003, 11 = 2003-2004, 12 = 2004-2005, 13 = 
2005-2006. 
SF A CE refers to SF A cost efficiency, SF A SPE to SF A standard profit efficiency, SF A APE to SF A 
alternative profit efficiency, DEA CE to DEA cost efficiency, DEA NCE to DEA new cost efficiency,. 
DEA PE refers to DEA profit efficiency, DEA NPE to DEA new profit efficiency. 
From Table 6.13 we can note the following. First, the efficiency ranking order for SF A 
CE, DEA CE, and DEA NE is more stable over time, but all models show a slight 
change. For example for SFA CE most of the banks efficiency scores remain stable over 
the period 1993-2006. That is the efficient banks continue to be efficient over the year 
1993-2006. Since market conditions and competition have changed over 1993-2006 in 
the Jordanian banking market, relative changes of efficiency rankings over time are 
90 Based on the assumption that all banks are working in a stable market, but in some cases and as result 
of external or internal shocks, some banks may be efficient in one year will change dramatically to 
inefficient in the next year. In Jordan, many internal and external shocks happened during the study 
period (see Chapter 4). 
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reasonable. Second, the period of study is long (i.e. 14 years) and in the long term may 
reflect different degrees of technical change (Fiorentino et aI., 2006) across the various 
banking groups. Some banks may be more successful in adopting new technologies than 
others, which in turn could improve their level of cost efficiency over time. In addition, 
between 1993-2006 many banks were subjected to re-structuring such as merging with 
other banks or re-structuring oftheir operations. These changes could have an impact on 
these banks in their efficiency scores becoming worse or improving over time (e.g. one 
Jordanian bank (National Bank) was an efficient bank between 1993-1997, and then 
changed markedly to an inefficient bank after 1997 as a result of its merger with another 
bank). 
Third, the rank order for SFA profit efficiency (i.e. APE and SPE) shows some stability 
between 1993-1997 but post 1998 the order becomes unstable and inconsistent. This 
supports our previous findings that as a result of the deregulation measures taken after 
1997, the Jordanian banks became more subject to high risks (i.e. credit risks), which in 
turn reduced the banks' profit efficiency. However, the scores for DEA profit efficiency 
show a more consistent ranking than those for SF A profit efficiency which can be 
interpreted in the light of DEA scores' not accounting for the differences between banks 
in terms of risk and quality of outputs (CoeIIi et al., 2005). 
To sum up, rank order between DEA and SFA cost efficiency scores over time is fairly 
high and statistically significant, while the rank order for profit efficiency scores, 
especially SF A, is unstable and non-consistent. This could reflect that the deregulation 
measures taken over the period 1996-2002 have negative impacts on the efficiency of 
some banks. 
6.5.5 Consistency with Performance Indicators Based on Financial Ratios 
The last consistency test is to compare efficiency scores from DEA and SF A with 
financial ratio performance indicators. These indicators are commonly used by 
regulators and are based on accounting information rather than on microeconomic 
theory (Fiorentino et aI., 2006). The most commonly used ratios for measuring bank 
performance are: ROA (return on average assets); ROE (return on average equities); 
CIR91 (cost income ratio); S/A92 (staff expenses over total assets) and TCITR93 (total 
91 Smaller CIR indicates greater cost saving. 
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costs to total revenue) (for more details on these measures see Chapter 4). These 
financial performance ratios are usually used by both managers and consultants to 
generally assess their performance and rank themselves against their peers within an 
industry (Bauer et aI., 1998). Berger and Humphrey (1991) stated that a perfect 
correlation is not expected between frontier and financial ratios measures as the latter 
are based on accounting ratios and do not consider input prices and the output mix. 
Table 6.14 shows the correlations between cost efficiency scores generated by DEA and 
SF A and the financial ratios performance measures. 
The results in Table 6.14 suggest that neither DEA nor SFA efficiency measures are 
highly correlated with the financial ratios performance measures. The low correlation 
between frontier scores and the financial ratios performance measures is in line with 
those reported by Bauer et al. (1998), Koetter (2006) and Fiorentino et al. (2006) and 
confirm that frontier measures contain additional information (i.e. prices and product 
mixes) compared to the financial performance measures. Table 6.14 indicates that the 
consistency between the frontier cost efficiencies and the financial cost-related 
measures (i.e. CIR, SI A and TC/TR) is substantially higher compared to the relationship 
with the financial profit measures (i.e. ROA and ROE). However, the DEA efficiency 
scores are generally more consistent with the financial performance measures than SF A 
efficiency scores. For example, the correlation between eIR and DEA CE is negative 
( 030) d th· . d· t th t 
- an IS III Ica es a as ong as th CIRd e t ffi . ecreases cos e IClency Illcreases. 
Table 6.14 Cost Efficiency Scores Correlations with Financial Ratio Performance Measures 
DEACE DEANCE SFACE 
Cost income ratio (CIR) -0.30* -0.28* -0.189* 
ROA 0.18* 0.17* 0.11 
ROE 0.18* 0.17* 0.26-
S/A (operating expenses). -0.41* -0.45- -0.20-
TCITR -0.19' -0.22' -0.10 
'Correlation coefficient statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
Notes. ROA: return on average assets, ROE: return on average equities, CIR: cost income ratio, S/A: 
staff expenses over total assets and TC/TR: total costs to total revenue. 
In the case of the profit indicators, (Table 6.15), the expected positive sign between the 
efficiency scores and the profitability financial ratio indicators (ROA and ROE) is 
always obtained. Thus, the most profit-efficient banking firms are also the m ost 
92 Smaller SI A indicates greater cost saving. 
93 Smaller TC/TR indicates greater cost saving. 
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profitable. It is important to emphasise that the correlations are higher with the DEA 
profit efficiency scores and the financial profit indicators. As in cost efficiency 
measures, the correlations between frontier efficiency measures and financial 
performance measures are not high. However, the DEA PE and DEA NPE are more 
correlated with non-frontier measures. 
T hI 615 P fit Effi . s a e ro I lClency. cOres C If 'th F' . IR . P £ I d' t orre a Ions Wl manC13 alIo er ormance n lea ors 
DEAPE DEANPE SFAAPE SFASPE 
Cost income ratio (eIR) -0.35* -0.53* -0.22* -0.22* 
ROA 0.21' 0048' 0.18* 0.22* 
ROE 0.13* 0040* 0.22* 0.27* 
S/A (operating expenses). -0.42' -0.43' -0.31* -0.13* 
TC/TR -0.28* -0.48' -0.24* -0.20* 
*CorrelatlOn coefficient statIstIcally slgmficantly dIfferent from zero at the 5% level 
Notes. ROA: return on average assets, ROE: return on average equities, CIR: cost income ratio, S/A: 
staff expenses over total assets and TCITR: total costs to total revenue. 
Despite the low level of correlation between the frontier measures and financial ratios 
performance measures, all measures are consistent in terms of direction. For example, a 
low level of financial cost-related measures is accompanied with a high level of frontier 
cost efficiency scores. This could justify that using of financial ratios as a measure of 
performance by the regulators is still valid to some extent. 
To sum up, apart from the relation of frontier measures and the financial ratios 
performance measures there is a reasonable consistency between the efficiency scores 
generated from the two methodologies (i.e. DEA and SFA) using consistency checks 
(i.e. comparable mean, ranking, identification of the best and worst banks and stability 
over time) as both methodologies: generated almost comparable means; placed the 
banks in the same rank order; identified the best and worst performing banks; and 
provided consistent ranking over time. Thus, this could validate our conclusion 
regarding the impact of deregulation (i.e. testing hypothesis 1) on the efficiency of 
Jordanian banks using SFA and DEA. 
6.6 Main Characteristics of Most and Least Efficient Banks 
For regulatory policy, it is important to determine the main characteristics of the most 
and the least efficient banks in relation to the rating systems used by supervisory 
authorities, such as CAMEL. Moreover, the ownership structure, specialisation and 
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bank size could be related to most and least efficient banks. This section will analyse 
cost and profit efficiency measures of the most and the least efficient banks in relation 
to the CAMEL rating system, ownership structure, specialisation and bank size. 
6.6.1 CAMEL Rating System 
CAMEL is a rating system followed by most of the supervisory authorities around the 
world. The rating is based on five factors represented by the acronym CAMEL, where C 
denotes capital adequacy, A asset quality, M management, E earnings and L liquidity. 
Bank supervisory authorities rate each bank on a scale of 1 (strong) to 5 (unsatisfactory) 
for each factor and the composite CAMEL rating also ranges from 1 (basically sound in 
every respect) to 5 (extremely highly unsatisfactory or near-term probability of failure) 
(De Young, 1998). The assigned scores are used by supervisory authorities to decide the 
level of supervision they should assign to each bank and to identify banks in need of 
attention. The assigned ratings on each factor (i.e. capital, asset quality, management, 
liquidity and earning) are the result of both off-site monitoring, which uses monthly 
financial statement information to get specific ratios, and an on-site examination, from 
which bank supervisors gather further qualitative data about the compliance of bank 
management with the regulations and the existence of the proper corporate governance 
and written policies and procedures within a banIe Despite the regulatory authority'S 
using some financial ratios to quantify the CAMEL rating, researchers have identified 
neither a precise financial variable corresponding to each CAMEL component nor a 
unique set of variables for the overall CAMEL rating (Gasbarro et al., 2002). The 
following are the indicators most commonly used by the CBJ to give scores for each 
CAMEL component. 
Capital adequacy: Capital to risk weighted asset ratio according to the Basel I Accord, 
(1988) is the most popular ratio used as a measure of the quality of capital adequacy. 
Banks with a high capital adequacy ratio usually get a high CAMEL rating. 
Asset quality: One of the most commonly used indicators for asset quality is non-
performing loans to total loans (Ansari, 2006). Banks with higher levels of non-
performing assets will result in lower asset quality ratings and a correspondingly lower 
CAMEL rating (Gasbarro et al., 2002). 
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Management: In the CAMEL rating system, management quality is treated as the most 
qualitative aspect and is subjectively assigned by supervisors based on their judgement 
of bank management systems, compliance and prudential practices (Gasbarro et aI., 
2002). However, there are some financial indicators used to evaluate a bank's 
management such as cost-income-ratio (CIR) and operating expenses per employee (i.e. 
salaries divided by the number of employees) (Ansari, 2006). Banks with a high 
percentage of these ratios usually receive a low CAMEL rating. 
Liquidity: The most common indicators used are the liquid assets to total assets and 
deposit mix (customers' deposits to total deposits). The former measures the volume of 
liquid assets the bank keeps in its balance sheet and the latter measures the dependency 
of the bank on inter-bank loans. The dependency of banks on purchased funds is an 
indicator for the regulatory authority that banks may be facing a liquidity problem94• A 
high level of liquid assets and less dependency on purchased funds result in high 
liquidity quality and a correspondingly higher CAMEL rating. 
Earning: The most commonly-used ratios for measuring banks' performance are ROA 
and ROE and earning assets95 (Tian and Zeitun, 2007). Banks with high ratios relating 
to ROA and ROE usually receive a high rating. 
To define the least and most efficient banks and relate that to the CAMEL rating system, 
this research follow the Spong et al. (1995) method by ranking banks from the most 
efficient to the least, and then dividing them into four quartiles. The first quartile will 
represent the most efficient banks and the fourth quartile will represent the least 
efficient. This approach enables one to analyse the difference between the most and the 
least efficient banks and to identify the properties determining bank efficiency in 
Jordanian banks. Table 6.16 reports some CAMEL indicators of the most and the least 
efficient banks. As Table 6.16 suggests, there is a consistency between most of the 
CAMEL indicators and the cost and the profit efficiency scores. On average, cost 
efficiency for the most efficient banks was 0.95, while for the least efficient it was 0.70. 
In profit efficiency, the most efficient banks have an average efficiency score of 0.93, 
94 Banks relying on purchased funds pay high interest rates compared with the interest rate paid to 
depositors. Continuous reliance on purchased funds could be seen as an inability of the banks to attract 
cbeap customers' deposits. 
9S Earning assets represent all assets that can generate income such as loans and investments. 
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while the least efficient have an average of only 0.58. Table 6.16 suggests that the most 
efficient and the least efficient banks have the same level of capital adequacy ratio. This 
is consistent with our results in the specification of the preferred cost and profit model 
(Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3) because the capital adequacy ratio did not make a significance 
difference and was not included in the preferred model. This is also consistent with 
Gasbarro et al. (2002) who found an insignificant relationship between capital adequacy 
ratio and CAMEL rating. With regard to asset quality, Table 6.16 confirms that the 
most efficient banks have a lower level of non-performing loans, while the least 
efficient banks have a higher level. Thus, the CAMEL indicator regarding asset quality 
is consistent with measured efficiency scores. This is consistent with our results in the 
specification of the preferred cost and profit models that suggest the asset quality has an 
impact on the specification of banks' cost and profit frontiers. 
Management has a vital role in controlling bank costs and generating profit. The CIR, 
defined as non-interest expenses divided by the sum of net interest and non-interest 
income, is used as a measure of the ability of management to control operating costs 
(Forster and Shafer, 2005). Table 6.16 suggests that the most cost/profit efficient banks 
have a lower ratio of CIR and lower operating expenses compared to those for less 
efficient banks. With regard to earning, the table shows a consistency between the 
efficiency scores and the CAMEL indicators. The most efficient banks have higher 
earning ratios than the least efficient. Maintaining sufficient liquidity is necessary to 
meet banks' obligations and the table suggests that the most cost efficient banks are 
more liquid than the least cost efficient bank. Also, it suggests that the most efficient 
banks are less dependent on purchased funds than the least efficient banks. Finally, the 
above analysis could have a good implication for the CBJ by adopting efficiency scores 
for Jordanian banks as a tool that supports the CBJ decision scores derived from the 
CAMEL rating system96• 
96 To ensure there are differences between the most and the least efficient banks in terms of the CAMEL 
indicators a t-test is made and refers to there being no difference between the most and the least efficient 
banks in terms of the capital adequacy ratio, ROA and earning assets, whereas there are differences 
between the most efficient and the least efficient banks in term of non-performing loans, operating 
expenses per employee, ROE, cost-income ratio and liquidity measures. 
235 
Chapter 6 Analysis and Discussion 
Table 6 16 CAMEL Indicators for Most and Least Efficient Banks 
Cost Efficiency Profit Efficiency 
Most Least 
CAMEL Indicators Efficient Efficient 
Capital Adequacy 
" 
Capital to risk weighted assets'. 0.Q9 0.10 
Asset quality 
Non-performing loans to total loans 0.08 0.15 
Management 
Cost-Income-Ratio (CIRi 0.76 0.80 
Operating expenses per employee' om 0.03 
Earning 
ROA4 om om 
ROE' 0.16 0.05 
Earning assets' 0.86 0.85 
Liquidity 
Cash and deposits at banks to total assets 0.52 0.39 
Deposit Mix 7 0.91 0.85 
Notes: 
'Equity to risk weighted assets. 
'Non-interest expenses97/ (non-interest income + net interest income") 
'Employees' expenses to number of employees. 
4Net profit to average assets. 
'Net profit to average equity. 
Most 
Efficient 
0.10 
0.11 
0.63 
0.02 
0.02 
0.16 
0.86 
0.45 
0.86 
'Performing loans plus investments plus deposits with banks bearing interest to total assets. 
7 Customers' deposits to total deposits. 
6.6.2 Ownership Structure 
Least 
Efficient 
0.097 
0.14 
0.96 
0.Q2 
om 
0.03 
0.85 
0.45 
0.84 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are two types of banks m Jordan according to 
ownership structure: foreign and domestic. The analysing of the banks' efficiency 
scores according to this structure could give the regulatory authority useful information 
about best and worst management practice with respect to the foreign and local 
ownership (Spong et aL, 1995). As reported earlier (see Table 6.1), the ownership 
structure has an impact on the inefficiency of banks (i.e. the dummy variable assigned 
for foreign banks is negative and significant, which means that foreign banks are less 
inefficient than domestic banks). Figure 6.5 and Table 6.17 show that over the years 
1993-2006, foreign banks are more cost efficient than local banks. The average cost 
efficiency score for foreign banks is 0.88, while the average cost efficiency score for 
domestic banks is 0.80. 
97 Non-interest expenses include salaries, technology, buildings, supplies and administrative expenses. 
98 Net interest income equals interest income less interest expenses. 
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These results are consistent with studies in developing countries99 that find foreign 
banks are more cost efficient than domestic banks (e.g. Bhattacharyya et al. 1997, Hao 
et al. 2001, Hasan and Marton, 2003, Isik and Hassan , 2002 and 2003, Harvylchyk, 
2006, Kraft et al. 2006). The superior cost efficiency of foreign banks can be attributed 
to inter alia their better technology, management structure and home government 
support (Isik and Hassan, 2003}. 
The theory of comparative advantage, as discussed in detail in Mahajan et al. (1996), 
advocates that foreign banks may possess relative comparative advantages stemming 
from different operating strategies, differences in organisation structures and support 
from home management. Levine (1996) and Goldberg (2003) argued that foreign banks 
coming in from more industrialised countries with well established technologies may 
help foreign banks to operate more efficiently than domestic banks. Stiglitz (1994) 
argues that foreign banks are less sensitive to the government pressures to finance 
specific proj ects that may not be profitable, whereas domestic banks are more sensitive 
to such government pressure. For example, the domestic banks in Jordan are subjected 
to some kind of intervention from the government to charmel investment funds to 
selected sectors (e.g. tourism, military housing finance at low interest rates). Moreover, 
the culture in Jordan is one heavily reliant on ties and relationships (i.e. services are 
obtained quickly according to the degree of influence one has among staff). For 
example, a decision on the lending of loans is influenced by the close relationship! 
family ties between the lender and the manager. However, such relationships/ways of 
doing business have led to problems of non-performing loans in domestic banks. The 
foreign banks in Jordan are less subject to this kind of business, which in turn could be 
viewed as a factor that enhances the cost efficiency of foreign banks. This finding could 
enhance the CBJ decision on allowing foreigners to own more that 50 per cent of 
Jordanian local banks. 
99 It should be noted that the literature on developed countries shows that the local banks are more 
efficient than foreign banks (e.g. Hasan and Hunter, 1996; Mabajan et aI., 1996; Chang et aI., 1998; De 
Young and Nolle, 1996; Berger et aI., 2000; Sathye, 2001). According to these studies, foreign banks in 
developed countries finance their operations by depending on the purchasing of funds, which are more 
expensive than core deposits (lsik and Hassan, 2003). 
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Figure 6.5 Cost Efficiency of Domestic and Foreign banks 
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Table 6.17 Cost Efficiencv of Domeslic and Foreil!n Banks. 
Year Domestic Banks Foreign Bank 
1993 0.84 0.9 
1994 0.86 0.88 
1995 0.85 0.91 
1996 0.85 0.91 
1997 0.85 0.89 
1998 0.82 0.91 
1999 0.79 0.91 
2000 0.78 0.87 
2001 0.80 0.9 
2002 0.80 0.88 
2003 0.75 0.81 
2004 0.75 0.83 
2005 0.77 0.82 
2006 0.75 0.84 
Average 0.80 0.88 
The difference in efficiency scores between foreign and domestic banks can be captured 
through profit efficiency. Table 6.18 indicates that the average profit efficiency for 
domestic and foreign banks over 1993-2006 is about 0.80. It should be noted there is no 
gap between the efficiency scores for domestic and foreign banks compared to the gap 
in cost efficiency scores between them. This is consistent with what we have reported 
earlier, that the dummy variable assigned for foreign bank (see Table 6.3) is negative 
but not significant. This suggests that there is no difference between foreign and 
domestic banks in terms of profit efficiency and that foreign banks in Jordan are more 
concerned with cost efficiency than profit efficiency. This conclusion could be valid to 
some extent since foreign banks, according to their policies, do not extend credit and 
advances to some risky sectors, such as loans for trading in stocks and securities. 
Moreover, all foreign banks from developed countries are prohibited from investing in 
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stocks and securities. These restrictions could have negative impacts on foreign banks' 
profit efficiency. Furthermore, some foreign banks (e.g. HSBC, City Bank and Standard 
Chartered) apply their own credit scoring to grant loans to Jordanian clients. Since the 
data base for a credit bureau in Jordan is not well developed, applications for loans are 
often refused by foreign banks. This result is consistent with Yildirim et al. (2007) and 
Cadet (2008) who find that foreign banks in transition countries and Tahiti are more 
cost efficient but are not better than domestic banks in terms of profit efficiency. This 
could be attributed to foreign banks' being more conservative in granting loans, which 
in turn reduces their revenue and profits. 
Figure 6.6 shows the trend of the alternative profit efficiency for domestic and foreign 
banks over the period 1993-2006. The graph suggests that both domestic and foreign 
banks follow the same trend, which means that market conditions in Jordan affected 
both foreign and domestic banks equally (see Chapter 4). 
Figure 6.6 Profit Efficiency of Domestic and Foreign Banks 
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Table 6.18 Profit Efficiencv orOomestic and Foreien Ban ks 
Year Domestic Banks Foreim Banks 
1993 0.82 0.82 
1994 0.84 0.83 
1995 0.83 0.81 
1996 0.83 0.82 
1997 0.83 0.87 
1998 0.80 0.86 
1999 0.70 0.80 
2000 0.79 0.64 
2001 0.82 0.86 
2002 0.82 0.92 
2003 0.85 0.90 
2004 0.85 0.85 
2005 0.81 0.75 
2006 0.64 0.54 
Avera.e 0.80 0.80 
6.6.3 Specialisation 
The Jordanian banking system is made up of commercial banks, Islamic banks and 
investment banks (see Chapter 4 for details). Analysing the performance of each type of 
bank is important to see which type performs better. Figure 6.7 and Table 6.19 report 
the cost efficiency scores for the three types of bank operating in Jordan. Table 6.19 
suggests that the Islamic banks are less cost efficient than commercial and investment 
banks. The average cost efficiency scores for commercial banks, investment banks and 
Islamic banks are 0.84, 0.80 and 0.79, respectively. This is consistent with (see Table 
6.1) the dummy variable assigned to Islamic banks being positive and significant; this 
indicates that the cost inefficiency has increased within the Islamic banks. This finding 
is consistent with Kamaruddin et al. (2008) and Hassan (2005) who reported that 
Islamic banks are less cost efficient. Hassan (2005) also reported that Islamic banks 
operate in regulatory environments which are not supportive of their operation (this 
applies to Jordan, as there are no special regulations for Islamic banks). Hassan et al. 
(2003) found that Islamic banks operating in countries (e.g. Iran and Sudan) where the 
entire banking system is under Islamic Shariah (i.e. law) are more efficient than those in 
countries without special regulations for Islamic banks (e.g. Jordan). Moreover, the 
Islamic banks produce distinctive services and different product mixes requiring a more 
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intense input use and more specialised stafflOO• In addition, there only two Islamic banks 
in Jordan and this leads to the Islamic banks having some market power in a country 
where more than 90% of its population is Muslim and they prefer to deal with Islamic 
banks. This market power enables Islamic banks to charge prices in excess of 
competitive levels and the managers may then take part of the benefits of the higher 
prices in the form of a quiet life (see Berger and Hannan, 1998), in which they do not 
work as hard to keep costs under control. 
Figure 6.7 Cost Efficiency of Specialised Banks 
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Table 6.19 Cost Efficiency of Specialised Banks 
Year Commercial Investment Islamic Year Commercial Investment Islamic 
1993 0.87 0.82 0.79 2002 0.83 0.80 0.82 
1994 0.86 0.87 0.80 2003 0.77 0.77 0,79 
1995 0,88 0,84 0.82 2004 0,79 0.77 0,78 
1996 0.88 0,81 0,86 2005 0,80 0,79 0,75 
1997 0.87 0.83 0.85 2006 0.80 0.77 0.79 
1998 0.86 0.83 0.84 Average 0.84 0,80 0.79 
1999 0,86 0.78 0.75 
2000 0.85 0.76 0,66 
2001 0.86 0.78 0.78 
With regard to profit efficiency, Figure 6.8 and Table 6.20 suggest that Islamic banks 
are more profit efficient than commercial and investment banks. The average profit 
efficiency for Islamic banks is 0.90 compared to 0.79 and 0.80 for commercial and 
investment banks, respectively. The results are consistent with Hassan (2005) who 
reports that Islamic banks are more profit efficient the than other kinds of bank. The 
superiority ofIslamic banks in profit efficiency can be attributed to the following: 
100 Islamic banks in Jordan do not grant mDney directly to the customer but finance what the client wants 
to purchase. For example, if the client wants to buy a car, the bank has to send an employee to check it 
and the car should be registered first in the name of the bank, which then seUs it to the client. This process 
is accompanied with costs that do not exist in commercial and investment banks. 
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1. The Islamic banks in Jordan, as mentioned earlier, may be exercise market power by 
pricing their products and services more than other banks, because there are just two 
Islamic banks in Jordan. 
2. The Islamic banks do not deal with risky assets such as derivatives and deal only with 
real assets, which in turn suggest that the Islamic banks are not facing the same risks as 
the other types of banks. Moreover, Islamic banking does not deal in debt trading and 
distances itself from market speculation that takes place in commercial and investment 
banking (AI-Hamzani, 2009). 
3. The ratio of non-performing loans to loans for Islamic banks in Jordan on average 
does not exceed 5% over the period 1993-2006, whereas this ratio for commercial and 
investment banks exceeds 15%. This gives an indication that the Islamic banks are less 
susceptible to the asset quality problem, which in turn enhances their profit efficiency. 
These results could be realistic in the light that the Islamic banks across the world are 
less affected by the global financial crisis (AI-Harnzani, 2009). 
Figure 6.S Profit Efficiency of Specialised Bank 
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Table 6.20 Profit Efficiency of Specialised Banks 
Year Conunercial Investment Islamic 
1993 0.83 0.78 0.95 
1994 0.85 0.76 0.94 
1995 0.84 0.75 0.94 
1996 0.83 0.81 0.90 
1997 0.84 0.8 0.92 
1998 0.82 0.81 0.91 
1999 0.68 0.82 0.96 
2000 0.69 0.81 0.93 
2001 0.83 0.81 0.92 
2002 0.84 0.91 0.94 
2003 0.88 0.75 0.94 
2004 0.85 0.85 0.85 
2005 0.77 0.87 0.78 
2006 0.58 0.63 0.67 
Average 0.79 0.8 0.90 
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6.6.4 Bank Size 
As shown earlier, the literature on the banking industry suggests that large banks enjoy 
several advantages compared to small banks. These include their ability to use more 
technology with less cost and their ability to exploit economies of scale and scope (Casu 
and Girardone, 2006). An analysis of the efficiency scores based on bank size could 
give the regulatory authority useful information regarding the relationship between bank 
size and efficiency (scores). Table 6.21 reports the cost efficiency scores based on 
different bank sizes lO1 • In general, it suggests that the largest banks have the highest cost 
efficiency scores', e.g., the average cost efficiency score for banks with assets size more 
than 1000 MJOD is about 0.90, whereas the average of the cost efficiency scores for 
banks with assets size less than 500 MJOD is about 0.82. 
As reported earlier (see Table 6.1), the asset size has an impact on the inefficiency of 
banks (i.e. the variable assigned for asset size is negative and significant, which means 
the big banks are less cost inefficient than small banks). This result is consistent with 
many studies that found a positive relationship between cost efficiency and bank size 
(e.g. Berger et aI., 1993; Miller and Noulas, 1996; Altunbas et aI., 2001; AI-Jarrah and 
Molyneux, 2003; Isik et aI., 2004). This result also supports the view of some authors 
who advocate that large banks might have a more professional management team and/or 
might be more cost conscious due to greater pressure from the owners (Evanoff and 
Israilevich, 1991). This could be valid in the Jordanian banks' case since the majority of 
large bank shareholders are foreigners who place great pressure on the management to 
control costs. In addition, the large banks can use more efficient technology with less 
cost and have the ability to attract more specialised staff (Molyneux and Iqbal, 2005). 
IOl This classification of asset sizes is used from different authors (e.g. Altunbas et aI., 2001). For Jordan, 
CBJ classifies banks according to assets size as: 1-499.9MJOD small banks, 500-999.9 MJOD medium 
banks and more than 1000 MJOD big banks. 
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Table 6.21 Cost Efficiency Scores Accordin!! to Asset Size (MJOD) 
Year 100· 200· 300· 500· 1000· 2500· More Average 
1·99.9 199.9 299.9 499.9 999.9 2499.9 4999.9 than per 
MJOD MJOD MJOD MJOD MJOD MJOD MJOD 5000 Year MJOD 
1993 0.84 0.86 0.83 0 0.84 0.99 0.87 
1994 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.84 1.00 0.87 
1995 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.82 0.93 0.87 
1996 0.86 0.82 0.9 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.97 0.88 
1997 0.83 0.83 0.93 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.99 0.88 
1998 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.8 0.77 0.86 1.00 0.86 
1999 0.84 0.93 0.84 0.78 0.73 0.85 1.00 0.85 
2000 0.81 0.8 0.82 0.86 0.75 0.84 0.97 0.84 
2001 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.86 0.99 0.85 
2002 0.83 0.98 0.81 0.86 0.78 0.78 0.99 0.86 
2003 0.68 0.88 0.75 0.82 0.73 0.72 0.99 0.79 
2004 0.82 0.71 0.92 0.81 0.72 0.71 0.99 0.81 
2005 0.88 0.84 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.80 
2006 0.78 0.84 0.79 0.8 0.75 0.69 0.93 0.80 
Average 0.83 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.94 0.93 
MJOD: MIllIons of JordanIan dmar. 
With regard to profit efficiency, Table 6.22 shows contradictory results compared to the 
cost efficiency scores. The small banks are more profit efficient than large banks. This 
could be interpreted in the light of the big two Jordanian banks which accounted for 
about 40% of the total Jordanian banks' assets, being dominated by foreign shareholders 
and, as reported earlier, foreigners are more concerned with issues of cost rather than 
profit issues. In addition, these two banks have proactive credit policies which prevent 
granting any loan without all the required documents from the clients. Moreover, the 
biggest Jordanian bank (Arab Bank), which has more than 100 branches outside Jordan, . 
faces many problems in the US as a result of granting loans to the largest American 
energy company (Enron) which went into bankruptcy in 2001. This event affected 
negatively the profit of this bank. Furthermore, the large banks in Jordan hold high level 
of liquidity; the average liquidity ratio (cash and deposits at banks to total assets) for the 
large banks is about 60%, while for other banks it is about 44% (CBJ, 2006). An excess 
liquidity in banks has a direct impact on the level of the banks' profits. Usually, liquid 
assets bear zero or Iow interest rates, which in turn will have a negative effect on bank 
profit (Armah and Park, 1998). 
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Table 6.22 Profit Efficiency Scores Accordin~ to Assets Size (MJOD) 
More 
Year 100- 200- 300- 500- 1000- 2500- than Average 
1-99.9 199.9 299.9 499.9 999.9 2499.9 499.9 5000 
MJOD MJOD MJOD MJOD MJOD MJOD MJOD 
1993 0.78 0.83 0.8 0.90 0.84 0.83 
1994 0.77 0.83 0.8 0.80 0.90 0.87 0.85 
1995 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.90 0.90 0.85 
1996 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.70 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.84 
1997 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.85 
1998 0.84 0.87 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.77 0.88 0.82 
1999 0.63 0.88 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.54 0.76 0.70 
2000 0.83 0.83 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.69 0.50 0.74 
2001 0.93 0.68 0.90 0.90 0.80 0.89 0.95 0.85 
2002 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.69 0.89 0.87 
2003 0.96 0.92 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.88 0.88 0.89 
2004 0.89 0.79 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.66 0.81 0.84 
2005 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.74 0.72 0.76 
2006 0.61 0.50 0.50 0.70 0.63 0.49 0.54 0.57 
Average 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.54 
MJOD: M!lhons of JordanIan dmar. 
6.7 Scale Economies and Technological Change 
6.7.1 Scale Economies 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, a measure of economies of scale (SE) is given by the cost 
elasticity by differentiating the cost function with respect to outputs (i.e. Yk). This can be 
measured by the partial derivative of the estimated cost function (i.e. equation 5.27 in 
Chapter 5), with respect to the outputs (i.e. Yk) and can be shown as: 
a TC 3 3 3 2 3 3 
-= ~)k + LLOkm InYm + LLTJ"" In(wn /w 3)+ LSlk lnE a Y k hi k=l m=l n=l k=1 k=l 
3 3 2 
+ LKlkT+ LLffi"lnc, (6.1) 
k=l k=1 r=l 
Given the preferred SFA cost specification reported earlier (see Table 6.1), scale 
economies estimated for the Jordanian banks over the years 1993-2006 are shown in 
Table 6.23. The table shows the economies of scale for the banks according to different 
asset size groups for each year. Table 6.23 suggests that the average scale economies 
between 1993-2006 is about 6% (i.e. 1.06). Also, the table suggests that scale 
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economies are prevalent for all banks with assets size less than 300 MJOD. Typically, 
scale economies for these banks range between 1 % and 27%. Thus a 100% increase in 
the level of all outputs would, on average, lead to about a 99% to 73% increase in total 
costs, respectively. Also, Table 6.22 suggests that banks with assets' size exceeding 300 
MJOD face diseconomies of scale, typically ranging from 2% to 32%. Thus a 100% 
increase in the level of all outputs would, on average, lead to about a 102% to 132% 
increase in total costs, respectively. The optimal bank sizes for the Jordanian banks are 
in the range of 200-500 MJOD. The magnitudes of the scale economies for the 
Jordanian banks are in accordance with previous studies (e.g. Berger et aI., 1993; 
Altunbas et aI., 2001), reporting widespread economies of scale for the smallest banks 
and diseconomies of scale for the largest banks. 
Table 6 23 Scale Economies for Jordanian Banks 1993 2006 
-
Asset Sizes in MJOD 
1- more 
99.9 100- 200- 300- 500- 1000- 2500- than 
199.9 299 499 999 2499 4999 5000 Average 
1993 0.7 0.88 0.99 1.29 1.39 1.05 
1994 0.75 0.89 1.02 0.98 1.29 1.38 1.05 
1995 0.87 0.94 1.04 1.06 1.3 1.34 1.09 
1996 0.89 0.90 1.09 1.07 1.33 1.34 1.46 1.15 
1997 0.71 0.96 1.06 1.06 1.17 1.26 1.44 1.09 
1998 0.74 0.88 0.97 1.04 1.15 1.2 1.2 1.02 
1999 0.68 1.03 0.92 1.05 1.1 1.16 1.41 1.05 
2000 0.65 0.90 0.96 0.93 1.08 1.14 1.35 1.00 
2001 0.63 0.87 0.80 0.93 1.07 1.11 1.21 0.94 
2002 0.66 1.06 0.94 0.93 1.08 1.11 1.23 1.00 
2003 0.77 1.18 0.98 1.01 1.07 1.13 1.27 1.06 
2004 0.61 0.79 1.06 1.02 1.15 1.15 1.29 1.01 
2005 0.84 0.95 1.03 1.07 1.1 1.22 1.29 1.07 
2006 0.99 1.04 1.11 1.19 1.28 1.32 1.32 1.18 
Average 0.73 0.95 0.99 1.02 1.17 1.23 1.32 1.32 1.06 
0 Values m bold statIstIcally slgmficant dIfferent from I at 5 Yo level '"' 
102 In testing for the presence of scale economies, the null hypothesis is Ho: scale economies equal I and 
the alternative hypothesis is HI: scale economies are not equal to I. The testing is done by calculating the 
standard error (se) from the covariance matrix produced from the program Frontier 4.1. After calculating 
the se, we follow traditional hypothesis testing by calculating the value of the test statistic which equals 1-
value of scale economies/standard error. If the value of the test statistic is less than the critical value at the 
5 % level (Le. ± 1.96), we accept the null hypothesis that the value of scale economies equals 1 and if the 
value of the test statistic is more than the critical value at 5% (Le. 1.96) we reject the null hypothesis and 
accept the alternative hypothesis. 
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Analysing trend of the scale economies ofJordanian banks over 1993-2006 as shown by 
Figure 6.9 reveals that through the years 1993-2006, with the exception of the years 
2000, 2001 and 2002, the Jordanian banks on average exhibit diseconomies of scale. 
This may be reflecting that deregulation has made it possible for banks to offer more 
products and services and alter the production process to offer more diverse products as 
a result of the removing of the restrictions on the scope of bank operations (e.g. on 
foreign currency operations; for more detail, see Table 4.3, Chapter 4). 
Figure 6.9 Trend of Scale Economies of Jordanian Banks 1993-2006 
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The results suggest that in order to improve economies of scale efficiency, small banks 
should expand their scale of production, while large banks should concentrate on 
reducing their outputs. However, the CBJ regulations still tie the granting of loans to the 
level of banks' equities (see Table 4.4, Chapter 4) which means that the small banks 
with Iow levels of equities could not reap the benefits of any possible economies of 
scale. Additionally, the CBJ has been persistently trying to consolidate the banking 
industry by offering incentives to smaller banks to merge with others. However, such 
efforts have not been particularly successful, as small Jordanian banks have a strong 
tradition of family ownership and the owners are re1u<;tant to pass control to another 
bank (Isik et aI., 2004). 
It should be noted that Evanoff and Israilevich (1995) saw confusion in the literature 
between two concepts: scale elasticity and scale efficiency. Scale elasticity is an 
elasticity associated with a particular output level and indicates the relative change in 
cost associated with an incremental change from this output level. Scale efficiency 
refers to the percentage the cost ought to change if a bank needs to move to minimum 
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efficient scale103 • Evanoffand Israilevich (1995) show that scale inefficiency (SI) can be 
measured as the percentage of the cost of the banks operating on constant returns to 
scale to the cost of banks operating on economies of scale. Evanoff and Israilevich 
(1995) derived the following equation104 as a direct measure for scale inefficiency: 
SI = e(O.Sls) (1-1'])' -1 (6.2) 
where SI is scale inefficiency, s is the second derivative of equation 6.1 and F the first 
derivative for equation 5.27 (i.e. equation 6.1). Thus, the scale inefficiency is a function 
of the first and the second derivatives of the cost function. 
Table 6.24 reports the scale efficiencies from SFA and DEA (for calculation of scale 
efficiency according to DEA, see Chapter 5). Average scale efficiency for Jordanian 
banks is about 0.97 according to SF A and 0.92 according to DEA. It should be noted 
these results are consistent with the view of Berger et al. (1993) and Berger and 
Hurnphrey (1994, 1997) who indicated that scale inefficiencies are usually found to 
account for less than 5 per cent of banks' cost. Moreover, Berger and Humphrey (1994) 
indicated that the measuring of scale inefficiency in banking is a problematic issue 
because scale economies theoretically apply only to banks operating on the production 
possibility frontier. However, in the literature, scale economies are usually measured 
using data on all banks in the sample. The use of data from banks other than those on 
the frontier could confound scale effects with differences in X-efficiency (Berger et ai., 
1993). 
103Minimum efficient scale can be defmed as the output for a bank in the long run where the internal 
economies of scale have been fully exploited, and correspond to the minimum point of the U-shaped long 
average costs curve (Molyneux et aI., 1996). 
104 For proof of the equation (6.2), see Evanoffand Israilevich (1995). 
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Table 624 S I E ca e ~ J d . 93206 fficlency or or aman Banks 1 9 -  
SFA DEA 
Year Scale Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
1993 0.96 0.95 
1994 0.97 0.95 
1995 0.98 0.95 
1996 0.97 0.94 
1997 0.97 0.92 
1998 0.98 0.94 
1999 0.98 0.93 
2000 0.98 0.92 
2001 0.98 0.92 
2002 0.98 0.92 
2003 0.98 0.89 
2004 0.96 0.90 
2005 0.98 0.90 
2006 0.97 0.86 
Average 0.97 0.92 
6.7.2 Technological Change 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, we have included the time trend (T) in the model to account 
for technological change in the Jordanian banking industry over the period 1993-2006. 
Baltagi and Griffin (1988), Kumbhaker and Lovell (2000) Altunbas et al. (2001) and 
Coelli et al. (2005) show that the technological change can be estimated by calculating 
the variation in total cost due to a given change in technology 105. This can be measured 
by the partial derivative of the estimated SF A cost frontier (i.e. equation 5.27, Chapter 
5), in respect of the time trend, and can be shown as: 
alnTC 3 2 . 
--- = tl +tllT+ LKk InYk + Len In(wn !w3 ) aT k=1 .=1 (6.3) 
The measures of technical progress, which indicate the possible contribution of 
technical advances in reducing average banking costs across time for Jordanian banks 
1993-2006, are reported in Table 6.25. This shows that technological change has made a 
positive contribution across Jordanian banks, reducing the real annual cost of 
production by around 1.3 %. Table 6.25 suggests that the annual rate of reduction in 
total cost attributed to technological change was around 2% in 1993, decreasing to 0.9% 
IOS De Young (I997) stated that the technological change can shift the cost frontier in a number of ways. 
First, adopting the new low-cost technologies such as A TMs to substitute for the existing high-cost 
technology. Second, using the new computer systems that allow the banks to reduce the costs by the 
substitution of the physical capital by labour. Third, deregulation can also provide an opportunity to 
recognise inputs in a lower cost fashion. 
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in year 1997. After year 1997, the technical change increased slightly from 1.1% in 
1998 to 1.7% in year 2004. However, the technological change slightly decreased from 
1.2% in year 2005 to 0.5% in year 2006. These findings seem plausible because the 
banks in Jordan have invested heavily in technology; especially in the year 1997 (banks' 
fixed costs increased that year by approximately 25%). The Jordanian banks started 
computerising all their operations, introduced ATMs, and applied an online system of 
communication. 
T I 6.25 T hi' ICh ab e ec no oglCa . h J d . B k' I d ange m t e or aman an mg, n ustry 19932006 -
Year Technological Change 
1993 -0.020 
1994 -0.018 
1995 -0.014 
1996 -0.011 
1997 -0.009 
1998 -0.011 
1999 -0.012 
2000 -0.012 
2001 -0.015 
2002 -0.015 
2003 -0.015 
2004 -0.017 
2005 -0.012 
2006 -0.005 . 
Average -0.013 
.. 0 ,1V6 Values In bold stabstlcally slgmficantly dIfferent from 0 at 5 Yo level 
By adopting the terminology of Baltagi and Griffin (1988), Atunbas et al. (1999) and 
Kasman and Kirbas (2006), the technological change can be decomposed to: 
1. Pure technical change ('t, +'tllT) , the part related to time in equation 6.3. 
3 
2. Scale augmenting technical change (L Kk In y k)' the part related to outputs in 
k=l 
equation 6.3. 
2 
3. Non-neutral technical change (Le n In(w n !w,», the part related to prices in 
n-' 
equation 6.3. 
Pure technological change accounts for the reduction in total costs over time due to 
technological changes. Scale augmenting technical change accounts for the reduction in 
cost due to efficient scale of production. Finally, non-neutral technical change reflects 
the reduction in total costs due to a variation in input prices. Table 6.26 suggests that the 
106 In testing for the presence oftechnologicaI change, we follow the same procedures as for the scale 
economies. 
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main source for technological change for Jordanian banks over 1993-2006 is due to pure 
technical change. 
Table 6.26 Decomposition of Technoloj!ical Chanj!es 
Pure Scale Non-Neutral 
Year Technological Augmentation Technological Change 
Challge Chan-'le 
1993 -0.018 -0.003 0.002 
1994 -0.018 -0.003 0.003 
1995 -0.017 0.000 0.003 
1996 -0.016 0.002 0.003 
1997 -0.015 0.001 0.005 
1998 -0.014 0.000 0.003 
1999 -0.014 0.000 0.001 
2000 -0.013 -0.001 0.002 
2001 -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 
2002 -0.011 0.000 -0.004 
2003 -0.010 0.001 -0.005 
2004 -0.010 -0.002 -0.005 
2005 -0.009 0.001 -0.004 
2006 -0.008 0.004 0.000 
Average -0.013 0.000 0.000 
Values in bold statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5% level 
6.8 Conclusion 
Total Technological· 
Change 
-0.020 
-0.018 
-0.014 
-0.011 
-0.009 
-0.011 
-0.012 
-0.()l2 
-0.015 
-0.015 
-0.015 
-0.017 
-0.012 
-0.005 
-0.013 
This chapter presented the cost and the profit efficiency scores obtai ned from SF A and 
DEA. Based on the results of preferred models of SFA, the cost efficiency scores 
averaged around 83% between 1993-2006. Given the alternative 
frontiers, the profit efficiency scores averaged 80% and 84%, 
and standard profit 
respectively. The 
shown significant 
cores of Jordanian 
efficiency scores for the cost and the profit efficiency models have 
volatility between 1993-2006. Analysing the trend of the efficiency s 
banks 1993-2006 has shown that the efficiency scores improved sI ightly 1993-1996, . 
2003. Linking the 
scores 1993-2006, 
then worsened markedly 1997-2003 and improved slightly after 
deregulation processes put in place by the CBJ with the efficiency 
we can note that the efficiency scores improved in the period characterised by 
ation processes put 
efficiency scores. 
anks' products and 
ces. This period of 
y, which in turn 
deregulation of the interest rate (i.e. 1993-1996), whereas the deregul 
in place 1997-2001 had a negative impact on the Jordanian banks' 
This period is characterised by deregulation of the scope of b 
services by allowing banks to produce a variety of products and servi 
deregulation led to many Jordanian banks' becoming more risk 
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worsened the efficiency of Jordanian banks. After the year 2003, there was little 
improvement in the Jordanian banks' efficiency as a result of entry of many foreign 
banks into the Jordanian banking market. Based on the results of DEA, the cost and 
profit efficiency scores show almost the same trend of SF A efficiency scores. It could 
be argued that the efficiency scores for the Jordanian banks over the period 1993-1996 
and 2003-2006 are improved slightly as a result of deregulation measures undertaken by 
the CBJ and the measures were put in place between 1997-2002 have markedly negative 
impacts on the efficiency levels of Jordanian banks (hypothesis 1). In general, the 
results indicate profit inefficiencies appear to be greater than cost inefficiencies. Banks 
therefore need to focus more on revenue generation, coupled with appropriate risk 
management practice and more prudential supervision from the CBJ regarding risky 
assets. 
This chapter also presented the testing for research hypotheses 2-9. With respect to the 
ownership structure, we conclude that foreign banks are more cost efficient than 
domestic banks, but are not better than domestic banks in terms of profit efficiency 
(hypothesis 2). This could be attributed to foreign banks' greater concern in controlling 
cost than in generating profit from risky activities. Regarding specialisation, we found 
that Islamic banks are less cost efficient than commercial and investment banks but 
more profit efficient than commercial and investment banks (hypothesis 3). The Islamic 
banks in general produce different products and services needing more resource than 
used by commercial and investment banks. At the same time, Islamic banking in Jordan 
has only two banks, which in turn suggests that Islamic banks have some market power 
by setting their prices above those set by commercial and investment banks. This could 
motivate the CBJ to license new Islamic banks to improve the competition within 
Islamic banks. With respect to bank size, we found that large banks seem to be 
relatively more cost efficient and less profit efficient than small banks (hypothesis 4). 
This suggests that large banks enjoy several advantages in terms of cost efficiency. This 
includes their ability to use more efficient technology with less cost and to use more 
specialised staff. In terms of profit efficiency, it seems that large banks are more 
conservative in dealing with risky assets, which in turn affects their profit efficiency. 
The new banks were found to be more cost and profit efficient than old banks 
(hypothesis 5). Regarding corporate control, the agency problem does not hold in the 
Jordanian banks (hypothesis 6). Regarding market structure, the traditional hypothesis 
of the SCP is not hold, where the efficient hypothesis is hold for the Jordanian banks 
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(hypothesis 7). It found that the volume of non-perfonning loans has a negative impact 
on both of cost and profit of the Jordanian banks (i.e. an increase in the non-perfonning 
loan increases costs and decreases profits) (hypothesis 8). The level of capital adequacy 
has no impact on the level of banks' costs and profits (hypothesis 9). 
This chapter also compared the cost and the profit efficiency scores derived from the 
two different methodologies (i.e. DEA and SFA) using five consistency checks. These 
were: comparable mean; ranking; identification of the best and worst banks; stability 
over time; and the relation to financial ratios perfonnance measures. To some extent, 
there is reasonable consistency between the efficiency scores generated from the two 
methodologies as both models: generated almost comparable means; placed the banks in 
the same rank order; identified the best and the worst perfonning banks; and provided 
consistent stability over time. Regarding the relation of the efficiency scores and 
financial ratios perfonnance measures, there is a low correlation between the frontier 
scores and the financial ratios perfonnance measures. 
This chapter also presented the main characteristics of the most and least efficient banks 
in relation to: the CAMEL rating system; ownership structure; specialisation; and bank 
size. With regard to the CAMEL rating system, the most cost and the profit efficient 
banks also obtained good financial indicators used by the regulatory authorities. 
This chapter also presented scale economies and scale efficiency for Jordanian banks. 
Aligned with the literature, scale efficiency did not exceed 5% in the Jordanian banking 
industry. The results have shown that small banks are facing economies of scale and 
large banks diseconomies of scale. According to the scale economies' results for 
Jordanian banks, the optimal bank size is in the range of200-500 MJOD. 
Finally, this chapter presented the technological change in Jordanian banks. The results 
show that technical change has made a positive contribution across Jordanian banks, 
reducing the real annual cost of production by about 1.3 %. 
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7.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings 
This thesis seeks to investigate the efficiency of Jordanian banks in the context of the 
banking sector deregulation policies implemented in Jordan in the early 1990s. Prior to 
the deregulation, the Jordanian banking industry served as an agent of the government 
and channelled investment funds to selected sectors under the country's economic 
development policy. Moreover, the CBJ implemented a direct management control 
system to determine the size, cost and direction of credit facilities and the structure of 
the financial portfolio of the banks. However, by the end of 1989 the Jordanian 
economy faced a major crisis when the Jordanian Dinar (JOD) suffered a major 
devaluation (i.e. the 100 lost 51 % of its value against the US Dollar), total government 
debt reached 197 per cent of GDP and the country's reserves of foreign currency 
declined sharply (Isik et ai., 2004). Consequently the banking sector suffered from 
problems such as an increase in the ratio of non-performing loans and this subsequently 
led to serious consequences for the banking industry and the collapse of many Jordanian 
Banks (e.g. Petra Bank, Islamic National Bank, Amman Bank) (AI-Jarrah, 2002). 
Therefore, following criticism of the government policies the Jordanian government 
started to co-operate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB) in the early 1990s, in order to develop and liberalise its banking system. Jordan 
thus witnessed a series of financial reforms and deregulation measures including 
removing the ceiling in interest rates, freeing foreign exchange controls, allowing non-
Jordanians to own more than 50% of Jordanian bank stocks, decreasing the entry 
restrictions on foreign banks, lowering banks' required reserve ratio and giving banks' 
management great autonomy in deciding the product mix of their banks. The main aims 
of the CBJ in liberalising the banking system were to promote its soundness, efficiency 
and competition, through measures such as improving resource' allocation and allowing 
banks to have more operating options: the government and CBJ hoped that profitability, 
lower intermediation costs and enhanced customer service would be achieved by the 
banking sector as a direct result of such liberalisation. The emphasis on the deregulation 
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of the banking sector in Jordan is due to the banking sectors pivotal role in the economy 
by facilitating transactions, mobilising savings and allocating capital across time and 
space. 
The main objective of this thesis was to examine whether the efficiency of banks has 
improved as a result of the deregulation. Moreover, the thesis aimed to test many 
conceptual issues (e.g. the level of risk taken by banks, ownership structure, 
specialisation, corporate control and market conditions) and their impact on banks' 
efficiency. 
This research used a parametric approach (SF A) and a data set comprising all the 
Jordanian banks, covering the period 1993-2006. Three distinct economic efficiency 
concepts (cost, standard profit and alternative profit) were used to measure efficiency 
for Jordanian banks. In this research, one-stage analysis was used by introducing 
directly into the model variables that account for internal bank-specific characteristics 
(e.g. risks, ownership structure, age of bank, size of banks, corporate control) and 
market conditions (e.g. the level of concentration). This approach allows estimating 
efficiency scores that take into account differences between banks and capturing the 
factors that could explain variations in the efficiency of banks in Jordan. In the 
specification of the cost and the profit frontiers, various contemporary methodologies 
were followed that use a variety of hypothesis testing to arrive at the preferred model 
specification(s). Based on the preferred cost/profit model(s), the efficiency scores for 
Jordanian banks were estimated. In order tD test the consistency of the efficiency 
estimates derived from the parametric approach (SFA), this research alsD used a 
nonparametric approach, (DEA), to measure efficiency scores for the banks. Despite 
major differences in the underlying assumptions of parametric and nonparametric 
methDdDlogies, there was reasonable consistency between the efficiency scores 
generated from the two approaches. For example, both generated almost comparable 
means; placed the banks in the same rank order; identified the same best and worst 
performing banks; and provided a consistent ranking for each bank over time. 
With regard tD the main aim of this study which was to examine whether the efficiency 
of banks has improved as a result of the deregulation, this thesis found that substantial 
cost and profit inefficiencies existed in Jordanian banks. The average cost inefficiency 
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of the Jordanian banks during 1993-2006 was around 17% (for both parametric and 
nonparametric approaches), whereas the average profit inefficiency was around 20% for 
the parametric approach and 25% for the nonparametric approach. Therefore, Jordanian 
banks could produce the same level of outputs with approximately a 17% saving in 
costs and a 25% increase in profits. Additionally, the results indicated that the profit 
inefficiencies appear to be even greater than the cost inefficiencies. Therefore, given 
these results banks might be best advised to focus more on revenue generation with 
sensible levels of risks and be subject to more prudential supervision from the CBJ 
regarding risky assets. 
This research finds that the average efficiency scores for Jordanian banks have fallen 
over the period 1993-2006. For example, referring to the results in Chapter 6, we find 
that the average level of cost efficiency fell from 86% (SF A) and 84% (DEA) in 1993 to 
around 79% (SFA) and 77% (DEA) in 2006. Regarding profit efficiency, the average 
efficiency scores fell from 82% (SFA) and 84% (DEA) in 1993 to around 59% (SFA) 
and 77% (DEA) in 2006. 
Linking the deregulation process put in place by the CBJ with the efficiency scores 
between 1993-2006, we can note that the efficiency scores improved in the period 
characterised by deregulation of the interest rate (i.e. 1993-1996) by about 1% (for SFA 
cost efficiency) and about 2% (for SF A profit efficiency). 
However, the deregulation process put in place 1997-2001 had negative impacts on 
Jordanian banks' efficiency scores. The SFA cost efficiency scores fell on average by 
8%, where the SF A profit efficiency scores fell by about 10%. This period is 
characterised by deregulation of the scope of banks' products and services by allowing 
banks to produce a variety of them. This stage of deregulation led to many Jordanian 
banks' becoming more riskier, which in turn worsened the efficiency scores of 
Jordanian banks. The prudential regulations at this period operating within the CBJ 
were possibly not adequate to cope with the attitude of banks towards expanding their 
operation with risky assets, which in turn led Jordanian banks to become subject to an 
increasing level of risks. This led to raising the percentage of non-performing loans 
from 20% in 1996 to an average of35%, 1998-2000. 
However, after 2003, there was little improvement in the Jordanian banks' level of 
efficiency as a result of: (i) the entry of many foreign banks into the Jordanian banking 
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market and (ii) the CB] worked from the year 2001 to strengthen its regulation on 
corporate governance and the issues relating to risk management (e.g. adopting Basel II). 
Referring to additional research questions (Chapter 1, p.4) and the hypotheses outlined 
in Chapters 4 and 5 this research also found: 
The level of capital adequacy ratio has no impact on the level of banks' costs 
(profits). Moreover, the most efficient banks have a lower level of non-
performing loans, while the least efficient banks have a higher level. 
Foreign banks are more cost efficient than domestic banks. Based on profit 
efficiency, there is no significant difference between foreign and domestic banks. 
Islamic banks are less cost efficient' than commercial and investment banks, 
although they are more profit efficient than commercial and investment banks. 
Large banks seems to be relatively more cost efficient, but in term of profit 
efficiency small banks show the greatest level of efficiency. 
New banks seem to be relatively more cost and profit efficient compared to old 
banks. Possibly because the old banks may suffer from bureaucracy and clumsy 
formal organisation, whilst newly-established banks employ the most efficient 
technology available. 
The agency problem does not hold in the Jordanian banking market because 
most of the banks are closely knit, where owners are strongly involved in 
management. 
Concentration does not increase cost inefficiency, whereas market share 
decreased the cost and profit inefficiency. 
This research found that there is a high correlation between efficiency scores generated 
from SF A and the CAMEL rating system indicators used by the CBJ. The most cost and 
profit efficient banks obtained good financial indicators used by the CBJ in relation to 
CAMEL rating system. For example, most efficient banks have: a low level of non-
performing loans, a lower cost-income-ratio, lower operating expenses, a higher 
liquidity ratio and less dependence on purchased funds, higher ROE and ROA ratios. 
There is low correlation between cost and profit efficiency scores. This suggests that 
banks with low cost efficiency tend to have high profit efficiency that offsets it. 
Moreover, the difference in the rank order of banks under profit efficiency and cost 
efficiency could relate to the attitudes of management towards optimisation objectives 
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and risks. Some banks may be concerned with controlling costs and others revenue 
generation. 
7.2 Policy Implications 
In the light of the main aim of this research, which was to investigate the impact of 
deregulation on the level of efficiency of the Jordanian banks, it could be argued that in 
general the deregulation implemented did not have a noticeable impact on the 
improvement in banking sector efficiency, especially over the period 1997-2002. The 
implication for government policy is that the conventional wisdom which holds that 
deregulation always improves efficiency may be incorrect. Industry conditions prior to 
deregulation and the existence of adequate prudential regulation and supervisory 
procedures from the CBJ are also crucial for the success of such deregulation measures. 
Therefore, before introducing any deregulation measures, the CBJ should ensure that it 
has adequate prudential regulations that can prevent banks from engaging in risky 
activities coupled with appropriate risk management practices within banks. 
Another policy implication from this study is that the entry of three new banks to the 
Jordanian market enhanced the level of competition in the Jordanian banking sector. 
Possibly regulators should encourage more competition amongst banks as a source of 
ongoing efficiency and innovation within the banking market. Moreover, as there are 
only two Islamic banks in Jordan and these banks are suffering substantial cost 
inefficiencies, this might encourage the CB] to increase the number of Islamic banks to 
improve competition within Islamic banks sector. 
In addition to measuring inefficiency levels, this research also sought to identifY the 
sources and causes of inefficiency. In this respect the results suggest that the main 
characteristics of inefficient banks include high level of non-performing loans, high 
cost-income-ratio, dependency on purchasing funds and low liquidity ratio. This finding 
could help the CB] to design appropriate policies to improve the performance of 
inefficient banks. 
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A final but very important conclusion in light of the high correlation between the 
efficiency scores generated from the frontier approaches and the CAMEL rating system 
used by the CBJ, this could have a good implication for the CBJ for adopting efficiency 
scores for Jordanian banks as a tool that supports the CBJ decision on rating banks 
according to the CAMEL system. 
7.3 Limitations of this Research and Future Research 
This research used the parametric approach (SFA) as the main methodology and the 
nonparametric approach (DEA) to check for consistency of efficiency scores generated 
from SFA. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, inefficiency is not observable and one 
can never be sure to get the correct values. Moreover, inefficiency estimates can vary 
quite strongly depending on the model specification. Therefore, any benchmarking 
analysis should not be based purely on one method but a combination of different 
techniques should be used to set standards. For example, in addition to SFA and DEA 
future research in this area might want to consider, despite any shortcoming, additional 
approaches such as DFA and TFA. 
Despite the growth of off-balance sheet activities in Jordanian banks as an important 
source of income, especially after 2000, this research does not include off-balance sheet 
items (as outputs) because suitable data are not available for the years 1993-1998. 
Additionally, an area of research deserving attention concerns efficiency comparisons 
among different countries. It might be interesting therefore to carry out similar 
efficiency research over all Arabian countries, (as per Europe), to compare banking 
sector efficiency scores across different Arabian regions. However, a lack of data on 
various Arabic banking countries may make this impractical. 
Finally, an interesting area for future research is the estimation of cost and profit 
efficiency scores for the Jordanian banks after 2007 to see to what extent the global 
financial crises has affected (positively or negatively) the level of Jordanian banks' 
efficiency. 
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Appendices 
AJlp_endix 6.1 Cost Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks (SFA) 1993-2006 
Bank Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 . 2006 Bank SD 
Average 
ABC 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.85 0.79 0.73 0.74 0.67 0.70 0.83 0.09 
Amman Bank 0.81 0.77 0.82 
-
0.80 0.02 
Arab Bank 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.99 1.00 LOO 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.02 
Arab Egyptian Bank 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.72 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.05 
Arab Investment Bank 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.67 0.83 0.80 0.72 0.68 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.05 
Arabic Islamic Bank 0.94 0.88 0.72 0.85 0.89 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.06 
Andi 0.85 0.82 0.89 0.85 0.04 
Business Bank 0.84 0.87 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.02 
Cairo Amman Bank 0.83 0.91 0.99 0.88 0.89 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.83 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.64 0.80 0.10 
City Bank 0.85 0.82 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.88 0.97 0.98 0.88 0.92 0.83 0.93 0.91 0.05 
Export Bank 0.86 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.93 0.89 0.76 0.89 0.06 
Housing Bank 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.80 0.72 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.81 0.09 
HSBC 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.03 
Jordan Bank 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.86 0.85 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.70 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.05 
Jordan Bank for Investment and Finance 0.82 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.80 0.87 0.07 
Jordan Gulf Bank 0.74 0.68 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.71 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.74 0.73 0.06 
Jordan Islamic Bank 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.73 0.62 0.60 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.08 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.81 0.81 0.95 0.86 0.88 0.04 
Kuwait National 0.77 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.06 
Lebanon 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.94 0.08 
National Bank 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.76 0.04 
Philadelphia Bank 0.80 0.99 0.80 0.75 0.78 0.90 0.74 0.66 0.66 0.79 0.11 
Societe General 0.97 0.92 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.79 0.94 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.83 0.09 
Standard Charter 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.86 0.89 0.93 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.9\ 0.89 0.06 
Union Bank 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.03 
Average per year 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.8\ 0.84 0.83 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.83 
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Appendix 6.2 Alternative Profit Efficienc Scores for Jordanian Banks (SF A 1993-2006 
Bank Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Bank SD 
. Avera~ 
ABC 0.92 0.90 0.78 0.81 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.65 0.85 0.07 
Amman Bank 0.75 0.66 0.73 0.71 0.05 
Arab Bank 0.84 0.87 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.76 0.49 0.95 0.89 0.88 0.81 0.90 0.54 0.83 0.14 
Arab EgYPtian Bank 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.86 0.82 0.89 0.79 0.84 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.84 0.78 0040 0.80 0.13 
Arab Investment Bank 0.85 0.82 0.84 0.89 0.84 0.93 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.88 0.87 0.71 0.50 0.85 0.12 
Arabic Islamic Bank 0.89 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.69 0.71 0.57 0.11 
Audi 0.63 0.53 0042 0.53 0.10 
Business Bank 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.83 0.89 0.06 
Cairo Amman Bank . 0.65 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.72 0.75 0.59 0.85 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.83 0.81 0.10 
City Bank 0.91 0.93 0.78 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.58 0.38 0.83 0.16 
Export Bank 0.92 0.85 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.74 0.61 0.83 0.10 
Housing Bank 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.77 0.54 0.69 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.78 0.53 0.49 0.78 0.16 
HSBC 0.73 0.69 0.88 0.68 0.88 0.93 0.72 0.53 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.76 0.81 0.13 
Jordan Bank 0.74 0.87 0.84 0.70 0.82 0.77 0.68 0.80 0.96 0.85 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.69 0.82 0.09 
Jordan Bank for Investment and Finance 0.91 0.89 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.75 0.84 0.92 0.91 0.84 0.62 0.71 0.96 0.54 0.81 0.12 
Jordan Gulf Bank 0.73 0.90 0.88 0.82 0.65 0.67 0.63 0.84 0.80 0.44 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.48 0.75 0.16 
Jordan Islamic Bank 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.78 0.87 0.64 0.89 0.D9 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.68 0.69 0.73 0.85 0.83 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.09 
Kuwait National 0.88 0.76 0.68 0.77 0.10 
Lebanon 0.85 0.81 0.61 0.16 0.13 
National Bank 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.82 0.76 0.58 0.03 0.43 0.54 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.48 0.38 0.56 0.23 
Philadelphia Bank 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.76 0.71 0.70 0.64 0.49 0.67 0.08 
Societe General 0.82 0.85 0.90 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.56 0.83 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.94 0.80 0.62 0.85 0.12 
Standard Chartered 0.91 0.83 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.76 0.22 0.67 0.96 0.90 0.92 0.74 0.47 0.78 0.20 
Union Bank 0.73 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.73 0.90 0.94 0.75 0.96 0.95 0.85 0.83 0.09 
Average per year 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.73 0.74 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.78 0.59 0.80 
284 
Appendix 6.3 Standard Profit Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks SFAl1993-2006 
Bank Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Bank S.D 
Average 
ABC 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.86 0.82 0.93 0.88 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.04 
Amman Bank 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.03 
Arab Bank 0.88 0.90 0.94 1.00 0.83 0.70 Q.60 0.61 0.99 0.89 0.86 0.99 0.93 0.79 0.85 0.13 
Arab Egyptian Bank 0.97 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.96 0.84 0.84 0.99 0.94 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.89 0.05 
Arab Investment Bank 0.77 0.75 0.66 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.04 
Arabic Islamic Bank \.00 0.59 0.62 0.51 0.88 0.86 0.81 0.63 0.85 0.75 0.16 
Audi 0.77 0.75 0.92 0.81 0.D9 
Business Bank 0.88 0.96 0.87 0.69 0.85 0.11 
Cairo Amman Bank 0.75 0.79 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.78 0.80 0.62 0.76 0.87 0.80 0.93 0.78 0.83 0.D9 
City Bank 0.87 0.73 0.84 0.92 0.98 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.92 \.00 0.99 0.91 0.87 0.74 0.90 0.08 
Export Bank 0.90 0.91 0.97 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.94 0.73 0.87 0.92 0.08 
Housing Bank 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.92 0.71 0.88 0.92 0.86 0.85 0.96 0.67 0.76 0.88 0.10 
HSBC 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.98 0.99 0.73 0.88 0.86 0.77 0.82 0.99 0.57 0.81 0.12 
Jordan Bank 0.70 0.77 0.79 0.84 0.70 0.79 0.76 0.93 0.96 0.85 0.89 0.99 0.93 1.00 0.85 0.10 
Jordan Bank for Investment and Finance 0.93 0.96 0.86 0.94 0.96 0.86 0.94 0.99 0.89 0.77 0.65 0.79 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.10 
Jordan Gulf Bank 0.78 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.98 0.78 0.89 0.98 0.86 0.54 0.93 0.81 0.67 0.98 0.84 0.12 
Jordan Islamic Bank 0.75 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.87 0.85 0.78 0.80 0.69 0.85 0.79 0.66 0.99 0.74 0.83 0.11 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.99 0.88 0.94 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.78 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.06 
Kuwait National 0.88 0.73 0.71 0.77 0.09 
Lebanon LOO 0.82 0.99 0.94 0.10 
National Bank 0.79 0.68 0.70 0.77 0.7l 0.73 0.05 0.63 0.61 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.96 0.72 0.64 0.18 
Philadelphia Bank 0.75 0.78 0.85 0.83 0.9l 0.99 0.62 0.84 0.69 0.81 0.11 
Societe General 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.91 LOO 0.69 0.96 0.93 0.76 1.00 0.94 0.81 0.94 0.89 0.09 
Standard Chartered 0.96 0.85 0.81 0.88 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.37 0.85 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.88 0.16 
Union Bank 0.74 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.67 0.93 0.69 0.86 0.92 0.86 0.87 1.00 0.76 0.95 0.84 0.10 
Average Qeryear 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.84 
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Appendix 6.4 Cost Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks (DEA~ 1993-2006 
Bank Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Bank SD 
Average 
ABC 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.79 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.83 0.80 0.79 0.69 0.74 0.73 0.82 0.83 0.09 
Amman Bank 0.66 0.54 0.67 0.46 0.58 0.10 
Arab Bank 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 . 0.99 0.00 
Arab Egyptian Bank 0.94 0.82 0.82 0.72 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.94 0.93 ·0.99 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.97 0.86 0.08 
Arab Investment Bank 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.84 0.84 1.00 0.81 0.91 0.83 0.88 0.78 0.73 0.76 0.86 0.83 0.D7 
Arabic Islamic Bank 1.00 0.62 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.84 0.90 0.15 
Audi 0.42 0.63 0.77 0.60 0.18 
Business Bank 0.96 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.10 
Cairo Amman Bank 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.70 0.66 0.70 ij./Z 0.83 0.12 
City Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 LOO 1.00 0.00 
Export Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.00 
Housing Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.01 
HSBC 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.80 1.00 0.83 0.79 0.85 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.77 0.71 0.64 0.82 0.11 
Jordan Bank 0.83 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.76 0.82 0.70 0.79 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.61 0.60 0.72 0.73 0.08 
Jordan Bank for Investment and Finance 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Jordan Gulf Bank 0.68 0.82 0.90 0.73 0.80 0.79 0.67 0.86 0.96 0.72 0.64 0.45 0.62 0.77 0.74 0.13 
Jordan Islamic Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.84 0.15 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.87 1.00 0.80 0.86 0.95 0.85 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.99 0.98 0.92 0.07 
Kuwait National 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Lebanon 0.56 1.00 0.93 0.83 0.23 
National Bank 0.99 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.79 0.78 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.71 0.83 0.10 
Philadelphia Bank 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.58 0.90 0.66 0.55 0.61 0.80 0.73 0.13 
Societe General 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.88 0.88 0.65 0.67 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.73 0.62 0.67 0.81 0.80 0.12 
Standard Chartered 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.82 0.88 0.84 0.87 0.77 0.89 0.08 
Union Bank 0.89 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.73 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.11 
Average per year 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.87 0.93 0.88 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.87 
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Appendix 6.5 New Cost Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks fDEA 1993-2006 
Bank Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Bank S.D 
Average 
ABC 0.80 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.68 0.67 0.60 0.65 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.07 
Amman Bank 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.01 
Arab Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.00 om 
Arab Egyptian Bank 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.65 0.59 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.69 0.66 0.51 0.51 0.99 1).72 0.71 0.13 
Arab Investment Bank 0.79 0.72 0.84 0.88 0.96 0.85 0.84 0.96 0.88 LOO 0.93 0.67 0.74 0.75 0.84 0.10 
Arabic Islamic Bank 0.93 0.93 0.72 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.09 
Audi 0.98 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.24 
Business Bank 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 
Cairo Amman Bank 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.84 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.57 0.65 0.57 0.74 0.16 
City Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.77 0.92 1.00 0.96 0.08 
Export Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.77 0.88 0.61 0.90 0.14 
Housing Bank 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
HSBC 0.99 0.76 0.80 0.77 0.70 0.77 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.63 0.79 0.08 
Jordan Bank 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.89 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.79 0.64 0.58 0.67 0.64 0.80 0.68 0.74 0.09 
Jordan Bank for Investment and Finance 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.93 0.83 0.89 0.91 0.96 0.06 
Jordan Gulf Bank 0.46 0.68 0.73 0.63 0.54 0.64 0.63 0.88 0.85 0.38 0.37 0.54 0.87 0.62 0.63 0.17 
Jordan Islamic Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.55 0.80 0.85 0.93 0.13 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.70 0.74 0.87 0.78 0.95 0.81 0.79 0.89 0.61 0.54 0.62 0.67 1.00 0.83 0.77 0.13 
Kuwait National 1.00 1.00 LOO LOO 0.00 
Lebanon 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.88 0.21 
National Bank 0.86 0.81 0.88 0.99 0.93 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.61 0.65 0.55 0.68 0.63 0.69 0.76 0.13 
Philadelphia Bank 0.81 0.70 0.58 0.51 0.72 0.74 0.58 0.53 0.66 0.65 0.10 
Societe General 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.78 0.83 0.58 0.60 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.88 0.63 0.74 0.12 
Standard Chartered 0.84 0.82 0.99 1.00 0.85 0.99 0.97 0.75 0.68 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.83 0.90 0.11 
Union Bank 0.85 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.62 0.73 0.78 0.88 1.00 0.83 0.84 0.12 
Average per year 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.87 0.77 
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Appendix 6.6 Profit Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks (DEA) 1993-2006 
Bank Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Bank s.n 
Average 
ABC 0.56 0.71 0.44 0.56 0.76 0.52 0.45 0.75 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.11 
Amman Bank 0.29 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.14 
Arab Bank 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.75 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.08 
Arab Egyptian Bank 0.49 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.63 0.35 0.43 0.73 0.54 1.00 0.44 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.24 
Arab Investment Bank 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.53 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.69 0.65 0.79 0.22 
Arabic Islamic Bank 1.00 0.73 0.64 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.76 0.90 0.14 
Audi 0.30 0.28 0.43 0.33 0.08 
Business Bank 0.60 0.63 1.00 0.47 0.68 0.23 
Cairo Amman Bank 0.35 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.56 0.41 0.37 0.58 0.53 0.45 0.52 0.61 0.73 0.60 0.58 0.21 
City Bank \.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 \.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Export Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 
Housing Bank 1.00 0.88 0.63 0.61 0.94 0.95 0.70 0.95 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.89 0.14 
HSBC 0.73 0.74 0.60 0.60 0.76 0.44 0.35 0.73 0.63 0.83 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.62 0.13 
Jordan Bank 0.48 0.26 0.37 0.37 0040 0.33 0.36 0.46 0.43 0.60 0042 0045 0.53 0.63 0.44 0.10 
Jordan Bank for Investment and 
Finance 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Jordan Gulf Bank 0.01 0.25 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.13 0.39 0.71 0.93 0.11 0.10 0.32 0.64 0.54 0.36 0.26 
Jordan Islamic Bank 0.72 0.95 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.32 0040 0.62 0.70 0.48 0.81 0.38 0.54 0.53 0.64 0.20 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.41 0.63 0.38 0.49 0.84 0.62 0.52 0.84 0.72 0.91 0.76 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.21 
Kuwait National 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Lebanon 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.97 0.04 
National Bank 0.59 0.61 0.53 0.63 0.59 0.68 0.D3 0.67 0.67 0.16 0.04 0.31 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.23 
Philadelphia Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.64 0.58 0.67 0.78 0.30 
Societe General 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.14 
Standard Chartered 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.83 0.68 0.53 0.76 0.64 1.00 0.82 0.84 1.00 0.92 0.82 0.16 
Union Bank 0.58 0.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.22 0.47 0.73 0.62 0.68 0.54 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.26 
Aver~r y.ear 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.80 0.61 0.61 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.74 0.83 0.80 
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Appendix 6.7 New Profit Efficiency Scores for Jordanian Banks (DEA) 1993·2006 
Bank Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Bank S.D 
Average 
ABC 0.58 0.69 1.00 0.75 0.72 0.44 0.43 0.71 0.66 0.69 0.83 1.00 LOO 0.65 0.73 0.18 
Amman Bank 0.29 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.14 
Arab Bank 0.76 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.06 
Arab Eg)'lltian Bank 0.53 0.54 0.50 0.66 1.00 0.37 0.41 0.66 0.22 LOO 1.00 0.24 0.28 0.06 0.53 0.30 
Arab Investment Bank 1.00 0.73 0.64 0.81 0.66 1.00 0.88 0.65 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.51 0.42 0.43 0.74 0.22 
Arabic Islamic Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.18 
Audi . 0.26 0.20 0.29 0.25 0.05 
Business Bank 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.24 0.71 0.36 
Cairo Amman Bank 0.27 0.30 0.45 0.62 0.68 0.36 0.38 0.61 0.45 0.45 0.66 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.57 0.24 
City Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Export Bank . 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.01 
Housing Bank 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.95 0.08 
HSBC 1.00 0.95 0.89 0.95 0.89 0.41 0.31 0.88 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.22 
Jordan Bank 1.00 0.31 0.43 0.67 0.52 0.32 0.39 0.82 1.00 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.89 0.72 0.63 0.23 
Jordan Bank for Investment and 
Finance 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Jordan Gulf Bank OM 0.24 0.40 0.39 0.31 0.11 0.33 0.63 0.60 0.11 0.20 0040 1.00 0.49 0.37 0.26 
Jordan Islamic Bank 0.58 1.00 0.72 0.89 0.85 0.69 0.42 0.75 0.98 0.48 0.37 0.21 0.92 0.49 0.67 0.25 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.43 0.54 0.40 0.69 0.70 0.50 0.51 0.90 0.76 0.91 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.23 
Kuwait National 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Lebanon 1.00 0.81 0.43 0.75 0.29 
National Bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.70 0.30 0.02 0.66 0.81 0.16 0.03 0.24 1.00 0.53 0.60 0.38 
Philadelphia Bank 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.56 0.64 0.08 0.57 0.54 0.67 0.65 0.27 
Societe General 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.70 0.90 0.17 
Standard Charter 0.62 0.83 0.69 1.00 0.95 0.57 0.45 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.19 
Union Bank 0.60 0.44 1.00 0.30 0.02 0.23 1.00 0.61 0.45 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.34 
Average per year 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.60 0.62 0.81 0.8! 0.78 0.82 0.73 0.88 0.76 
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